Himachal Pradesh High Court
Bindu Rajput vs Amit Kumar & Anr on 14 July, 2025
( 2025:HHC:22684 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.731 of 2024
Reserved on: 1.7.2025
.
Date of Decision: 14.07.2025
Bindu Rajput ...Petitioner
Versus
Amit Kumar & anr. ...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. P.P. Chauhan, Advocate.
For the Respondent No.1 : Mr. Vinod Thakur, Advocate.
For respondent No.2/State : Mr. Tarun Pathak, Dy. Advocate
General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment
dated 27.09.2024 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Hamirpur,
District Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which, the
judgment of conviction dated 20.03.2024 and order of sentence
dated 27.03.2024 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First
Class, Court No. III, Hamirpur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as
they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short, NI
Act). It was asserted that the accused is known to the complainant.
construction
rof her to
She demanded financial help from the complainant for the
house. The complainant deposited
₹1,00,000/- and ₹ 50,000/- in her account on 26.11.2018 and
28.11.2018, respectively. He also paid ₹80,000/- in cash to her. The
accused agreed to repay the money after few months. The
complainant demanded money from the accused, and the accused
handed over one cheque for ₹2,30,000/- to the complainant. The
complainant presented the cheque to Punjab National Bank, from
where it was sent to the Bank of the accused for collection.
However, the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement
“funds insufficient”. The complainant sent a notice to the accused
through registered post, which was duly served upon the accused,
and an acknowledgement to this effect was received by the
complainant. The accused failed to pay the money despite the
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receipt of the notice of demand; hence, the complaint was filed
against before the learned Trial Court to take action as per law.
.
3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of
acquisition was put to her for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which she pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4.
5.
r to
The complainant examined himself (CW1).
The accused in her statement recorded under Section
313 of Cr.PC stated that Anu Kumari had told her that she would
send money through the account of someone, and she was
depositing ₹2,00,000/- in her account. The accused handed over a
cheque to Anu Kumari at Police Station, Hamirpur. She did not
know the complainant. She had no liability towards the
complainant. She stated that she wanted to lead defence evidence,
however, a statement was made on her behalf subsequently that
she did not want to produce any evidence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused admitted the
issuance of the cheque. Therefore, a presumption would arise that
the cheque was issued for consideration in discharge of the legal
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liability. The burden would shift upon the accused to discharge
this burden. She claimed that the cheque was issued to Anu
.
Kumari at Police Station, Hamirpur. However, no evidence was
presented to prove this fact. The version of the complainant
regarding the deposit was duly proved. The accused failed to show
how the cheque came into the possession of the complainant. A
cheque issued as a security will also attract the provisions of
Section 138 of the NI Act. The cheque was dishonoured with the
endorsement “insufficient funds”. The notice was served upon the
accused, and she failed to pay the amount despite the receipt of
notice of demand. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the
accused for the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced her to undergo simple
imprisonment for two months, pay a fine of ₹2,90,000/-, and in
default of payment of fine to further undergo additional 15 days
simple imprisonment. It was further ordered that out of the
amount of ₹2,90,000/-, an amount of ₹2,85,000/- would be
disbursed to the complainant and the remaining amount of
₹5,000/- would be paid to the State.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was
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decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Hamirpur (learned
Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the
.
findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the issuance of
the cheque was not disputed, and a presumption arises that the
cheque was issued for consideration in discharge of the legal
liability. The accused claimed that she had handed over the cheque
to Anu Kumari, but she failed to examine her. The accused failed to
rebut the presumption attached to the cheque. The cheque was
dishonoured with an endorsement “funds insufficient”. The
notice was duly served upon the accused, and the accused failed to
pay the amount despite the receipt of the valid notice of demand.
Accordingly, the appeal filed by the accused was dismissed.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by
the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present
revision petition, asserting that the learned Courts below
misconstrued the provision of law. The evidence was not correctly
interpreted, and the defence regarding the issuance of a cheque to
Anu Kumari was wrongly ignored. The evidence on record did not
establish the liability of the accused. There was no evidence to
show the existence of enforceable debt or liability. There were
various discrepancies in the statement of the complainant. The
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complainant admitted that he did not know the accused, and the
whole version that he had advanced the money to the accused
.
became doubtful. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the
learned Courts below be set aside.
9. I have heard Mr. P.P. Chauhan, learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused, Mr. Vinod Thakur, learned counsel for
respondent No.1-complainant and Mr. Tarun Pathak, learned
Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No.2-State.
