Patna High Court
Branch Manager, Sbi General Insurance … vs Smt. Shashi Bala Singh on 25 July, 2025
Author: Arun Kumar Jha
Bench: Arun Kumar Jha
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS JURISDICTION No.585 of 2025
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1. Branch Manager, SBI General Insurance Company Limited, Mal,
Dakbunglow Chauraha, Patna 8000012.
2. SBI General Insurance Company Limited, having its registered office at 9th
floor, A and B Wing, Fulcrum Building, Sahar Road, Andheri East, Mumbai-
400099, Maharashtra, Through its authorised representative Srishti Khemka
(Female), Daughter of - Shankar Kumar Khemka, aged about-30 years,
resident of- Muradpur, Ashok Rajpath, Opp.- P.M.C.H., P.S.- Pirbahore,
Dist- Patna, Bihar- 80004.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
Smt. Shashi Bala Singh Wife of late Achint Kumar, Residing- At Narayan
Niketan Road No. 13A Rajendra Nagar, Distt.- Patna, Bihar-800013.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Saurav Agrawal, Advocate
Mr. Kundan Kumar Ojha, Advocate
Mr. Anshuman Choudhary, Advocate
Ms. Kiran Devrani, Advocate
Mr. Shivam Chaudhary, Advocate
Mr. Radhik Chawda, Advocate
Mr. Ajay Sharma, Advocate
Ms. Mehak Joshi, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Apurv Yash, Advocate
Mr. Nand Kishore Singh, Advocate
Mr. B. K. Sharma, Advocate
Mr. Jitendar Kumar, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR JHA
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 25-07-2025
Heard the learned counsels for the respective parties on
the point of maintainability.
02. The petitioners have approached this Court for
quashing the order dated 24.09.2024 passed by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal comprising of a sole Arbitrator in an
arbitration case arising out of Request Case no. 65 of 2023,
whereby and whereunder an application filed by the petitioner
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under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 2016
(for short 'the Act'), challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
has been rejected and the learned Tribunal proceeded to dispose
of the matter on its merit.
03. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts of the case are
that petitioner no. 2 is an Insurance Company (a company
registered under the Companies Act, 1956) and petitioner no. 1
is its Branch Manager and for the sake of convenience, both of
them would hereinafter be referred to as 'the petitioner'. The
petitioner entered into a lease agreement with husband of
respondent for its office premises and, accordingly, a registered
agreement for lease dated 22.02.2011 was executed between the
petitioner and one Anchit Kumar, the deceased husband of
respondent, in respect of the subject unit (Unit No. 4002) which
lease period starting from 16.02.2011 till 15.02.2017. The lease
period was further extended in respect of said subject unit from
16.02.2017
to 15.02.2026 by executing an agreement for lease
between the petitioner and respondent. Another registered
agreement for lease dated 22.02.2011 was also executed
between the petitioner and one Ajay Kumar in respect of Unit
No. 4001, beginning from the period 16.02.2011 till 15.02.2017.
This lease agreement was also extended in the same manner
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from 16.02.2017 to 15.02.2026 by execution of an agreement
between the parties. The lease deed so entered between the
parties had a termination clause which allowed the petitioner to
terminate the lease deed without assigning any reason by giving
the lessor prior notice of 90 days in writing of its intention to
terminate the lease. It was further stipulated that the petitioner
would pay the lease rent regularly to the lessor during the notice
period and after expiry of the said period, the petitioner was
required to vacate the premises along with its movables and
handover the peaceful possession to the lessor. The lessor was
required to return the security deposit against the vacant
possession. Under the termination Clause, the lessee/petitioner
gave a termination notice to the lessor on 14.12.2020 to refund
the security deposit of Rs. 3,31,688/-. On 13th March, 2021, a
joint inspection was carried out by the parties. On 09.04.2021,
the petitioner received a letter from the Advocates of the
respondent, calling upon the petitioner to pay the sum of Rs.
27,78,672/- towards compensation for the purported structural
damage caused to the subject unit and towards rent for the
subject unit after termination of the lease deed by the petitioner.
The petitioner replied to the said letter on 22.04.2021, denying
the allegations made by the respondent. It further transpires that
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dispute arose between the parties over repair work in the subject
unit and refund of the security deposit and the respondent
refused to take possession of the subject unit. The respondent
had been asking the petitioner to handover the possession of the
subject unit after carrying out certain repairs and a number of
meetings were held between the parties but the issues remained
unresolved. In this manner, the keys of the subject unit were
handed over to the respondent on 06.10.2021, but the
respondent did not refund the security deposit to the petitioner.
