Bhanwaru Khan vs State on 17 June, 2025

0
1

Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

Bhanwaru Khan vs State on 17 June, 2025

Author: Farjand Ali

Bench: Farjand Ali

[2025:RJ-JD:26821]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
             S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 607/2006

Bhanwaru Khan S/o Rahim Khan, R/o Bitur District Ajmer.
                                                                     ----Petitioner
                                      Versus
State of Rajasthan
                                                                   ----Respondent


For Petitioner(s)           :     Mr. S.K. Verma
For Respondent(s)           :     Mr. Shrawan Singh Rathore, Dy.G.A.


                HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI

Order

Reportable
Order Reserved On : 08/05/2025
Order Pronounced On : 17/06/2025

1. By way of filing this instant petition under Sections 397 and

401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner has

assailed the judgment dated 07.07.2006 passed by the

learned Sessions Judge, Balotra (Shri T.H. Samma, RHJS) in

Criminal Appeal No. 8/2004, whereby the learned appellate

court, while partly allowing the petitioner’s appeal, modified

and reduced the substantive sentences awarded to him by

the trial court and sentenced him to undergo one month’s

simple imprisonment under Section 279 IPC, three months’

simple imprisonment under Section 337 IPC, nine months’

simple imprisonment under Section 338 IPC, and one year’s

simple imprisonment under Section 304-A IPC, along with a

fine of ₹500/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further

undergo one month’s simple imprisonment, with all

(Downloaded on 19/06/2025 at 10:05:47 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:26821] (2 of 9) [CRLR-607/2006]

sentences directed to run concurrently. The petitioner has

also challenged the earlier judgment dated 26.08.2004

passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Balotra in Criminal

Case No. 123/1997, whereby he was convicted and

sentenced to six months’ rigorous imprisonment under

Section 279 IPC, six months’ rigorous imprisonment under

Section 337 IPC, one year’s rigorous imprisonment under

Section 338 IPC, and two years’ rigorous imprisonment

under Section 304-A IPC, along with a fine of ₹1,000/-, and

in default thereof, to further undergo two months’ simple

imprisonment, with all sentences directed to run

concurrently. The petitioner seeks setting aside of both the

judgments on the grounds urged in the present revision.

2. The brief facts of the case are that an FIR was lodged on

05.12.1996 by one Ashok Kumar at Police Station Kalyanpur,

alleging that on the same day, while he and his family

members were travelling in a Rajasthan Roadways bus (No.

RJ-04 P-0098) towards Pali, and the bus was being driven by

Rana Ram, a truck (No. RJ-01 G-0457), driven rashly and

negligently by one Bhanwru Khan, collided with the bus near

Balotra. The truck entered from the driver’s side, causing

injuries to several passengers including the driver and the

conductor (khalasi). One passenger, Gudi No. Satya Narayan,

died on the spot. Upon registration of the FIR, the police

investigated the matter and filed a chargesheet against the

present petitioner. The case was tried before the Judicial

(Downloaded on 19/06/2025 at 10:05:47 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:26821] (3 of 9) [CRLR-607/2006]

Magistrate, Balotra. During the trial, the prosecution

examined 20 witnesses and exhibited several documents.

The petitioner’s statement was recorded under Section 313

Cr.P.C., and one defence witness (DW-1 Shokin) was also

examined. After the conclusion of the trial, the learned

Judicial Magistrate convicted the petitioner for offences

under Sections 279, 337, 338, and 304-A IPC and sentenced

him accordingly vide judgment dated 26.08.2004. Aggrieved

by the said judgment, the petitioner preferred an appeal

before the learned Sessions Judge, Balotra, who, vide

judgment dated 07.07.2006, partly allowed the appeal and

reduced the sentence on each count. Challenging the

legality, propriety, and correctness of both the judgments,

the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the

present revision petition.

3. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone

through the materials available on record.

4. Before proceeding to analyse the merits of the impugned

conviction and sentence, this Court deems it appropriate to

advert to a significant finding recorded by the learned

Sessions Judge in the appellate judgment dated 07.07.2006.

At paragraph 8 (pages 6-7), the learned Judge has

categorically observed that:

“दोनों ही वाहन चालकों ने अपने अपने वाहनों की सड़क के बीच में प्रताया , यदि एक भी

वाहन चालक अपने वाहन को साईड में ले लेता तो इस दु र्घटना से बचा जा सकता था।

(Downloaded on 19/06/2025 at 10:05:47 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:26821] (4 of 9) [CRLR-607/2006]

वास्तव में यह दु र्घटना बस चालक एवं ट्र क चालक अभियुक्त की संयुक्त लापरवाही के

कारण घटित हुई थी। इस दु र्घटना के घटित होने में केवल मात्र अभियुक्त की ही लापरवाही

नहीं थी, बल्कि बस चालक भी दु र्घटना के घटित होने के लिए बराबर का जिम्मेदार है ,

लेकिन दु र्भा ग्यवश बस चालक को अभियोजित नहीं किया गया है , केवल मात्र ट्र क चालक

को ही अभियोजित किया गया है ।”

5. The above finding clearly reflects that the occurrence was a

consequence of joint or contributory negligence of both the

drivers involved. The learned Sessions Judge has himself

noted that if either of the drivers had taken reasonable care,

the accident could have been averted. Notably, the

Roadways bus driver was found to be equally culpable, yet,

for reasons unexplained on record, only the present

petitioner was arraigned and prosecuted. This unilateral

prosecution raises serious doubts regarding the fairness of

the investigative process and casts a shadow on the

legitimacy of the petitioner’s conviction.