10. Mr. P.P. Chauhan, learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below did
not appreciate the material placed on record before them. The
complainant admitted in his cross-examination that he did not
know the accused. Therefore, the whole story of the complainant
that he had advanced ₹2,30,000/- to the accused was doubtful.
The plea taken by the accused that she had handed over the cheque
to Anu Kumari in Police Station Hamirpur, was highly probable.
There was no evidence of advancing ₹80,000/- to the accused.
Learned Courts below failed to appreciate that the cheque has to
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be issued in discharge of the legal liability. Therefore, he prayed
that the present revision be admitted and listed for final hearing.
.
11. Mr. Vinod Thakur, learned counsel for respondent
No.1/complainant, submitted that the learned Courts below had
rightly appreciated the material placed before them and there is
no infirmity in the judgments and order passed by the learned
Courts below. The accused did not dispute her signatures on the
cheque, and the learned Courts below had rightly drawn the
presumption in favour of the complainant. The accused did not
step into the witness box to prove her version. She did not even
examine Anu Kumari. The learned Courts below were justified in
discarding the version of the accused; therefore, he prayed that
the present revision be dismissed.
12. Mr. Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for
respondent No.2-State, supported the judgments and order
passed by the learned Courts below and submitted that no
interference is required with them. He prayed that the present
revision be dismissed.
13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
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14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022)
.
3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is
not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect,
errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: –
“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at
the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent
findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after adetailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought
on record. The High Court in criminal revision against
conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like
the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revisionis extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure
Code (in short “CrPC“) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or
himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any
finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the
regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. Theobject of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an
error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded
error which is to be determined on the merits of individualcases. It is also well settled that while considering the same,
the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the factsand evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under
Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to
call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the
purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and
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( 2025:HHC:22684 )object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an
error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept
in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
.
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397
has been considered and succinctly explained as under:
(SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the
power to call for and examine the records of an inferior
court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to thelegality and regularity of any proceedings or order made
in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a
patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has
to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriatefor the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the
face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and
appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the
various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the
revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where thedecisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is
no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding
recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence isignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but aremerely indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional
jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the
inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an
interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in
mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself
should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is
dealing with the question as to whether the charge has
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( 2025:HHC:22684 )of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially
falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of
charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings
under CrPC.”
.
16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor
case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] has also laid
down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdictionunder Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for
quashing of charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought
for as under : (Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh
Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1SCC (Cri) 986], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27)
“27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under
these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of
the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, itwill now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles
with reference to which the courts should exercise such
jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but
inherently impossible to state such principles with
precision. At best and upon objective analysis of variousjudgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of
the principles to be considered for proper exercise of
jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing ofcharge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section
397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the casemay be:
27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the
Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more thepower, the more due care and caution is to be exercised
in invoking these powers. The power of quashing
criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in
terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised
very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in
the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the
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( 2025:HHC:22684 )the case and the documents submitted therewith prima
facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so
patently absurd and inherently improbable that no
prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and.
where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not
satisfied, then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No
meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for
considering whether the case would end in conviction or
not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of
charge.
***
27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts
have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts,
evidence and materials on record to determine whether
there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case
would end in a conviction; the court is concerned
primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether
they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of
the process of court leading to injustice.
***
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of
continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even
broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to
permit continuation of prosecution rather than its
quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected
to marshal the records with a view to decide
admissibility and reliability of the documents or records,
but is an opinion formed prima facie.”
17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and
start appreciating the evidence by finding out
inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses, and it is not
legally permissible.
16. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC
165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine
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SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate
the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any
.
perversity. It was observed on page 169:
“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of
Sections 397/401 CrPC and the ground for exercising therevisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of
Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of
Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2
SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope ofthe revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has
laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)
“5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can
call for and examine the record of any proceedings tosatisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the
jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised
by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice.
But the said revisional power cannot be equated with thepower of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as
a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it
would not be appropriate for the High Court toreappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on
the same when the evidence has already beenappreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions
Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to
the notice of the High Court which would otherwisetantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On
scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court
from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in
concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction
in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by
reappreciating the oral evidence. …”
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and
relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court
in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao
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Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao
Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court
held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the
.
Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or
there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the
order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another
view is possible. The following has been laid down in para
14: (SCC p. 135)
“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is
perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
relevant material or there is palpable misreading of
records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting
aside the order, merely because another view is possible.
The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate
court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is
to preserve the power in the court to do justice in
accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.
The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to
401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal.
Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought
to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law
or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or
where the decision is based on no material or where the
material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the
courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of
their revisional jurisdiction.”
