Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
B.Nanjundappa vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 10 January, 2025
Author: R.Raghunandan Rao
Bench: R.Raghunandan Rao
APHC010017892023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA
PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction) [3493]
FRIDAY, THE TENTH DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R.RAGHUNANDAN RAO
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
WRIT PETITION NO: 9545/2024
Between:
B.NANJUNDAPPA, S/O.CHINNA ANJINAPPA, AGED 63 YEARS,
R/O.H.NO.2/78, CHOWLURU VILLAGE, HINDUPUR MANDAL, SRI
SATHYA SAI DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REPT., BY ITS CHIEF
SECRETARY, GENERAL ADMINISTRATION (LAW & ORDER)
DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT BUILDINGS, VELAGAPUDI,
AMARAVATI, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
2. THE COLLECTOR & DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, SRI SATYA SAI
DISTRICT AT PUTTAPARTHY.
3. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, SRI SATYA SAI DISTRICT AT
PUTTAPARTHY.
4. THE SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL PRISON, KADAPA, KADAPA
DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. AKULA SRI KRISHNA SAI BHARGAV
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. ADDL ADVOCATE GENERAL (AP)
2
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
(Per Dr.Justice Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa)
Heard Sri Akula Sri Krishna Sai Bhargav, learned counsel appearing for
the Petitioner and learned Additional Advocate General for Respondents.
2. The detenue in the present case is said to have been arrayed as an
accused in the following cases:-
1. Cr.No.52/2018, U/s.341, 323, 363 and 506 IPC of Hindupur
Rural Upgrade Police Station.
2. Cr.No.10/2019, U/s. 393 IPC of Chilamathur PS, Anantapur
District.
3. Cr.No.108/2019, U/s 452, 323, 324 and 506 read with 34 IPC
of Hindupur Rural PS, Anantapur District.
4. Cr.No.236/2022, U/s 147, 148, 120(b), 109 and 302 read with
149 IPC of Hindupur Rural Upgrade PS.
5. Cr.No.239/2022, U/s 305 IPC of Hindupur Rural PS.
6. Cr.No.180/2023, U/s 506 IPC of Hindupur Rural Upgrade
Police Station.
7. Cr.No.59 of 2023, U/s 20(b)(ii)(c) and 8(c) of NDPS, Act of
Anandapuram PS, Visakhapatnam.
8. Cr.No.104 of 2023, U/s 328 & 284 r/w 34 IPC, Sec 20(b)(ii)(c)
& 22(c) of NDPS, Act and Section 18(c) DCA-1940 of II town PS,
Visakhapatnam.
3. The detenue is also said to have been arrayed as an accused in the
following cases in the State of Karnataka:-
1. Cr.No.55/2017, U/s. 395 IPC of Goribidanur Rural PS,
Karnataka State.
2. Cr.No.167/2021, U/s 392 IPC of Uppinangadi PS, Karnataka
State.
3
3. Cr.No.268/2021, U/s 392 & 394 IPC of Koratageri PS,
Karnataka State.
4. Cr.No.21/2022, U/s 395 IPC of Midigesi PS, Karnataka State.
5. Cr.No.51/2022, U/s 394 IPC of Koratageri PS, Karnataka
State.
6. Cr.No.72/2022, U/s 392 IPC of Koratageri PS, Karnataka
State.
7. Cr.No.83/2022, U/s 392 IPC of Gudibanda PS, Karnataka
State.
8. Cr.No.100/2022, U/s 392 IPC of Koratageri PS, Karnataka
State.
4. The detenue had been granted bail in one of the above six (06) cases
registered in the State of Andhra Pradesh and no bail has been granted in the
remaining five cases registered in Andhra Pradesh and eight cases registered
in Karnataka State. At that stage, the 2nd Respondent had issued an order of
detention dated 02.02.2024 detaining the detenue in Central Jail, Kadapa. The
same was approved vide G.O.Rt.No.643, dated 26.03.2024 issued by the 1st
Respondent.
5. The grounds on which the order of detention and subsequent
proceedings had been issued was that the detenue was habituated in the
commission of Goonda activities in violation of law, which comes under the
category of GOONDA as defined under Section 2(g) of Section 2 of
A.P.Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug
Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986
due to which public order was being affected and there was every possibility
4
of the detenue continuing to indulge in these kind of acts which would pose
danger to the community as well as affect public order.
