Bangalore District Court
Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike … vs M/S Struct Geotech Research … on 20 January, 2025
KABC170024392024
IN THE COURT OF LXXXIII ADDL. CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE,
COMMERCIAL COURT, BENGALURU (CCH-84)
Present: Sri S. Sudindranath, LL.M., M.B.L.,
LXXXIII ADDL. CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE
BENGALURU.
COM.A.P.No.139/2024
Dated on this 20th day of January 2025
Petitioner/s 1. Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara
Palike (BBMP)
Office at N R Square,
Bengaluru - 560001.
Represented by its
Chief Commissioner
2. Executive Engineer,
Quality Control Division - 2
Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara
Palike, Office at N R Square,
Bengaluru - 560 001.
(By Sri. Prashanth Chandra S.N.,
Advocate)
// versus //
Respondent/s 1. M/s Struct Geotech Research
Laboratories (P) Ltd. (STRUCT),
No.588, 2nd Main, 6th Block,
Hosakerehalli Cross, BSK 3rd Stage,
2nd Phase, Bengaluru - 560 085.
Represented by its Authorized Signatory
Mrs.Vinutha Prakash
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2. Sri. H.M.Nanjundaswamy
Former District Judge & Former
Director, Arbitration & Conciliation
Centre, Sole Arbitrator,
Arbitration & Conciliation Centre,
Bengaluru (Domestic & International)
Khanija Bhavana, Race Course Road,
Bengaluru - 560 001.
(By R.1 Exparte & R.2 Arbitrator)
Date of institution of suit : 12/09/2024
Nature of suit Arbitration Suit under
:
Arbitration Act
Date of commencement of
: -
recording of the evidence
Date on which the judgment
: 20/01/2025
was pronounced
Year/s Month/s Day/s
Total duration :
00 04 08
JUDGMENT
This is a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act filed by the respondents before the
learned arbitrator challenging the arbitral award dated
04-05-2023 passed by the learned sole arbitrator, namely
respondent No. 2 herein, in AC 10 of 2022 awarding ₹
34,33,562/= [less Rs. 1,95,000/=] along with interest at
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12% per annum compounded quarterly from the date of
petition till the date of payment, in favour of the claimant
before the learned arbitrator, namely the respondent No.
1 herein.
2. On issuance of notice of the present petition, the
respondent No. 1 / claimant is duly served on office clerk
through court and placed exparte. The notice to the
learned arbitrator is dispensed with.
3. The arbitration records have been secured from the
arbitration centre.
4. However, since, the claim statement and statement
of defence have been returned to the respective parties by
the Arbitration Center, learned counsel for Petitioner
herein, at the time of arguments has filed memo
producing the copy of Statement of Claim and Original
Statement of Defence filed before the Arbitral Tribunal
and same is taken on record.
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5. I have heard the arguments of Learned Counsel for
Petitioner and perused the records of the case.
6. The only point that arises for my consideration is :-
Whether the impugned arbitral award
dated 04-5-2023 passed by the learned
sole arbitrator, namely Respondent No. 2
herein, in AC 10 of 2022, calls for
interference under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act?
7. My answer to the above point is in the affirmative
for the following :-
REASONS
8. The facts in brief are that, the Respondent No. 1
herein, [hereinafter referred to as the claimant], is an
accredited laboratory consultant providing services to the
civil engineering sector. The petitioners herein,
[hereinafter collectively referred to as the BBMP], had
called tender for selecting lab consultants for quality
control of the works undertaken by BBMP through civil
contractors. The claimant participated in the said tender
and was awarded work order dated 18-3-2013. In this
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regard, the parties also entered into a contract dated 18-
3-2013.
9. Under the contract, the responsibility of the
claimant was to provide consultancy service and
laboratory testing of construction materials used by the
contractors for doing the civil work of BBMP and to issue
certificates in respect of the same. It is only on the
claimant issuing certificates certifying the quality of the
construction material used by the civil contractors that,
the BBMP would clear the bills of the civil contractors for
such works.
10. Accordingly, the claimant carried out its work under
the contract and submitted invoice dated 29-01-2015 for
sum of Rs. 1,95,000/=. Since BBMP did not clear the
said invoice in spite of several reminders and also
issuance of legal notice, the claimant approached the
MSMED Facilitation Council under Section 18 of the
MSMED Act, since the claimant is a registered supplier
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under the Act. The MSMED Facilitation Council
conducted conciliation proceedings, and since
conciliation failed, the Facilitation Council referred the
matter to Arbitration to the Arbitration Centre,
Bangalore.