14. In the above case, also conviction of the accused was
recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao
Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom
1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This
Court set aside the High Court’s order holding that the High
Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and
that too without any legal basis.
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17. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)
.
309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal ProcedureCode, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity,
upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional
Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales &
Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern
Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH,
(2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well-established principle of law
that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrongorder is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence
of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is,
therefore, in the negative.”
18. The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
19. The accused admitted in her statement recorded under
Section 313 of Cr.PC that the cheque was issued by her. She
claimed that the cheque was handed over to Anu Kumari at Police
Station, Hamirpur. It was laid down by this Court in Naresh Verma
vs. Narinder Chauhan 2020(1) Shim LC 398 that where the accused
had not disputed his signatures on the cheque, the Court has to
presume that it was issued in discharge of legal liability and the
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burden would shift upon the accused to rebut the presumption. It
was observed: –
.
“8. Once signatures on the cheque are not disputed, the plea
with regard to the cheque having not been issued towards
discharge of lawful liability, rightly came to be rejected by
learned Courts below. Reliance is placed upon Hiten P. Dalalv. Bartender Nath Bannerji, 2001 (6) SCC 16, wherein it has
been held as under:
“The words ‘unless the contrary is proved’ which
occur in this provision make it clear that thepresumption has to be rebutted by ‘proof’ and not by
a bare explanation which is merely plausible. A fact is
said to be proved when its existence is directly
established or when, upon the material before it, the
r Court finds its existence to be so probable that areasonable man would act on the supposition that it
exists. Unless, therefore, the explanation is supported
by proof, the presumption created by the provision
cannot be said to be rebutted……”
9. S.139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed,
unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a
cheque received the cheque of nature referred to in
section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of
any debt or other liability.
20. Similar is the judgment in Basalingappa vs.
Mudibasappa 2019 (5) SCC 418 wherein it was held:
“26. Applying the proposition of law as noted above, in the
facts of the present case, it is clear that the signature on the
cheque, having been admitted, a presumption shall be
raised under Section 139 that the cheque was issued in
discharge of debt or liability.”
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21. This position was reiterated in Kalamani Tex v. P.
Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2
.
SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75 wherein it was held at page
289:
“14. Once the 2nd appellant had admitted his signatures on
the cheque and the deed, the trial court ought to have
presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a
legally enforceable debt. The trial court fell in error when itcalled upon the respondent complainant to explain the
circumstances under which the appellants were liable to
pay. Such an approach of the trial court was directly in the
teeth of the established legal position as discussed above,and amounts to a patent error of law.”
22. Similar is the judgment in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v.
Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724, wherein it
was observed: –
“7.2. What is emerging from the material on record is that
the issuance of a cheque by the accused and the signature ofthe accused on the said cheque are not disputed by the
accused. The accused has also not disputed that there weretransactions between the parties. Even as per the statement
of the accused, which was recorded at the time of theframing of the charge, he has admitted that some amount
was due and payable. However, it was the case on behalf of
the accused that the cheque was given by way of security,
and the same has been misused by the complainant.
However, nothing is on record that in the reply to the
statutory notice, it was the case on behalf of the accused
that the cheque was given by way of security. Be that as it
may, however, it is required to be noted that earlier the
accused issued cheques which came to be dishonoured on
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( 2025:HHC:22684 )consolidated cheque of ₹9,55,574 was given which has been
returned unpaid on the ground of “STOP PAYMENT”.
Therefore, the cheque in question was issued for the second
time. Therefore, once the accused has admitted the issuance
.
of a cheque which bears his signature, there is a
presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or
liability under Section 139 of the NI Act. However, such a
presumption is rebuttable in nature, and the accused is
required to lead evidence to rebut such presumption. The
accused was required to lead evidence that the entire
amount due and payable to the complainant was paid.
9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and
considering the fact that the accused has admitted the
issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and
that the cheque in question was issued for the second time
after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even
according to the accused some amount was due and
payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the NI
Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. Of
course, such presumption is rebuttable in nature. However,
to rebut the presumption, the accused was required to lead
evidence that the full amount due and payable to the
complainant had been paid. In the present case, no such
evidence has been led by the accused. The story put forward
by the accused that the cheques were given by way of
security is not believable in the absence of further evidence
to rebut the presumption, and more particularly, the cheque
in question was issued for the second time after the earlier
cheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts
below have materially erred in not properly appreciating
and considering the presumption in favour of the
complainant that there exists a legally enforceable debt or
liability as per Section 139 of the NI Act. It appears that both
the learned trial court as well as the High Court have
committed an error in shifting the burden upon the
complainant to prove the debt or liability, without
appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of the NI
Act. As observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example
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of reverse onus clause and therefore, once the issuance of
the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the
cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in
favour of the complainant that there exists legally
.
enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the
accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence.”
