Gauhati High Court
Bail Appln./1100/2025 on 9 May, 2025
GAHC010075382025
2025:GAU-AS:5773
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
BAIL APPLICATION NO.1100 OF 2025
Arun Khundongbam @ Nanao,
S/o- Kh. Ingobi Singh,
R/o- Vill: Sikhong Bazaar,
P.O.- Yairipok, P.S.- Nongpok Sekmai
District- Thoubal, Manipur.
Pin- 795149
.......Petitioner
-Versus-
The Central Bureau of Investigation,
Represented by its Director, Plot No.5-B,
6th Floor, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road,
Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium Marg, New
Delhi- 110003.
.......Respondent
-BEFORE-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI
For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. R. Sekhar, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s) : Ms. M. Kumari, Retainer Counsel, CBI.
Date of Hearing : 02.05.2025.
Date of Order : 09.05.2025.
Page 1 of 24
ORDER (CAV)
Heard Mr. R. Sekhar, learned Counsel appearing
for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. M. Kumari, learned
Retainer Counsel, CBI for the sole respondent.
2. This application is filed under Section 483 BNSS
2023 seeking grant of regular bail to the accused/petitioner
i.e. Shri Arun Khundongbam @ Nanao, who was arrested
on 20.07.2023 in connection with CBI FIR No.
RC0562023S0012/CBI/SCB/Kolkata, re-registered and re-
numbered by the CBI by taking over the case from
Nongpok Sekmai Police Station being FIR No. 110(06)2023
NSK-PS, registered under Section-
153A/398/427/436/448/302/354/364/326/376/34, read
with section 25(1-C) of Arms Act, added Section 376-D of
the IPC, read with Section 3(1)d, 3(1)e, 3(1)g, 3(1)(w(i)),
3(1)z, 3(2)(iii), 3(2)(iv) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989.
3. The brief facts of the case are that pursuant to a
notification No. 12/1(4)/2023-H(CBI) dated 26.07.2023
issued by the Government of Manipur u/s 6 of the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred
to as DSPE Act), and notification F. No. 228/47/2023-AVD-
II dated 28.07.2023 issued by the Government of India,
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension, New
Delhi, under Section 5(1) of the DSPE Act, CBI/SCB/Kolkata
has re-registered RC 0562023S0012 on 28.07.2023 by
Page 2 of 24
taking over the said FIR No. 110(06)2023 NSK-PS dated
21.06.2023 of Nongpok Sekmai P.S., Thoubal District,
Manipur, and its corresponding FIR No. ZERO (91)(5)2023
SKL-PS dated 18.05.2023 of Saikul P.S. District-
Kangpokpai registered u/s- 153
A/398/427/436/448/302/354/364/326/376/34 IPC, read
with section 25(1-C) of the Arms Act, registered against
unknown miscreants numbering about 900-1000 persons.
4. Pertinent that the aforesaid case is registered on
the basis of a written complaint of one Mr. Thangboi
Vaiphei against unknown miscreants at Saikul P.S., alleging
physical assault and gang rape of women victims, murder
of the father and brother of one of the victim women, and
other offences that took place in and around other villages
on 04.05.2023. The brief case of the prosecution as
unfolded from reading of the said complaint is that it is
alleged, inter alia, that on 04.05.2023 at around 3 pm,
some unknown miscreants numbering about 900-1000
carrying sophisticated weapons and suspected to be
members of Meitei Leepun, Kangleipak Kanba Lup (KKL),
Arambai Tenggol and World Meitei Council (WMC),
Schedule Tribe Demand Committee (STDC) entered village
B. Phainom, Island Sub-Division, Kangpokpi District,
Manipur, and vandalized and burnt the houses. It is further
alleged that 5 villagers fled towards the forest and rescued
by the Nongpok Sekmai Police team; however, on the way
they were blocked by the mob, which snatched the 5
villagers from the custody of the police team. It is further
Page 3 of 24
alleged that father of one of the victims was killed on the
spot, and 3 victim women were physically forced to remove
their clothes and were stripped naked in front of the mob.
