Delhi District Court
Babita vs Sh. Shubhash Chand Jain on 22 July, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN, ARC-01,
CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI.
Eviction Petition No. 03/2022
RC ARC NO. 13/2022
CNR NO. DLCT03-000176-2022
BABITA
W/o Sh. Parmil Kumar,
R/o 2981-2982, Siraj Ganj, Bahadur Garh Road,
Sadar Bazar, Delhi - 110006. ............Petitioner
Versus
SH. SUBHASH CHAND JAIN
S/o Sh. Madan Lal,
At shop situated at Ground Floor
of property No. 2736, Chowk Kishan Ganj,
Teliwara, Delhi - 110006. .........Respondent
Date of Institution of the case 10.01.2022
Under Section 14(1)(e) r/w Section 25B, Delhi
Rent Control Act.
Date of Judgment 16.07.2025
Decision Eviction petition is allowed.
Argued by : Sh. Shiv Kumar Gautam, Counsel for petitioner.
Sh. R. K. Jain, Counsel for respondent.
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 1 of 42
JUDGMENT
1) This judgment shall dispose of the eviction petition under
Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called as the
DRC Act) in respect of one shop situated at ground floor at property
bearing no. 2736, Chowk Kishan Ganj, Teliwara, Delhi- 110006
(hereinafter referred to as tenanted premises).
PETITION
2) Briefly stated, it is averred that originally Smt. Ganga Devi,
w/o Sh. Ram Swarup was the owner of the entire property bearing no.
2736, Chowk Kishan Ganj, Teliwara, Delhi, total admeasuring 95 sq.
yards (hereinafter referred to as subject premises). It is further averred
that the said Smt. Ganga Devi sold out the entire subject premises in
favour of her five sons namely Sh. Rattan Lal, Sh. Dina Nath, Sh.
Radhey Mohan, Sh. Bishan Chand (father of petitioner) and Sh. Radhey
Kishan by executing five separate sale deeds in respect of 1/5th
undivided share each in their favour. It is stated that Sh. Rattan Lal died
on 03.02.1983 leaving behind his wife Smt. Ram Rakhi who later on
sold out her 1/5th share to one Mohd. Azim by virtue of a sale deed. It is
further stated that Sh. Radhey Kishan died on 15.09.2008 leaving behind
his son namely Sh. Bablu who acquired his 1/5th undivided share in the
aforesaid property. It is also stated that Sh. Dinanath also demised on
09.02.1999 leaving behind his son Satish Kumar who later sold out his
undivided 1/5th share to Sh. Bablu, S/o Sh. Radhey Kishan. It is stated
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 2 of 42
that thereafter Sh. Radhey Mohan also sold his 1/5th undivided share to
the aforesaid Sh. Bablu, S/o of Sh. Radhey Kishan by way of sale deed.
It is stated that the Bablu had sold out one shop situated at the ground
floor of the subject premises to one Smt. Pooja Arora, w/o Sh. Vijay
Kumar. It is, therefore, stated that in the subject premises Sh. Mohd.
Azim became the owner of 1/5th undivided share, Sh. Bablu became the
owner of 3/5th undivided share except the portion sold out by him to
Smt.Pooja Arora and Sh. Bishan Chand remained owner of 1/5th
undivided share.
3) It is averred that the father of petitioner namely Sh. Bishan
Chand expired on 05.05.2015 and hence, the petitioner became the
owner of 1/5th undivided share of late Sh.Bishan Chand by virtue of Will
dated 17.12.1993 as mother of petitioner namely Laxmi Devi had also
expired on 21.08.2002. It is further averred that the aforesaid Sh. Mohd.
Azim had filed a partition suit bearing no. 96/14/2009 wherein
Sh.Bishan Chand (father of the petitioner), Sh. Bablu and Smt. Pooja
were arrayed as respondents. It is further averred that after the death of
Sh. Bishan Chand, the four brothers of the petitioner being legal heirs of
Sh. Bishan Chand gave their no objection qua aforesaid registered Will
dated 17.12.1993 in favour of the petitioner herein and the said suit for
partition was disposed of vide judgment dated 25.09.2018 as
compromised between all the co-owners of subject premises. It is stated
that by virtue of the said compromise and judgment dated 25.09.2018,
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 3 of 42
the tenanted shop fell into the share of petitioner herein and she became
the absolute and exclusive owner of the same.
4) It is further stated that the respondent was inducted as a tenant
in the tenanted shop by the erstwhile owner at a monthly rate of rent of
Rs. 100/-. However, he is in arrears of rent for which a separate petition
for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent has already been filed
by the petitioner. It is further stated that the petitioner’s husband and
younger son are engaged in the work of printing materials and they
obtain orders from various clients and get the same done from outside
and supply the same to their respective customers. It is also averred that
both of them are operating the said business from their home as they do
not have any independent office from where they can maintain their
aforesaid business activities. Hence, it is stated that the petitioner
requires the tenanted shop for setting up office for her husband and son .
It is averred that the tenanted shop is situated in the market of Teliwara,
Sadar Bazar, Delhi which is a famous market across the country. It is
further stated that the husband of the petitioner is also a co-owner in the
property bearing no. 2981-2982, Siraj Ganj, Bahadur Garh Road, Sadar
Bazar, Delhi which was the self acquired property of his mother namely
Smt. Saroj Devi. It is stated that the same is a residential property and
petitioner alongwith her family members is residing at its first floor. It is
also stated that the said property has not been partitioned between the
legal heirs of Smt. Saroj Devi. It is further stated that earlier also, an
eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act was filed by the
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 4 of 42
petitioner against the respondent, however, the same was withdrawn with
the liberty to file it afresh due to various clerical mistakes in the
description of the property in the pleadings as well as site plan. Hence, it
is prayed that eviction order may be passed against the respondent.
LEAVE TO DEFEND
5) Upon issuance of summons under the Third Schedule of the
DRC Act, the respondent filed his leave to defend application. The said
application was allowed vide order dated 23.03.2023 as triable issues
had been raised by the respondent.
WRITTEN STATEMENT
6) Thereafter, written statement was filed on behalf of the
respondent whereby he has challenged the bonafide need of the
petitioner and raised various contentions. Firstly, it is contended that the
eviction petition is not maintainable as previously eviction petition of the
petitioner on the ground of bonafide requirement has been dismissed on
02.11.2021. It is also stated that the petitioner is making improvement in
her case as contradictory allegations have been made in the present
petition in contrast to the previous eviction petition. Secondly, it is
contended that the petitioner as per her pleadings has become owner of
the shop in question on 25.09.2018 and therefore, the petition is
premature in view of section 14(6) of the DRC Act. Thirdly, it is
contended that the petitioner is not the owner of the premises and there is
no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. It is stated that the
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 5 of 42
respondent has never attorned to the petitioner as his landlord. It is also
stated that the petitioner has not filed any document to show ownership
of Ganga Devi or for showing sale of her share by Ganga Devi in favour
of Bishan Chand. It is further contended that the Will purportedly
executed by Bishan Chand in favour of the petitioner is also not valid
and consequently the decree obtained therefore is also bad in law. It is
also stated that the petitioner has deliberately filed incomplete sale deed
dated 08.09.1993. Fourthly, it is contended that the need of the petitioner
is not bonafide and the present eviction petition has been filed only for
getting the tenanted premises vacated from the respondent and thereafter,
handing over the shop to Mohd. Azim in pursuance of compromise
decree between the petitioner and said Mohd. Azim in suit no. 450/2016.
