Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Bhanwar Lal vs State Of Rajasthan (2025:Rj-Jd:23885) on 16 May, 2025
Author: Manoj Kumar Garg
Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg
[2025:RJ-JD:23885]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 673/2024
Bhanwar Lal S/o Kishana Ram, Aged About 37 Years, R/o Village
And Post Neelkanth, Ps Bhadrajun, Dist Jalore.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2. Sanwal Singh S/o Pabu Singh, R/o Village And Post
Neelkanth, Ps Bhadrajun, Dist Jalore.
3. Jalam Singh S/o Pabu Singh, R/o Village And Post
Neelkanth, Ps Bhadrajun, Dist Jalore.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Khet Singh Rajpurohit
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpurohit, PP
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG
Order
16/05/2025
Instant criminal revision petition has been filed by the
petitioner/complainant under Section 397/401 Cr.P.C. against the
order dated 04.05.2023, passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/
ST Cases, Jalore in FR Case No.1/2021, whereby the learned
Judge rejected the protest petition by the petitioner/complainant
and accepted the negative final report submitted by the Police
against the accused-respondents.
The present revision petition has been listed in ‘Defect’
category as the same is barred by delay of 277 days. The
petitioner has filed an application under Section 5 of Limitation
Act.
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[2025:RJ-JD:23885] (2 of 8) [CRLR-673/2024]
Counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order
was passed by the court below on 04.05.2023 but the petitioner
could not approach the local counsel at Jalore within the
prescribed time as he is a government servant serving as driver in
District Consumer Forum, Jodhpur and is permanently residing in
Jodhpur. The petitioner during Diwali vacation went to Jalore and
obtained the complete record of the case. Thereafter, he met with
an accident. For these reasons, the petitioner was unable to file
the revision against the impugned order within the prescribed
time. Counsel further submits that the delay in filing the revision
petition was not intentional and that no party should be deprived
of justice due to an unintentional delay. Therefore, it is prayed
that the delay in filing the revision petition, being bonafide, may
be condoned and the revision petition may be heard on merits.
I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and carefully
gone through the record.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is reproduced
hereinunder for our reference:
“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain
cases.–Any appeal or any application, other than
an application under any of the provisions of Order
XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), may be admitted after the prescribed
period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the
court that he had sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal or making the application
within such period.
Explanation.–The fact that the appellant or the
applicant was misled by any order, practice or
judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or
computing the prescribed period may be sufficient
cause within the meaning of this section.”
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[2025:RJ-JD:23885] (3 of 8) [CRLR-673/2024]
A court’s principle duties are to resolve disputes between
parties and achieve substantial justice. The purpose of limiting
rules is not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant
to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their
remedy promptly. In accordance with widely accepted principles,
Section 5 grants the courts discretion over jurisdiction. The term
“sufficient cause” is to be interpreted liberally to promote
substantial justice in cases where the appellant cannot be held
accountable for any negligence, inaction, or lack of bonafides. In
the case of N. Balakrishnan vs. m. Krishnamurthy Reported in
1998 (7) SCC 123 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that:-
“It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a
matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the
Limitation Act does not say that such discretion
can be exercised only if the delay is within a
certain limit. Length of delay is no matter,
acceptability of the explanation is the only
criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range
may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable
explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay
of a very long range can be condoned as the
explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court
accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the
result of positive exercise of discretion and
normally the superior court should not disturb
such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction,
unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly
untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it
is a different matter when the first court refuses
to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior
court would be free to consider the cause shown
for the delay afresh and it is open to such
superior court to come to its own finding even
untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower
court.”
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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pathupati Subba
Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. The Special Deputy
Collector (LA) [2024] 4 S.C.R. 241 has observed as under:
“16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very
liberal approach in construing the phrase
‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to
enable the courts to do substantial justice and to
apply law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. vs. Katiji and
Ors.2, this Court in advocating the liberal
approach in condoning the delay for ‘sufficient
cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant does not
stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is
not necessary to explain every day’s delay in filing
the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to
condone delay may result in throwing out a
meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest
of justice that cause of substantial justice should
be allowed to prevail upon technical
considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it
ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the
above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in
condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’
for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition
precedent for exercising the discretionary power
to condone the delay. The phrases ‘liberal
approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and cause
for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’
cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation
so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact
dead matters to be revived and re-opened by
taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while
construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding
application under Section 5 of the Act, that on
the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed
for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of
a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not
to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats
the decree to be binding with the lapse of time(Downloaded on 19/05/2025 at 09:34:48 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:23885] (5 of 8) [CRLR-673/2024]and may proceed on such assumption creating
new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of
Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields
Ltd has emphasized that even after sufficient
cause has been shown by a party for not filing an
appeal within time, the said party is not entitled
to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay
is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the
court. The court, despite establishment of a
‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse
to condone the delay depending upon the bona
fides of the party.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, this Court held that the
discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised judiciously based upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. The expression
‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ
large. It was also observed that even though
limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties
but it has to be applied with all its rigour as
prescribed under the statute as the courts have
no choice but to apply the law as it stands and
they have no power to condone the delay on
equitable grounds.”