11. Accordingly, the Respondent No. 2 entered upon the
reference as the learned sole arbitrator.
12. The claimant filed a detailed statement of claim
dated 28-9-2022 before the learned arbitrator. In the said
claim statement, the aforestated facts were reiterated,
and it was stated that the invoice amount of Rs.
1,95,000/= was paid by BBMP only on 01-02-2022.
Hence, it was contended that, there is delay in payment
of the invoice, from 45 days from the date of invoice when
it became payable under section 16 of the MSMED Act till
1-02-2022 and hence claim No. 1 was raised for interest
for said period which was quantified, as per the summary
of claim marked as Ex. P7 at Rs. 19,33,562. In addition,
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claim No. 2 was raised for the cost of the arbitration
proceedings of Rs. 15 lakhs and therefore, the claim
statement was filed for recovery of total sum of Rs.
34,33,562.
13. To the said claim statement, the BBMP filed a
detailed statement of objections. The BBMP admitted
awarding the work order and entering into the contract
with the claimant. However, it was contended that from
the invoice, there is nothing to show that the claimant
has completed the work in accordance with the contract.
Further, it was contended that the invoices do not
indicate the enclosures of the test reports.
14. Another contention raised was that, as per Clause 2
(b) of the contract, the competent authority to release
payments to the claimant is the divisional executive
engineer, and therefore, the invoices had to be submitted
to the said authority. However, the claimant had
submitted the invoice to the executive engineer.
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Therefore, it was contended that the invoice was not
submitted to the proper authority within BBMP, and
hence, the invoice cannot be considered.
15. Another contention taken was that the invoice is
dated 29-01-2015 and claim has not been raised within
three years from the date of the last invoice, and
therefore the claim is barred by limitation.
16. With these contentions, the BBMP prayed for
dismissal of the claim petition.
17. The claimant filed a detailed rejoinder to the said
objection statement.
18. On the basis of the rival pleadings of both sides, the
following issues were framed:
1) Whether the claimant proves that it is
an institution within the fold of
MSMED Act 2006?
2) Whether the claimant is entitled for an
amount of Rs. 34,33,562 as claimed in
the petition?
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3) Whether the claimant is entitled for
interest as per Section 16 of the
MSMED Act 2006?
4) Whether the claim petition is bad for
mis-joinder of causes of action?
5) Whether the claim is barred by time?
6) What award?
19. In the inquiry before the learned arbitrator, both
sides agreed to dispense with oral evidence and to
proceed on the basis of documents marked by consent.
Accordingly, on behalf of the claimant, Ex. P1 to P14
were marked. No documents were produced and marked
on behalf of the BBMP.
20. Thereafter, after hearing both sides, the learned
arbitrator answered issue No. 1 to 3 in the affirmative,
issue No. 4 & 5 in the negative, and has passed the
impugned arbitral award directing the BBMP to pay sum
of Rs. 34,33,562 [less Rs. 1,95,000 paid by BBMP, if not
deducted already] along with interest at 12% per annum
compounded quarterly from date of petition till
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realization and also directed BBMP to pay to the claimant
all money deposited by the claimant including any on
behalf of the BBMP towards arbitrators’ fee,
administration charges, and sitting charges.
21. Aggrieved by the said arbitral award, the BBMP
viz. the respondents before the learned arbitral tribunal,
are before this court, seeking to set aside the award
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
22. In support of the present petition, the Learned
Counsel for Petitioners has essentially urged 4 points. He
has reiterated the contention taken before the Learned
Arbitrator that, the invoices were submitted by the
claimant to improper authority, i.e. to executive
engineer, whereas under the contract, the payment had
to be released by the divisional engineer. Therefore, he
submitted that if the invoices are submitted to the
improper authority, there was no question of BBMP
considering the same and releasing payment. He also
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reiterated the contention taken before the learned
arbitrator that there is no proper proof adduced by the
claimant to show that the claimant has actually done the
work under the contract. The principal contention urged
by him was that the claim was barred by limitation and
therefore ought to have been dismissed by the learned
arbitrator. Lastly, it was argued that, in the operative
portion of the award, the BBMP is directed to pay Rs.
34,33,562 less than Rs. 1,95,000 paid by BBMP, if not
already deducted and thereby the award is vague and is
liable to be set aside on this ground.