Fifthly, it is contended that the petition is bad since as per the consent
decree relied upon by the petitioner, the said Mohd. Azim had also
acquired ownership right over part of the tenanted premises but he has
not been impleaded as a party in the present matter. Sixthly, it is
contended that the site plan filed by the petitioner is also incorrect. It is
stated that as per the site plan which is part of consent decree, the subject
premises bearing no.2736 is admeasuring 110 sq. yards whereas as per
the averments made by the petitioner in the eviction petition, the subject
premises is admeasuring 95 sq. yards. It is contended that the petitioner
has failed to explain as to how the size of property was increased by 15
sq. yards and therefore, it is a possibility that the petitioner and other
persons have trespassed into public land and, hence, have no right, title
or interest over the tenanted premises. Seventhly, it is contended that the
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 6 of 42
petitioner has claimed herself to be wife of one Parmil Kumar, however,
as per the site plan filed by the petitioner, she has averred that Babita is
wife of late Sh. Bishan Chand. It is also contended that the other
documents filed by the petitioner mentions that Babita is wife of a
person namely Praveen Kumar. Hence, it is contended that the identity of
the petitioner is in doubt. Lastly, it is contended that the need is not
bonafide as her husband and her son are not dependent upon the
petitioner in any manner for commercial accommodation. It is stated that
the petitioner is guilty of concealment as she has various alternative
commercial accommodations available which are; (i) property bearing
no. 2981-2982 which is a three storied resident-cum-commercial
property wherein the entire ground floor is being used by the husband
and son of the petitioner for running a printing press and printing of
stickers; (ii) two commercial accommodations just above the tenanted
premises forming part of property bearing no. 2726, Chowk Kishan
Ganj, Teliwara, Delhi-06 which is being used by the husband and son of
the petitioner for printing of stickers; (iii) shop no. 1 to shop no. 6, which
are part of property bearing no. 313-B, Inderlok, Delhi-35; (iv)
commercial premises bearing no. 8506, Katra Abdulla Beg, Roshanara
Road, Delhi-7 and used by her husband and son for printing and sale of
stickers; (v) commercial premises bearing no. 8495, Katra Abdulla Beg,
Roshanara Road, Delhi-7 having ground floor and first floor built
thereon and used by the husband and son of the petitioner for printing
and sale of stickers; and (vi) shop in gali no. 3, Village Chandrawal,
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 7 of 42
adjoining Kamla Nagar, Delhi-7. Hence, it is stated that eviction petition
is liable to be dismissed.
REPLICATION
7) Thereafter, petitioner denied the averments of the respondent
in the replication and reiterated her need of the tenanted premises.
Additionally, it is stated that the respondent has previously in eviction
petition no. 137/2019 admitted the landlord-tenant relationship between
the parties and therefore, respondent now cannot resile from the said
admission. Further, it is stated that the name of the husband of petitioner
is Sh. Parmil Kumar who is also known as Praveen Kumar. It is averred
that both Parmil Kumar and Praveen Kumar is one and same person. It is
further stated that petitioner is daughter of Sh. Bishan Chand and the
only word i.e. “W” instead of “D” has been written due to clerical
mistake. It is also stated that petitioner has no concern with the purported
alternative accommodations except tenanted premises and first floor of
the property bearing no. 2981-2982, Siraj Ganj, Bahadur Garh Road,
Sadar Bazar, Delhi-06 which is ancestral property of her husband.
TRIAL
PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE
8) In order to prove her case, petitioner examined herself as
PW-1. She tendered her evidence by way of affidavit Ex. PW-1/A. In
addition, she relied upon following documents as under:
1. Ex.PW-1/1 is site plan.
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 8 of 42
2. Ex. PW-1/2 is sale deed dated 08.09.1993.
(Objected to by Ld. Counsel for respondent on the
ground that the document is incomplete and last few
pages are missing as apparent from the Ex. PW-1/2)
3. Ex. PW-1/3 (OSR) is the copy of certified copy of
Will dated 17.12.1993 which is obtained from the
court. (Objected to by Ld. Counsel for respondent on
the ground that the same is not the certified copy
obtained from the office of Sub-registrar, Delhi).
4. Mark A is photocopy of death certificate of father
of petitioner (the said document is de-exhibited Ex.
PW-1/4 and now the same is marked as Mark A).
5. Mark B is photocopy of death certificate of mother
of petitioner (the said document is de-exhibited Ex.
PW-1/5 and now the same is marked as Mark B).
6. Mark C (colly) which is stated to be certified copy
of partition suit, is not on record and the same is de-
exhibited Ex. PW-1/6 and the certified copy of some
order is marked as Mark C.
7. PW-1/7 is certified copy of site plan forming part
of partition decree. (Objected to by Ld Counsel for
respondent on the ground that this document cannot
be proved without summoning the original file).
8. Ex. PW-1/8 is internet generated copy of my birth
certificate.
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 9 of 42
9. Ex. PW-1/9 (OSR) is copy of my aadhar card.
10. Ex. PW-1/10 (OSR) is copy of my Voter Identity
Card.
11. Ex. PW-1/11 (OSR) is copy of my PAN Card.
12. Mark D is photocopy of leave to defend
application alongwith its list of document filed by the
respondent in earlier eviction petition bearing no.
1101/2018. (The said document is de-exhibited Ex.
PW-1/12 and now the same is marked Mark D).
13. Mark E is the photocopy of order dated
23.12.2021 (The said document is de-exhibited Ex.
PW-1/13 and now the same is marked as Mark E).
9) In her cross examination, she admitted that the sale deed dated
08.09.1993 is an incomplete document as it contains only three pages
whereas it mentions that there is page no. 4 also. She further admitted
that there is no mention in the sale deed that undivided 1/5th share in
property number 2736 at Chowk Kishan Ganj, Teliwara, Delhi-11006
has been sold by the vendor in favour of the vendee Sh. Bishan Chand.
She denied the suggestion that her father Bishan Chand never purchased
any portion in this property or that he was not the owner of 1/5 the
undivided share. She further stated that she cannot read the Will relied
upon by her and therefore she cannot confirm whether there is any
mention as to how Bishan Chand became the owner of 1/5th undivided
share of the subject premises. She further deposed that the respondent
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 10 of 42
was inducted as a tenant by one Smt. Ganga Devi about 20-25 years
back. She conceded that neither her father Bishan Chand nor she ever
received any rent from the respondent. She further stated that she never
got prepared the site plan of the entire property number 2736 at Chowk
Kishan Ganj, Teliwara, Delhi-11006. She admitted that she has filed the
site plan of only Ground floor of this property which is EX. PW1/1.
