Jharkhand High Court
Bhokta Murmu vs The State Of Jharkhand on 24 June, 2025
Author: Ananda Sen
Bench: Ananda Sen
2025:JHHC:16636
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
............
(Arising out of judgment of conviction dated 10.01.2008 and order of
sentence dated 11.01.2008 passed by learned 5th Additional. Sessions Judge
(F.T.C.), Dumka in Sessions Case No. 234 of 2006)
Criminal Appeal (S.J.) No.453 of 2008
Bhokta Murmu, Son of Late Ruthu Murmu, resident of village- Bara, P.S.
Jarmundi (T), District-Dumka
... ... ... Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of Jharkhand ... ... ... Respondent(s)
PRESENT :
SRI ANANDA SEN, J.
For the Appellant(s) : Ms. Juhi Kumari, Amicus Curiae
For the State : Mr. S.K. Srivastava, AddI. P.P.
JUDGMENT
Reserved on:19.06.2025 Pronounced On: 24/06/2025
This Criminal Appeal is preferred on behalf of the sole appellant being
aggrieved by the judgment of conviction dated 10.01.2008 and order of
sentence dated 11.01.2008 passed by learned 5 th Additional. Sessions Judge
(F.T.C.), Dumka in Sessions Case No. 234 of 2006, whereby and where under
the appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 307 of the Indian
Penal Code. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five
years.
2. The prosecution’s case is based on the fardbeyan of informant
Kaleshwar Rai (P.W-7), recorded on 29/09/2006. He in his fardbeyan stated
that on 28/09/2006, after returning from Hatia with co-villager Bhokta Murmu
(Appellant), an altercation broke out at around 7:00 P.M. between him and
Bhokta Murmu and his wife Roshni Marandi as they were abusing him.
During the altercation, Roshni Marandi held him while Bhokta Murmu
attacked him with a farsa (5-6 blows) on his head and face, causing bleeding
injuries. Both accused also slapped him, causing him to fall unconscious.
3. On the basis of aforesaid fardbeyan F.I.R. being Jarmundi P.S. Case No.
177 of 2006 was registered under Sections 341, 323, 324, read with Section
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34 of the Indian Penal Code and the chargesheet was submitted against the
appellant. The Court took cognizance and the case was committed to the
Court of Sessions where charges were framed under Sections 323 and 307
against the appellant and his wife.
4. It is argued by the learned amicus curiae on behalf of the appellant that
the Investigating Officer (P.W-8), after due investigation, filed chargesheet
only under Sections 323, 324, 341 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. However,
the learned Court took cognizance under Section 307 of IPC also despite the
absence of necessary ingredients to constitute an offence under the Section
307. She further argued that even if the prosecution case is accepted in totality,
at best, an offence under Section 324 IPC is made out. The incident arose out
of a sudden quarrel without any premeditation, and there is nothing on record
to suggest that the appellant had any intention to cause death or knowledge
that the assault will cause death. She further submitted that although the
prosecution alleges that the Appellant was armed with a farsa, the injuries
inflicted were not on any vital part of the Informant’s body and therefore, there
was no intention to kill. Moreover, the alleged weapon–farsa was never
recovered or seized during the investigation. Additionally, the Informant has
admitted that after victim fell to the ground, the appellant did not continue to
assault him, which suggests that there was no intention to kill. The conduct of
the Appellant does not support the charge under Section 307 IPC. Lastly, it is
submitted that the Informant has made material improvements in his
testimony by introducing motive (i.e., demand of wages/money), which was
never mentioned in the original Fardbeyan, indicating an afterthought. Hence,
the conviction under Section 307 IPC is unsustainable and is liable to be set
aside.
5. Learned counsel on behalf of the state submitted that informant has
fully supported his case in his deposition. He submitted that there is direct
allegation against the petitioner of assaulting the informant. He further
submitted that the injury report of the informant clearly showed that the
petitioner was intending to kill the informant and the injury inflicted is on the
vital part of the body. Thus, he prayed that the conviction under Section 307
is valid and it should not be interfered with.