23. As already noted, the Respondent No. 1, who was
the claimant before the arbitral tribunal, is exparte.
24. Notwithstanding the fact that the Respondent No. 1
is exparte, this court has to still consider on merits
whether the grounds taken in the petition fall within the
scope of section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
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and whether on such grounds the arbitral award can be
set aside.
25. At the outset, this court has to consider whether
the present petition is filed within the period of limitation
as provided under section 34 [3] of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act. This question has to be decided by this
court although the contesting Respondent No. 1 is
exparte, since, under section 3 of the Limitation Act, the
point of limitation has to be considered by the court even
if the same is not raised as a defence.
26. This question assumes importance in view of the
fact that the impugned arbitral award is dated 4-5-2023
whereas the present petition under section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act is filed after nearly one
year and four months on 12-9-2024.It is to be noted that
under Section 34 [3] of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, the Section 34 petition has to be filed within 3
months from the date of receipt of the arbitral award by
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the petitioner. The court has the discretion to condone
further period of 30 days under Proviso to Section 34 [3]
of the Act, but, thereafter even the court has no
discretion to condone the delay.
27. In this regard, along with the present petition, the
petitioner has filed certified copy of “copy application
register” of the Arbitration Centre which discloses that,
the award is furnished to the advocate for Petitioner
[respondent before the arbitral tribunal] only on 15-06-
2024. It is to be noted that, under section 34 [3] of the
Act, the period of limitation begins to run not from the
date of the Award, but, from the date on which the award
is received by the petitioner. Therefore, from the certified
copy of the Copy Application Register produced along
with the petition, it is clear that, the award was furnished
to the petitioner herein only on 15-06-2024 and therefore
limitation has to be counted from said date. There is no
reason to disbelieve the version of the petitioner that the
award was received only on 15-06-2024 particularly
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since the respondent No. 1 is exparte and has not
contested the said fact put forth by the petitioner herein.
Therefore, if the limitation is counted from 15-6-2024,
within 3 months from the said date on 12-9-2024, the
petition is filed and therefore the present petition is
within the period of limitation.
28. Turning to the merits of the present petition, at
the outset, it is to be noted that, there is no dispute that
under the work order and contract dated 18-03-2013, the
BBMP awarded the contract to the claimant to provide
civil engineering consultancy service for lab testing of
construction materials to be used by the civil contractors
for the construction of various projects for BBMP. It is
for recovery of invoice amount dated 29-01-2015 in
respect of work done under the said contract that the
claim was raised by the claimant.
29. The first contention raised that, the said work was
not completed by the claimant, is a purely factual
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contention which cannot be considered in a petition
under section 34 of the Act. Even otherwise, admittedly
the invoice amount of Rs. 1,95,000 has already been paid
by BBMP to the claimant on 1-2-2022 and therefore, this
contention does not survive because the very fact that
the invoice amount has already been cleared by BBMP is
testimony to the fact that, the claimant had done the
work under the invoice.
30. The second contention raised by the BBMP that
the invoices were not submitted to the proper authority,
viz. Division Engineer, but were submitted to Executive
Engineer is a contention only to be stated to be rejected
because ultimately the BBMP is a statutory authority
represented by its Chief Commissioner. The BBMP
performs its functions through a hierarchy of officials.
However, all the officials are the officers of BBMP and
therefore no distinction can be drawn between a
divisional engineer and executive engineer insofar as
submitting the invoices is concerned. Even otherwise, as
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already noted supra, it is admitted that the invoice
amount was cleared by BBMP on 1-2-2022 and therefore
it means that the submission of the invoice to executive
engineer is inconsequential since the BBMP itself has
cleared the invoice. Therefore, this contention also does
not survive for consideration.
LIMITATION
31. Now, let me consider the question of limitation
which is the main ground raised in the present petition.
32. The contention of the Petitioners / BBMP in this
regard is that, the invoice in respect of which payment is
claimed is dated 29-01-2015 and therefore, within the
period of three years from the date of invoice, i.e. on or
before 29-01-2018, the claimant should have approached
the Facilitation Council under the MSMED Act. But
admittedly, the claimant approached the Facilitation
council only on 18-02-2019. Therefore, it is contended
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that the claim itself is barred by limitation and could not
have been allowed by the learned arbitrator.
