Supreme Court of India
Basheera Khanum vs City Municipal Council on 31 July, 2025
Author: Aravind Kumar
Bench: Aravind Kumar
2025 INSC 955
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 9317 OF 2014
BASHEERA KHANUM ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE CITY MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL AND ANOTHER ….RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. The instant appeal is directed against the final
judgment dated 29th July, 2011 passed by the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore1 in Regular Second
Appeal No. 3394 of 2006, whereby the second appeal
preferred by respondent No. 1-City Municipal
Council2 was allowed.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
KANCHAN CHOUHAN
Date: 2025.08.11 1 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘High Court’
16:59:41 IST
Reason: 2 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘respondent no. 1-CMC’.
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3. The appellant Basheera Khanum3 was the
plaintiff, and respondent No. 1-CMC was defendant
No.1 in the original suit proceedings, which were
instituted seeking the relief of declaration and
permanent injunction.
4. The High Court, while accepting the second
appeal, reversed the judgment and decree dated 13th
September, 2006 passed by the first appellate Court,
i.e., Additional Sessions Judge and Presiding Officer,
Fast Track Court-III, Kolar4 in Regular Appeal No. 2
of 1999. The first appellate Court had dismissed the
appeal preferred by respondent No. 1-CMC, and
affirmed the judgment and decree dated 23rd October,
1998 passed by the Principal Civil Judge (Sr.
Division), Kolar5 in O.S. No. 113 of 1997 in favour of
the appellant-plaintiff.
Facts of the case
5. The dispute between the parties pertains to two
plots of land, bearing plot6 No. 394 and plot No. 395
(corresponding to bank site No. 2), which were
3 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘appellant-plaintiff’ or ‘appellant’
4 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘first appellate Court’.
5 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘trial Court’.
6 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘plot’ or ‘site’
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auctioned by respondent No. 1-CMC. Admittedly,
respondent No. 2-T.M. Prabhudeva7 (original
defendant No. 2 before the trial Court) purchased plot
No. 395 in the first auction held on 25th April, 1973.
The sale deed in favour of respondent No. 2-
Prabhudeva was executed by respondent No. 1-CMC
in the year 1988, wherein an error crept in as the plot
number was inadvertently mentioned as 394 instead
of 395. The auction purchaser, respondent No. 2-
Prabhudeva, upon realizing the said error in the sale
deed, moved an application dated 24th July, 1992 for
rectification of the mistake of plot number and for
demarcation of the plot. Respondent No. 1-CMC
appointed its Junior Engineer to inspect the site and
furnish a report regarding the same. The Junior
Engineer conducted the site inspection and reported
that plot No. 394 was auctioned to the appellant and
bank site No. 2, which is plot No. 395, had been
purchased by respondent No. 2-Prabhudeva. Acting
on the report prepared by the Junior Engineer,
respondent No. 1-CMC passed a Resolution dated
10th August, 1992, rectifying the mistake that
7 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘respondent no. 2-Prabhudeva’
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occurred in the plot number mentioned in the sale
deed and affirming that it was actually plot No. 395
which had been sold to respondent No. 2-
Prabhudeva. It has been the contention of the
appellant that respondent No. 2-Prabhudeva has
executed an agreement to sell the said plot, i.e. plot
No. 395, on 12th August, 1992.
6. However, after respondent No. 2-Prabhudeva
had parted with the plot No. 395, he got greedy and
colluding with respondent No. 1-CMC, he got a
meeting convened, wherein a Resolution was drawn
to the effect that there was no mistake in executing
the original sale deed in favour of respondent No. 2-
Prabhudeva, which rightly conveyed plot No. 394.
Accordingly, a Resolution dated 29th March, 1993
was drawn up to the effect that the sale deed issued
in favour of the appellant for plot No. 394 be
cancelled. Based on the said resolution, respondent
No. 2-Prabhudeva tried to interfere with the
possession of the appellant over plot No. 394,
purchased in the auction held on 24th June, 1977.
7. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed a suit,
impleading both the respondents, and sought a
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declaration that she was the successful bidder for
plot No. 394, and that respondent No. 2-Prabhudeva
had purchased plot No. 395. She also sought an
injunction, restraining the defendants (respondents
herein) in the original suit, from interfering with her
possession over plot No. 394.