Thereafter, attention of the witness was drawn towards the site plan and
she was asked to tell about the portions on the Ground floor of the
subject premises which are in her possession or ownership. She stated
that there is no portion in her possession or ownership on the Ground
floor of subject premises of which the site plan Ex PW1/1 has been filed
on record. Then she was asked to clarify as to who are occupying the
four rooms, bathroom, covered portion and the two shops (other than the
portion shown with red color) as shown in Ex. PW1/1 . She stated that
Rooms A,B and C as shown in Ex. PW1/1 are in possession of one
Babloo, she then again said that Room C is probably in the possession
of one Sh. Azim and Room D is also in possession of Babloo. She also
stated that shop shown at point E in Ex. PW1/1 is in the possession of
some other person, whose name she does not remember. She further
stated that the shop marked as F in the said site plan is in the possession
of Azim. She further deposed that Babloo is the owner of 3/5th share in
this property whereas Sh. Azim is owner of 1/5the share and the
remaining 1/5the share is under her ownership. Thereafter, she stated that
on the first floor of this property, there are four rooms built and the rest
of the portion is open and out of said four rooms on the first floor, she is
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 11 of 42
in physical possession of one room on the front side having about 10 feet
front portion. She further stated that the open portion on the first floor is
common and she also uses the same. With respect to the second floor,
she stated that initially there were two rooms which have totally fallen
down and as on date, there are two tin sheds on the second floor. She
further stated that one tin shed and open portion on the second floor is
under her physical possession. She stated that no other portion exists
above the second floor. She denied the suggestion that she has not
disclosed the portions in her possession on the first floor and the second
floor of this property or that she malafidely did not file the site plan of
the upper floors of this property and have concealed the occupation of
various portions on the upper floors of this property, in order to show
scarcity of accommodation available with her. She further denied the
suggestion that the entire first floor and entire second floor is in her
physical occupation or that her husband and her son are doing
commercial activities on the first floor. She further denied that she has
deliberately made false statement with regard to occupation of the first
floor by her husband and her son. She admitted that she does not reside
on the first floor or the second floor of the property but stated that the
same is due to the fact that the property is on the verge of falling down
and is in a dilapidated condition. She further admitted that at the time of
filing of evidence affidavit, no other eviction petition is pending between
the parties. She further admitted that her mother Smt. Laxmi Devi had
already expired on the date when her father Bishan Chand expired. She
also admitted that no other Will except Ex. PW1/3 was executed by her
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 12 of 42
father after the death of her mother. She further stated that the tenanted
shop came to her share in partition. She also stated that probably some
portion of the shop around 4 inch went to the share of Azim as well. She
further stated that by virtue of the partition and the order of the Court, a
total of 22.5 gaj came into the share of each person, from ground floor
uptil the top most floor. She conceded that she cannot tell the exact
measurements of the abovementioned property. She also conceded that
she cannot tell the measurement of the property owned by Smt. Ganga
Devi. She, however, stated that the size of the property that was
mentioned in the sale deed relied upon by her was 95 Sq. Yds., whereas
the partition took place in respect of 110 Sq. Yds. She clarified that at the
time of partition, the property was measured again and it was found to be
110 Sq. Yds. She stated that her father was pursuing the partition suit
however, she cannot tell who had filed the said suit. She again said, that
it was probably Azim, and her father who had instituted it. She stated
that she has never been a party to the said suit for partition. She also
stated that she does not remember if her brothers who had renounced
their rights in her favour had described the size of the entire property
being 95 sq. yards. She admitted that she had not measured the size of
the property at the time of filing of the suit but it was Mr. Babloo who
had measured the size. She further stated that the measurement was
taken at the time of settlement in the said partition suit by the said Mr.
Babloo and perhaps, it was Mr. Babloo who had informed the court
about the size of the property. She stated that she does not know as to
whether any public land was encroached by the parties to the extent of
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 13 of 42
15 sq. yards so as to claim the size of the property to be 110 sq. yards
instead of 95 sq. yards. She admitted that the shop in question is situated
on the main road. She also admitted that she owns two flats in Roshanara
Road, Delhi area. She stated that it is on Dinanath Road but she does not
remember the flats no./property no. in which the said two flats are
situated. Though it may be 8142 and 8143. She further stated that they
have recently shifted in the said two flats in the year 2023. Thereafter,
the attention of the witness was drawn towards para no. 25 of her
evidence affidavit wherein she has stated that neither she nor her
husband, and her sons have any property in Delhi except property no.
2981-2982, Siraj Ganj, Bahadurgarh Road, Sadar Bazar, Delhi and she
was asked if her statement is contradictory to the assertion made in the
affidavit. She stated that they have shifted from 2981-2982, Siraj Ganj,
Bahadurgarh Road, Sadar Bazar, Delhi and said property is no more in
their ownership. She further stated that the property was sold by the
children of her late mother-in-law. She admitted that she has not filed
any document regarding sale of the said property at Sadar Bazar, Delhi
or regarding purchase of the two flats by her at Dinanath Road,
Roshanara Road, Delhi.
10) She also stated that the property bearing no. 9730, Gali Neem
Wali, Nawab Ganj, Delhi-110006 is no more. She stated that it was
earlier owned by her father and after his demise, it was inherited by her
brothers only to her exclusion. She, however, stated that she does not
know if her brothers had inherited the said property by virtue of any Will
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 14 of 42
executed by her father. She again stated that the said property was sold
by her father during his lifetime. She also stated that she does not know
if on the Will executed by her father, her father had shown his address as
that of 9730, Gali Neem Wali, Nawab Ganj, Delhi-110006. She further
deposed that house no. 8495, Gali Abdulla Baki, Roshanara Road, Delhi
is owned by her daughter namely Ms. Shilpi. She admitted that in the
death certificate of her father, the aforesaid address of 8495, Gali
Abdulla Baki, Roshanara Road, Delhi is mentioned. She stated that her
father had expired at the said address and for that reason, the said
address find mentioned in the death certificate of her father. She further
stated that property bearing no. 313/3B, Shop 1 to 6, Inderlok, Delhi,
belonged to her father and after his death, is owned by his sons. She
stated that she does not know if her father had executed any Will in
respect of the said property in favour of her brothers. Thereafter,
attention of the witness was drawn towards the attested copy of the
consent decree sheet filed by her wherein her residential address is
shown to be as that of 313/3B, Shop 1 to 6, Inderlok, Delhi and she was
asked to clarify in this regard. She stated that it was not her property then
why would she state the same as her residential address. She further
stated that she does not know who owns the property bearing no. 2703,
Gali Neem Wali, Nawab Ganj, Delhi and that she has no connection with
the said property. She stated that she does not remember if it was the
address that was mentioned by her father in the partition suit. She stated
that she does not recollect whether this property was owned by her father
or by her mother. She then stated that her father had sold this property
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 15 of 42
during his lifetime. She stated that she has neither filed nor has brought
in the court, the documents showing the sale of the said property by her
father during his lifetime. She stated that she did not inherit any share in
this property at Nawab Ganj, Delhi. She further stated that it was
inherited by her brothers. She stated that she does not know whether her
brothers inherited this property by virtue of any Will executed by her
father or her mother. She admitted that in the settlement in the partition
suit, Smt. Babita was one of the party. She stated that she does not know
what name of Smt. Babita’s husband was reflected in the said settlement.