33. In considering this question of limitation at the
outset, it is to be noted that, as per the law laid down by
Hon’ble Apex Court the provision of Limitation Act
applies even to arbitrations initiated under Section 18 (3)
of MSMED Act 2006. In this regard, reference may be
made to the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Silpi Industries v. Kerala SRTC, (2021) 18 SCC
790 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 439 at page 806, as
follows;
26. Applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963
to the arbitrations is covered by Section 43 of
the 1996 Act. The High Court, while
referring to abovesaid provisions and
the judgment of this Court inA.P. Power
Coordination Committee v. Lanco
Kondapalli Power Ltd. [A.P. Power
Coordination Committee v. Lanco
Kondapalli Power Ltd., (2016) 3 SCC
468] has held that the Limitation Act,
1963 is applicable to the arbitrations
covered by Section 18(3) of the 2006 Act.
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A reading of Section 43 itself makes it clear
that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to
the arbitrations, as it applies to proceedings
in court. When the settlement with regard to
a dispute between the parties is not arrived
at under Section 18 of the 2006 Act,
necessarily, the Micro and Small Enterprises
Facilitation Council shall take up the dispute
for arbitration under Section 18(3) of the
2006 Act or it may refer to institution or
centre to provide alternate dispute resolution
services and provisions of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 are made
applicable as if there was an agreement
between the parties under sub-section (1) of
Section 7 of the 1996 Act.
27. In view of the express provision applying
the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 to
arbitrations as per Section 43 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, we
are of the view that the High Court has
rightly relied on the judgment in A.P. Power
Coordination Committee [A.P. Power
Coordination Committee v. Lanco Kondapalli
Power Ltd., (2016) 3 SCC 468] and held that
the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the
arbitration proceedings under Section 18(3)
of the 2006 Act. Thus, we are of the view
that no further elaboration is necessary
on this issue and we hold that the
provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963
will apply to the arbitrations covered by
Section 18(3) of the 2006 Act. We make it
clear that as the judgment of the High Court
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is an order of remand, we need not enter into
the controversy whether the
claims/counterclaims are within time or not.
We keep it open to the primary authority to
go into such issues and record its own
findings on merits.
(Emphasis Supplied)
34. In fact, the learned arbitrator also refers to the said
ruling of Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph 26 of the
award, as follows;
“The counsel for the claimant has relied upon
the decision in M/s Silpi Industries v. Kerala
State Road Transport Corporation in 2021
SCC Online SC 439, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Silpi Industries noted that in case a dispute
arose under Section 17 of the MSMED Act, a
reference must be made to the Council.
The Council was then to refer the parties
to conciliation and if the conciliation
proceedings failed, the Council was to
refer the dispute to arbitration, (either
administered by itself or by any institution or
center deemed fit by the Council) under
Section 18 of the MSMED Act. In view of the
same, it looks to me that the question of
limitation does not arise till the MSME Council
refer the parties to arbitration.”
(Emphasis In Original)
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35. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Silpi
Industries v. Kerala SRTC (Supra) has nowhere laid
down the law that the question of limitation does not
arise till the parties are referred to arbitration. The
specific law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the afore-
stated ruling is that the provisions of Limitation Act will
apply to arbitrations covered by Section 18 (3) of MSMED
Act.
36. In view of the said law laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex Court, it becomes necessary to see when the
limitation begins to run and whether the reference to the
Facilitation Council under Section 18 (1) of the Act was
made within the period of limitation.
37. In this regard, the learned arbitrator at paragraph
20 & 21 of the award has referred to various articles of
the Schedule of the Limitation Act and ultimately opined
that it is the Residuary Article, namely Article 113, which
is applicable to the case on hand. This finding regarding
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the applicability of Article 113 of the Limitation Act is not
challenged before me. Even otherwise, the finding of the
learned arbitrator that none of the articles of the
Limitation Act except the Residuary Article i.e. Article
113 applies to the facts of the present case is perfectly in
accordance with law.
38. Article 113 of the Limitation Act, provides that the
period of limitation for any suit for which no limitation is
provided elsewhere in the schedule shall be three years
when the right to sue accrues. The learned arbitrator at
Paragraph 21 to 24 of the award has referred to the
ruling of Hon’ble Apex Court in Shakti Bhog Food
Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, (2020) 17
SCC 260 : (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 286 : 2020 SCC OnLine
SC 482.
39. The facts of the said case were that, certain excess
charges were levied by the bank up to October 2000.