8. The trial Court framed the following issues for
determination: –
1. Whether the Plaintiff proves that she is the
bonafide purchaser of the ‘A’ Schedule property
as alleged?
2. Whether the 2nd Defendant proves that he is
the bonafide purchaser of ‘A’ Schedule property
mentioned in the schedule of the plaint.
3. Whether the Plaintiff proves that she is in
actual and lawful possession of the suit
schedule property?
4. Whether the Plaintiff is illegally
interference of the Defendant as alleged?
5. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for D relief of
declaration sought for?
6. Whether the Plaintiff entitled for permanent
injunction sought for?
7. What order or decree?
Addl. Issue:
Whether the suit of the Plaintiff is barred by
limitation?
9. During the pendency of the suit proceedings,
the appellant filed an application, seeking a direction
to respondent No. 1-CMC to produce all the records
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pertaining to the auction held on 24th June, 1977.
However, respondent No.1-CMC failed to produce the
records in spite of the pertinent direction given by the
trial Court.
10. Upon thorough appreciation of the evidence
placed on record by the parties, the trial Court held
that respondent No. 1-CMC failed to produce the
documents pertaining to the auction of plot No. 394
sold to the plaintiff, i.e., appellant herein. The
appellant’s suit was decreed by drawing an adverse
inference against respondent No. 1-CMC. The
auction proceedings dated 24th June, 1977 were held
to be valid. The plaintiff, i.e., appellant herein, was
found to be the highest bidder for plot No. 394 for a
sum of Rs. 16,300/-, which she paid vide receipt Nos.
5185 dated 24th June, 1977, and 5186 dated 11th
July, 1977. The sale certificate issued on 5th
November, 1980 was declared to be conferring a valid
title in favour of the plaintiff, i.e., appellant herein.
11. The stand taken by respondent No. 1-CMC, that
there was confusion in respect of plot Nos. 394 and
395, was held to be invalid and unsustainable. The
trial Court noted that respondent No. 2-Prabhudeva
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had himself moved the application for rectification of
the plot number from 394 to 395 in his sale
certificate, which disentitled him to raise a fresh
dispute in relation to the same.
12. The documents of the appellant having been
found genuine, the trial Court held that in case
respondent No. 1-CMC desired to contradict these
documents, then the original records pertaining to
the proceedings of the auction of plot No. 394 should
have been produced before the Court. The trial Court
also held that the Resolution dated 29th March, 1993,
holding that plot No. 394 was sold to respondent No.
2-Prabhudeva, was invalid and non est in the eyes of
law. Accordingly, the appellant was declared to be the
bona fide purchaser and true owner of plot No. 394
in the auction held on 24th June, 1977.
13. It was also held that the appellant was in
possession of plot No. 394 and accordingly, the suit
was decreed in favour of the appellant vide judgment
and decree dated 23rd October, 1998.
14. Respondent No. 1-CMC assailed the said
judgment and decree of the trial Court, by filing
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Regular Appeal No. 2 of 1999 before the first appellate
Court. Respondent No. 2-Prabhudeva did not
challenge the judgment of the trial Court.
15. The first appellate Court, vide judgment dated
13th September, 2006, dismissed the appeal preferred
by respondent No. 1-CMC and affirmed the
judgement and decree of the trial Court.
16. Aggrieved, respondent No. 1-CMC preferred a
second appeal to the High Court, questioning the
concurrent judgments of the first appellate Court and
the trial Court. As stated above, the High Court, vide
judgment dated 29th July, 2011 allowed the said
second appeal and reversed the concurrent findings
of the courts below.
17. The High Court held, in its judgment, that no
material was placed on record to substantiate and
prove the sale certificate issued to the plaintiff
(appellant herein). The burden was upon the plaintiff
to prove the genuineness of the said document. Since
she failed to discharge the said burden, the findings
of the appellate Court and the trial Court were held
to be unsupported by evidence, and accordingly, the
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second appeal was allowed, thereby reversing the
judgment and decree passed in favour of the
appellant-plaintiff. The said judgment of the High
Court dated 29th July, 2011 is assailed by the
appellant-plaintiff in this appeal by special leave.