23. The presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Triyambak S. Hegde v.
Sripad, (2022) 1 SCC 742: (2022) 1 SCC (Civ) 512: 2021 SCC OnLine SC
788 as under at page 747:
“12. From the facts arising in this case and the nature of the
rival contentions, the record would disclose that thesignature on the documents at Exts. P-6 and P-2 are not
disputed. Ext. P-2 is the dishonoured cheque based on
which the complaint was filed. From the evidence tendered
before the JMFC, it is clear that the respondent has not
disputed the signature on the cheque. If that be theposition, as noted by the courts below, a presumption
would arise under Section 139 in favour of the appellant
who was the holder of the cheque. Section 139 of the NI Act
reads as hereunder:
“139. Presumption in favour of the holder. –It shall be
presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the
holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature
referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in wholeor in part, of any debt or other liability.”
13. Insofar as the payment of the amount by the appellant in
the context of the cheque having been signed by the
respondent, the presumption for passing of the
consideration would arise as provided under Section 118(a)
of the NI Act, which reads as hereunder:
“118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. —
Until the contrary is proved, the following
presumptions shall be made:
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(a) of consideration: that every negotiable instrument
was made or drawn for consideration, and that every
such instrument, when it has been accepted,
indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted,.
indorsed, negotiated or transferred for
consideration.”
14. The above-noted provisions are explicit to the effect
that such presumption would remain until the contrary is
proved. The learned counsel for the appellant in that regard
has relied on the decision of this Court in K.
Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan [K.
Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999) 7 SCC 510:
1999 SCC (Cri) 1284] wherein it is held as hereunder: (SCC
pp. 516-17, para 9)
“9. As the signature in the cheque is admitted to be
that of the accused, the presumption envisaged inSection 118 of the Act can legally be inferred that the
cheque was made or drawn for consideration on the
date which the cheque bears. Section 139 of the Act
enjoins the Court to presume that the holder of the
cheque received it for the discharge of any debt orliability. The burden was on the accused to rebut the
aforesaid presumption. The trial court was not
persuaded to rely on the interested testimony of DW 1to rebut the presumption. The said finding was
upheld [Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan v. K. Bhaskaran,Criminal Appeal No. 234 of 1995, order dated 23-10-
1998 (Ker)] by the High Court. It is not now open to
the accused to contend differently on that aspect.”
15. The learned counsel for the respondent has, however,
referred to the decision of this Court
in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa [Basalingappa v. Mudibasapp
a, (2019) 5 SCC 418: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 571] wherein it is held
as hereunder: (SCC pp. 432-33, paras 25-26)
“25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this
Court in the above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139,
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we now summarise the principles enumerated by this
Court in the following manner:
25.1. Once the execution of the cheque is admitted,
Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that.
the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other
liability.
25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a
rebuttable presumption, and the onus is on the
accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of
proof for rebutting the presumption is that of
preponderance of probabilities.
25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the
accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused
can also rely on the materials submitted by the
complainant in order to raise a probable defence.
Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be
drawn not only from the materials brought on record
by the parties but also by reference to the
circumstances upon which they rely.
25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to come
into the witness box in support of his defence, Section
139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a
persuasive burden.
25.5. It is not necessary for the accused to come into
the witness box to support his defence.
26. Applying the preposition of law as noted above, in
the facts of the present case, it is clear that the
signature on the cheque, having been admitted, a
presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that
the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability.
The question to be looked into is as to whether any
probable defence was raised by the accused. In the
cross-examination of PW 1, when the specific
question was put that a cheque was issued in relation
to a loan of Rs 25,000 taken by the accused, PW 1 said
that he does not remember. PW 1 in his evidence
admitted that he retired in 1997, on which date he
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received a monetary benefit of Rs 8 lakhs, which was
encashed by the complainant. It was also brought in
evidence that in the year 2010, the complainant
entered into a sale agreement for which he paid an
.
amount of Rs 4,50,000 to Balana Gouda towards sale
consideration. Payment of Rs 4,50,000 being
admitted in the year 2010 and further payment of
loan of Rs 50,000 with regard to which Complaint No.
119 of 2012 was filed by the complainant, a copy of
which complaint was also filed as Ext. D-2, there was
a burden on the complainant to prove his financial
capacity. In the years 2010-2011, as per own case of
the complainant, he made a payment of Rs 18 lakhs.