She stated that somewhere the name of husband of Smt. Babita is
reflected as Praveen Kumar and somewhere as Parmeel /Parmil Kumar.
She conceded that it might be correct that the name of Babita may not
have been written as wife of Parmeel /Parmil Kumar in the partition suit.
She stated that she does not know that if nowhere in the said partition
suit, the name of husband of Babita was ever shown as Parmeel/Parmil
Kumar. She denied the suggestion that Babita wife of Sh. Praveen
Kumar on one hand and Babita wife of Sh. Parmeel/Parmil Kumar are
two different persons/ladies. She also denied the suggestion that the
husband of Smt. Babita is never known by both the names i.e. Praveen
Kumar @ Parmeel Kumar. She conceded that she has neither filed nor
has brought in the court any document to show that the husband of
Babita is known by both the names i.e. Praveen Kumar as well as
Parmeel Kumar.
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 16 of 42
11) She stated that on the first floor of the property no. 2736,
Chowk Kishan Ganj, Teliwara Delhi -110006, four rooms existed and on
the second floor, two rooms and two tin shed existed earlier. She
however stated that she does not know till when the said four rooms
existed on the first floor or two rooms and two tin sheds existed on the
second floor of this property no. 2736, Chowk Kishan Ganj, Teliwara
Delhi -110006. She stated that at the time of filing of eviction petition,
only two rooms and two tin sheds existed on the second floor of this
property and on the ground floor, there existed three shops, three rooms
and open space, bathroom, latrine and passage. Thereafter suggestion
was put to the witness that she has disclosed different particulars
regarding the premises on the ground floor as well as on the second floor
at the time of filing the eviction petition, to which, she stated that she has
nothing to comment and there may be a site plan with regard to it. She
also stated that she does not remember if she has filed the site plan of
first floor and second floor of this property. She denied the suggestion
that she and her husband have number of commercial premises suitable
to carry on business thereon. She denied the suggestion that the petition
has been filed malafidely and there is no bonafide need.
12) Further, the petitioner also examined PW-2 Krishan Gopal. He
tendered his evidence by way of affidavit which is Ex. PW-2/A. In
addition, he relied upon documents exhibited as follows:
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 17 of 42
(i) Ex. PW-2/1 (OSR) is copy of my adhaar card.
(ii) Ex. PW-2/2 is certified copy of the sale deed
dated 08.09.1993 (Objected to by ld. Counsel for
the respondent on the ground that certified copy
can only be proved after summoning the original
record from the office of Sub-Registrar concerned
and that the ceritified copy had only to be marked).
13) In his cross examination, he admitted that he has not brought
any document to show that the name of husband of the petitioner is
Pravin Kumar @ Pramil Kumar. He stated that he has never mentioned
anywhere that the name of husband of the petitioner is Pravin Kumar @
Pramil Kumar. He further stated that he does not remember whether he
had filed any affidavit-cum-NOC in the proceeding which was settled
between the owners of the property in question, by a settlement
/judgment between the parties. He further stated that he was never a
party in any litigation with regard to the property in question. He stated
that he has not brought any document including the birth certificate,
school leaving certificate, income tax record, bank record, or any other
government document in which the name of husband of the petitioner is
mentioned as Pravin Kumar @ Pramil Kumar. He further stated that
Mohd. Azim had filed a civil suit in which one Sh. Bishamber Chand
was defendant no. 1. He stated that the name of his father is not
Bishamber Chand but Bishan Chand. He admitted that he does not know
any person by the name of Bishamber Chand. He stated that there wasRC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 18 of 42
some error in mentioning the name of Sh. Bishan Chand and it was
mentioned as Bishamber Chand in the judgment which was marked as
Mark D. He stated that no probate order was obtained by the petitioner in
respect of the Will claimed by her in her favour. He further stated that no
relinquishment deed was ever executed by the brothers of the petitioner
in favour of the petitioner relinquishing the rights over the property in
favour of the petitioner. He further stated that the certified copy of the
sale deed filed by him alongwith hhis affidavit by way of evidence Ex.
PW-2/A was never applied for or obtained by him. He stated that it was
obtained by the petitioner herself. He further stated that the certified
copy which has been relied upon is the copy of the sale deed executed by
his grandmother Smt. Ganga Devi in favour of her five sons namely
Ratan Lal, Radhey Mohan, Dinanath, Bishan Chand and Radhey Kishan.
He admitted that he has never seen the original of this sale deed executed
by Smt. Ganga Devi. He stated that his brother Sh. Surender Kumar was
having all the knowledge regarding the said sale deed or the original
thereof and he has already expired. He further stated that his father
Bishan Chand never mentioned “Jain” alongwith his name Bishan
Chand. He admitted that in para no. 7 of his evidence affidavit Ex.
PW-2/A, he had mentioned the name of his father as Bishan Chand Jain.
He denied the suggestion that he has filed a false affidavit in evidence or
that he is deposing falsely.
14) No other witness was examined on behalf of the petitioner and
therefore, matter was adjourned for the evidence of the respondent.
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 19 of 42
RESPONDENT’S EVIDENCE
15) Respondent Subhash Chand examined himself as RW-1. He
tendered his evidence by way of affidavit and the same is Ex. RW1/A. In
his cross examination, he stated that he has been running a shop of
selling packed milk on retail basis since last 15 years. He further stated
that he lastly paid the rent qua the tenanted premise to Smt. Ganga Devi.
He further stated that Ganga Devi had five sons namely Bishan Chand,
Deena Nath, Ratan Lal and two other sons whose names he could not
recollect. He stated that the entire property no. 2736, Chowk Kishan
Ganj, Teliwara, Delhi consists of ground floor, first floor and second
floor. He further stated that the ground floor is commercial one. He then
stated that the Upper floors are also commercial. He denied the
suggestion that the upper floors are residential. He further stated that the
first floor of said property is being used by the husband and children of
petitioner for running screen printing press business. He, however, stated
that he does not remember the name of sons of the petitioner. He stated
that the name of the husband of the petitioner is Praveen Kumar and
Parmeel Kumar. He further stated that petitioner used to write two names
of her husband and stated that he does not know if she has one husband
or two. He also stated that the measurement of entire property is
mentioned 95 sq. yards on papers. However, at spot the same is
measuring 115 sq. yards. The tenanted premises is measuring 6 X 14 sq.
ft. He stated that the petitioner and her husband are having many
properties for the projected bonafide need. He further stated that he did
not attend the last rites of father of petitioner Sh. Bishan Chand and he
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 20 of 42
does not remember the date of death of Sh. Bishan Chand. Thereafter,
attention of witness was drawn towards site plan i.e. Ex. PW1/1 and he
identified the tenanted premises as the portion as shown in red portion in
the said site plan. He stated that he has not paid rent to any one as no
one approached me for claiming the rent. He further stated that even
during the lifetime of Smt. Ganga Devi, nobody approached him for
claiming rent. Thereafter, attention of the witness was drawn towards the
certified copy of order dt. 23.12.2021 passed in eviction petition no.