6. The petitioner who is the father of the detenue moved the present Writ
Petition for issuance of a Writ of Habeas- Corpus on the ground that the
original detention order as well as the confirmation order were vitiated on the
following grounds:-
1. The order of preventive detention could not have been issued as
the sponsoring authority deliberately suppressed the factum of
grant of bails to the detenue by the concerned Courts before the
detaining authority.
2. The detenue was granted bails in almost of all the six cases
registered in Andhra Pradesh, but he was not supplied the bail
orders which were granted in his favour and the failure on the
part of the detaining authority in supplying the bail orders vitiates
the order of preventive detention.
3. The detenue was not furnished with the copies of the bail orders
to enable him to make an effective representation before the
concerned authorities and this procedural irregularity is sufficient
to vitiate the entire order.
4. The copy of the order of detention as well as grounds of
detention along with the material relied on by the detaining
authority have not been served on the detenue and most of the
documents are illegible and without proper pagination and
without supply of copies of FIR.
5. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court time and again that grant of
bails to the detenue in the cases which were taken as grounds is
a very vital fact and that not having knowledge about the said
aspect clearly vitiates the entire order of preventive detention.
7. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment
of a Coordinate Bench of the Composite High Court of A.P., in Vasnthu
5
Sumalatha Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others1, wherein it was held as
follows:
“93. Documents, statements or other material relied upon in the
grounds of detention, must be communicated to the detenu, because
they form part of the grounds, and the grounds furnished to the
detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. It would not,
therefore, be sufficient to communicate to the detenu a bare recital of
the grounds of detention. (Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel78; Icchu Devi
Choraria24). If the documents, which formed the basis of the order of
detention, are not served on the detenu along with the grounds of
detention, there would be no service of the grounds of detention in
the eye of law; and that circumstance would vitiate the detention, and
would make it void ab initio. (M. Ahamedkutty19; S. Gurdip Singh v.
Union of India ; Ichhu Devi Choraria24 v. Union of India and Shalini
Soni v. Union of India ). The documents relied on, and referred to in
the order of detention, should be furnished at the earliest so that the
detenu can make an effective representation immediately, instead of
waiting for the documents to be supplied later. The question of
demanding the documents is wholly irrelevant. (M. Ahamedkutty19;
Mohd. Zakir v. Delhi Administration ).
94. The right is to make an effective representation and when some
documents are referred to or relied on in the grounds of detention,
without copies of such documents, the grounds of detention would
not be complete. If there is failure or even delay in furnishing those
documents it would amount to denial of the right to make an effective
representation. (M. Ahamedkutty19; Ramachandra A. Kamat v.
Union of India ; Francies Coralie Mullin10; Ichhu Devi Choraria24;
Pritam Nath Hoon v. Union of India ; Tushar Thakker v. Union of
India ; Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel78; Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya
v. Union of India ; and Ana Carolina DSouza v. Union of India ). The
material and documents, which influence the mind of the detaining
authority in passing the order of detention, are part of the basic facts
and material, and should be supplied to the detenu. (Lallubhai
Jogibhai Patel78; Icchu Devi Choraria24).
95. If the documents, relating to the grant of bail, had been given to
the detenu, he could have made an effective representation
explaining the circumstances relevant to the grant of bail. The denial
of an effective opportunity, by not giving the detenu the relevant
documents while he was in custody, would result in failure of justice.
(P.U. Abdul Rahiman v. Union of India ; M. Ahamedkutty19). It is
immaterial whether the detenu already knew about the contents of1
MANU/AP/0602/2015
6the documents or not. Non-furnishing of the copy of the document is
fatal as the detenu, who is in jail, would have no access to his own
documents. (M. Ahamedkutty10; Mehrunisa v. State of Maharashtra
). It is hardly an answer to the submission made on behalf of the
detenu that copies of material documents referred to in the grounds
of detention, were not supplied to the him, and he was thus
prevented from making an effective representation, to contend that
copies of the documents were not supplied as the detenu was
already aware of the contents of the documents. The detenu is
entitled to be supplied with copies of all the material documents,
instead of having to rely upon his memory in regard to the contents of
the documents. Failure of the detaining authority to supply copies of
such documents vitiates the detention, and the detenu is entitled to
be released. (Mehrunisa88; Icchu Devi Choraria24; Shalini Soni80).
96. To enable the detenu to exercise his right to make an effective
representation against his detention, it is imperative that all relevant
material, including copies of the bail orders, are furnished to him. The
contention that the detenu was aware of the bail order, even if
accepted as true, would not justify failure of the detaining authority to
furnish these copies to the detenu when he has no access to these
documents when he is in preventive custody. Failure to furnish
copies of the orders granting bail to the detenu vitiates the order of
detention”.