Submissions on behalf of the appellant
18. Smt. Anjana Chandrashekar, learned counsel
representing the appellant, placed reliance on
Section 376 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act,
1964, which reads as below: –
“376. Admissibility of document or entry as
evidence. (1) A copy of any receipt, application,
plan, notice, order or other document or of any
entry in a register in the possession of the
municipal council shall, if duly certified by the
Municipal Commissioner or the Chief Officer,
be admissible in evidence of the existence of
the document or entry, and shall be admitted
as evidence of the matter and transactions,
therein recorded in every case where and to the
same extent to which the original document or
entry would, if produced, have been admissible
to prove such matters and transactions.
(2) No municipal officer or other employee
shall, in any legal proceedings to which the
municipal council is not a party, be required to
produce any register or document the contents
of which can be proved under sub-section (1)
be a certified copy, or to appear as a witness to
prove any matter or transaction recorded
therein save by order of the court made for
special cause.”9
19. She urged that a bare reading of sub-section (1)
of this provision would make it clear that certified
copies of documents in possession of the Municipal
Council, and duly certified by the Municipal
Commissioner or the Chief Officer, as the case may
be, carry the same legal sanctity as the original
documents, and are admissible as valid evidence of
the existence and contents of the original documents.
20. Learned counsel urged that the certified copies
of the documents pertaining to the auction and sale
of plot No. 394 to the appellant herein, issued by
respondent No. 1-CMC, were produced on record by
the appellant in support of the plaint. The
genuineness and admissibility of such documents is
given an imprimatur by the statutory provision
mentioned above. In case respondent No.1-CMC
intended to question the genuineness of these
documents, then the onus was upon respondent
No.1-CMC to produce the contemporaneous record to
rebut the documents relied upon by the appellant
herein.
21. The respondent No. 1-CMC not only failed to
discharge this burden, but rather, it flouted the
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pertinent direction given by the trial Court on an
application filed by the appellant requesting for
production of the original record.
22. She further urged that the trial Court had
drawn an adverse inference against respondent No.
1-CMC on account of the fact that the original
records pertaining to the auction of 1977 were not
produced by it, despite a pertinent direction to that
effect. However, the High Court failed to advert to
this crucial aspect of the matter and, in a very
cursory manner, overturned the concurrent findings
of the Courts below.
23. Learned counsel further urged that respondent
No. 1-CMC failed to offer any explanation regarding
mistake of the plot number in the documents of
respondent No. 2-Prabhudeva, who himself did not
contest the suit and also failed to assail the findings
recorded by the trial Court, particularly on the
significant aspect of action taken on his own
application for rectification of the plot number from
394 to 395 in the contemporaneous records. Thus,
as per the learned counsel, the said finding of the trial
Court has attained finality. The learned counsel for
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the appellant urged that the High Court had
committed a grave error in interfering with the
concurrent findings of facts recorded in the
judgments of the Courts below. The second appeal
was allowed without there being any substantial
question of law, and hence, the impugned judgment
of the High Court should be set aside.
Submissions on behalf of respondent No. 1-CMC
24. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.
1-CMC supported the judgment of the High Court.
He urged that the claim of the appellant regarding
having purchased plot No. 394 in the auction held on
24th June, 1977 was not supported by documentary
evidence and hence, the High Court was justified in
observing that the appellant failed to substantiate
her claim. Since the appellant was the plaintiff in the
original suit proceedings, the burden to prove the
factum of purchase of the plot in auction was upon
the appellant, which she failed to discharge. Thus,
as per learned counsel, the impugned judgment
rendered by the High Court is unassailable in facts
and law, and does not require any interference by this
Court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction
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conferred by virtue of Article 136 of the Constitution
of India.
Decision and Analysis:
25. We have given our thoughtful consideration to
the submissions advanced at the bar and have
perused the judgments of the trial Court, the first
appellate Court, and the High Court, as well as the
material available on record.
26. At the outset, we may note that the High Court,
while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seems to have
undertaken a roving factual inquiry for interfering
with the well-reasoned judgment of the trial Court
decreeing the suit in favour of the appellant, as
affirmed by the first appellate Court.
27. The reasoning assigned by the High Court in the
impugned judgment, that the burden lay upon the
appellant to fortify the factum of purchase of plot No.