1101/18 and certified copy of said petition, leave to defend application
filed by respondent in the said petition and the witness admitted the same
as correct which is Ex. RW1/DX. He denied the suggestion that neither
the petitioner nor any of her family members is having any of the
properties as mentioned by him in his evidence affidavit. He stated that
he does not know if petitioner or any of her family members is having
two residential floors in property no. 8143B, Deena Nath Road,
Roshnara Road, Delhi-07. Thereafter, witness was asked that the
petitioner i.e. daughter of Sh. Bishan Chand @ Vishan Chand, had many
a times approached him for claiming rent but he stated that she has never
approached him for demand of rent at any point of time. He further
stated that he did not attend the last rites of Smt. Ganga Devi and Laxmi
Devi. He also stated that he did not attend the last rites of wife of Bishan
Chand or mother of petitioner.
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 21 of 42
FINDINGS
16) Then, final arguments were advanced by the respective
counsels on behalf of both the parties. Both the parties also filed written
submissions in support of their arguments. At the outset, it is stated that
there is no doubt regarding the case laws relied upon on behalf of both
the parties where the Superior Courts have laid down the principles with
respect to provisions of the DRC Act, 1958 in different factual scenarios.
However, each case has its own distinguishing facts and circumstances
and each matter has to be decided in its own factual background. It is
trite to state that in a petition u/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act in order to get an
eviction order the petitioner/landlord is required to establish the
following: –
(i) That he/she is the owner/landlord of the property;
(ii) That he/she requires the premises bonafide and
iii) That he/she does not have any other alternative suitable
accommodation for this purpose.
LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
17) As far as the landlord-tenant relationship is concerned, the
respondent has disputed the same. It is contended that the petitioner is
not the owner of the premises. It is also stated that the petitioner in her
cross examination has admitted that the sale deed filed is incomplete. It
is also contended that no probate of the Will of Bishan Chand was
obtained by the petitioner. Furthermore, it is stated that no documents
have been filed to show ownership of Ganga Devi from whom theRC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 22 of 42
petitioner is claiming ownership of the premises through her father.
However, it is pertinent to note that the respondent has admitted in his
cross examination that he was tenant under Ganga Devi. It is also
conceded by the respondent that Ganga Devi was survived by five sons
including the father of the petitioner namely Bishan Chand. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra v. Stanley
Parker Jones (2006) 3 SCC 91 had held that:
“…..13. The underlying policy of section 116 is that
where a person has been brought into possession as a
tenant by the landlord and if that tenant is permitted to
question the title of the landlord at the time of the
settlement, then that will give rise to extreme confusion
in the matter of relationship of the landlord and tenant
and so the equitable principle of estoppel has been
incorporated by the legislature in the said section.”
18) Thus, a tenant is estopped from challenging the ownership or
denying the title of the landlord. Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that
in the previous round of litigation between the parties in eviction petition
bearing no. 1101/2018, respondent had admitted that the tenanted
premises is owned jointly to the extent of 1/5th share by 05 persons
including Bishan Chand. Thus, co-ownership of Bishan Chand to the
extent of 1/5th share is already admitted by the respondent. As far as
contention with respect to the Will of Bishan Chand is concerned, it is
pertinent to note that even if the said Will is ignored, it is not in dispute
that Bishan Chand as well as his wife have already demised. Therefore,
petitioner being her daughter would succeed his right, title and interest in
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 23 of 42
the tenanted premises as his class I heir. Even otherwise, it is trite to state
that the respondent cannot challenge the title documents of the landlord.
In this regard, reliance is placed upon the case of Sh. Bharat Bhushan Vs.
Arti Teckchandani 2008 (153) DLT 247. Therefore, the contentions with
respect to the Will relied upon by the petitioner are devoid of merits and
does not assist his case.
19) As far as the contention is concerned that the petition is bad
since Mohd. Azim also acquired co-ownership of the tenanted premises
on the basis of compromise relied upon by the petitioner, the said
contention is also devoid of merits. Further, the contention that the
NOCs/affidavits of the brothers of the petitioner in her favour are also
invalid is also of no assistance of the respondent. It is a well settled law
that petition u/s 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act can be filed even by one of the co-
owners without impleading the other co-owners. In this regard, the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in M/s India Umbrella
Manufacturing Company Vs. Bhaja Bandei Aggarwalla, 2004 (3) SCC
178 is pertinent to be noted where it was held that even a co-owner can
file an eviction petition against the tenant and all the co-owners are not
required to be joined as a party. Thus, the law is well settled that even
one of the co-owners can file a petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of DRC
Act on the ground of bonafide necessity, against the tenants without
impleading the other co-owners. The decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court
in case titled as Dhannalal Vs. Kalawati Bai & Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 16
states the law in this regard.
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 24 of 42
20) Further, the contention that the respondent has never attorned
to the petitioner and has never paid rent to the petitioner is also devoid of
merits. It is well settled that if the transfer of the landlord’s title is valid,
even if the tenancy is not attorned in favour of the transferee, the lease
continues. Thus, a transferee of the landlord’s rights, steps into the shoes
of the landlord with all the rights and liabilities of the transferor landlord
in respect of the subsisting tenancy. Thus, attornment in favour of the
new landlord is unnecessary to confer validity to the transfer of the
landlord’s rights and there is no such statutory requirement. Reference
may be made to the case of Hajee K. Assainar vs. Chacku Joseph AIR
1984 Ker 113.
21) Further, the contention that the petition is premature since the
petitioner as per pleadings became owner of the premises on 25.09.2018
whereas the eviction petition has been filed in the year 2022 is devoid of
merits. It is pertinent to note that petitioner did not purchase or acquire a
new interest by way of said partition/compromise. Rather the undivided
interest which she had inherited in the premises as that belonged to her
father Bishan Chand on the demise of her parents, was partitioned
amongst the co-owners. It is a well settled principle of law that the bar
under Section 14 (6) of the DRC Act is not applicable in the case of co-
owner and relinquishment deed or Will cannot be considered to be a
transfer within the meaning of section 14(6) of the DRC Act. In this
regard, it is necessary to refer to the case of Onkar Singh VS. Saheb
Ditte Mal Kohli, 1970 RCJ 15 (Del). wherein it is stated that the
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 25 of 42
devolution of interest of the landlord by inheritance or by Will is a
transfer by operation of law. It was stated with regard to Section 14 (6)
that the sub-section contemplates of voluntary transfer by the owner in
favour of another and will not apply to such a case. Accordingly, in the
present case, execution of relinquishment deeds by the brothers of the
petitioner in her favour or acquisition of interest in the tenanted premises
by virtue of Will of her father on his demise cannot be stated to be a
transfer within the meaning of Section 14 (6) of DRC Act and therefore,
the bar u/s 14 (6) of the DRC Act would not be applicable in the present
case.