It is further alleged that one victim woman was brutally
gang raped in broad daylight and the younger brother of
the victim woman was also murdered by the members of
the mob, and the 3 victim women managed to escape from
the mob with the help of some persons. It is on the basis
of the aforesaid complaint that a case was registered on
18.05.2023 as FIR bearing No. ZERO (91)(5)2023 SKL-PS.
Thereafter, the case was transferred to Nongpok Sekmai
P.S. Thoubal district, Manipur, as it falls under the
jurisdiction of the said police station, and accordingly, FIR
No. 110(06)2023 NSK/PS dated 21.06.2023 was re-
registered.
5. During the investigation, the role of the
accused/petitioner being surfaced, he was arrested from
Nongpok Lourembam Chinglak by the Investigating Officer
on 20.07.2023. Accordingly, he was produced before the
jurisdictional Magistrate and upon being remand, he has
been in custody. Hence, the instant bail application.
6. Mr. R. Sekhar, learned Counsel for the
accused/petitioner, submits that the accused/petitioner was
arrested on suspicion. He further submits that the arresting
authority while arresting the accused/petitioner, has not
informed the grounds for arrest, and as such, the
fundamental and constitutional rights guaranteed to him
under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India have been
Page 4 of 24
totally infringed by the arresting authority. He accordingly
submits that the accused/petitioner is entitled to be
released forthwith.
7. Per contra, Ms. M. Kumari, learned Retainer
Counsel, CBI submits that the accused/petitioner was duly
informed of the grounds of his arrest, and the same were
also informed to his relatives. She accordingly submits that
the arresting authority has duly complied with the
mandatory requirement relating to arrest as contained
under Article 22 of the Constitution of India. She further
submits that there are materials available on record
indicating the involvement of the accused/petitioner in the
offence alleged. She further submits that the offence
against which the accused/petitioner has been arrested is a
heinous crime and the trial is yet to start. She further
submits that if the bail is granted, the same shall hamper
the trial. She further submits that the victims are staying
outside their village and are scared to return to their
homes. She further submits that in the event the
accused/petitioner is released on bail there is a possibility
of threat and tampering with the victims and the witnesses.
8. I have given my anxious considerations to the
arguments advanced by the learned counsels appearing for
the contending parties and have perused the materials
available on record, including the case diaries and the
scanned copies of the case records made available before
this Court.
Page 5 of 24
9. It appears that pursuant to the directions of the
Apex Court in SLP (Civil) Diary No. 19206/2023, the
Gauhati High Court issued notification on 31.08.2023
designating the Court of Special Judge, CBI, Assam at
Guwahati for trying the case relating to Manipur violence,
including the instant case. It appears that during the
pendency of the instant bail application, the CBI, after
completion of the investigation, has filed Charge-sheet
before the trial Court. It further appears that the trial Court
is yet to take cognizance of the Charge-sheet.
10. A perusal of the case record, including the case
diary, it appears that during the course of investigation,
statements of three victims as well as one witness were
recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. It further appears
that all the 3 victims and the independent witness have
disclosed the naked parading, physical and sexual assault
and gang rape of victim no.1 and victim no.2; the murder
of father and brother of victim no.1; and physical assault of
victim no.3 by the mob. It further appears that the victims
have also confirmed the name of the accused/petitioner in
their statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.,
thereby implicating him of the alleged offence.
11. It further appears that during the course of
investigation, a photo test identification parade was
conducted in accordance with law wherein victims also
identified the accused/petitioner. It further appears that
during investigation it revealed that the cause of death of
the two deceased was homicidal in nature, and the death
Page 6 of 24
of one of the deceased was due to laceration of the brain
associated with fracture, dislocation of skull bone caused
by hard and blunt force to the body and the death of the
other deceased was due to shock and hemorrhage. It
further appears from the material on record that the
accused/petitioner, along with other co-accused, was part
of the mob at the spot and played active role in the
incident involving sexual assault/gang rape, naked parading
of women victims, and murder of two relatives of one
woman victim.
12. The primary ground urged in this bail application is
as regard non-compliance of the constitutional and right
of the accused/petitioner guaranteed under Article 21 and
22(1) of the Constitution of India.
13. Apt at the outset to refer to Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, which reads as hereunder: –
“21. Protection of life and personal
liberty.–No person shall be deprived of his
life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law.”