8. Sri Vishnu Teja, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the learned
Advocate General would submit that, the original order of detention, at page
No.48 of the compilation filed along with the counter affidavit specifically
states that ” I am satisfied from the material placed before me that you fall
under the category of “GOONDA” as defined Section 2(g) of Section 2 of
A.P.Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug
Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986
and you are a fit person to be detained u/s 3 of the said Act…………..”
9. Sri Vishnu Teja, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the learned
Advocate General would further submit that the said statement is sufficient
recording of the satisfaction of the authority that the detenue was likely to be
released and would continue his activities which are detrimental to the public
7
order. He would submit that in such circumstances, there is enough material
and recording of satisfaction of the imminent release of the detenue from jail
due to which an order of detention came to be passed. He would further
submit that non furnishing of the bail orders would not in any manner detract
from the case of the detenue in as much as the burden of demonstrating that
there was a likelihood of release of the detenue is on the authority passing the
detention order and the same has already been discharged by the authority by
virtue of the above statement which has been extracted in this order. Reliance
is placed upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of K.Varadharaj vs. State of Tamil Nadu and another2.
10. This Court had also, perused the Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in the cases of Rameshwar Shaw Vs. District Magistrate3,
Makhan Singh Tarsikka Vs. State of Punjab4 and Rekha Vs. State of T.N.5.
Consideration of the Court
11. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan, had held, on the
question of whether a detention order could be passed against a person in
judicial custody, in the following manner:
“12. As abstract proposition of law, there may not be any doubt that
Section 3(1)(a) does not preclude the authority from passing an order of
detention against a person whilst he is in detention or in jail; but the
relevant facts in connection with the making of the order may differ and
that may make a difference in the application of the principle that a
2
AIR 2002 SUPREME COURT 2953
3
AIR 1964 SC 334
4
AIR 1964 SC 1120
5
(2011) 5 SCC 244
8
detention order can be passed against a person in jail. Take for
instance, a case where a person has been sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment, for ten years. It cannot be seriously suggested that soon
after the sentence of imprisonment is pronounced on the person, the
detaining authority can make an order directing the detention of the said
person after he is released from jail at the end of the period of the
sentence imposed on him. In dealing with this question, again the
considerations of proximity of time will not be irrelevant. On the other
hand, if a person who is undergoing imprisonment, for a very short
period, say for a month or two or so, and it is known that he would soon
be released from jail, it may be possible for the authority to consider the
antecedent history of the said person and decide whether the detention
of the said person would be necessary after he is released from jail, and
if the authority is bona fide satisfied that such detention is necessary, he
can make a valid order of detention a few days before the person is
likely be released. The antecedent history and the past conduct on
which the order of detention would be based would, in such a case, be
proximate in point of time and would have a rational connection with the
conclusion drawn by the authority that the detention of the person after
his release is necessary. It may not be easy to discover such rational
connection between the antecedent history of the person who has been
sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and the view that his
detention should be ordered after he is released after running the whole
of his sentence. Therefore, we are satisfied that the question as to
whether an order of detention can be passed against a person who is in
detention or in jail, will always have to be determined in the
circumstances of each case.”
12. This principle was followed by another Constitution Bench in Makhan
Singh Tarsikka vs. State of Punjab.
13. Another Constitution bench judgement of the hon’ble Supreme Court
has to be noticed. In Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B.,6 the bench had held
as follows:
“34. The recent decisions of this Court on this subject are many.
The decisions in Borjahan Gorey v. State of W.B. [(1972) 2 SCC 550 :
1972 SCC (Cri) 888] , Ashim Kumar Ray v. State of W.B. [(1973) 4 SCC
76 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 723] ; Abdul Aziz v. District Magistrate,
Burdwan [(1973) 1 SCC 301 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 321] and Debu
Mahato v. State of W.B. [(1974) 4 SCC 135 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 274]
correctly lay down the principles to be followed as to whether a
detention order is valid or not. The decision in Biram Chand v. State of
U.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 573 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 609] which is a Division
Bench decision of two learned Judges is contrary to the other Bench
decisions consisting in each case of three learned Judges. The6
(1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816 at page 209
9principles which can be broadly stated are these. First, merely because
a detenu is liable to be tried in a criminal court for the commission of a
criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from
committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal
Procedure would not by itself debar the Government from taking action
for his detention under the Act. Second, the fact that the Police arrests a
person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute
him under the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first
information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate issuing
an order under the preventive detention. Third, where the concerned
person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention
is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of
time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction
on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a
person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the
State or the public order. Fourth, the mere circumstance that a detention
order is passed during the pendency of the prosecution will not violate
the order. Fifth, the order of detention is a precautionary measure. It is
based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person
based on his past conduct in the light of the surrounding
circumstances.”
