Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Avinash Kumar Dhilan vs State Of Rajasthan on 27 March, 2025
[2025:RJ-JD:13304]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1011/2024
Avinash Kumar Dhilan S/o Shri Harphool Singh Dhilan, Aged
About 28 Years, R/o Village Kishanpura, Post Shishu, Tehsil
Dantaramgarh, District Sikar, Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Its Principal Secretary,
Department Of School Education (Elementary),
Secretariat, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
2. The Director, Elementary Education Rajasthan, Bikaner,
Rajasthan.
3. District Education Officer (Appointment), Elementary And
Secondary Education Rajasthan, Bikaner, Rajasthan.
4. District Education Officer (Headquarter), Elementary
Education, Chittorgarh, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Keshav Bhati.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. B.L. Bhati, AAG with
Mr. Sandeep Soni.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA
Judgment
Reserved on : 06/03/2025
Pronounced on : 27/03/2025
1. Acquitted of all charges qua offences allegedly committed by
petitioner when he was a young boy of 19 years, he is before this
Court assailing an order dated 02.01.2024 (Annex.7), vide which,
his candidature for the post of Teacher Gr.III, was rejected by the
respondents on the ground that his antecedents were not found
satisfactory, as he was involved in multiple criminal cases
registered under Sections 147, 323, 332, 336, 341, 353, 427, 504
& 34 of IPC.
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2. Brief facts of the case first. Petitioner is a Graduate having
Degree in Science and thereafter enrolled in B.Ed course in year
2014. The requisite educational qualification for the purpose of
appearing in the REET examination for Level-II was Graduation
Degree and B.Ed. The petitioner took the Rajasthan Eligibility
Examination for Teachers -2022 (REET) examination and qualified
the same with 84% marks in the Level-II for the subjects of
Science/Maths.
2.1. Respondent No.2 issued an Advertisement dated 16.12.2022
(Annex.1) for the post of Teacher Grade-III Level-II (Subject
Science/Maths). Total 5,678 posts were advertised for the Non-
TSP area and 1,030 posts were meant for TSP area. As per the
advertisement, the last date of filling up the application forms was
19.01.2023. Petitioner being eligible submitted his online
application form. Written examination/MCQ for recruitment to the
said post was conducted on 25.02.2023, wherein the petitioner
secured 193.4677 marks. Thereafter, a provisional select list dated
07.06.2023 (Annex.4) was issued and petitioner was declared
successful for the purpose of document verification.
2.2. Petitioner participated in the document verification process
and got his documents verified. Respondents issued an office
order dated 23.09.2023 whereby a list of shortlisted candidates
was published for the purpose of making recommendation to for
appointments. Petitioner’s name was in merit list dated
23.09.2023 (Annex.5). Thereafter, the respondent department
issued an order dated 26.09.2023 (Annex.6), whereby the
shortlisted candidates were allotted the districts as per their merit
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and preference. Name of the petitioner was mentioned at Sr.
No.2561 and he was allotted District Chittorgarh.
2.3. The petitioner was called for the counseling and upon
completion of the same he was allotted Government Upper
Primary School, Kalyanpura, Mungana, Tehsil Kapasan, District
Chittorgarh for taking the charge as Teacher Grade-III, Level-II.
However, the respondents did not allow the petitioner to join the
services at the aforesaid place. Upon enquiring, the petitioner
came to know that the Police Verification Report of the petitioner
WAS found negative. A clarification was sought from the
Directorate, Bikaner. Thereafter, respondent District Education
Officer issued impugned order dated 02.01.2024 (Annex.7) stating
therein that the petitioner is having criminal antecedents,
therefore, in pursuance of the circular dated 04.12.2019, he is not
eligible for appointment. His candidature was thus cancelled.
Petitioner submitted his representations (Annex.10 collectively)
mentioning all the facts and circumstances. But the same have not
been considered by the respondents till date. Hence this petition.