These excess charges were noticed by the plaintiff in July
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2000 and the plaintiff issued a letter dated 21-07-2000 to
the bank. On 9-7-2001, the Assistant General Manager of
the bank informed the plaintiff that comments from the
branch office concerned had been invited and appropriate
decisions would be taken on the plaintiff’s representation
as early as possible. On 8-5-2002, the Senior Manager
repudiated the contention of the plaintiff, which was
followed by another letter of the Senior General Manager
dated 19-09-2002. In this background, the trial court,
the district court, and Hon’ble High Court in the said
case had rejected the plaint as barred by limitation under
Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC on the ground that the cause
of action accrued in October 2000, up to which date the
alleged excessive charges were charged by the bank and
therefore suit filed on 23-02-2005 would be barred by
limitation. When the matter reached the Hon’ble Apex
Court, it was held as follows;
Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v.
Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260
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: (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 286 : 2020 SCC
OnLine SC 482 at page 273
12. From the averments in the plaint, if read
as a whole, it would appear that the assertion
of the appellant is that the respondents had
extended financial facility with effect from 1-
4-1997 till October 2007, but somewhere in
the month of July 2000, the appellant noticed
that the respondents were unilaterally
charging interest/commission @ Rs 4 per
thousand Rs. on local cheques and drafts in
an arbitrary manner in violation of the
assurance given to the appellant. Immediately
thereafter, the appellant wrote to the
respondent Bank vide letter dated 21-7-
2000 for taking corrective steps in the matter.
Then correspondence ensued between the
parties in that regard and the appellant was
assured by the regional office of the
respondent Bank that an appropriate
decision will be taken at the earliest. The
relevant assertion in that regard is found in
Para 11 of the plaint, wherein it is mentioned
that the Assistant General Manager Shri
P.S. Bawa of Regional Office-B, Delhi,
vide letter dated 9-7-2001 informed the
appellant that comments from the
branch office concerned have been
invited and appropriate decision will be
taken on its representation as early as
possible. Thereafter, on 8-5-2002, the Senior
Manager of the respondent Bank informed the
appellant that the cheques were being
purchased at the prevailing rates; which plea,
according to the appellant, was to deviate
from the position stated by the Assistant
General Manager of Regional Office in his
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letter dated 9-7-2001 referred to earlier.
Resultantly, the appellant wrote to the
officials of the respondent Bank vide letters
dated 12-7-2002, 22-9-2002 and 24-3-2003.
13. Notably, it is averred in Para 15 of the
plaint that the Senior Manager of the
respondent Bank vide letter dated 19-9-
2002 had informed the appellant that
everything was being done in accordance
with the rules and the appellant need not
pursue the matter any further. It is
asserted that despite this intimation, the
appellant continued to correspond with the
respondent Bank with a sanguine hope that
the issue will be resolved at the appropriate
level by the Bank and finally issued a legal
notice on 28-11-2003, which was duly
responded to by the respondent Bank vide
advocate’s letter dated 23-12-2003.
Nevertheless, the appellant gave another legal
notice on 7-1-2005 and thereafter, proceeded
to file the subject suit in February 2005.
15. As aforesaid, on reading the plaint as a
whole, it is seen that the gravamen of the
case made out in the plaint is that the
appellant noticed the discrepancy in July
2000 and immediately took up the matter
with the officials of the respondent Bank at
different levels and in response, the
Assistant General Manager of the
Regional Office of the Bank had
communicated in writing to the
appellant vide letter dated 9-7-2001, that
its representation was being examined
and comments of the branch office have
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been invited and after receipt thereof the
matter will be decided as early as
possible. As no further communication was
received by the appellant, it had to make a
representation to the Finance Minister,
Government of India, vide letter dated 31-10-
2001 and presumably because of that, the
appellant received a communication from the
Senior Manager vide letter dated 8-5-2002
informing the appellant that the cheques were
being purchased at the prevailing rates. This
stand taken by the Senior Manager was
to sidetrack the issue pending
consideration before the Assistant
General Manager, Regional Office
referred to in his letter dated 9-7-2001.
The case made out by the appellant is that no
communication was received by the appellant
from the Assistant General Manager, Regional
Office and instead, for the first time it was
informed vide letter dated 19-9-2002 sent by
the Senior Manager of the respondent Bank,
that all actions taken by the Bank are as per
the rules and, therefore, the appellant need
not correspond in this regard any further. This
response of the Bank could also be regarded
as a firm denial or refusal by the authorised
official of the Bank, giving rise to cause of
action to sue the Bank.