In the case of Harish & Anr. Vs Rajasthan Board of
Muslim waqf decided on 09.03.2017 by the co-ordinate bench of
this Court, it has been observed that:
“7. It is to be noticed that while levelling an
allegation against the counsel in not informing
the petitioner regarding the order passed by the
Estate Officer, there is no explanation set out as
to why the petitioners did not contact the
counsel for the period of 5½ years. A litigant
should be vigilant enough and should keep
himself informed about the pending proceedings
and therefore, the bald assertions on the part of
the petitioner that the counsel did not inform
about the disposal of the matter, cannot be
considered to be a plausible explanation for(Downloaded on 19/05/2025 at 09:34:48 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:23885] (6 of 8) [CRLR-673/2024]condonation of inordinate delay in filing the
petition.”
The relevant para from the case of Hussain Vs. Om
Prakash (supra) is reproduced as under:
“9. While construing Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, it is relevant to bear in mind two important
considerations. The first consideration is that the
expiration of period of limitation prescribed for
laying an appeal gives rise a right in favour of the
decree holder to treat the decree as binding
between parties. In other words, on expiry of
prescribed period of limitation the decree holder
acquires a benefit under law of limitation to
construe the decree as beyond challenge, and
this legal right which has accrued to the decree
holder by lapse of time should not be light
heartedly disturbed. The other consideration,
which is to be kept in mind by the Court is that if
sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown by
the party, Court in its discretion may condone the
delay. It is needless to emphasize here that even
after sufficient cause has been shown by a party,
it is not entitled to the condonation of delay in
question as a matter of right. The proof of a
sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in
the Court by Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Thus, the application under Section 5 of the Act
deserves rejection.”
In the case of Gauri Shankar vs Ram Sahay (supra), the
Court has held that:
“8. …….Therefore, if the appellant has chosen
not to approach the counsel for inquiry about the
progress of the case, it is his own sweet will and
he cannot now turn around and rely on the said
so called default on part of the Advocate for
seeking condonation of delay.”
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[2025:RJ-JD:23885] (7 of 8) [CRLR-673/2024]
Admittedly, the impugned order of rejecting protest petition
was passed by the trial court on 04.05.2023 and the present
revision petition along with an application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act was filed by the petitioner on 15.05.2024. Thus, the
revision is barred by 277 days i.e. almost nine months.
From the explanation provided by the petitioner in the
application for condonation of delay, it does not appear that he
was keen to prefer a revision petition against the impugned order.
Thus, the petitioner has failed to give any legitimate explanation
for the delay caused in the filing of the revision. Hence, this Court
is not satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioner for the
aforesaid delay in filing the revision.
The law states that if a case is presented beyond limitation,
the applicant must explain the “sufficient cause” for the delay. It is
against the legislative intent and the specific language of the Act
to excuse tardiness in such cases. It is not appropriate to excuse
the delay only on the grounds that the applicant did not have due
knowledge of the decision passed by the court below. It is
noteworthy that no justification for the applicants’ failure to notify
the counsel is provided. Hence, the petitioner bald claims that he
could not approach the local counsel within time, cannot be taken
seriously as a reasonable justification for the excessive delay in
filing the revision. If a party is found inactive, negligent or
unjustified, no court can condone the delay. The application must
be decided within the court’s parameters. Therefore, the reasons
mentioned by the petitioner would not suffice for the delay in filing
the present Criminal Revision Petition.
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[2025:RJ-JD:23885] (8 of 8) [CRLR-673/2024]
Therefore, I do not deem it proper to condone the delay in
filing the present revision petition.
Even on perusal of the impugned order, it appears that while
dismissing the protest petition, the learned trial court has
observed that there are major contradictions, improvements and
omissions in the statements of the witnesses and from the
evidence available on record, it appears that prima facie no case is
made out against the accused-respondents No.2 & 3, therefore,
the trial court accepted the negative final report submitted by the
police. The learned trial court has given ample reasoning in
accepting the negative final report and in dismissing the protest
petition filed by the petitioner. Thus, the impugned order is just
and proper and the same does not warrant any interference from
this Court.
Accordingly, the criminal revision petition is dismissed being
barred of limitation and being bereft of any merit.
(MANOJ KUMAR GARG),J
24-MS/-
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