3. The relevant stand taken by the respondents in their reply is
as below:-
3.1. It is not in dispute that the petitioner secured 193.4677
marks in the examination concerned, got selected, and was
allotted a school in the Chittorgarh district, as mentioned in the
writ petition itself. However, four criminal cases were registered
against the petitioner. All the allegations levelled in the criminal
cases against the petitioner are very grievous in nature. It is is
settled law that mere disclosure of the alleged offences and the
result of the trial is not sufficient, and the employer cannot be
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[2025:RJ-JD:13304] (4 of 18) [CW-1011/2024]compelled to give appointment to any such candidate, also during
probation, if the department finds that the services of any
employee are not in the interest of public welfare. The employer
has the right to cancel the appointment of that candidate on the
basis of character based on the report. The petitioner cannot claim
that facts of acquittal and disclosure of these facts may be
considered. These facts have already been taken into
consideration by the respondents. Thus in light of the circular and
settled propositions of law, the committee, after considering the
past criminal cases of the petitioner, came to the cognizant
conclusion, as per the minutes of the committee dated
22.12.2023, that the petitioner is not found fit for appointment.
Therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
4. During pendency of the writ petition, vide order dated
02.05.2024 passed by this very Bench, an interim protection was
granted to the petitioner by keeping one post vacant, which reads
as under:
“Issue notice. Returnable on 06.08.2024.
Liberty is granted to serve through the nominated counsel.
In the meanwhile, it is expected of the respondents that
since the petitioner has been acquitted in the offence, under
which he was being tried at the relevant time by a competent
criminal court, his case would be considered on the
administrative side in the light of judgment rendered by this
Court in Patram v. State of Rajasthan & ors.: S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No.18747/2019, decided on 30.01.2024. Pendency of
the instant proceedings shall not be construed as any
impediment. It is also borne out that it is not a case of any
misrepresentation or concealment on the part of petitioner as
he had duly disclosed about the pending criminal case to the
respondents.
Meanwhile, the post in question, on which, the petitioner
has been selected, shall not be filled up.”
5. Before proceeding further, first and foremost let us see the
past cases, which is the reason of non-suiting the petitioner. As
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per the police verification report of the petitioner, there were four
criminal cases registered against the petitioner.
(i) The summary of the FIRs is mentioned below-
Sr. No. Police Station FIR Number Sections Stage of Trial
& Dated
1 Kotwali District 371/2015 147 & 427 IPC Acquitted
Sikar 06.07.2015
2 Kotwali District 587/2015 332, 353 & 504 Acquitted
Sikar 30.09.2015 IPC
3 Kotwali District 664/2015 341, 323 & 336 Acquitted
Sikar 06.11.2015 IPC
4 Kotwali District 325/2021 323, 341 & 34 Acquitted
Sikar 12.07.2021 IPC
(ii) Details of the above cases are as under:-
“(1) On a written complaint filed by one Milan Bharti, an FIR
bearing no.371/2015 was registered against the petitioner
and nine other persons under sections 147 and 427 of Indian
Penal Code. All the witnesses turned hostile and on the basis
of compromise submitted by the complainant, the petitioner
was acquitted by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sikar vide
its order dated 07.04.2022 from all the charges.
(2) Another FIR bearing no.664/2015 was registered in
pursuance of a written complaint filed by Ashish Kulhari
against the petitioner and 1 other person under section 341,
323 and 336 of Indian Penal Code. Petitioner is an innocent
person who had been intentionally framed by the
complainant. That the complaint was filed on false and
frivolous facts therefore the complainant has submitted a
compromise and on the basis of the same, the petitioner was
acquitted by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sikar vide its
order dated 28.03.2023 from all the charges.