Thereafter, the respondent filed a petitioner under Section 12A
of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which was subsequently
withdrawn. On 22.04.2023, the respondent raised a dispute with
regard to structural changes being carried out by the petitioner
in the subject unit and invoked Arbitration Clause of the lease
deed. As the petitioner did not agree for appointment of an
Arbitrator, the respondent filed Request Case No. 65 of 2023
under Section 11(6) of the Act for appointment of an Arbitrator.
Since there was no dispute to the existence of the arbitration
agreement, the Patna High Court on 5th of January, 2024 referred
the disputes to learned Arbitral Tribunal for adjudication. On
15.01.2024, the respondent filed its claim petition under Section
23 of the Act making following claims against the petitioner:
“(a) Claim No. 1 – Claim for rent as per the
Patna High Court C.Misc. No.585 of 2025 dt.25-07-2025
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filing of the Statement of Claim i.e. 14 th January
2024 at Rs.1,09,644/- Rs. 4180/- maintenance
charges, totaling the claim to Rs. 1.13.824/- for
34 months which would aggregate to Rs.
38,70,016/-;
(b) Claim No. 2 – Claim for compensation of
occupying the said unit @ Rs. 75,000/- per
month for 34 months which aggregates to Rs.
25,50,000/-;
(c) Claim No. 3 – Claim for cost of restoration
in rebuilding the subject unit, estimated at Rs.
35,00,000/-
(d) Claim No. 4 – Claim for costs of litigation
and arbitration estimated at Rs. 10,00,000/-;
(e) Claim No. 5 – Claim for pre-reference
interest @ 15% for each month of the rent
falling due till the date of filing the Statement of
Claim, which according to the Claimant
aggerates to Rs.8,45,143/-; and
(f) Claim No. 6 – Claim for interest on amount
awarded @15% p.a., till realization thereof.
Therefore, the total claim, aggregates to Rs.
1,17,65,259/-.”
04. On 17.02.2024, the petitioner filed an application
under Section 16 of the Act, inter alia, making objection to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate upon the disputes
raised in the statement of the claim taking a plea that the dispute
exclusively fell within the ambit of the Bihar Building (Lease,
Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (for short ‘the BBC Act’)
and appropriate civil court would have jurisdiction and not the
Arbitral Tribunal. The respondent on 21.02.2024, filed its reply
to the Section 16 Application. The petitioner on 01.03.2024,
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filed his rejoinder to the reply. On 17.02.2024, the petitioner
filed its statement of defence along with its compilation of
documents and raising various contentions and opposing the
reliefs sought by the respondent. The petitioner filed counter
claim, inter alia, seeking security deposit and interest. The
respondent on 21.02.2024 filed its reply to the counter claim.
On 23.02.2024, the respondent filed first amendment application
under Section 23(3) of the Act seeking amendment in the
following claims against the petitioner:
“(a) Claim No. 5 for pre-reference interest for
each month of the rent falling due till the date of
filing the Statement of Claim was enhanced
from the rate of 15% per annum to the rate of
21% per annum.
(b)Claim No. 6 – Claim for interest on amount
awarded till realization thereof subject to the
discretion of the Hon’ble Court was enhanced
from the rate of 15% per annum to the rate of
21% per annum.”
05. The petitioner filed its reply to the first amendment
application on 01.03.2024 and thereafter, the respondent filed its
affidavit in rejoinder. In the meantime, the respondent filed a
second amendment application under Section 23(3) of the Act
on 06.06.2024 seeking amendment in the claims against the
petitioner in the following manner:
“a) The nature and description of the Claim No. 1
has been changed to “Claim for compensation/
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agreement”. Prior to the amendment, the Claim
No. I was for “claim for rent”.
b) The nature and description of the Claim No. 2
has been changed to- “claim for liquidated
damages”. Prior to the amendment, the Claim No.
2 was for “claim for compensation/ illegal
occupation”.
c) Claim No. 7 was introduced by the Claimant
i.e. Claim for payment of electric charges dues for
the period between 14th March 2021 to 19th May
2024 for an amount of Rs. 2,34,377/- (Rupees
Two Lakhs Thirty Four Thousand Three Hundred
Seventy Seven only).”
06. On 23.09.2024, the amendment applications were
allowed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal. Vide order dated
24.09.2024, the learned Arbitral Tribunal passed an order on the
application filed by the petitioner under Section 16 of the Act
holding that Arbitral proceeding is not without jurisdiction in
relation to all or any reliefs sought by the respondent/claimant.