6. In light of the above, and for the purpose of dispelling any

ambiguity while undertaking a further re-appreciation of

evidence, this Court has independently scrutinised the

depositions of the prosecution witnesses. A cumulative

reading of the testimonies reveals glaring inconsistencies

and a conspicuous absence of cogent evidence to

conclusively establish that the petitioner was the person

driving the truck at the relevant time:

PW-1 candidly admitted that she could not identify the driver

of the truck.

(Downloaded on 19/06/2025 at 10:05:47 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:26821] (5 of 9) [CRLR-607/2006]

PW-2 explicitly stated that he did not witness the occurrence.

PW-3 gave no testimony regarding the identity of the truck

driver.

PW-4 merely stated that the bus was being driven by Rana

Ram but did not establish who was driving the offending

truck.

PW-5 is not a witness to the factum probandum and lends no

assistance to the prosecution’s core case.

PW-6 also did not mention anything concerning the identity

of the truck driver.

PW-7 is not a witness to the principal fact in issue and hence

his testimony holds no probative value.

PW-8 affirmed that he had no knowledge about who was

driving the truck.

PW-10, while claiming to have seen the truck, initially did not

name the driver, and only in court identified the petitioner,

who was singularly standing in the dock. No prior

identification was conducted in his presence, and the manner

in which the identification was made — for the first time

during trial — severely undermines its evidentiary weight.

Notably, he also stated that he lost consciousness due to the

impact of the collision, thereby rendering his claim of

recognising the driver inherently doubtful and legally

unreliable.

PW-11 did not support the prosecution version at all.

(Downloaded on 19/06/2025 at 10:05:47 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:26821] (6 of 9) [CRLR-607/2006]

PW-12 unequivocally attributed the cause of the accident to

the negligence of the bus driver.

PW-13 denied knowledge regarding the petitioner’s

involvement.

PW-14, while claiming that the truck was being driven by

Bhanwru Khan and that it hit the bus from behind, failed to

demonstrate how he came to know about the identity of the

driver, especially in light of his own injury and the impact

happening from behind.

PW-16, in her examination-in-chief, admitted that she was

told after the accident by someone that the petitioner was

the driver. Her statement lacks personal knowledge and is

therefore inadmissible as hearsay.

PW-17 turned hostile and did not support the prosecution.

PW-18 and PW-20 are not relevant to the principal issue of

identity or culpability.

PW-19, being the Investigating Officer, is limited to the

formal aspects of investigation and is not a witness to the

occurrence itself.

7. The combined effect of the above depositions is that there

exists no direct, reliable, and legally admissible evidence

affirmatively identifying the petitioner as the person driving

the offending vehicle at the time of the incident. The

prosecution’s case is replete with contradictions,

assumptions, and speculative assertions unsupported by a

(Downloaded on 19/06/2025 at 10:05:47 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:26821] (7 of 9) [CRLR-607/2006]

coherent chain of evidence. In criminal jurisprudence,

conviction cannot rest on conjecture or presumption,

particularly in the absence of a Test Identification Parade or

prior consistent statement establishing the accused’s

identity.

8. Moreover, the presence of doubt regarding the exclusive

culpability of the petitioner is further compounded by the

appellate court’s own finding of joint negligence. When the

responsibility for the accident is evenly apportioned between

the petitioner and the bus driver, the selective prosecution of

only one party — and the exoneration of the other without

lawful justification — raises serious questions of due process

and prosecutorial fairness.

9. It is trite law that when two possible inferences emerge from

the evidence — one pointing to the guilt of the accused and

the other to his innocence — the benefit of doubt must

invariably go to the accused. The present case, as it stands,

not only presents such conflicting inferences, but also suffers

from material infirmities and legal deficiencies in proof,

particularly with respect to the essential ingredient of

identity and exclusive criminal negligence.

10. The law is well settled that in order to fasten criminal

liability under Section 304-A IPC, it must be shown that the

death was the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the

accused, and that the said act was the proximate and

(Downloaded on 19/06/2025 at 10:05:47 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:26821] (8 of 9) [CRLR-607/2006]

efficient cause of death, uninfluenced by any intervening or

contributory negligence. This position was lucidly expounded

by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap,

4 Bom. L.R. 679, wherein it was held:

“To impose criminal liability under Section 304-A, Indian

Penal Code, it is necessary that the death should have been

the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused,

and that act must be the proximate and efficient cause

without the intervention of another’s negligence. It must be

the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been

the causa sine qua non.”

11. In the present case, the very foundation of prosecution

is clouded by the trial court’s and appellate court’s

concurrent findings that the bus driver was equally

responsible, and the overwhelming lack of direct, credible,

and unambiguous evidence identifying the petitioner as the

actual driver of the offending truck. Thus, the legal

ingredients for invoking criminal liability under Section 304-A

IPC — particularly the requirement of exclusive rash and

negligent act being the proximate cause — remain

unfulfilled.

12. In view of the foregoing discussion and guided by the

legal principles enunciated in Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap

(supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the

prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proving the

(Downloaded on 19/06/2025 at 10:05:47 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:26821] (9 of 9) [CRLR-607/2006]

petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The findings

recorded by the learned trial court and the appellate court

suffer from legal infirmities, factual inconsistencies, and

improper appreciation of evidence. Consequently, the

conviction of the petitioner under Sections 279, 337, 338,

and 304-A IPC cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

13. Accordingly, the revision petition is allowed. The

judgments dated 26.08.2004 passed by the learned Judicial

Magistrate, Balotra, and dated 07.07.2006 passed by the

learned Sessions Judge, Balotra, are hereby set aside. The

petitioner stands acquitted of all charges. His bail bonds, if

any, shall stand discharged.

14. The record be sent back.

(FARJAND ALI),J
6-Mamta/-

(Downloaded on 19/06/2025 at 10:05:48 PM)

Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)



Source link

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here