(3) Third FIR bearing no.587/2015 was registered in
pursuance of a written complaint filed by Dr. G.S. Kalwaniya
against the petitioner and 1 other person under section 332,
353 and 504 of Indian Penal Code. The complaint was filed(Downloaded on 11/04/2025 at 10:33:23 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:13304] (6 of 18) [CW-1011/2024]on false and frivolous facts therefore, all the witnesses
turned hostile and in absence of any evidence, the petitioner
was acquitted by the learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Sikar vide its order dated 04.05.2023 from all the
charges.
(4) Fourth FIR bearing no.325/2021 was registered in
pursuance of a written complaint against the petitioner and 1
other person under section 341, 323 and 34 of Indian Penal
Code. That the petitioner is an innocent person who had
been intentionally framed by the complainant. That the
complaint was filed on false and frivolous facts therefore the
complainant has submitted compromise and on the basis of
the same, the petitioner was acquitted by the learned Judicial
Members of Lok Adalat vide its order dated 11.09.2021 from
all the charges.
6. In the aforesaid backdrop, I have heard the rival contentions
and have perused the case file.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Rule 256 of the
Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996. Rule, ibid, deals with the
eligibility conditions of a person for the purpose of employment
and contends that from the bare perusal thereof it is clear that the
rule does not make the petitioner ineligible for appointment,
unless the incumbent has been convicted for an offence which
involves moral turpitude. Relevant of Rule 256, ibid, is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“256. Person ineligible for employment-
(1) No person shall be employed in permanent, temporary or
part-time capacity in a Panchayati Raj Institution, if he-
(a) is not of good character, or
(b) has been dismissed for misconduct from the service of
any other Panchayati Raj Institution or by any local authority or
of the State or Central Government, or
(c) has been convicted for an offence which involves moral
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(d) is a member of any Panchayati Raj Institution or any
municipality, or
(e) is less than 18 years of ager or more than ¹[35] years of
age on the first day of January following last date of receipt of
applications. Provided that for part-time employees the
restriction of minimum or maximum age limit shall not apply, or
(f) is a son, grandson, real brother or other near relative of
a member of the Panchayat:
Provided that an employee will not be discharged, if after his
appointment, any relative of his is elected as such member.”
7.1. He further argued that from the bare perusal of the above
referred Rule it is clear that the said rule deals with the cases
where the candidates have been convicted and penalized with
imprisonment. Whereas, in the present case petitioner has not
been convicted let alone penalized with fine. Currently no case is
pending against the petitioner. The provision of Rule 256
specifically says that only if the incumbent is convicted for an
offence which involves moral turpitude, he will not be considered
for appointment.
7.2. He canvasses that respondents ought to have considered the
fact that the petitioner had been acquitted of all the charges and
the said guiding principle has been overlooked before rejecting the
candidature of the petitioner. There is no concealment on the part
of the petitioner.
7.3. Further, he submitted that Condition No.12 of the
advertisement dated 16.12.2022 deals with the “Disqualifications
for Appointment”. Condition no.12(v) specified that the cases
where the incumbent who has been convicted for an offence which
involves moral turpitude then he will not be considered for
appointment. Whereas, the petitioner had been acquitted by the
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[2025:RJ-JD:13304] (8 of 18) [CW-1011/2024]competent court much prior to the passing of impugned order
dated 02.01.2024 (Annex.7) rejecting his candidature.
7.4. He further contended that the Circular dated 04.12.2019
(Annex.9) merely deals with the situations where any candidate
can be debarred upon his conviction or if any criminal case is
pending against him before any court of law. Thus, as per the
Circular dated 04.12.2019, petitioner is fully eligible to be
appointed.
7.5. In the alternative, it is further argued that respondents
ought to have considered the fact that the Circular dated
04.12.2019 was issued by the State Government is not statutory
in nature. It cannot override the effect of the Rules of 1996. Apex
Court in catena of Judgments has held that in service
jurisprudence, the service rules are to prevail. There can be
Government resolutions or circulars but they must be in
consonance with or to expound the rules, not in conflict with the
same. The decision circulated vide Circular dated 04.12.2019 is an
administrative decision and it cannot prevail over a statutory
provision as prescribed under the Rule 256 of the Rajasthan
Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996.