This order is under challenge before this Court. But at the outset
this Court directed the petitioner to show how the present civil
miscellaneous petition was maintainable in its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.
07. Learned counsel, Mr. Saurav Agrawal, who addressed
the Court through video conferencing, at the outset, submitted
that the impugned order of learned Arbitrator is ex facie,
arbitrary, illegal and without considering the facts of the matter.
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The order passed by the learned Arbitrator is without
jurisdiction and is perverse. Learned counsel further submitted
that the learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate that there was
patent lack of jurisdiction and the dispute forming the subject
matter is squarely covered by Section 18(3) of the BBC Act. Mr.
Agrawal further submitted that the lease came to an end on
14.03.2021 and the petitioner vacated the premises and was not
in possession of the same and any claim made by the respondent
for payment of subsequent rent is without any basis. When
objection was taken by the petitioner before the learned
Arbitrator, the respondent filed an amendment application and
instead of claiming rent, started asking for compensation. Mr.
Agrawal further submitted that once the lease agreement came
to an end, the Arbitration Clause of the lease agreement also
came to an end and did not remain applicable for any
subsequent claim made by the claimant/respondent. Mr.
Agrawal further submitted that when further objection was
raised by the petitioner under Section 16 of the Act, nature and
description of Claim No. 2 was changed as ‘claim for liquidated
damages’ whereas prior to amendment, the Claim No. 2 was
read as ‘claim for compensation/illegal occupation’. Mr.
Agrawal further submitted that the respondent, by filing
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consecutive amendment application sought to justify and
modify the nature of claim and the learned Arbitrator,
erroneously, allowed the amendment applications and thus,
allowed the respondent to overcome the objection raised by the
petitioner under Section 16 of the Act.
08. Mr. Agrawal next submitted that the learned Arbitrator
completely missed the point that Clause 24 of the Agreement
provided for arbitration only till existence of the lease and in
Clause 25, it has been provided that subject to what is specified
in Clause-24, the Courts in Patna shall have exclusive
jurisdiction in all matters arising under this Agreement. Mr.
Agrawal, thus, submitted that if the respondent claims rent after
termination of lease, the option open to the respondent is to
approach the Rent Control Tribunal and for any other claim after
the termination of lease, the same would be adjudicated by the
court of competent jurisdiction. Hence, by no stretch of
imagination, learned Arbitrator has the jurisdiction to proceed in
the matter.
09. Mr. Agrawal further submitted that the learned
Arbitrator inherently lacked jurisdiction in the matter and if
there is patent lack of inherent jurisdiction, this Court is
empowered to intervene in the matter under Article 227 of the
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Constitution of India and, therefore, this petition would be
maintainable. Mr. Agrawal submitted that if an application
under Section 16 of the Act was dismissed by the Arbitrator, it is
permissible for this Court to entertain an application under
Article 227 of the Constitution if such an order is so perverse
that the patent lack of inherent jurisdiction stares one in face. In
the present case, perversity is very much obvious but the learned
Arbitrator proceeded in the matter knowing very well that after
termination of the lease agreement, there remained no scope for
arbitration in the matter. The respondent could maintain only a
civil suit under the BBC Act or the Transfer of Property Act or
to avail any other statutory remedy except proceeding in the
matter under the Act.
10. Mr. Agrawal referred to the decision of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Deep Industries Limited Vs.
ONGC, reported in (2020) 15 SCC 706 submitting that the
Hon’ble Supreme Court restricted the intervention of High
Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution in arbitration
proceedings to the orders that are passed which are patently
lacking in inherent jurisdiction. Mr. Agrawal further referred to
the decision in the case of Punjab State Power Corporation
Limited Vs. Emta Coal Limited & Anr., reported in (2020) 17
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SCC 93 wherein it has been clarified that what is patent lack of
inherent jurisdiction and the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed
that a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction requires no argument
whatsoever – it must be the perversity of the order that must
stare one in the face. Mr. Agrawal, referring to the facts of the
present case, submitted that the perversity in the order is one
such instance of patent lack of inherent jurisdiction.
11. Mr. Agrawal also referred to a number of decisions of
different High Courts to stress the point that upon valid
termination of the lease and expiry of the notice period, the
contractual relationship between the parties came to an end and
a post-termination claim would fell outside the scope of the
arbitration clause in the terminated agreement. Mr. Agrawal
referred to the decision in the case of A. N. Traders (P) Ltd Vs.