16. Thus understood, the letter dated 8-
5-2002 sent by the Senior Manager of the
respondent Bank, at best, be reckoned as
accrual of the cause of action to the
appellant to sue the respondent Bank. It
is then stated that the appellant received a
communication dated 19-9-2002, informing
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the appellant that it should not carry on any
further correspondence with the Bank relating
to the subject-matter. Until then, the appellant
was having a sanguine hope of favourable
resolution of its claim including by the
Regional Office of the respondents. The
appellant, therefore, had to send a legal
notice on 28-11-2003, to which the Bank
responded on 23-12-2003. Reckoning these
dates, the plaint filed on 23-2-2005 was
within limitation, as stated in Para 28 of the
plaint. Resultantly, the question of rejecting
such a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC
did not arise.
17. The expression used in Article 113 of the
1963 Act is “when the right to sue accrues”,
which is markedly distinct from the
expression used in other Articles in First
Division of the Schedule dealing with suits,
which unambiguously refer to the happening
of a specified event. Whereas, Article 113
being a residuary clause and which has
been invoked by all the three courts in this
case, does not specify happening of particular
event as such, but merely refers to the accrual
of cause of action on the basis of which the
right to sue would accrue.
18. Concededly, the expression used in
Article 113 is distinct from the expressions
used in other Articles in the First Division
dealing with suits such as Article 58 (when
the right to sue “first” accrues), Article 59
(when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have
the instrument or decree cancelled or set
aside or the contract rescinded “first” become
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known to him) and Article 104 (when the
plaintiff is “first” refused the enjoyment of the
right). The view taken by the trial court,
which commended to the first appellate
court and the High Court in the second
appeal, would inevitably entail in
reading the expression in Article 113 as
— when the right to sue (first) accrues.
This would be rewriting of that provision and
doing violence to the legislative intent. We
must assume that Parliament was conscious
of the distinction between the provisions
referred to above and had advisedly used
generic expression “when the right to sue
accrues” in Article 113 of the 1963 Act.
Inasmuch as, it would also cover cases falling
under Section 22 of the 1963 Act, to wit,
continuing breaches and torts.
22. It is well-established position that the
cause of action for filing a suit would consist
of bundle of facts. Further, the factum of the
suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily,
would be a mixed question of fact and law.
Even for that reason, invoking Order 7 Rule
11 CPC is ruled out. In the present case,
the assertion in the plaint is that the
appellant verily believed that its claim
was being processed by the regional
office and the regional office would be
taking appropriate decision at the
earliest. That belief was shaken after
receipt of letter from the Senior Manager
of the Bank, dated 8-5-2002 followed by
another letter dated 19-9-2002 to the
effect that the action taken by the Bank
was in accordance with the rules and the
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appellant need not correspond with the
Bank in that regard any further. This
firm response from the respondent Bank
could trigger the right of the appellant to
sue the respondent Bank. Moreover, the
fact that the appellant had eventually sent a
legal notice on 28-11-2003 and again on 7-1-
2005 and then filed the suit on 23-2-2005, is
also invoked as giving rise to cause of action.
Whether this plea taken by the appellant is
genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed
question of fact and law, depending on the
response of the respondents.
23. Reverting to the argument that
exchange of letters or correspondence
between the parties cannot be the basis
to extend the period of limitation, in our
opinion, for the view taken by us
hitherto, the same need not be dilated
further. Inasmuch as, having noticed
from the averments in the plaint that the
right to sue accrued to the appellant on
receiving letter from the Senior Manager,
dated 8-5-2002, and in the particular letter
dated 19-9-2002, and again on firm refusal
by the respondents vide advocate’s letter
dated 23-12-2003 in response to the legal
notice sent by the appellant on 28-11-2003;
and once again on the follow-up legal notice
on 7-1-2005, the plaint filed in February 2005
would be well within limitation. Considering
the former events of firm response by the
respondents on 8-5-2002 and in
particular, 19-9-2002, the
correspondence ensued thereafter,
including the two legal notices sent by
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the appellant, even if disregarded, the
plaint/suit filed on 23-2-2005 would be
within limitation in terms of Article 113.
24. The respondents had relied on the
exposition of this Court in Boota Mal v. Union
of India [Boota Mal v. Union of India, AIR
1962 SC 1716] , S.S. Rathore v. State of
M.P. [S.S. Rathore v. State of M.P., (1989) 4
SCC 582 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 50] , Venkappa
Gurappa Hosurv. Kasawwa [Venkappa
Gurappa Hosur v. Kasawwa, (1997) 10 SCC
66] and Kandimalla Raghavaiah &
Co. v. National Insurance Co. [Kandimalla
Raghavaiah & Co. v. National Insurance Co.,
(2009) 7 SCC 768 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 295]
and of the Delhi High Court in C.P.