During his cross-examination, when the financial
capacity to pay Rs 6 lakhs to the accused was
questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by
r the complainant. The evidence on record, thus, is a
probable defence on behalf of the accused, which
shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his
financial capacity and other facts.”
16. In that light, it is contended that the very materials
produced by the appellant and the answers relating to lack
of knowledge of property details by PW 1 in his cross-
examination would indicate that the transaction is
doubtful, and no evidence is tendered to indicate that the
amount was paid. In such an event, it was not necessary for
the respondent to tender rebuttal evidence, but the case put
forth would be sufficient to indicate that the respondent has
successfully rebutted the presumption.
17. On the position of law, the provisions referred to in
Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act, as also the enunciation of
law as made by this Court, need no reiteration as there is no
ambiguity whatsoever. In Basalingappav. Mudibasappa
[Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418 : (2019) 2
SCC (Cri) 571] relied on by the learned counsel for the
respondent, though on facts the ultimate conclusion
therein was against raising presumption, the facts and
circumstances are entirely different as the transaction
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between the parties as claimed in the said case is peculiar to
the facts of that case where the consideration claimed to
have been paid did not find favour with the Court keeping in
view the various transactions and extent of amount
.
involved. However, the legal position relating to the
presumption arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI
Act on signature being admitted has been reiterated. Hence,
whether there is a rebuttal or not would depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case.”
24. This position was reiterated in Tedhi Singh v. Narayan
Dass Mahant, (2022) 6 SCC 735: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 726: (2022) 3 SCC
(Civ) 442: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 302, wherein it was held at page 739:
“8. It is true that this is a case under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 139 of the NI Act
provides that the court shall presume that the holder of a
cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in
Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any
debt or other liability. This presumption, however, isexpressly made subject to the position being proved to the
contrary. In other words, it is open to the accused to
establish that there is no consideration received. It is in thecontext of this provision that the theory of “probable
defence” has grown. In an earlier judgment, in fact, whichhas also been adverted to in Basalingappa [Basalingappa v.
Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 571], this
Court notes that Section 139 of the NI Act is an example ofreverse onus (see Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [Rangappa v. Sri
Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441: (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477: (2011) 1 SCC
(Cri) 184]). It is also true that this Court has found that the
accused is not expected to discharge an unduly high
standard of proof. It is accordingly that the principle has
developed that all which the accused needs to establish is a
probable defence. As to whether a probable defence has
been established is a matter to be decided on the facts of
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( 2025:HHC:22684 )that exist…”
25. Similar is the judgment in P. Rasiya v. Abdul Nazer, 2022
SCC OnLine SC 1131, wherein it was observed:
.
“As per Section 139 of the N.I. Act, it shall be presumed,
unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque
received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138for discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability. Therefore, once the initial burden is discharged by
the Complainant that the cheque was issued by the accused
and the signature and the issuance of the cheque are notdisputed by the accused, in that case, the onus will shift
upon the accused to prove the contrary that the cheque was
not for any debt or other liability. The presumption under
Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a statutory presumption andthereafter, once it is presumed that the cheque is issued in
whole or in part of any debt or other liability which is in
favour of the Complainant/holder of the cheque, in that
case, it is for the accused to prove the contrary.”
26. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh,
(2023) 10 SCC 148: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1275, wherein it was
observed at page 161:
33. The NI Act provides for two presumptions: Section 118
and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that
it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved that everynegotiable instrument was made or drawn for
consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that “unless
the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that the holder
of the cheque received the cheque for the discharge of,
whole or part of any debt or liability”. It will be seen that
the “presumed fact” directly relates to one of the crucial
ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under Section
138. [The rules discussed hereinbelow are common to both
the presumptions under Section 139 and Section 118 and are::: Downloaded on – 14/07/2025 21:22:01 :::CIS
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( 2025:HHC:22684 )hence not repeated–reference to one can be taken as
reference to another]
34. Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the form of a
“shall presume” clause, is illustrative of a presumption of.
law. Because Section 139 requires that the Court “shall
presume” the fact stated therein, it is obligatory for the
Court to raise this presumption in every case where the
factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been
established. But this does not preclude the person against
whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and
proving the contrary, as is clear from the use of the phrase
“unless the contrary is proved”.
35. The Court will necessarily presume that the cheque had
been issued towards the discharge of a legally enforceable
debt/liability in two circumstances. Firstly, when the drawer
of the cheque admits issuance/execution of the cheque
and secondly, in the event where the complainant proves
that the cheque was issued/executed in his favour by the
drawer. The circumstances set out above form the fact(s)
which bring about the activation of the presumptive clause.
[Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand
Payrelal [Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand
Payrelal, (1999) 3 SCC 35]]
36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding
that presumption takes effect even in a situation where the
accused contends that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily
signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir
Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4
SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40] ].
Therefore, the mere admission of the drawer’s signature,
without admitting the execution of the entire contents in
the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the presumption.
37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to
prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the
accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under
Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden on the
accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to
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transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving
that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the
discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is
discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be
.
taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do
anything further.
38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of
Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as
follows:
“The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is
merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to
reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to thecontrary from the opponent but if the opponent does
offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the
Judge’s requirement of some evidence), the
presumption ‘disappears as a rule of law and the caseis in the Jury’s hands free from any rule’.”
39. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential
burden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations
where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an
accused. The accused is not expected to prove the non-
existence of the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
The accused must meet the standard of “preponderance of
probabilities”, similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding.
[Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11
SCC 441: (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184: AIR
2010 SC 1898]]
27. Therefore, the Court has to start with the presumption
that the cheque was issued for valuable consideration in discharge
of the legal liability, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut
the presumption.
28. The accused claimed that Anu Kumari told her that she
was sending money through the account of some person. She
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claimed that the cheque was handed over to Anu Kumari in the
Police Station. The complainant specifically denied, for want of
.
knowledge, that the accused had a transaction with Anu Kumari,
and Anu Kumari had also filed a case against the accused
regarding the cheque. It was nowhere suggested to the
complainant that Anu Kumari had handed over the cheque to him.
Thus, the version of the accused that the cheque was handed over
to Anu Kumari in the Police Station is not established by the
cross-examination of the complainant.
29. The accused did not lead any evidence and relied upon
the statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. to prove her defence.
This was not sufficient. It was held in Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech
Fab Industries, (2022) 15 SCC 689: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 201 that the
accused has to lead defence evidence to rebut the presumption and
mere denial in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.PC is not
sufficient to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 700:
“20. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these
documents in support of his complaints and recorded the
statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the
appellant has recorded her statement under Section 313 of
the Code but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut
the presumption in support of her defence available under
Section 139 of the Act. The statement of the accused recorded
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( 2025:HHC:22684 )defence, but only an opportunity for the accused to explain the
incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution’s
case against the accused. Therefore, there is no evidence to
rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for.
consideration.” (Emphasis supplied)”
30. The complainant specifically stated that ₹1,00,000/-
and ₹ 50,000/- were deposited on 26.11.2018 and 28.11.2018
respectively. This fact was not denied by the accused in her
statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.PC, rather, it was
stated that Anu Kumari told her that she was depositing the
money through the account of some person. The version of the
complainant is duly supported by the deposited receipts
(Ext.CW1/G and Ex-CW1/H) showing the deposits of ₹1,50,000/-,
respectively. This deposit corroborates the version of the
complainant.
31. The complainant stated in his cross-examination that
he did not know the accused personally; he volunteered to say that
the accused used to visit his shop with his (complainant’s)
friend’s sister, and he became acquainted with her. The accused
visited his shop 10-12 times. He went to the house of the accused
once with his family members. He also admitted that he does not
advance money to strangers. It was submitted based on this cross-
examination that the accused is a stranger, and it is highly
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unlikely that the complainant had advanced money to the accused.
This submission is not acceptable. The complainant explained that
.
the accused used to visit his shop with his friend’s sister, and
therefore, he became acquainted with her. Further, the
complainant had deposited ₹1,50,000/- in the account of the
accused, which shows that the complainant trusted the accused
and that is why he had deposited the money in her account. The
accused denied the acquaintance with the complainant and
explained that the money was got deposited by Anu Kumari.
However, she failed to provide any evidence to prove this fact.
Therefore, the admission that the complainant did not know the
accused personally will not make his case doubtful.
32. It was submitted that there is no proof of payment of
₹80,000/-. No document was brought on record to establish this
fact. Learned Courts below erred in relying upon the presumption
to conclude this fact. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Versus State of
U.P, 2025 SCC Online SC 706 that the complainant is not to prove
the advancement of the loan because it is a matter of presumption.