14. Reading of the said Article, it is apparent that it is
in relation to protection of life and personal liberty and that
these two protections can only be taken away in
accordance with procedure established by law.
15. Apt also to refer to Article 22(1) and (2) of the
Constitution of India, which reads as hereunder: –
“22. Protection against arrest and detention
in certain cases.–(1) No person who is arrestedPage 7 of 24
shall be detained in custody without being
informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for
such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to
consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner
of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in
custody shall be produced before the nearest
magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of
such arrest excluding the time necessary for the
journey from the place of arrest to the court of the
magistrate and no such person shall be detained in
custody beyond the said period without the
authority of a magistrate.”
16. Reading clause (1) of the aforesaid Article, it is
clear that it gives a twofold protection to an arrested
person: firstly, he shall not be detained in custody without
being told the grounds of such an arrest, and secondly, he
shall be entitled to consult and to be defended by a legal
practitioner of his choice. Under clause (2) of the aforesaid
Article, it gives a further protection to an accused person
that upon arrest, he must be produced before the nearest
Magistrate within a period of 24 hours of his arrest.
Therefore, it is the fundamental right of an arrestee, firstly,
as soon as may be, to know the grounds of his arrest and,
secondly, to be produced before the nearest Magistrate
within 24 hours of his arrest. As such, whenever there is an
arrest, the grounds of such arrest must be told to the
arrestee, and he must be produced before the nearest
Magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest. This right is
guaranteed to the arrestee under the Constitution of India;
if it is taken away from the arrestee, it would be depriving
him of his right to liberty, which being his precious
fundamental right, such arrest would be in total violation of
Page 8 of 24
his fundamental rights. (Refer:- State of Madhya
Pradesh Vs. Shobharam and Others., reported in AIR
1966 SC 1910.)
17. Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind, let me
now examine whether the fundamental right of the
accused/petitioner to be informed of the grounds of his
arrest as soon as after his arrest is complied with or not
in the instant case. It appears from the case diary that
the accused/petitioner was arrested on 20.07.2023 at
6.49 pm by preparing an arrest memo in presence of
witnesses and giving intimation to the father of the
accused/petitioner. It further appears that the grounds
for arrest of the accused/petitioner exist in the
contemporaneous record of the local police diary. It
further appears that the accused/petitioner was produced
before the jurisdictional Magistrate through a petition on
21.07.2023, within 24 hours of his arrest. It further
appears that the accused/petitioner, upon being produced
was informed by the jurisdictional Magistrate of the
grounds of his arrest, and the accused/petitioner, upon
being asked whether his arrest is communicated to his
relatives, answered in the affirmative.
18. Apt to reproduce the remand order dated
21.07.2023, which reads as hereunder:-
“REMAND ORDER
21/07/2023
The I0 of the case namely, Shri N. Suraj Singh,
Addl SP (Law & Order), Thoubal filed anPage 9 of 24
application for allowing the production of the
accused persons for police remand via Video
Conferencing. Therein, it is stated that the present
case is being highly covered by media as well as
both bonafide and malafide various angry Civil
Society Organisations. That, there exist high
security risk to both the accused persons as well
as security personnel. It is also stated therein that
there is reported incidents of burning houses of the
accused persons yesterday as well as today
through inputs of police intelligence and sources.
That, due to the present unpredictable law and
order condition in which mobs are formed at the
drop of a hat, production of the accused persons is
very difficult. The I.0. further stated that in such
extraordinary circumstances, the option of
producing the accused persons via Video
Conferencing be allowed considering the safety of
the accused persons, police personnel and general
public.
Considering the submission of the I.O. of the
case, volatile law and order condition of the State
as it exist today and keeping in view of the safety
of the accused persons and extraordinary
circumstances, the prayer of the I.0. is allowed. As
such, the present remand application hearing is
done through the mode of Video Conferencing and
there was no disturbances in the internet network
connection during the hearing.