Kapur [C.P. Kapur v. Chairman, 2012 SCC
OnLine Del 5465 : (2013) 198 DLT 56] , to
buttress the above argument, which, as
aforesaid, is unavailable in light of the
averments in the plaint under consideration.
Suffice it to observe that going by the
averments in the plaint, the argument of
the respondents that the appellant had
placed reliance on the correspondence to
get extension of the limitation period, is
untenable. The averments in the plaint,
however, are very explicit to the effect that the
grievance of the appellant about unilateral
charging of interest/commission by the
respondent Bank was firmly denied or
refused by the Senior Manager of the
respondent Bank vide letter dated 8-5-2002
and in the particular letter dated 19-9-2002
and again by Advocate’s letter on 23-12-
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2003, giving rise to cause of action and
accrual of right to sue.
(Emphasis Supplied)
40. The categorical law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court
in the aforestated Judgment is that for the purpose of
Article 113 of the Limitation Act, the limitation begins to
run when the cause of action accrues and not when the
cause of action first accrues.
41. The learned arbitrator at paragraph 23 has held
that, as per the above decision of Hon’ble Apex Court, “it
is the response of the defendant which is firm in denying
the claim that gives rise to the cause of action and nothing
else, not the submitting of the bill, invoices, legal notice,
but the response and the response alone.”
42. It is trite that the law laid down in the rulings of
Superior Courts have to be understood in the facts and
circumstances of the said case. In this regard, the
following rulings are instructive as to the manner in
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which the ratio decidendi of a judgment is to be
discerned;
Krishena Kumar v. Union of India,
(1990) 4 SCC 207 : 1991 SCC (L&S)
112 at page 226
20. In other words, the enunciation of the
reason or principle upon which a question
before a court has been decided is alone
binding as a precedent. The ratio decidendi
is the underlying principle, namely, the
general reasons or the general grounds upon
which the decision is based on the test or
abstract from the specific peculiarities of the
particular case which gives rise to the
decision. The ratio decidendi has to be
ascertained by an analysis of the facts
of the case and the process of reasoning
involving the major premise consisting
of a pre-existing rule of law, either
statutory or judge-made, and a minor
premise consisting of the material facts
of the case under immediate
consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the
duty of the court to spell it out with difficulty
in order to be bound by it. In the words of
Halsbury (4th edn., Vol. 26, para 573)
“The concrete decision alone is binding
between the parties to it but it is the abstract
ratio decidendi, as ascertained on a
consideration of the judgment in relation to
the subject matter of the decision, which
alone has the force of law and which when it
is clear it is not part of a tribunal’s duty to
spell out with difficulty a ratio decidendi in
order to bound by it, and it is always
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dangerous to take one or two observations
out of a long judgment and treat them as if
they gave the ratio decidendi of the case. If
more reasons than one are given by a
tribunal for its judgment, all are taken as
forming the ratio decidendi.”
Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka, (2008)
3 SCC 574 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 : (2008)
1 SCC (L&S) 910 : 2008 SCC OnLine SC
338 at page 580
9. When the words “rarest of rare cases” are
used after the words “sparingly and with
circumspection” while describing the scope of
Section 482, those words merely emphasise
and reiterate what is intended to be
conveyed by the words “sparingly and with
circumspection”. They mean that the power
under Section 482 to quash proceedings
should not be used mechanically or
routinely, but with care and caution, only
when a clear case for quashing is made out
and failure to interfere would lead to a
miscarriage of justice. The expression “rarest
of rare cases” is not used in the sense in
which it is used with reference to
punishment for offences under Section 302
IPC, but to emphasise that the power under
Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR or
criminal proceedings should be used
sparingly and with circumspection.
Judgments are not to be construed as
statutes. Nor words or phrases in
judgments to be interpreted like
provisions of a statute. Some words
used in a judgment should be read and
understood contextually and are not
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intended to be taken literally. Many a
time a judge uses a phrase or expression
with the intention of emphasising a point or
accentuating a principle or even by way of a
flourish of writing style. Ratio decidendi of
a judgment is not to be discerned from a
stray word or phrase read in isolation.