It was observed:
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22. The High Court while allowing the criminal revision has
primarily proceeded on the presumption that it was
obligatory on the part of the complainant to establish his
case on the basis of evidence by giving the details of the.
bank account as well as the date and time of the withdrawal
of the said amount which was given to the accused and also
the date and time of the payment made to the accused,
including the date and time of receiving of the cheque,
which has not been done in the present case. Pausing here,
such presumption on the complainant, by the High Court,
appears to be erroneous. The onus is not on the complainant
at the threshold to prove his capacity/financial wherewithal
to make the payment in discharge of which the cheque is
alleged to have been issued in his favour. Only if an
objection is raised that the complainant was not in a
financial position to pay the amount so claimed by him to
have been given as a loan to the accused, only then the
complainant would have to bring before the Court cogent
material to indicate that he had the financial capacity and
had actually advanced the amount in question by way of
loan. In the case at hand, the appellant had categorically
stated in his deposition and reiterated in the cross-
examination that he had withdrawn the amount from the
bank in Faizabad (Typed Copy of his deposition in the
paperbook wrongly mentions this as ‘Firozabad’). The Court
ought not to have summarily rejected such a stand, more so
when respondent no. 2 did not make any serious attempt to
dispel/negate such a stand/statement of the appellant.
Thus, on the one hand, the statement made before the
Court, both in examination-in-chief and cross-
examination, by the appellant with regard to withdrawing
the money from the bank for giving it to the accused has
been disbelieved whereas the argument on behalf of the
accused that he had not received any payment of any loan
amount has been accepted. In our decision in S. S.
Production v. Tr. Pavithran Prasanth, 2024 INSC 1059, we
opined:
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( 2025:HHC:22684 )‘8. From the order impugned, it is clear that though the
contention of the petitioners was that the said amounts were
given for producing a film and were not by way of return of
any loan taken, which may have been a probable defence for.
the petitioners in the case, but rightly, the High Court has
taken the view that evidence had to be adduced on this point
which has not been done by the petitioners. Pausing here,
the Court would only comment that the reasoning of theHigh Court, as well as the First Appellate Court and Trial
Court, on this issue is sound. Just by taking a counter-stand
to raise a probable defence would not shift the onus on the
complainant in such a case, for the plea of defence has to bebuttressed by evidence, either oral or documentary, which in
the present case has not been done. Moreover, even if it is
presumed that the complainant had not proved the source of
the money given to the petitioners by way of loan byproducing statement of accounts and/or Income Tax
Returns, the same ipso facto, would not negate such claimfor the reason that the cheques having being issued and
signed by the petitioners has not been denied, and no
evidence has been led to show that the respondent lacked
capacity to provide the amount(s) in question. In thisregard, we may make profitable reference to the decision
in Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant, (2022) 6 SCC 735:
’10. The trial court and the first appellate court have
noted that in the case under Section 138 of the NI Act, thecomplainant need not show in the first instance that he
had the capacity. The proceedings under Section 138 of
the NI Act is not a civil suit. At the time, when thecomplainant gives his evidence, unless a case is set up in
the reply notice to the statutory notice sent, that the
complainant did not have the wherewithal, it cannot be
expected of the complainant to initially lead evidence to
show that he had the financial capacity. To that extent,
the courts in our view were right in holding on those
lines. However, the accused has the right to demonstrate
that the complainant in a particular case did not have
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( 2025:HHC:22684 )acceptable, which he can do by producing independent
materials, namely, by examining his witnesses and
producing documents. It is also open to him to establish
the very same aspect by pointing to the materials.
produced by the complainant himself. He can further,
more importantly, achieve this result through the cross-
examination of the witnesses of the
complainant. Ultimately, it becomes the duty of thecourts to consider carefully and appreciate the totality of
the evidence and then come to a conclusion whether, in
the given case, the accused has shown that the case of the
complainant is in peril for the reason that the accusedhas established a probable defence.’
(emphasis supplied)’
(underlining in original; emphasis supplied by us in bold)
33.
Therefore, the case of the complainant cannot be
doubted because no document was prepared at the time of
advancing the loan, or no witness was examined to establish this
fact.
34. Learned Courts below had rightly held that
presumption under Section 118(a) and 139 of the N.I. Act would
arise in the present case that the cheque was issued for
consideration in discharge of the legal liability. The accused failed
to rebut this presumption by any satisfactory evidence. Therefore,
it was rightly held that the version of the complainant that the
cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability was
acceptable.