Today, the accused persons namely, 1)
Huirem Herodash Meitei (32), S/o Late H. Rajen
Meitei of Pechi Awang Leikai, 2) Arun
Khundongbam @ Nanao (29), S/o Kh. Ingobi Singh
of Sikhong Bazar, Nongpok Sekmai, 3) Yumlembam
Jiban Singh (18), S/o Y. Ibomcha Singh of Nongpok
Sekmai Awang Leikai and 4) Ningombam Tomba
Singh @Tomthin (21), S/o N. Biren Singh of Pechi
Awang Leikai are produced before this Court via
VC mode through Ld. APP to JMFC, Thoubal in
connection with the above referred FIR along with
the prayer for remanding the accused persons in
police custody for a period of 11 days with effect
from 21.7.23 to 31.7.23.
Page 10 of 24
The brief facts of the Prosecution is that on
21.6.23 at 4:31 pm one ZERO FIR ZERO
(91)(5)2023 SKL PS u/s
153A/398/427/436/448/302/354/364/326/376
/34 IPC & 25(1-C) A. Act from SKL PS was received
in which one complainant namely Thangboi
Vaiphei (65), S/o Late Buthen Vaiphei, Chief of B.
Phainom village, PO Yairipok, PS Nongpok Sekmai,
Kangpokpi District, Manipur lodged a written report
to OC/SKL-PS stating that on 4.5.23 at around
3:00 pm some unknown miscreants suspected to
be members of Meitei Youth Organizations, Meetei
Leepun, Kangleipak Kanba Lup (KKL), Arambai
Tenggol and World Meitei Council (WMC), Schedule
Tribe Demand Committee (STDC) numbering about
900-1000 persons carrying sophisticated weapons
like AK Rifles, SLR, INSAS and .303 Rifles
forcefully entered their village B. Phainom, Island
Sub-Division, Kangpokpi District, Manipur which is
about 68 Km South from Saikul PS. The violent mob
vandalised all the houses and burnt them to the
ground after looting all the moveable properties
and cash including furniture, electronic items,
utensils, clothes, grains, cattles, domestic animals
etc. leaving all of them homeless.
It is also stated that five villagers namely
1. Soitinkam Vaiphei (56), S/o Lalminlian Vaiphei,
2. Nengkholun Vaiphei (19), S/o Soitinkam Vaiphei,
3. Ms. Thiamthainhoi Vaiphei (21), D/o Soitinkam
Vaiphei, 4. Tingngailam Vaiphei (42), W/o
Thangboi Vaiphei and 5. Tingdoihat Vaiphei (52),
W/o Joseph Vaiphei who feared loss of life fled
towards the forest.
Later, they were rescued by Nongpok Sekmai
Police team and on their way to Nongpok Sekmai
PS, however, they were blocked on the way by the
mob and snatched them from the custody of police
team by the violent mob near Toubul (Sekmai
Khunou) which is about 2 km from Nongpok
Sekmai PS and about 3 Km from 33 AR Somrei
Post.
Further it is stated that Mr. Sotinkam
Vaiphei (56), S/o Lalminlinan Vaiphei was killed at
Page 11 of 24
the spot by the mob and all three women were
physically forced to remove their clothes and were
stripped naked in front of the mob. Miss
Thiamthianhoi Vaiphei (21), D/o Soitinkam Vaiphei
was brutally gang raped in the broad daylight in
front of the witnesses namely Nengkholun Vaiphei
(19), S/o Soitinkam Vaiphei, Mrs. Tingngailam
Vaiphei (42), w/o Thangboi Vaiphei and Tingdoihat
Vaiphei (52), W/o Joseph Vaiphei. Mr. Nengkholun
Vaiphei (19), S/o Soitinkam Vaiphei who is the
younger brother tried to defend his sister’s
modesty and life but he was murdered by the
members of the mob on the spot. The victim (Ms.
Thiamthianhoi Vaiphei) alongwith witnesses
namely Mrs. Tingngailam Vaiphei (42), w/o
Thangboi Vaiphei and Tingdoihat Vaiphei (52), W/o
Joseph Vaiphei managed to escape from the spot
with the help of some people of the areas who were
known to them.
A regular FIR No. 110 (06) 2023 NSK-PS u/s
153A/398/427/436/448/302/354/364/326/376
/34 IPC & 25 (1-C) Arms Act was registered on
21/06/2023 for further investigation.
Hence, the present application praying for
remanding the accused persons in police custody
for a period of 11 days w.e.f. 21.7.2023 to
31.7.2023 in the interest of further investigation of
the case.