22) Next, it is contended that the petition is liable to be dismissed
as previously also the eviction petition of the petitioner on the ground of
bonafide requirement has been dismissed on 02.11.2011. However, the
said contention is also devoid of merits. It is trite to state that cause of
action u/s 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act is a recurring cause of action.
Therefore, a second eviction petition filed by the petitioner on the
ground of bonafide requirement is maintainable. In this context reliance
is placed upon the decision of Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in
case titled as “Ram Sewak & Ors. Vs. Chakresh Kumar Jain” [2001 (4)
MPHT 375]. Moreover, perusal of copy of the order dated 23.12.2021 in
previously filed eviction petition bearing no. E-1101/2018 reveals that
the said petition was simply dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file it
afresh. As such, the said petition was not dismissed on merits so as to
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 26 of 42
debar the petitioner from filing fresh eviction petition on the same
ground of Section 14 (1) (e) DRC Act.
23) Lastly, it is contended that the petitioner is not the person who is
the owner of the tenanted premises as per compromise deed. It is
contended that the petitioner has claimed herself to be wife of one Parmil
Kumar, however, as per the site plan filed by the petitioner, she has
averred that Babita is wife of late Sh. Bishan Chand. It is also contended
that the other documents filed by the petitioner mentions that Babita is
wife of a person namely Praveen Kumar. However, it is pertinent to note
that the title of the petitioner is not drived by her through her husband,
rather her father. It is not the case of the respondent that petitioner is not
the grand daughter of Ganga Devi. Even otherwise, respondent in his
cross examination has admitted that the petitioner used to write two
names of her husband i.e. Praveen Kumar and Parmil Kumar. It is also
stated by the respondent that he does not know if petitioner has one
husband or two. Therefore, it is clear from the said admission that Babita
w/o Praveen Kumar and Babita w/o Parmil Kumar refers to the same
person i.e. the petitioner herein. As far as the discrepancy in the name of
the father of the petitioner is concerned, it is conceded by the respondent
in the cross examination, the name of father of the petitioner was Bishan
Chand and name of mother of the petitioner was Laxmi Devi; whose last
rites, he did not attend. Moreover, it is not the case of the respondent that
there is some other Babita, other than the petitioner herein, who is
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 27 of 42
claiming to be the daughter of Bishan Chand and owner of the tenanted
premises. Hence, the said contention is also devoid of merits.
24) Accordingly, it can be stated that the petitioner is the owner
/landlord of the tenanted premises and the respondent is tenant in the
said premises. Thus, the first ingredient of landlord-tenant relationship
between the parties in the present case, stands established.
BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT AND NON-AVAILABILITY OF
ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION
25) Since the two issues are interconnected, therefore, the said two
issues are taken up together. In the present matter, petitioner has averred
that she requires the tenanted premises for setting of office of her
husband and son. However, it is contended on behalf of the respondent
that the need of the petitioner is not bonafide and the present eviction
petition has been filed only for getting the tenanted premises vacated
from the respondent and thereafter, handing over the shop to Mohd.
Azim in pursuance of compromise decree between the petitioner and
said Mohd. Azim in suit no. 450/2016. However, the provision of Section
19 (2) of DRC Act is to be emphasized which protects a tenant in case
the landlord recovers possession of any premises and the premises are
not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the
premises are held within two months of obtaining such possession or
having obtained the possession, the same are re-let to any other person
within three years from the date of obtaining the possession. Thus, the
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 28 of 42
said contention is also devoid of merits and does not render the need of
the petitioner as malafide. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Baldev Singh Bajwa vs Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC 778 has held that
whenever a landlord seeks eviction of the tenant for bonafide need, the
controller shall presume the need as genuine and bonfide.
26) Next, it is contended that the site plan filed by the petitioner is
also incorrect. It is stated that as per the site plan which is part of consent
decree, the subject premises bearing no.2736 is admeasuring 110 sq.
yards whereas as per the averments made by the petitioner in the eviction
petition, the subject premises is admeasuring 95 sq. yards. It is
contended that the petitioner has failed to explain as to how the size of
property was increased by 15 sq. yards and therefore, it is a possibility
that the petitioner and other persons have trespassed into public land and,
hence, have no right, title or interest over the tenanted premises .
However, it is pertinent to note that during cross examination of RW-1,
his attention was drawn towards site plan i.e. Ex. PW1/1 and he
identified the tenanted premises as the portion as shown in red portion in
the said site plan. Therefore, there is no dispute in the identity and the
extent of the tenanted premises. Hence, the contention that the different
measurement of the subject premises have been given in the two site
plans of the petitioner does not assist the case of the respondent. Further,
no counter site plan has been filed by the respondent in the present
matter. In the case of V.S. Sachdeva Vs. M.L. Grover 1997 (2) RCR 302,
it was held that if no site plan is filed by tenant, then the site plan filed
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 29 of 42
by the landlord is deemed to be correct. Also, in the case of Rishal Singh
Vs. Bohat Ram & Ors. 2014 (144) DRJ 633, the Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi held that it is settled law that when the tenant contests the accuracy
of the site plan filed by the landlord, he is required to file a copy of the
site plan, he believes to be correct so as to guide the Court in finding the
discrepancies in the site plan filed by the landlord. It was observed that
without such site plan being filed, the mere contentions raised to this
effect will be considered meritless. Thus, the aforesaid contention is
devoid of merits.
27) Next, it is contended that the need is not bonafide as her
husband and her son are not dependent upon the petitioner in any manner
for commercial accommodation. It is stated that the petitioner is guilty of
concealment as she has various alternative commercial accommodations
available which are; (i) property bearing no. 2981-2982 which is a three
storied resident-cum-commercial property wherein the entire ground
floor is being used by the husband and son of the petitioner for running a
printing press and printing of stickers; (ii) two commercial
accommodations just above the tenanted premises forming part of
property bearing no. 2726, Chowk Kishan Ganj, Teliwara, Delhi-06
which is being used by the husband and son of the petitioner for printing
of stickers; (iii) shop no. 1 to shop no. 6, which are part of property
bearing no. 313-B, Inderlok, Delhi-35; (iv) commercial premises bearing
no. 8506, Katra Abdulla Beg, Roshanara Road, Delhi-7 and used by her
husband and son for printing and sale of stickers; (v) commercial
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 30 of 42
premises bearing no. 8495, Katra Abdulla Beg, Roshanara Road, Delhi-7
having ground floor and first floor built thereon and used by the husband
and son of the petitioner for printing and sale of stickers; and (vi) shop in
gali no. 3, Village Chandrawal, adjoining Kamla Nagar, Delhi-7.
28) It is pertinent to note here the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30 where it
was stated by the Hon’ble court that requirement is the existence of bona
fide need, when there is no other “reasonably suitable accommodation”.
Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the
requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non-availability of a reasonably
suitable residential accommodation. Further, such reasonableness along
with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not
the tenant. Therefore, a bald averment that the need is not bonafide as
other properties are available is devoid of merits. Hence, the contention
that the petitioner has alternative accommodation in the form of property
bearing no. 8506, Katra Abdulla Beg, Roshanara Road, Delhi-7 and
shop in gali no. 3, Village Chandrawal, adjoining Kamla Nagar, Delhi-7
does not assist the case of the respondent. Petitioner has denied having
any concern with the said properties. No material has been placed on
record by the respondent to even prima facie to show that the said
properties are under the ownership of the petitioner and how, they are
suitable for the projected bonafide need. Here, I also find it pertinent to
refer to the decision of the Hon’ble High Court passed in the case of
Mohd. Naseer Vs. Mohd. Zaheer and Anr. RC Rev. No. 267/2016 dated
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 31 of 42
03.11.2016 wherein it was observed that mere raising of baseless
contentions against the landlord cannot be a ground for being granted
leave to defend to the petitioners. Further, it is a well settled proposition
of law that it is not sufficient that any kind of the property should be
available to the petitioner/landlord to rule out the benefit of 14(1)(e) of
D.R.C. Act. The property available with the petitioner/landlord should
also be reasonably suitable property. In M M Quasim vs/ Manohar Lal
Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36, the Apex Court has that the landlord does not
have an unfettered right to choose the premises but merely showing that
the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession may not
be sufficient to negative the landlord’s claim if the vacant premises were
not suitable for the purpose for which he required the premises .
Therefore, the said contentions are of no assistance of the respondent.
29) Next, as far as the claim of alternative accommodation in the
form of premises just above the tenanted premises forming part of
property bearing no. 2726, Chowk Kishan Ganj, Teliwara, Delhi-06 is
concerned, the same is also devoid of merits. In this regard it is pertinent
to note, the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Uday Shankar
Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari (2010) 1 SCC 503 is to be noted
where it was held that it is not for the Courts to say that the landlord
should shift to the first floor or any higher floor as it is well known that
shops and businesses are usually conducted on the ground floor, because
the customers can reach there easily. It was reiterated that the Court
cannot dictate to the landlord which floor he should use for his business
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 32 of 42
and that is for the landlord himself to decide. Thus, a ground floor
premises is more suitable for commercial purpose than the premises on
upper floor as it has more footfall of the customers. Reliance in this
regard is placed upon the decision of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in
case of Dilip Singh Kapoor & Ors Vs. Neeraj Khanna & Anr, RC.REV.
66/2017, decided on 31.08.2022. Furthermore, the landlord being the
best judge of his own requirement is the best person to decide as to
which premises he has to chose for conducting his business and a tenant
cannot force the landlord to conduct his business from upper floors. It
has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rahabhar
Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajendera Kumar Tandon 72 (1998) DLT 629
that the landlord is not disentitled from seeking recovery of the
possession of a ground floor merely on the plea that he is also in
possession of first floor and second floor so long as the court is satisfied
with respect to the bonafide requirement of the landlord for the tenanted
premises. Therefore, the contention with respect to the said
accommodation also does not assist the case of the respondent.
30) Further, as far as the contention with respect to availability of
the alternative accommodation in the form of property at 8142/8143,
Dina Nath Road, Roshanara Road is concerned, petitioner has stated that
residential floors have been purchased by her and her family members.
No contrary material has been brought on record by the respondent to
show that the said property has any commercial accommodation
available with the petitioner. It is trite to state that the burden is upon the
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 33 of 42
tenant to show that other alternative suitable accommodation is available
with landlord and how the said premises were suitable for the pleaded
requirement. Reference is made to the judgment of the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi in the case of Lalta Prasad Gupta Vs. Sita Ram, 2017
SCC Online Del 13026, wherein it was held that the tenant must plead
that the particulars of the alternative premises; the right/title of the
landlord to the same; that the said premises were vacant and available for
use at the time of pleaded requirement of landlord; and support the said
pleas with material on the basis whereof such pleas will be proved.
However, no material has been placed on record by the respondent to
entail denial of relief to the petitioner on the ground of availablity of
alternative accommodation. Similarly, with respect to property no. 8495,
Katra Abdulla Beg, Roshanara Road, Delhi-7, nothing has been placed
on record by the respondent to show that the property is owned by the
petitioner herein. Per contra, petitioner has categorically deposed that the
said property is owned by her daughter Shilpi and has also clarified the
reason for mentioning of the said address in the death certificate of her
father. Therefore, the said purported alternative accommodation also
does not assist the case of the respondent.
31) Further, it is contended on behalf of the respondent that the
petitioner in her cross examination has admitted that property bearing no.
313/3B, Inderlok, Delhi-35, bearing no. 9730, Gali Neem Wali, Nawab
Ganj, Delhi-110006 and property bearing no. 2703, Gali Neem Wali,
Nawab Ganj, Delhi was owned by her father. It is further contended that
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 34 of 42
PW-1 has admitted in her cross examination that no other Will was
executed by her father except Ex. PW-1/3. Therefore, alternative
accommodation is available with the petitioner in the said premises.
Though the petitioner has contended that the said properties were
inherited by her brother to her exclusion, however, even if, the said
contention of the petitioner is ignored still she would only be a co-sharer
in the said properties whereas in comparision, the tenanted premises fall
to her exclusive share (barring a small portion) and therefore, cannot be
compared with the same. No material has been placed on record by the
respondent that the said properties in question are owned exclusively by
the petitioner. Only inference which can be drawn from the admission of
the petitioner is that the properties in question were owned by her late
father and therefore, in the absence of any contrary material, she would
be a co-sharer alongwith the other legal heirs in the said properties
whereas the tenanted premises have exclusively fallen to the share of the
petitioner as per the compromise decree dated 25.09.2018. Furthermore,
Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act creates a presumption in favour of the
landlord regarding bona fide need, which is rebuttable only with
substantive material capable of raising a triable issue. Therefore, the
burden of proof is on the tenant to demonstrate, with cogent evidence,
that the landlord’s requirement is not genuine as alternative
accommodation is available. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the
judgment of this Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain
Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30. It was further observed that the degree of
probability is one of preponderance forming the subjective satisfaction of
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 35 of 42
the Rent Controller. Thus, the quality of adjudication is between a mere
moonshine and adequate material and evidence meant for the rejection of
a normal application for eviction. Even otherwise, the landlord possesses
the prerogative to determine his specific requirements, exercising full
autonomy in this regard. It is not within the purview of the courts to
impose directives on the landlord regarding the nature or quality of their
chosen usage of the tenanted premises. Therefore, the courts refrain from
prescribing any standard or guidelines for the landlord’s choices
(residential or commercial). Reliance in this regard can be placed upon
the judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Tarun
Kumar Vs. Parmanand Garg in RC. Rev. No. 56/2018 decided on
09.11.2023.
32) Similarly, with respect to the contention that the entire ground
floor of property bearing no. 2981-2982, Siraj Ganj, Bahadur Garh Road,
Sadar Bazar, Delhi is being used by the husband and son of the petitioner
for running a printing press and printing of stickers, no material has been
placed on record by the respondent. No photographs were put to the
petitioner in her cross examination nor were tendered by the respondent
in his evidence to even prima facie to show that use of commercial
accommodation on the ground floor of the said property. As far as the
contention with respect to the upper floors of the said properties is
concerned, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Rahabhar Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajendera Kumar Tandon 72 (1998)
DLT 629 that the landlord is not disentitled from seeking recovery of the
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 36 of 42
possession of a ground floor merely on the plea that he is also in
possession of first floor and second floor so long as the court is satisfied
with respect to the bonafide requirement of the landlord for the tenanted
premises.
