Introduction
The principle of finality in judicial proceedings is a cornerstone of procedural law, aiming to prevent indefinite litigation and ensure certainty in legal outcomes. A significant manifestation of this principle is reflected in Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which limits the scope for intra-court appeals within High Courts. The recent judgment of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh in Attiqa Bano v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. (LPA Nos. 224 & 225 of 2023), delivered on 30 May 2025, reinforces this principle by unequivocally holding that an intra-court appeal under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is barred when a Single Judge decides an appeal arising from a subordinate court’s decree or order—even if that appeal pertains to a special enactment like the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
The ruling not only clarifies the scope and operation of Section 100-A but also resolves confusion regarding its applicability to appellate orders under special statutes. The Court’s interpretation underscores the legislative intent to streamline appellate remedies and restrict multiplicity of proceedings, thereby fortifying judicial efficiency and finality. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the judgment, its legal context, and its broader implications for civil and appellate procedure.
Factual Background and Procedural History
The litigation arose from a motor accident claim filed by the appellant, Attiqa Bano, who suffered permanent disablement due to a road traffic accident. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Kupwara, passed an award on 30 November 2019 granting her compensation of ₹5,45,600 with interest at 7.5% per annum.
Aggrieved by the quantum, both parties filed cross-appeals. The appellant challenged the insufficiency of the compensation in Mac App No. 69/2021, while the insurer contested the award in Mac App No. 71/2021. These appeals were clubbed and disposed of by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 1 September 2023.
The Single Judge reduced the compensation to ₹2,33,200 while maintaining the interest rate. Dissatisfied, the claimant filed LPA Nos. 224 & 225 of 2023 under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, leading to the present judgment by a Division Bench.
Identification of Legal Issues
The case centered on the following core legal issue:
- Whether an intra-court appeal under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is maintainable against a judgment passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction?
This issue required interpretation of the interplay between Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Arguments of the Parties
For the Appellant (Claimant):
The claimant’s counsel argued in favour of maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeals, relying on the general right of appeal under Clause 12. The emphasis was placed on the nature of the dispute arising from a special enactment — the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — and not a conventional civil suit.
For the Respondent (Insurer):
The counsel for the National Insurance Company objected to the maintainability of the appeals on a preliminary ground. It was asserted that Section 100-A of CPC unequivocally bars a second appeal from a judgment of a Single Judge, even when the appeal arises under a special statute like the Motor Vehicles Act. The respondent argued that the MACT award, by virtue of Section 169(4) of the MV Act, is deemed a decree, thereby attracting the bar under Section 100-A CPC.
Court’s Analysis and Reasoning
The Division Bench (Justices Sanjeev Kumar and Sanjay Parihar) undertook a rigorous textual and purposive analysis of Section 100-A of CPC and its relationship with Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.
- Statutory Interpretation:
The Court held that Section 100-A, by its non-obstante clause (“notwithstanding anything contained”), overrides any provision of the Letters Patent or other law. It categorically bars a further appeal against judgments rendered by a Single Judge in appellate jurisdiction, even in matters arising under special statutes like the MV Act. - Doctrine of Overriding Effect:
The Court emphasized that the intention of the legislature is to limit the number of appeals to avoid prolonged litigation. The use of “notwithstanding” gives Section 100-A primacy over Clause 12, regardless of the nature of the original proceeding. - Nature of MACT Award:
Referring to Section 169(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Court reiterated that the award of the Tribunal is treated as a decree, and therefore, the appeal therefrom is governed by the same procedural regime. - Precedential Affirmation:
The Court followed established precedent interpreting the bar created by Section 100-A CPC, affirming the trend of narrowing intra-court appeal avenues.
Final Conclusion and Holding
The High Court conclusively held that:
“An intra-Court appeal under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is not maintainable against an order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction against an original or appellate decree or order passed by Courts subordinate to the High Court.”
Consequently, both LPAs filed by the appellant were dismissed as not maintainable.
FAQs:
1. Can a person file a second appeal in the High Court after a Single Judge’s decision?
No, if the Single Judge hears the matter in appellate jurisdiction, Section 100-A of CPC bars any further intra-court appeal, even under the Letters Patent.
2. What does Section 100-A of the Civil Procedure Code state?
Section 100-A CPC prohibits further appeals from decisions made by a Single Judge of the High Court when acting in appellate jurisdiction, overriding any contrary provisions in special laws or Letters Patent.
3. Is an award by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal treated like a civil court decree?
Yes, under Section 169(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, a MACT award is treated as a decree, thereby making appeals from it subject to the CPC framework.
4. Do special enactments like the Motor Vehicles Act override Section 100-A CPC?
No, the bar under Section 100-A applies even to appeals arising from special statutes, unless such statute expressly provides a further appellate remedy.
5. What is Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, and when does it apply?
Clause 12 permits intra-court appeals within the High Court, but this right is subject to statutory limitations like Section 100-A CPC, which overrides it in appellate matters.
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