The I.O. of the case also made prayer for
adding section 376DIPC, section 3(1)d, 3(1)e, 3(1)g,
3(1)w(i), 3(1)z, 3(2)(iii) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989.
The accused persons are made known about
the grounds of their arrest and was asked if their
arrests is informed to their relatives. All the
accused persons answered in affirmative. This
Court also enquired about the medical condition of
all the accused persons. The accused persons
replied that they do not have any such medical
condition or had such history of medical condition.
The I.O. of the case through Ld. APP also
forwarded the copy of FIR and OE pertaining to the
Page 12 of 24
case also the arrest memo of the accused persons
through Whatsapp. The same are examined and
perused. The extract copy of the CD is also
forwarded alongwith the present application
through Whatsapp and same is perused.
Heard the submission of Shri. Tipoo
Ningombam, Id. APP of the State as well as
remand objection made by Shri. Yumnam Johnson,
Deputy Legal Aid Defence Council, Thoubal for the
accused persons. Perused the documents available
on record.
Shri. Yumnam Johnson, Deputy Legal Aid
Defence Council, Thoubal for the accused persons
had objected to the remand application and
submitted that the period of detention of the
accused persons in police custody be shortened
from 11 days.
As the present case is at initial stage of
investigation and considering the serious nature of
offences alleged against the accused persons, this
Court is of view that proper and thorough
investigation is required. Considering the
submissions of the Prosecution and for smooth
investigation of the case, the detention of the
accused persons in police custody is highly
required for the purpose of investigation of the case
so as to unearth the real facts of the case. Thus,
the present remand application is allowed and the
accused persons are remanded into police custody
for a period of 11 days w.e.f 21.7.23 to 31.7.23 for
proper and further investigation of the case.
The I.0 of the case is directed to produce the
accused persons before a registered Medical Officer
for medical checkup for every 48 hours while they
are in the police custody and to provide every
required medication as prescribed or as per the
requirement of the accused persons and to provide
proper meal.
Produce the accused persons before this Court on
31.7.23.
(Ningombam Sofiarani Devi)
i/c Judicial Magistrate First Class, Thoubal.”
Page 13 of 24
19. Reading of the aforesaid remand order it is
absolutely clear that the accused/petitioner was produced
before the jurisdictional Magistrate within 24 hours of his
arrest. Therefore, clause (2) of Article 22 stands fully
complied.
20. This brings me to the first part of clause (1) of
Article 22, with which I am concerned in this case. The
requirement under the first part of Article 22(1) is that a
person arrested must be told the brief facts constituting
the grounds of his arrest as soon as may be, after the
arrest. Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be in
violation of the fundamental right of the accused
guaranteed under the said Article. Therefore, when an
accused is produced before a judicial Magistrate after
arrest, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain
whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other
mandatory safeguards has been made or not. Hence,
only when a violation of Article 22(1) is established, the
Court shall have no option but to release forthwith such
arrestee.
21. Reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court
in the case of Vihaan Kumar Vs State of Haryana and
Anr., reported in 2025 SCConline SC 269. Paragraph 21
of the aforesaid decision is reproduced hereunder for ready
reference:
“21. Therefore, we conclude:
Page 14 of 24
a) The requirement of informing a person arrested of
grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of
Article 22(1);
b) The information of the grounds of arrest must be
provided to the arrested person in such a manner that
sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the
grounds is imparted and communicated to the
arrested person effectively in the language which he
understands. The mode and method of
communication must be such that the object of the
constitutional safeguard is achieved;
c) When arrested accused alleges non-compliance
with the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will
always be on the Investigating Officer/Agency to
prove compliance with the requirernents of Article
22(1);
d) Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation
of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed
by the said Article. Moreover, it will amount to a
violation of the right to personal liberty guaranteed by
Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, non-
compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1)
vitiates the arrest of the accused. Hence, further
orders passed by a criminal court of remand are also
vitiated. Needless to add that it will not vitiate the
investigation, charge sheet and trial. But, at the same
time, filing of chargesheet will not validate a breach of
constitutional mandate under Article 22(1);
e) When an arrested person is produced before a
Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the
Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with
Article 22(1) and other mandatory safeguards has
been made; and
f) When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is
the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of
the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even
if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The
statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the
court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21
and 22 of the Constitution is established.”