7.6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that even if
there was any doubt on the good character of the petitioner, he
stood subsequently completely vindicated by virtue of his
acquittal. He would rely on a judgment rendered in Sukhjit Singh
& Ors. Vs. State of Punjab1 in support of his contentions. He
contends that an acquittal is an acquittal and merely because
petitioner was given benefit of doubt or he was acquitted on the
1 Punjab and Haryana High Court – CWP No.9808 of 2003
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[2025:RJ-JD:13304] (9 of 18) [CW-1011/2024]basis of compromise, the respondents cannot deny him the
employment on the specious plea that he has not been honourably
acquitted.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit
that a candidate seeking employment, if involved in any criminal
case, is not entitled to appointment as he does not meet the
criteria of having a sound character to the satisfaction of the
employer. The requirement of having a good character is sine qua
non as per the condition of the advertisement. Even otherwise, it
is the right of the employer to ascertain the suitability of a
candidate depending upon his character. In support he cited
Supreme Court judgment rendered in the case of Commissioner
of Police Vs. Raj Kumar2.
8.1. He would argue that the employer has the right to consider
antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint a candidate even
if acquitted. Antecedents of the petitioner were not found
satisfactory as provided in the circular dated 04.12.2019, which is
fortified by the decision of the committee constituted pursuant to
the circular dated 04.12.2019. After thorough examination, the
committee has not found it appropriate to not give appointment to
the petitioner, and his candidature has been rightly rejected for
the post of Teacher Grade-III, Level-II (Science/Maths). The
reasons for rejecting the candidature of the petitioner are
mentioned in the minutes dated 22.12.2023, which are based on
the findings given by the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi
Administration Vs. Sushil Kumar3. A candidate acquitted in a
criminal case on the grounds of compromise between the parties
2 (2021) 8 SCC 347
3 1996(11) SCC 605
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or lack of evidence does not support the granting of an
appointment to the post of Teacher.
9. In light of the above, I shall now proceed to render my
opinion on the rival contentions by recording reasons and
discussion in the preceding part of the order.
10. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondents
on a Supreme Court judgment in the case of Commissioner of
Police Vs. Raj Kumar (supra) seems to be out of place in view
of the fact that the Screening Committee therein (in Raj Kumar’s
case) had given a finding that the nature of offences and the role
attributed to the petitioner directly impinged on the duties to be
performed by him and amounted to moral turpitude. The Supreme
Court upheld the Screening Committee’s decision to consider the
circumstances of acquittal of Raj Kumar who was accused of
criminal trespass, theft and assault but was acquitted due to lack
of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the Screening
Committee had the right to assess suitability beyond mere
acquittals.
11. Adverting now to the instant case. Here the Screening
Committee, which was constituted under the Chairmanship of
Director, Primary Education, Bikaner, with three members i.e. (i)
Joint Director (Training), Secondary Education, Bikaner (ii)
Additional Superintendent of Police, Leave Reserve Bikaner (iii)
Joint Legal Remembrancer, Secondary Education, Bikaner, in its
report dated 20.12.2023 opined that since the petitioner is
involved in criminal cases, which are of serious nature, therefore,
he is not entitled to be considered for the job in question. Based
on the aforesaid report of the committee, respondent No.3 –
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District Education Officer, Elementary & Secondary Education
Rajasthan, Bikaner, vide order dated 02.01.2024 (Annex.R/1),
held the petitioner as unsuitable and not eligible for appointment.
12. Having regard to the aforesaid, there is no quibble about the
proposition that a person who wishes to join the Education
Department must be having an impeccable character and integrity
and if the offence committed involves moral turpitude, then the
employer is entitled to reject the candidature given the sensitive
nature of job which the disciplinary forces are meant for.