14. It has been argued that this judgement is an authority for the principle
that an order of preventive detention cannot be passed against a person who
is already in prison. A reading of the above passage would show that no such
absolute bar has been placed. The observations made above are merely
reiterating the principle laid down in Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate,
Burdwan.
15. Subsequent judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court had followed
this line of reasoning. However, there has been some variation in the manner
in which this principle had been followed. There have also been submissions
made, at various points of time, that the Hon’ble Supreme court had taken the
view that orders of detention cannot be passed when a person is in judicial
custody or otherwise in jail. A three judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in Rekha v. State of T.N., at page 250, after noticing both trends had
held as follows:
10
“8. It has been held in T.V. Sravanan v. State [(2006) 2 SCC 664 :
(2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 593] , A. Shanthi v. Govt. of T.N. [(2006) 9 SCC 711
: (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 371] , Rajesh Gulati v. Govt. of NCT of
Delhi [(2002) 7 SCC 129 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1627] , etc. that if no bail
application was pending and the detenu was already, in fact, in jail in a
criminal case, the detention order under the preventive detention law is
illegal. These decisions appear to have followed the Constitution Bench
decision in Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B. [(1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974
SCC (Cri) 816] wherein it has been observed: (SCC p. 209, para 34):
“34. … where the person concerned is actually in jail custody at the
time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely
to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend
that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority
as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would
jeopardise the security of the State or public order.”
9. On the other hand, Mr Altaf Ahmed, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu, has relied on the judgments of
this Court in A. Geetha v. State of T.N. [(2006) 7 SCC 603 : (2006) 3
SCC (Cri) 324] and Ibrahim Nazeer v. State of T.N. [(2006) 6 SCC 64 :
(2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 17] wherein it has been held that even if no bail
application of the petitioner is pending but if in similar cases bail has
been granted, then this is a good ground for the subjective satisfaction
of the detaining authority to pass the detention order.
10. In our opinion, if details are given by the respondent authority
about the alleged bail orders in similar cases mentioning the date of the
orders, the bail application number, whether the bail order was passed
in respect of the co-accused in the same case, and whether the case of
the co-accused was on the same footing as the case of the petitioner,
then, of course, it could be argued that there is likelihood of the accused
being released on bail, because it is the normal practice of most courts
that if a co-accused has been granted bail and his case is on the same
footing as that of the petitioner, then the petitioner is ordinarily granted
bail. However, the respondent authority should have given details about
the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not been done in the
present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention
cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored.”
16. These principles were reiterated in the case of Champion R. Sangma
vs. State of Meghalaya and Anr.,7
“9. Coming to the ground on which we intend to allow this appeal,
we may point out that even if the appellant is in jail in connection with
some criminal case(s) there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention
order. Law on this aspect is well settled and stands crystallised by a
7
(2015) 16 SCC 253
11
plethora of judgments of this Court. However, a reading of those very
judgments also clarifies that there are certain aspects which have to be
borne in mind by the detaining authority and satisfaction on those
aspects is to be arrived at while passing the detention order.
10. There are three such factors which were restated
in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India [Kamarunnissa v. Union of India,
(1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 88] : (SCC pp. 140-41, para 13)
“13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to
us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can
validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the
fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the
basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real
possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so
released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (3)
if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the
authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf,
such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper
course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted
notwithstanding such opposition, to question it before a higher court.
What this Court stated in Ramesh Yadav [Ramesh Yadav v. District
Magistrate, Etah, (1985) 4 SCC 232 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 514] was that
ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or
circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal
in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us
well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts
and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law
of preventive detention. This seems to be quite clear from the case law
discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court
decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold
otherwise. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the
counsel for the petitioners that there was no valid and compelling
reason for passing the impugned orders of detention because the
detenus were in custody.”
17. The law, as can be seen from the above, can be summarised in the
following manner. There is no bar against passing an order of preventive
detention merely on the ground that the detenue is already in prison.