22. In the present case, it is apparent from the
aforesaid remand order that the accused/petitioner was
informed of the grounds of his arrest upon being
Page 15 of 24
produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate within the
stipulated period of time. That apart, it is further
apparent that the grounds of such arrest were also
informed to his relatives. That apart, the jurisdictional
Magistrate, after hearing the accused/petitioner and
satisfying itself that the mandatory requirement of arrest
had been complied with, ordered remand of the
accused/petitioner. The short question thus is whether
the grounds of arrest being made known to the
accused/petitioner by the jurisdictional Magistrate upon
being produced within 24 hours of his arrest is sufficient
compliance with Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India
or not.
23. Undoubtedly, no fixed time is provided under
clause (1) of Article 22 within which the information of
the grounds of arrest is to be provided to the arrestee.
However, what is provided thereunder is that, when a
person is arrested, he is required to be informed “as soon
as may be” of the grounds of his arrest. Thus, the
expression “as soon as may be,” as appearing in clause
(1) of Article 22 assumes significance. In common
parlance the said expression “as soon as may be” would
mean “as early as possible” or “within a reasonable
convenient period of time.” No straight jacket formula
can be adopted to calculate as what would be a
reasonable convenient period of time to construe the
expression “as soon as may be” as appearing in clause
(1) of Article 22. The mandatory safeguards under Article
Page 16 of 24
22(1) must be protected, not jettisoned. However, what
cannot be overlooked is that the protection that is
provided by the Constitution to an arrestee is that he
should not be kept in custody/detention without being
informed of the grounds of his arrest and that he is
mandatorily required to be produced before the nearest
Magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest. The object of
informing the arrestee is to enable him to make his
representation against the order. Therefore, the
combined effect of clause (1) and clause (2) of Article 22
is undoubtedly that if an arrestee is informed about his
arrest upon being produced before the jurisdictional
Magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest, the same would
be sufficient compliance with Article 22(1).
24. It would be worthwhile to mention that the Apex
Court has held in the case of Pankaj Bansal v. Union
of India, which is reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576, that
the grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing to
the accused. However, the case of Pankaj Bansal
(Supra) can be made applicable only to arrests made
after the said decision rendered by the Apex Court on
03.10.2023. In other words, in respect of arrest made
after 03.10.2023, an arrestee must not only be made
known the grounds of arrest, but the same must also be
communicated in writing.
25. Reference is made to the decision of the Apex
Court in the case of Ram Kishore Arora Vs.
Directorate of Enforcement, reported in (2024) 7
Page 17 of 24
SCC 599. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid
judgment are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:-
“17. It is true that the expression “as soon as may
be has not been specifically explained in Vijay
Madanlal Choudharys. Even the said expression
has not been interpreted in either V. Senthil Balaji
or in Pankaj Bansal case. In V. Senthil Balaji, it is
held, inter alia, that after forming a reason to
believe that the person has been guilty of an
offence punishable under PMLA, the officer
concerned is at liberty to arrest him, while
performing his mandatory duty of recording the
reasons, and that the said exercise has to be
followed by way of an information being served on
the arrestee of the grounds of arrest.
18. In Pankaj Bansal case also the court after
highlighting the inconsistent practice being
followed by the respondent ED about the mode of
informing the person arrested, held that it would be
necessary henceforth, that a copy of such written
grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested
person as a matter of course and without
exception.
19. In view of the above, the interpretation of the
expression „as soon as may be‟ assumes
significance. In our opinion, the interpretation of the
said expression should not detain us more in view
of the Constitution Bench judgment in Abdul Jabar
Butt v. State of J&K. In the said case, the
Constitution Bench while interpreting Section 8 of
the Jammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention Act,
2011, had an occasion to interpret the expression
„as soon as may be‟ and it observed thus: (SCC
OnLine SC para 6)
„6. Sub-section (1) imposes on the
Government two duties, namely. (i) the duty
of communicating to the detenue the grounds
on which the order has been made and (ii)
the duty of affording him the earliest
opportunity of making representation against
the order to the Government. The first duty is
to be performed „as soon as may be‟. QuitePage 18 of 24
clearly the period of time predicated by the
phrase „as soon as may be‟ begins to run
from the time the detention in pursuance of
the detention order begins. The question is-
what is the span of time, which is
designated by the words „as soon as may
be‟? The observations of Dysant, J. in King’s
Old Country Ltd. v. Liquid Carbonic Can.