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35. The complainant stated that the cheque was
dishonoured with the endorsement “insufficient funds”. This is
.
duly established by the memo (Ex-CW1/C) wherein the reason for
the dishonour has been mentioned as “funds insufficient”. It was
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mandvi Cooperative
Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010) 3 SCC 83: (2010) 1 SCC (Civ)
625: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 155 that the memo
issued by the Bank is presumed to be correct and the burden is
upon the accused to rebut the presumption. It was observed at
page 95:
“24. Section 146, making a major departure from the
principles of the Evidence Act, provides that the bank’s slipor memo with the official mark showing that the cheque
was dishonoured would, by itself, give rise to the
presumption of dishonour of the cheque, unless and until
that fact was disproved.”
36. In the present case, no evidence was produced to rebut
the presumption, and the learned Courts below had rightly held
that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement
‘insufficient funds’
37. The complainant stated that he had issued a notice to
the accused, which was duly served upon her. He has proved an
acknowledgement (Ex-CW1/F) bearing the signatures of someone.
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This corroborates his version that the notice was served upon the
accused.
.
38. The accused claimed that she was in Delhi at the time of
issuance of the notice. However, she did not provide any evidence
of this fact. The cheque was sent to the same address upon which
the accused was served. She furnished the same address in her
statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.PC., a personal bond
furnished by her and the notice of acquisition put to her.
Therefore, the notice was sent to the correct address and is
deemed to be served under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
This presumption is supported by the acknowledgement
(Ex.CW1/F). Therefore, the learned Courts below rightly held that
notice was duly served upon the accused.
39. In any case, it was laid down in C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala
Pelly Mohd. 2007(6) SCC 555 that the person who claims that he
had not received the notice has to pay the amount within 15 days
from the date of the receipt of the summons from the Court and in
case of failure to do so, he cannot take the advantage of the fact
that notice was not received by him. It was observed:
“It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving
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( 2025:HHC:22684 )where there is no stipulation of giving of notice before filing
a complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the
notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons
from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of.
the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the
Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of
summons (by receiving a copy of the complaint with the
summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected.
A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the
summons from the Court along with the copy of the complaint
under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that
there was no proper service of notice as required under Section138, by ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary under
Section 27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In
our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would
defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed inBhaskaran‘s case (supra), if the giving of notice in the
context of Clause (b) of the proviso was the same as thereceipt of notice a trickster cheque drawer would get the
premium to avoid receiving the notice by adopting different
strategies and escape from legal consequences of Section
138 of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied)
40. Thus, it was duly proved on record that the accused had
issued a cheque of ₹2,30,000/- to the complainant in discharge of
her legal liability, which cheque was dishonoured with an
endorsement “funds insufficient”. The notice was served upon
the accused, and she failed to pay the amount despite the receipt
of the valid notice of demand. Thus, all the ingredients of the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI
Act were duly satisfied, and the learned Trial Court had rightly
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convicted the accused for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act.
.
41. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to simple
imprisonment for a period of two months. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC
197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine
SC 138 that the penal provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act is
deterrent in nature. It was observed at page 203:
“6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable instruments,
including cheques, and to encourage and promote the use of
negotiable instruments, including cheques, in financial
transactions. The penal provision of Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent tocallous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques
without serious intention to honour the promise implicit in
the issuance of the same.”
42. Keeping in view the deterrent nature of the sentence,
the period of two months cannot be said to be excessive.
43. Learned Trial Court awarded a compensation of
₹2,85,000/- to the complainant. The compensation was awarded
on 27.03.2024. The cheque was issued on 18.07.2019. Thus, the
compensation was awarded about five years after the issuance of
the cheque. The complainant lost interest on the amount which he
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( 2025:HHC:22684 )
would have gained by depositing the money in his bank. He also
paid the fees to the Advocate and bore the litigation expenses;
.
therefore, he was entitled to be compensated for the same. It was
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalamani Tex v. P.
Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2
SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75 that the Courts should
uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with
page 291: –
r to
simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. It was observed at
19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf of
the respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles
that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not only punitive
but also compensatory and restitutive. The provisions of
NIA envision a single window for criminal liability for the
dishonour of a cheque as well as civil liability for the
realisation of the cheque amount. It is also well settled that
there needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding
compensation, and unless there exist special
circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy fines up to
twice the cheque amount along with simple interest @ 9%
p.a. [R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260, para 20: (2012) 1
SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520]”
44. Thus, the amount of ₹55,000/- awarded on the
principal amount of ₹2,30,000/- is inadequate; however, no
appeal was preferred by the complainant, and no interference is
required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court as
affirmed by the learned Appellate Court.
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P a g e | 37
( 2025:HHC:22684 ).
45. No other point was urged.
.
46. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and the
same is dismissed.
47. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the
learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. Pending
miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
r (Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
14th July, 2025
(mamta)
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