13. At the same time, there is no denying the fact that the mere
registration of an FIR does not diminish a citizen’s status or
impugn his/her character. Every individual is presumed innocent
until proven guilty. In the present case, it is important to highlight
that the petitioner has been acquitted in all pending criminal
cases. This acquittal indicates that the petitioner has not been
found guilty of any criminal conduct. Furthermore, the alleged role
attributed to the petitioner does not hold any significant weight or
impact on the nature of the duties he is to perform. There is also
no indication of any moral turpitude or misconduct that would
undermine the petitioner’s suitability for the role in question.
Thus, the acquittal reflect the petitioner’s innocence, and there is
no valid reason to question their integrity or capacity to fulfill their
responsibilities.
14. In Rakesh Yadav Vs. Union of India & Ors. 4, a criminal
case under Sections 323 and 147 IPC was filed against the
petitioner and his family members due to personal enmity before
his appointment at the age of 20. His services as a police official
were terminated for non-disclosure of the criminal case. In the
4 P&H High Court, CWP No.24254 of 2015 (O&M), decided on 02.07.2019
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judgment (rendered by this very Bench), it was held that non-
disclosure of a case arising from a family dispute, which resulted
in acquittal, cannot justify termination, especially when the
incident occurred at a young age and did not involve moral
turpitude or professional misconduct. The relevant observations
and reasoning recorded therein are reproduced below:”
“12. Perusal of record shows that the criminal case under
Sections 323 and 147 of IPC was filed by persons having enmity
against the petitioner’s family members. Same is evident from
the fact that all the family members including petitioner were
made accused in the said case. Even otherwise, the case was
compromised and the petitioner was acquitted of all the charges
by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, District Mau, Uttar
Pradesh vide order dated 17.03.2011. Sheer pendency of
criminal proceedings in a petty offence cannot be made ground
of termination of services of the petitioner. Particularly, keeping
in view that when the case was registered the petitioner was
only aged 20 years. In this context, reliance may be had on a
judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case titled
as ‘Commissioner of Police and others Vs. Sandeep Kumar‘ in
Civil Appeal No. 1430 of 2007, wherein it has been held as
under:-
“We respectfully agree with Delhi High Court that
cancellation of his candidature was illegal but we wish to
give our opinion in the matter. When the incident
happened the respondent must have been of 20 years of
age. At that age young people often commit indiscretions
and such indiscretions can often be condoned. After all
youth will be youth. They are not expected to behave in as
mature a manner as older people. Hence, our approach
should be to condone minor indiscretions made by young
people rather than to brand them as criminals for rest of
their lives.”
13. With respect to the allegation that the petitioner failed to
disclose the pendency of criminal case at the time of filling up
his application form for recruitment as per CRPF Form 25,
given the young age of 20 years of petitioner at the relevant
time, there is some force in the contention of learned counsel for
the petitioner that it was bonafide. The petitioner was under the
false impression that being a co-accused and a petty family feud
and also having been granted bail in the criminal case there
was no case pending in the Court against him and he did not
disclose the same under a genuine mistake.
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14. The explanation rendered in normal course would lack the
credence so as to be believable enough, however, as already
stated the petitioner was about 20 years boy at the relevant time
and, therefore, in all likelihood would have perceived non-
disclosure of the requisite information to be innocuous in
nature. In somewhat similar circumstances, in a case titled
Naresh Baliram Ingle Vs. Commandant CISF NLC Neyveli
Tamil Nadu, 2012(11) SCT 800, learned Brother B. Rajendran,
J. of Madras High Court observed thus:-
“10. When the incident happened, the respondent must
have been about 20 years of age. At that age, young
people often commit indiscretions, and such indiscretions
can often been condoned. After all, youth will be youth.
They are not expected to behave in as mature a manner as
older people. Hence, our approach should be to condone
minor indiscretions made by young people rather than to
brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives.”