Corpn. Ltd., WWR at p. 606 quoted in
Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn., Vol. 1.
p. 200 are apposite. Said the learned Judge
to do a thing „as soon as possible‟ means to
do it within a reasonable time, with an
understanding to do it within the shortest
possible time. Likewise to communicate the
grounds „as soon as may be‟ may well be
said to mean to do so within a reasonable
time with an understanding to do it within
the shortest possible time. What, however, is
to be regarded as a reasonable time or the
shortest possible time? The words „as soon
as may be‟ came for consideration before
this Court in Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab.
At SCC p. 175, para 9 this Court observed
that the expression meant with a „reasonable
dispatch‟ and then went on to say that ‘what
was reasonable must depend on the facts of
each case and no arbitrary time limit could
be set down.‟ In Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar v.
State of Bombay the word „forthwith‟
occurring in Section 3(3) of the Preventive
Detention Act (4 of 1950) came up for
consideration. After observing that the word
„forthwith‟ occurring in Section 3(3) of that
Act did not mean the same thing as „as soon
as may be‟ used in Section 7 of the same Act
and that the former was more peremptory
than the latter, this Court observed that the
time that was allowed to the authority to
communicate the grounds to the detenu and
was predicated by the expression „as soon
as may be‟; was what was „reasonably
convenient‟ or „reasonably requisite‟.
Page 19 of 24
20. Again, a three-Judge Bench in Durga Pada
Ghosh v. State of W.B.26 while considering the
scheme of Article 22 of the Constitution held as
under: (SCC p. 664, para 8)
„8. The scheme underlying Article 22 of the
Constitution highlights the importance
attached in our constitutional set-up to the
personal freedom of an individual. Clauses
(1) and (2) refer to the protection against
arrest and detention of a person under the
ordinary law. Persons arrested or detained
under a law providing for preventive
detention are dealt with in Clauses (4) to (7).
Clauses (5) says that when a person is
detained in pursuance of an order under a
law providing for preventive detention the
grounds on which the order is made have to
be communicated to the person concerned as
soon as may be and he has to be afforded
earliest opportunity to represent against the
order. The object of communicating the
grounds is to enable the detenu to make his
representation against the order. The words
„as soon as may be‟ in the context must
imply anxious care on the part of the
authority concerned to perform its duty in
this respect as early as practicable without
avoidable delay.‟
21. In view of the above, the expression „as soon
as may be‟ contained in Section 19 PMLA is
required to be construed as- „as early as possible
without avoidable delay‟ or „within reasonably
convenient‟ or „reasonably requisite period of time‟.
Since by way of safeguard a duty is cast upon the
officer concerned to forward a copy of the order
along with the material in his possession to the
adjudicating authority immediately after the arrest
of the person, and to take the person arrested to
the court concerned within 24 hours of the arrest,
in our opinion, the reasonably convenient or
reasonably requisite time to inform the arrestee
about the grounds of his arrest would be twenty-
four hours of the arrest.
Page 20 of 24
22. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, it has been
categorically held that so long as the person has
been informed about the grounds of his arrest, that
is sufficient compliance with mandate of Article
22(1) of the Constitution. It is also observed that
the arrested person before being produced before
the Special Court within twenty-four hours or for
that purposes of remand on each occasion, the
Court is free to look into the relevant records made
available by the authority about the involvement of
the arrested person in the offence of money-
laundering. Therefore, in our opinion the person
arrested, if he is informed or made aware orally
about the grounds of arrest at the time of his arrest
and is furnished a written communication about
the grounds of arrest as soon as may be i.e. as
early as possible and within reasonably convenient
and requisite time of twenty-four hours of his
arrest, that would be sufficient compliance of not
only Section 19 PMLA but also of Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India.