However, the question of whether such an order can be passed, would be
dependent on the facts of each case. The detaining authority, before passing
an order of detention should find that there was a possibility of the proposed
detenue being released from jail. This possibility can be gleaned from various
sources and factors. A non exhaustive list would be where the detaining
12
authority finds that, the proposed detenue has applied for bail; the proposed
detenue has obtained bail in similar cases and consequently bail, if applied for
in future could be granted on this ground; a co accused of the detenue, who is
placed in a situation similar to the proposed detenue, has obtained bail, and
there is a possibility of the proposed detenue getting bail if he applied, etc.
The said finding would have to be given on the basis of cogent factors and a
mere statement to that effect, without explaining and enumerating the factors
which gave rise to such a finding, would not be sufficient discharge of that
duty by the detaining officer.
18. In the circumstances, this Court would have to look at the question of
whether the detention order had been passed after considering the likelihood
of the release of the detenue from judicial custody or whether it has been
passed without taking this factor into account.
19. The order of detention dealt with the question of the likelihood of the
release of detenue from judicial custody in the following manner.
“In the circumstances PREVENTIVE DETENTION is only the
precautionary measure to avert the situation and this preventive
detention is always the precautionary measure and it is based on
reasonable prognosis of your future behavior based on your past
conduct found in the light of the above circumstances. From the nature
of these incidents inference can reasonably be drawn that you would be
likely to repeat such acts unless detained under preventive detention.
Thus I am satisfied from the material placed before me that you fall
under the category of “GOONDA” as defined U/S 2 (g) of Sec.2 of A.P.
Prevention of Dangerous activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug
offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic offenders and Land Grabbers act,
1986, and you are a fit person to be detained u/s 3 of the said act and
accordingly orders I will be issued with a view to preventing you from
acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order.
You are hereby informed that you have a right to make a
representation to the Govt. to the Advisory Board and also to the
detaining authority. You have a right to appear before the Advisory
13board and to avail assistance of a person, other than advocate in the
proceedings before the advisory board.”
20. A perusal of the order does not reveal any details of the cases in which
the detenue has been granted bail or the details of any pending bail
applications. The statement relating to the likelihood of release of the detenue,
extracted above, is a statement made without any supporting material.
21. The 2nd Respondent, in paragraph 35 of his counter affidavit, had
submitted as follows:
“It is further submitted that the detenue is a habitual criminal and
dangerous and desperate person and he is so hardened and became
incorrigible that the ordinary provisions of penal code will not have
deterrent effect over her acts and she is likely to repeat such acts in
future. It is submitted that even though many cases were registered
against him but no change in him attitude and day to day increasing him
criminal activities. And the detenue is acting in a manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of Public Order and it is necessary to prevent him from
further indulging in such dangerous activities prejudicial to the
maintenance of Public Order and safety of the general public in keeping
the normal peace in the society by directing him to be detained under
the provisions of the Act.”
22. The aforesaid statement, in the counter affidavit, is not reflected
anywhere in the order of detention. It is settled law that subsequent pleadings
cannot supplement reasons given in an order.
23. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on this aspect,
requires the detaining authority to set out the grounds on which the detaining
authority has arrived at a subjective satisfaction that there is a possibility of
the detenue being released from jail, on bail or otherwise. A mere sentence in
the order of detention that there is a possibility of the detenue being enlarged
on bail is not sufficient. The Hon’ble Supreme court in Rekha vs. State of T.N.,
had specifically dealt with this aspect and had held as follows:
14
“However, the respondent authority should have given details about
the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not been done in the
present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention
cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored.”
24. In the present case, the detention order, except containing a ipse dixit
statement of the possibility of the detenue being released, does not contain
any details about the bail orders in similar cases or the reasons why there was
a possibility for the detenue to be granted statutory bail. In the absence of
these details, the order of detention cannot be sustained.
25. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed and the order of detention in
Rc.No.MAGL1/1883/2023, dated 02.02.2024 passed by the 2nd respondent,
and the proceedings of confirmation by the 1st respondent in G.O.Rt.No.643,
dated 26.03.2024 are set aside and consequently the detenue, viz.,
Badannagari Manjunath @ Manju @ Varu, S/o.B.Nanjundappa, aged 25
years, Caste:Boya (BC-A), Chowluru Village, Hindupur Mandal, Sri Sathya Sai
District, shall be, forthwith, set at liberty, if he is not required in any other case.
There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
_____________________________
JUSTICE R.RAGHUNANDAN RAO
________________________________________
Dr.JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
Date: 10.01.2025
Dinesh
15
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R.RAGHUNANDAN RAO
HON’BLE DR.JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
WRIT PETITION No.9545 of 2024
Dt.10.01.2025
Dinesh