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6. To prove the prosecution case, altogether nine prosecution witnesses
have been examined :-
P.W.1, Ishwar Lal Rai, he is the resident of same village. He deposed
that he got information of the incidence from his co-villager. Thus, he is not
an eye witness.
P.W.2, Sitaram Singh, has deposed that he got aware of the incidence
from the accused himself. In his cross examination in para-7 he admits that
there was very cordial relation between him and the appellant.
P.W.3, Mahia Devi, is the sister of the informant. She has said that she
got to know about the incidence from the accused himself. Thus, she is also
not an eye witness.
P.W.4, Kishan Roy, was tendered for cross examination. He has stated
nothing about the incidence.
P.W.5, Bandhiya Devi, was also tendered for cross examination. She
has stated nothing about the incidence.
P.W.6, Dr. Rudrani Kisku, opined that all the injuries were due to sharp
edged weapon. She exhibited injury report Exhibit-1. Supplementary injury
report was exhibited by another doctor as Exhibit-1/1. He opined that the
injuries are simple in nature.
P.W.7, Kaleshwar Rai, is the informant. He in his depostition stated that
the accused named Bhokta Murmu assaulted him with farsa. He in
examination has said that assault took place due to demand of money. He has
also admitted in cross examination the fact that the other accused Roshni Devi
has not assaulted him. He stated that on the next date of occurrence he went
to hospital.
P.W.8, Parsuram Prasad, is the investigation officer of the case. He went
to the place of occurrence and he has recorded the fardbeyan of the informant.
He exhibited the fardbeyan and formal F.I.R. as Exhibit Nos.2 and 3.
P.W.9, Hemanti Devi, she has stated that the assault took place due to
the demand of money. She said that the accused Bhokta Murmu gave farsa
blows to her husband. She said that the accused Roshni Devi caught hold of
her husband (P.W. 7) during assault.
7. Several documents were also exhibited:-
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Ext.1 and 1/1 :- Injury Reports
Ext.2 :- Fardbeyan
Ext.3 :- Formal FIR
FINDING
8 It is an undisputed fact that no independent eyewitness was present at
the time of the alleged incident. The witnesses examined in the case, namely
P.W.1, P.W.2, and P.W.3, have not claimed to have personally witnessed the
occurrence; rather, their testimonies are based on what they were told by
others, making them hearsay witnesses. Furthermore, P.W.4 and P.W.5 were
merely formal or tendered witnesses, and their depositions do not contain any
substantive or material statements regarding the incident in question.
Additionally, P.W.9, who happens to be the wife of the informant, is evidently
an interested witness due to her close relationship with the complainant, and
her testimony must therefore be approached with a degree of caution.
9. From the evidence of P.W.7 (informant) who is an injured witness I find
that he stated that the appellant has assaulted him on head and his wife also
caught him during assault, P.W.9 has also corroborated the same fact, this
clearly suggests that the informant was assaulted and injured.
10. As regards P.W.6, he is the medical officer who conducted the medical
examination and prepared the injury report of the alleged victim. Although it
was opined that the injuries sustained were caused by a sharp-cutting weapon,
it was also clearly stated that the injuries were simple in nature and not
grievous. Furthermore, P.W.8, who is the investigating officer in this case, did
not provide any substantial evidence beyond formally proving the place of
occurrence.
11. To invoke Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code ‘intention or
knowledge’ is sine qua non. Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code reads as
follows:-
“Attempt to murder.–Whoever does any act with such
intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if
he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine;
and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall
be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment
as is hereinbefore mentioned. ………………..