Shriram Distribution Services (P) Ltd., reported in 2018 SCC
OnLine Del 12416 wherein the learned Single Judge held that
the agreement expired by efflux of time and the arbitration
agreement could thereafter have been invoked only for disputes
that arose out of or in relation to the agreement and not for
transactions thereafter. Learned counsel thereafter referred to the
decision in the case of Penumalli Sulochana Vs. Harish
Rawtani, reported in 2013 SCC OnLine AP 667 wherein the
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Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that where
the term is for fixed time and the parties also understood that the
lease does not spillover beyond a date mentioned therein, the
relationship between the parties ceases to be governed by the
lease deed. Once the lease deed became redundant, any clause
contained in it also ceases to be of any relevance to the parties.
It was further held that the arbitration clause contained in the
lease deed ceases to be of any relevance unless the dispute
between the parties is the one that has arisen during the
subsistence of the lease. In other words, if the claim of one of
the parties is in relation to state of affairs that arose after the
expiry of the lease period, the clause would not bar adjudication
of the dispute through Courts. Mr. Agrawal further referred to
the decision in the case of M/S Eigen Technical Services Pvt.
Ltd. Vs. M/S Vatika Limited & Anr., reported in 2015(1) ILR
Punjab & Haryana, wherein the learned Single Judge of Punjab
and Haryana High Court held that in view of the terms of the
lease deed, the arbitration clause contained therein stands
perished with efflux of time and the same cannot be enforced.
Mr. Agrawal further referred to the decision in the case of
Ravinder Nath & Anr. Vs. Best Entertainment (P) Ltd.,
reported in 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2637 wherein the learned
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Single Judge of Delhi High Court held that the arbitration clause
referred to by the defendant in a prior lease deed, which has
already expired, cannot be used to decide the rights of the
parties after expiry of the lease tenure.
12. Thus, Mr. Agrawal has submitted that the present
petition is maintainable considering the fact that once the lease
deed was terminated, there remained no arbitration agreement
between the parties and proceeding with the arbitration
agreement by the learned Arbitrator is illegal and the same
requires interference by this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution.
13. Mr. Apurv Yash, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of respondent, vehemently contended that there could be
no question about legality of proceeding before the learned
Arbitrator and the same is perfectly valid. Learned counsel, at
the outset, took this Court to the order passed by the learned
Arbitrator and submitted that the learned Arbitrator observed
that the effective claims of the claimant are three fold; (i)
damages for wrongful deprivation of possession of demise
premises after willful surrender/ termination of tenancy by the
Respondents; (ii) cost of restoration of the demise premises to
its original status, and; (iii) the Electricity charges and the
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maintenance charges which were payable during the period of
deprivation including the enhanced fixed charge of electricity
which the Respondents did not get reduced upon their leaving
the premises. It has further been noted that except for the first
claim, learned Arbitrator noted that, admittedly, other two
claims could be tried and adjudicated upon by the Arbitral
Tribunal. Learned counsel further submitted that for
adjudication of the first claim, the petitioner contended that the
claim of the claimant basically related to Section 18(3) of the
BBC Act and the present petitioner relied on the decision of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Drolia Vs. Durga
Trading Corporation, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 1. However, the
learned Arbitrator discussed the law as provided under Section
18(3) of the BBC Act and came to the conclusion that the
claimant/respondent did not claim any relief in terms of Section
18(3) of the BBC Act. On the same line, Vidya Drolia (supra)
has been distinguished as the claim of the claimant/respondent
was not found to be falling within the ambit of four conditions
laid down in the case of Vidya Drolia (supra) whereunder a
dispute was held to be non-arbitral. Learned counsel further
submitted that on further discussion, the learned Arbitrator came
to the conclusion that the arbitral proceeding was not without
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jurisdiction in relation to all of any of the reliefs as sought by
the Claimant.
14. Learned counsel also submitted that if there is no
patent lack of inherent jurisdiction, the present civil
miscellaneous petition is not maintainable since there is no
perversity in the order that is staring one in the face as observed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab State
Power Corporation Limited (supra). Learned counsel also
referred to Paras-22, 23 and 24 of the decision in the case of
Deep Industries Limited (supra) in support of his contention
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the policy of the
Act is speedy disposal of arbitration cases and it is a self-
contained code and only such acts are permissible which are
mentioned in the Act and acts or things not mentioned therein
are not permissible to be done. Thus, the learned counsel
submitted that the present petition is not maintainable and the
same be dismissed with cost.
15. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival
submission of the parties and perused the record.
16. At this stage, the issue before this Court is whether the
present petition is maintainable against an order passed by the
learned Arbitrator on an application filed under Section 16 of
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the Act ?