15. I see no reason why nature of indiscretion committed by the
petitioner be not treated with a little lenient view. However, a
word of caution would not be out of place here, so as not to
treat this as a precedent. It is made clear that each case has to
be seen in its own peculiar facts and circumstances and,
therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it should be perceived
that indiscretions committed at the young age ought to be
condoned merely because youth deserves certain leniency.
16. It is made clear that each case has to be seen in its own
peculiar facts and circumstances and, therefore, by no stretch
of imagination, it should be perceived that indiscretions
committed at the young age ought to be condoned merely
because youth deserves certain leniency.”
15. Reference may also be had to another judgment in a case
titled Patram vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 18747/2019 decided on 30.01.2024, though in
somewhat different circumstances, but the views expressed
therein are applicable in the present case as well. Relevant part
thereof, is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“6. Turning to the petitioner’s case on its merits, it is
acknowledged, as per the respondents’ submitted response,
that the petitioner did not withhold any information
regarding the FIR against him. Before joining his duties, he
voluntarily disclosed the existence of FIR No.309/2019,
registered at Police Station Anoopgarh, District Sri
Ganganagar, under Sections 498-A, 406, 323, 354 of IPC,
initiated by his estranged wife due to marital discord.
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Furthermore, the criminal trial stemming from this FIR has
concluded with the petitioner’s acquittal.
7. The only opposition at this stage for not allowing the
petition is reliance placed by the learned counsel for the
respondent on the Apex Court judgment rendered in Avtar
Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2016 (8) SCC
471.
8. Having perused the judgment, ibid, what has to be borne
in mind is that candidates must truthfully disclose
information regarding convictions, acquittals, arrests, or
pending criminal cases to their employers, both before and
after employment, without suppression or false statements.
Employers, when terminating services or canceling
candidatures due to false information, should consider
special circumstances and relevant government regulations.
Additionally, appropriate actions should be taken if there is
suppression or false information regarding involvement in a
criminal case, depending on its nature. The accuracy and
specificity of attestation/verification forms are crucial, and
guilt for suppression or false suggestion requires attributable
knowledge. Employers, no doubt, can maintain their
discretion in considering disclosed information and are not
obligated to appoint candidates even if truthful disclosures
are made, particularly in cases involving multiple pending
cases or serious criminal offences.”
16. Youth deserve a reformative approach to the indiscretions
committed in heat of the moment, which may or may not be
intentional. Societal and so should the legal perspective be, of
course depending upon the nature of delinquency, that youthful
indiscretions should not permanently tarnish an individual’s future.
A compassionate and reformative approach ought to be adopted
when dealing with young individuals who may have committed
minor transgressions. Young people, particularly in their late teens
and early twenties, are still in the process of emotional and
intellectual development. At this stage, they often act impulsively,
sometimes making decisions that are not well thought out. A rigid
punitive approach that permanently brands young individuals as
criminals for relatively minor mistakes is against the principles of
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justice/fairness, recidivism and reformation and their reintegration
into society.
17. Furthermore, the principle of proportionality must be kept in
mind by the administrative authority. Not all offences are of the
same gravity, and minor indiscretions should not be equated with
serious crimes. In the present case, the rejection of the
petitioner’s candidature appears to be solely based on the fact
that, despite the petitioner having been acquitted in criminal
cases, the nature of those criminal cases is considered to be of a
serious and grave character.
18. Similar controversy was involved in a case titled Sukhjit
Singh vs. State of Punjab5. Vide a judgment rendered therein
incidentally by me, while as a Judge of Punjab and Haryana High
Court, which in turn is based on Division Bench judgments of two
different High Courts6. For ready reference, relevant thereof is
reproduced hereinbelow:-
“12. Every acquittal is honourable acquittal. There is
nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code nor is there any
rule of criminal jurisprudence for treating the effects and
consequences of an honourable acquittal from an acquittal
on failure of the prosecution to prove the case beyond
reasonable doubt.