394 in the auction and that she failed to discharge
this burden, was recorded in sheer ignorance of the
evidence on record and is absolutely perverse. There
is no dispute that the appellant had placed on record
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the certified copies of the documents pertaining to the
auction proceedings held on 24th June, 1977, in
which she was declared to be the highest bidder for
plot No. 394. These documents included the money
receipts, evidencing the deposit of the bid amount by
the appellant, and also the documents pertaining to
allotment of plot No. 395 made to respondent No. 2-
Prabhudeva. The minutes of the meeting dated 10th
August, 1992 convened by respondent No. 1-CMC,
whereby the plot number of respondent No. 2-
Prabhudeva was altered from 394 to 395, were also
placed on record by the appellant and were not
disputed by any of the parties to the lis. The
appellant had taken a specific plea that respondent
No. 2-Prabhudeva entered into an agreement for
selling plot No. 395 to another person during the
pendency of the suit proceedings. This fact was also
not disputed by respondent No. 2-Prabhudeva, who
unsurprisingly did not contest any of the
proceedings. There was wholesome evidence,
documentary as well as oral, on the record to
establish beyond the shadow of doubt that the
appellant had purchased plot No. 394 in the auction
held on 24th June, 1977. Moreover, it has also been
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established that such sale had been fructified with
the payment of the auction money and issuance of
the sale certificate, which was a duly registered
document. Respondent No. 1-CMC, by virtue of the
Resolution drawn in its meeting dated 29th March,
1993, tried to set at naught the registered sale
certificate issued to the appellant, which
tantamounts to a gross illegality.
28. We may record that generally and subject to
exceptions as may be provided by statute, a valid
registered document conveying immovable property
cannot be annulled by any procedure other than a
civil suit. In any event, cancellation of such a valid
document of title by simply drawing a resolution in a
board meeting is illegal on the face of the record.
Such grossly illegal and high-handed action deserves
to be deprecated.
29. The view taken by the High Court that the
appellant failed to establish and fortify the sale deed
issued to her is conjectural and erroneous on the face
of the record. The appellant filed a suit for declaration
and injunction, premising her claim on the purchase
of plot No. 394 in an open auction. She had placed
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the copies of the contemporaneous documents on
record to fortify her claim. The original documents
pertaining to the auction were unquestionably in the
possession of respondent No. 1-CMC, who failed to
bring the same on record despite a specific direction
given by the trial Court, thus inviting adverse
inference and rightly so.
30. Apart from a bald assertion that the documents
relied upon by the appellant regarding the purchase
of plot No. 394 were fabricated, no substantive
evidence was produced by respondent No. 1-CMC to
prove this theory. If at all these documents were
fabricated and the said fact had come to the
knowledge of the officers of respondent No. 1-CMC
way back in the year 1992-1993, the first step which
they would be expected to take would be to lodge an
FIR. Further, respondent no. 1-CMC has failed to
produce the original documents before the trial
Court, even after trial Court had directed to produce
such documents.
31. Resultantly, we are of the view that the High
Court misdirected itself in holding that the appellant
failed to substantiate the case set up by her in the
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plaint. Suffice it to note that the appellant submitted
certified copies of the relevant documents, including
the sale certificate, money receipt, etc., on record,
and an application was filed on her behalf with a clear
indication that if respondent No. 1-CMC intended to
dispute the title of the appellant, then it should have
come forward with the contemporaneous record.
These documents are admissible in evidence by
virtue of Section 376 of the Karnataka Municipalities
Act, 1964.
32. The fact that respondent No. 2-Prabhudeva had
purchased plot No. 395, and not plot No. 394 (which
the appellant purchased in the auction dated 24th
June 1977), is supported by unimpeachable
documentary evidence referred above. The most
significant among them is the Resolution dated 10th
August, 1992 passed during the board meeting of
respondent No. 1-CMC, wherein the number of the
plot purchased by respondent No. 2-Prabhudeva was
rectified in the documents from 394 to 395.
33. The assertion of the appellant that pursuant to
the rectification in the plot number, respondent No.
2-Prabhudeva entered into an agreement for selling
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the said plot No. 395, is not denied. In this backdrop,
we are of the firm opinion that the impugned
judgment dated 29th July, 2011, passed by the High
Court is unsustainable in facts as well as in law, and
hence, the same is quashed and set aside.
34. The judgment and decree passed by the trial
Court decreeing the suit in favour of the appellant, as
affirmed by the first appellate Court, is restored.
35. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No order as
to costs.
36. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….……………………J.
(ARAVIND KUMAR)
……………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 31, 2025.
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