17. It has been strenuously argued on behalf of the
petitioner that the present application is maintainable since the
learned Arbitrator lacked the jurisdiction to proceed in the
matter which arises out of post-termination events of the lease
agreement between the petitioner and respondent. In the case of
Deep Industries Limited (supra), a three Judges Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that though petitions can be filed
under Article 227 of the Constitution against judgments
allowing or dismissing first appeals under Section 37 of the Act
but cautioned that the High Court must be extremely
circumspect in interfering with the same, taking into account the
statutory policy, so that interference is restricted to orders that
are passed which are patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction.
Again, in the case of Punjab State Power Corporation Limited
(supra), another three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that a foray to the writ Court from a section 16
application being dismissed by the Arbitrator can only be if the
order passed is so perverse that the only possible conclusion is
that there is a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court further held that a patent lack of inherent
jurisdiction requires no argument whatsoever – it must be the
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perversity of the order that must stare one in the face. On the
same lines, in the case of Bhaven Construction Vs. Executive
Engineer, Sardar Srovar Narmada Nigam Limited & Anr.,
reported in (2022) 1 SCC 75, wherein the ruling of the arbitrator
under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act was under challenge
with regard to jurisdiction of the Arbitrator, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that interference under Article 226/227 of
the Constitution by High Court with arbitral process is not
permissible except in exceptionally rare circumstances and
further held that discretion under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution cannot be exercised to allow judicial interference
beyond the procedure established under the Act. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court further held that this power needs to be
exercised in exceptional rarity, wherein one party is left
remediless under the statute or a clear “bad faith” shown by one
of the parties. The Hon’ble Supreme Court proceeded further
and held that for deciding the jurisdiction of an Arbitrator, the
competent authority is the Arbitrator and not the writ Court
under Article 226/227 of the Constitution and has further held
that challenge to ruling of arbitrator in this regard must be as per
the statute and not by resort to Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution.
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18. Thus, position of law has been made very much clear
that an interlocutory order passed in arbitration proceeding can
become subject matter of challenge under Article 227 of the
Constitution only when the petitioner has no other remedy
available against such order or in exceptional cases of patent
lack of inherent jurisdiction or “bad faith” being shown.
19. Coming back to the facts of the case and applying the
law, as annunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases
of Deep Industries Limited (supra), Punjab State Power
Corporation Limited (supra) and Bhaven Construction (supra),
it is apt to note here that the learned counsel for the petitioner
has to resort to lengthy argument to show the patent lack of
jurisdiction to bring out the perversity to convince the Court that
it is staring on face of it. But I am unable to persuade myself
that the facts show any patent lack of inherent jurisdiction
because there is no perversity staring one in the face. Similarly,
no ‘bad faith’ has been shown by the petitioner to make the
impugned order amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution. Moreover, the petitioner is not
left remediless as statutory appeal under Section 34 of the Act
has been provided and the petitioner has a recourse of law to
agitate of his grievance in the appeal provided by the Statute. It
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would be apposite to quote what the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held in the case of Deep Industries Limited (supra):
“One other feature of this case is of some
importance. As stated herein above, on 09.05.2018,
a Section 16 application had been dismissed by the
learned Arbitrator in which substantially the same
contention which found favour with the High Court
was taken up. The drill of Section 16 of the Act is
that where a Section 16 application is dismissed,
no appeal is provided and the challenge to the
Section 16 application being dismissed must await
the passing of a final award at which stage it may
be raised under Section 34……..”
20. In the light of aforesaid discussion of law vis-à-vis the
facts of the case, the authorities cited by the petitioner are of no
help to the cause of the petitioner.
21. In these circumstances the petitioner would have to
wait for time and allow the arbitral proceeding to come to an
end. When the Arbitral Award is announced or any interim
appealable order is passed, the petitioner can always challenge
such award or order, as the case may be, under Section 34 or
Section 37 of the Act and the petitioner would be at liberty to
raise the ground taken in the present petition in the appeal.
22. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the
present case provides no occasion for this Court to utilize its
discretionary power under Article 227 of the Constitution and
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the present civil miscellaneous petition is not maintainable and
hence, is dismissed.
23. It is, however, made clear that while disposing of the
application of the petitioner filed under Section 16 of the Act, if
any comments on merits of the case were made by the learned
Arbitrator, the same would not cause prejudice to the case of the
parties at the time of final disposal of the arbitration proceeding.
24. Consequently, both I.A. No. 01 of 2025 and I.A. No.
02 of 2025 stand disposed of.
(Arun Kumar Jha, J)
Ashish/-
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