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12. The Hon,ble Supreme Court in the case of Sivamani and
Another versus State Represented by Inspector of Police reported in 2023
SCC OnLine SC 1581 has observed that the intention of the accused in a case
involving bodily harm can be inferred not only from the actual injuries
sustained by the victim but also from the overall circumstances surrounding
the incident. In order to determine such intent, courts may take into account
various factors, including type and nature of the weapon used during the
commission of the offence, the manner in which it was used, the number and
force of the blows delivered, the part of the body targeted, and the general
context or background in which the assault occurred. These elements
collectively help establish whether there was an intention to cause grievous
harm or even death. It is necessary to quote paragraphs 9 and 10 of the
aforesaid judgement:
9. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554,
the Court held that to sustain a conviction under
Section 307, IPC, it was not necessary that a bodily injury
capable of resulting in death should have been inflicted. As such,
non-conviction under Section 307, IPC on the premise only that
simple injury was inflicted does not follow as a matter of course.
In the same judgment, it was pointed out that ‘…The court has
to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with
the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned
in the section.’ The position that because a fatal injury was not
sustained alone does not dislodge Section 307, IPC conviction
has been reiterated in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11
SCC 366 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha, (2019) 3 SCC
605. Yet, in Jage Ram (supra) and Kanha (supra), it was
observed that while grievous or life-threatening injury was not
necessary to maintain a conviction under Section 307, IPC,
‘The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual
injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances.
Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the
severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.’
13. It is an admitted position that the informant was hospitalized only on
the following day after the alleged occurrence. This delayed hospitalization
itself is indicative of the fact that the injuries sustained by the informant were
not of a grievous or life-threatening nature. Had the injuries been severe or
posed an immediate danger to life, it would be natural and expected for the
victim to seek urgent medical attention. The absence of such prompt
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hospitalization, therefore, lends support to the conclusion that the injuries
were not grave.
14. Furthermore, it is significant to note that the weapon allegedly used in
the commission of the assault has not been recovered by the Investigating
Officer during the course of investigation. The non-recovery of the said
weapon, seriously weakens the prosecution’s case. The absence of such a
crucial piece of evidence casts a doubt on the veracity of the prosecution’s
version. In criminal jurisprudence, the burden lies heavily on the prosecution
to prove the charge against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. In the
present case, the failure to recover the weapon, coupled with other
inconsistencies and lack of corroborative evidence, leads this Court to
conclude that the prosecution has fallen short of discharging that burden.
Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has not
been able to establish the guilt of the accused to be punished under Section
307 of IPC beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.
15. Based on the statements of the informant and his wife and the medical
evidence, it is clear that the appellant did cause the injury however, there is
lack of intention to kill the informant. Also, there is no material to suggest that
it was within the knowledge of the appellant that the assault and injury would
cause death. Therefore, this court believes that Section 307 of the IPC does
not apply in this case. Instead, the offence falls under Section 324 of the IPC.
16. Considering what has been discussed hereinabove this court is of the
considered view that the conviction of the appellant under Section 307 of the
Indian Penal Code cannot be legally sustained and the same is liable to be
converted into Section 324 of the IPC. This conviction is converted to one
under Section 324 of IPC.
17. The appellant has already remained in custody for 2 Years 11 Months
and 21 Days. The maximum punishment prescribed under Section 324 of the
IPC is three years. Thus, the punishment of the appellant is modified to the
period which he has already undergone in custody.
18. Accordingly, this criminal appeal is partly allowed with the
modification of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence as
mentioned above.
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19. The appellant is discharged of the liability of the bail bonds.
20. Pending I.A., if any, stands disposed of.
21. Let the Trial Court Records be transmitted back to the Court concerned
along with a copy of this judgement.
22. The Court had appointed Ms. Juhi Kumari, the learned counsel as
Amicus Curiae to assist the Court. Considering her assistance, I direct the
Jharkhand High Court Legal Services Committee to pay remuneration of
Rs.7,500/- to Ms. Juhi Kumari, the learned Amicus Curiae.
(Ananda Sen, J.)
High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi
Dated 24/06/2025
NAFR /R.S./ Cp 03.
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