23. As discernible from the judgment in Pankaj
Bansal case also noticing the inconsistent practice
being followed by the officers arresting the persons
under Section 19 PMLA, directed to furnish the
grounds of arrest in writing as a matter of course,
„henceforth‟, meaning thereby from the date of the
pronouncement of the judgment. The very use of
the word „henceforth‟ implied that the said
requirement of furnishing grounds of arrest in
writing to the arrested person as soon as after his
arrest was not mandatory or obligatory till the date
of the said judgment. The submission of the
learned Senior Counsel Mr Singhvi for the appellant
that the said judgment was required to be given
effect retrospectively cannot be accepted when the
judgment itself states that it would be necessary
„henceforth‟ that a copy of such written grounds of
arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a
matter of course and without exception. Hence,
non-furnishing of grounds of arrest in writing till
the date of pronouncement of judgment in Pankaj
Bansal case could neither be held to be illegal nor
the action of the officer concerned in not furnishing
Page 21 of 24
the same in writing could be faulted with. As such,
the action of informing the person arrested about
the grounds of his arrest is a sufficient compliance
of Section 19 PMLA as also Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India, as held in Vijay Madanlal.”
26. Reading the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court,
it is clear that for arrests made prior to the
pronouncement of judgment in Pankaj Bansal (Supra),
so long as the arrestee has been informed about his
arrest at the time he is produced within the stipulated
prescribed period of time under Article 22(2), it would
construe sufficient compliance with the mandate of Article
22(1) of the Constitution of India. In other words, it was
not mandatory to communicate the grounds of arrest in
writing prior to the pronouncement of the said judgment.
27. In the present case, the accused/petitioner was
arrested on 20.07.2023, and therefore, the decision of
the Apex Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal (Supra) is
not applicable. Hence, the arrest of the
accused/petitioner cannot be held to be illegal. Viewed
thus, I am of the unhesitant view that in the facts of the
present case Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India has
been sufficiently complied with. That being so, no
violation of Article 22(1) is made out in the instant case.
28. I cannot be unmindful of the seriousness of the
nature of the allegations against the accused/petitioner in
the case at hand, the severity of punishment in case of
conviction against the alleged offences and also the fact
that cognizance is yet to be taken by the trial Court. That
Page 22 of 24
apart, it appears that the victims as well as the witnesses
have implicated the accused/petitioner for the alleged
offences and that one of the victims, whose father and
brother are alleged to have been murdered by the
accused/petitioner, has also identified the
accused/petitioner to be one of the perpetrators. Thus,
there is prima-facie material available on record indicating
the involvement of the accused/petitioner in the offences
alleged. I also cannot disregard the fact that the victims
are yet to depose before the trial Court. Furthermore, the
apprehension of the prosecution that there is every
possibility of the accused/petitioner threatening and
tampering with the victims and witnesses if is released on
bail can also not be disregarded by this Court in the
peculiarity of the facts and circumstances of the case.
29. There is no quarrel with the proposition that at the
stage of granting bail, this Court is not punishing the
accused. It is well settled that the grant or refusal of bail
is the discretion of the Court and the same should be
exercised judiciously. I am reminded of the age-old
principle propounded by the Apex Court in the case of
Gurbaksh Singh Vs. the State of Punjab, reported in
AIR 1980 SC 1632, that the grant of bail is the rule and
refusal is the exception. However, in the backdrop of the
rare facts and circumstances of the instant case, I shall
not be justified if I do not make an exception to the said
rule.
Page 23 of 24
30. Thus, keeping in mind, amongst other
circumstances of the case, the seriousness of the
offences, the prima-facie case against the
accused/petitioner, the possibility of the
accused/petitioner threatening and tampering the victims
and witnesses, and the larger interest of the public vis-a-
viz Article 21 of the Constitution of India, I am of the firm
opinion that bail at this stage cannot be granted to the
accused/petitioner. Accordingly, the prayer for grant of
bail stands rejected.
31. It is needless to clarify that the observation made
in course of consideration of the bail shall not have any
bearing on the independent judicial discretion of the trial
Court.
32. Resultantly the bail application stands dismissed.
33. Return the case diary and original records of the
trial Court.
34. Certified copy of the remand order as placed by
Ms. M. Kumari, learned Retainer Counsel, CBI is kept on
record and marked as “X”.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
Page 24 of 24
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