13. A Division Bench of this Court in a case titled as Shashi
Kumar Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam and another,
2005 (1) SCT 576 relying in turn on another Division Bench
of Madras High Court has held that the terms honourable
acquittal or fully exonerated unknown in the Criminal
Jurisprudence. His Lordship S.S.Nijjar, J. (as he then was of
this Court) speaking for the Division Bench observed as
below:-
7. In any event, the terms “honourable acquittal” or
“fully exonerated” are unknown in the Code of Criminal
Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms
came up for consideration before a Division Bench of
the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India Vs.
Jayaram, AIR 1960 Madras 325. Rajammannar, C.J.
5 Punjab & Haryana High Court, CWP No.9808/2003, decided on 13.08.2019
6 Shashi Kumar Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam, 2005(1) SCT 576 & Union of India Vs. Jayaram,
AIR 1860 Madras 325.
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Delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed
as under:-
There is no conception like “honourable acquittal”
in Criminal Procedure Code The onus of establishing
the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails
to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused is entitled to be acquitted.
Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service
Regulations which says that when a Government servant
who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he
may be given the full salary to which he would have
been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only
to the case of departmental Inquiry.
Where the servant was suspended because there
was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was
acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the
general law, to the full pay during the period of his
suspension. To such a case Article 193(b) does not
apply.”
8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was
considered and followed by this Court in the case of
Jagmohan Lal Vs. State of Punjab through Secy, to Punjab
Govt. Irrigation and others, AIR 1967 (54) Punjab and
Haryana 422 (punjab). In that case, on acquittal, the
petitioner was reinstated in service, buthis period of
suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He
had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of
the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full
pay and allowances for the period of his suspension.
Considering the impact of Rules 7.3,7.5 and 7.6 of the
Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol.I Part-1, it was observed as
follows:-
(2) XXX XXX XXX
The interpretation which has been put by the
Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which
attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal
charge against him under which he was standing his
trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is
acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are
called upon to decide whether the prosecution has
succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The
moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of
the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is
acquitted after being given a benefit of doubt or for that
reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The
Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate
honourable acquittal. The only words known to the Code
are ‘discharged’ or ‘acquitted’. The effect of a person
being discharged or acquitted is the same in the eyes of
law. Since, according to the accepted notions of
imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied
regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable(Downloaded on 11/04/2025 at 10:33:23 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:13304] (17 of 18) [CW-1011/2024]doubt, it is generally held that there being a doubt in the
mind of the court, the accused is acquitted.
I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention
underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this” the
moment the criminal charge on account of which an
officer was suspended fails in a court of law, he should
be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other
interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule.
It is futile to expect a finding of either honourable
acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of
acquittal. The reason is obvious; the criminal courts are
not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They
are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has
succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the
guilt of the accused.”
19. As an upshot of my discussion in the preceding part and in
view of the ratio laid down in the judgments ibid, the instant writ
petition has to be necessarily allowed.
20. It is so ordered.
21. Respondents are directed to issue an appointment letter to
the petitioner by passing appropriate order pursuant to his
selection, subject to his otherwise being eligible and meritorious in
the selection process, since during the pendency of the writ
proceedings, vide an interim order dated 02.05.2024, one post
was ordered to be kept vacant.
22. Necessary exercise be carried out within a period of 30 days
from the date petitioner approaches the respondents with a web
print of the instant order.
23. In the parting, I may hasten to add here that for the period
the petitioner remained out of service, he shall not be entitled to
any financial benefits on the principal of ‘No Work No Pay’.
However, he shall be accorded all the notional benefits including
seniority with effect from the same date his counterparts were
(Downloaded on 11/04/2025 at 10:33:23 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:13304] (18 of 18) [CW-1011/2024]
appointed pursuant to the same selection process wherein
petitioner had competed along with them.
24. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(ARUN MONGA),J
98-Sumit/Jitender//-
Whether fit for reporting : Yes / No.
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