33) Furthermore, it is the prerogative of the landlord to determine
which premises best suits his requirements. It is trite to state that an
alternative accommodation, to entail denial of claim of landlord, must be
reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with tenanted premises,
where from the landlord is seeking eviction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
and the Delhi High Court have repeatedly held that the Courts are not to
sit in the armchair of the landlord and dictate as to how the available
property of the landlord is to be best utilized by him. The landlord is the
absolute owner of his property and is the best person to decide which
property is to be utilized in what way. Reliance is placed upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case of Praveen & Anr. Vs.
Mulak Raj & Ors. RC Rev. 417/2016 in this regard. Thus, the court
cannot make choices for the landlord qua the portion of the premises
from where he should run his business/profession. Furthermore, while
deciding the question of bonafide requirement of the landlord, it is quite
unnecessary to make an endeavor as to how else the landlord could have
adjusted. Also, in case the petitioner fails to occupy the premises as has
been claimed by him, the Delhi Rent Control Act also provides for
recovery of possession by the respondent/tenant of the tenanted premises
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 37 of 42
for his re-entry and occupation. Further, in the case of Ravichandran and
Ors. Vs Natrajan Nadar and Ors. (2004) 1 MLJ 458, it was held:
“Even assuming that other premises are available, then the
choice is left to the landlord to decide as to which non-
residential premises he should occupy, and the tenant
cannot have any say in the matter. If the landlord is able to
show the bonafide, then the tenant cannot dictate terms to
the landlord that he should occupy some other building
and not the one mentioned in the petition.
34) Reference is also made to the decision of the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi in the case of M/s A.K. Woolen Industries and Ors. Vs.
Shri Narayan Gupta RC Rev. 495/2017 dated 31.10.2017 in which the
following was held :-
“19.The law to be applied in this regard has been laid
down by the Supreme Court in Ragavendra Kumar Vs.
Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679, Sait
Nagjee Purushottam & Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimlabai Prabhulal
(2005) 8 SCC 252 and Anil Bajaj Vs. Vinod Ahuja
(2014) 15 SCC 610. It has been held that even if the
landlord has other commercial premises available to
him and even if the landlord is carrying on other
businesses, if it is found that the landlord intends to use
the premises in occupation of the tenant for carrying on
his business therefrom, the landlord is entitled to an
order of eviction and the Courts cannot intervene in the
same”.
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 38 of 42
35) Also, the contention that petitioner has sold property bearing
no. 2981-82, Siraj Ganj, Bahadur Garh Road, Sadar Bazar, Delhi does
not assist the case of the respondent. In this regard, reliance is placed
upon the case of Shyam Sunder Ahuja Vs. Sushil Kumar, 2017 SCC
Online Del 10624, wherein the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has held
that the plea that the landlord has sold some property or let out some
property is not a ground to deny the order of the eviction to the landlord.
The relevant extract is reproduced here under :-
” 16. Not only so, the petitioner/tenant also did not state
that there was no change in the requirement of the
respondent/landlord since then. Merely taking a plea
that the respondent/landlord has in the past sold som
property or let out some property has in Narender
Kumar Shah Proprietor Jay Bharat Steels Vs. Malti
Narang 2014 SCC Online Del 3839 and Anil Kumar
Bagania Vs. Shiv Rani 2014 SCC Online Del 6645 been
held to be not a ground for denying order of eviction to
landlord on the ground of self requirement of premises.”
36) Even otherwise, in the case of Ragavendra Kumar vs. Firm
Prem Machinery AIR 2000 SC 534, the Hon’ble Supreme court held that
it is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his
requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete
freedom in the matter. Reference may also be made to the case of Prativa
Devi (Smt) v. T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353.
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 39 of 42
37) Further, the contention that respondent has no other place for
business or is dependent upon tenanted premises for livelihood has no
bearing on the merits of present case. It is a well settled principle of law
that a Rent Controller has to see the bonafide requirement of the
petitioner and not the comparative hardship of the respondent. Reliance
in this regard is placed upon the Apex Court’s decision in Bega Begum
and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan and Ors (1979) AIR 272 that the
inconvenience loss and trouble resulting from denial of decree of
eviction in favour of the landlord far outweigh the prejudice or the
inconvenience which will be caused to the tenant.
38) As far as the contention is concerned that the petitioner is
guilty of concealment, I find it pertinent to refer to the case of Nalini
Kant Gupta Vs. Lajja Gupta, 2017 SCC Delhi 10247, wherein it was
held that once the tenant has had full opportunity and the parties have
gone to trial on all facts, the petition for eviction for self requirement
cannot be dismissed on the ground of suppression. It was held that the
argument of concealment is not available in as much as no prejudice can
be said to have been suffered by the tenant after having an opportunity to
lead evidence on all pleas. Therefore, even if the petitioner had
concealed certain facts, the same is not a ground for dismissal of the
present eviction petition since the parties had an opportunity to lead
evidence.
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 40 of 42
39) Also, it is trite to state that even if the landlord has other
commercial premises available to him and even if the landlord is running
business from the said premises, since the petitioner intends to use the
premises in occupation of the tenant for need of her husband and son, the
Court cannot intervene in the same. It is not within the purview of the
courts to impose directives on the landlord regarding the nature or
quality of their chosen usage of the tenanted premises. It is the right of
the petitioner to look after his affairs and if the tenanted premises is
suitable as per his needs, he has every right to possess the said premises
and the respondent cannot contend that he should manage his work
otherwise. Further, I also find it relevant to refer to the observation of the
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the matter bearing RC Rev. 411/2019 titled
as Kuldeep Singh Baweja Vs. Amarjeet Singh Khurana dated 11.07.2020
wherein it was observed by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court that the fact
that landlord is doing business from various other premises cannot
foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted premises so long as
he intends to use the said tenanted premises for his own business.
40) Hence, in the light of the aforesaid observations and findings, I
find that petitioner has been able to establish her bonafide need and
respondent has failed to show any suitable alternative accommodation
for the said bonafide need.
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 41 of 42
RELIEF
41) Therefore, I find that the petitioner has established the
ingredients of the eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC
Act on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. Accordingly, eviction
petition stands allowed and eviction order is passed in terms of Section
14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act in favour of the petitioner and
against the respondent with respect to the tenanted premises i.e. one shop
situated at ground floor at property bearing no. 2736, Chowk Kishan
Ganj, Teliwara, Delhi- 110006 and more specifically shown in red color
in the site plan Ex. PW-1/1. File be consigned to the record room.
Digitally signed by
RUPINDER RUPINDER SINGH
SINGH DHIMAN
Date: 2025.07.22
DHIMAN 17:05:58 +0530
(RUPINDER SINGH DHIMAN)
ARC-01, Central District, THC
Delhi/22.07.2025
RC ARC No. 13/2022 Babita Vs. Subhash Chand Page no. 42 of 42