(Emphasis Supplied)
43. Therefore, the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court
in Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank
of India (Supra) has to be understood from the overall
reading of the reported ruling and in the background of
the facts prevailing in said case. From reading of the said
ruling of Hon’ble Apex Court as a whole, it is clear that,
firstly, Hon’ble Apex Court has interpreted Article 113 of
the Schedule of the Limitation Act, making it clear that
the limitation will begin to run when the right to sue
accrues as distinct from the right to sue first accrues.
The distinguishing feature of the said case was that, in
the said case, when the plaintiff first objected to
excessive charges by letter dated 21-07-2000, there was
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a reply by the Assistant General Manager dated 9-07-
2001 that a proper decision would be taken as early as
possible. It is in this background that the Hon’ble Apex
Court held that, only when there was a firm response
from the bank rejecting the contention of the plaintiff by
the letters dated 8-5-2002 and 19-9-2002, the same
furnished the cause of action to the plaintiff, and even
disregarding the subsequent correspondence, and
considering that the cause of action occurred on the
dates of such firm refusal by the bank, suit would be
within limitation (Paragraph 23 of reported ruling). It is
crucial to note that the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the
firm refusal by the bank gave rise to the cause of action
because of the earlier letter of the Assistant General
Manager dated 9-7-2001 in which an assurance was
given by the bank that the representation of the plaintiff
is being considered and a decision will be taken as soon
as possible. Therefore, it is only when such assurance
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is given by the other side that the plaintiff can wait
for firm refusal of his claim and then file the suit.
44. Therefore, the finding of the learned arbitrator at
paragraph 23 of the award that, as per the said decision
of the Hon’ble Apex Court, “it is the response of the
defendant, which is firm in denying the claim, that gives
rise to the cause of action and nothing else not the
submitting of the bill, invoices, letters, or legal notice, but
the response and the response alone” is based on
misunderstanding of the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex Court and without taking note of the facts and
circumstances in which the said law was laid down by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shakti Bhog case supra.
45. In the case on hand, if, at any point of time the
BBMP had given an assurance to the claimant that his
claim is being considered and decision will be taken
shortly, as was the fact situation in the case before the
Hon’ble Apex Court, then the said ruling would be
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applicable to the facts of the present case. In such a
case, it could be said that the claimant could wait for the
firm refusal and only on the firm refusal, the cause of
action would accrue to the claimant and the limitation
would begin to run. However, in the case on hand, in the
statement of claim, there is no plea raised that, at any
point of time after submitting the invoice, there was any
assurance by the BBMP to consider the claim and to take
a decision. In fact, an admission is made by the claimant
that no such assurance was ever given by BBMP by
pleading at paragraph 10 of the claim statement that
although the claimant has time and again approached
the respondent for release of the amount, it has fallen on
deaf ears. This makes it clear that at no point in time
there was any response by the BBMP that the claim of
the claimant is being considered and a decision will be
taken.
46. Such being the case, the said ruling of the Hon’ble
Apex Court (Shakti Bhog case supra), in which there was
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such a specific assurance by the defendant, cannot come
to the aid of the claimant in the present case and said
ruling is inapplicable to the case on hand.
47. Another reason given by the Learned arbitrator to
hold that claim is within the period of limitation is at
paragraph 29 of the Award holding that, the invoice
amount was transferred by BBMP to the account of the
claimant on 1-2-2022 as per Ex. P-12 and thereby if not
acknowledgement of debt there was part payment of the
claim which invalidates the claim of the respondents
about limitation.
48. This finding of Learned arbitrator is totally contrary
to law because under section 18 and section 19 of the
Limitation Act, for any acknowledgment of debt or part
payment to extend the period of limitation, the
acknowledgment of debt or part payment should be made
within the period of limitation. Any acknowledgment of
debt or part payment, beyond the period of limitation, is
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of no avail and will not have the effect of extending the
period of limitation. In the case on hand, the payment of
the invoice was made on 1-2-2022 which is subsequent
to the date on which the claimant approached the
MSMED facilitation council under section 16 of the
MSMED Act.
49. Therefore, the payment of the invoice amount on
01-02-2022 being after the date on which the claimant
had already approached the Facilitation Council, it will
not help the claimant to show that the claim was within
limitation as on the date of approaching the Facilitation
Council on 18-02-2019.
50. It is to be noted that in the case on hand, the claim
No. 1 as forthcoming from Paragraph 9 (a) of the claim
statement is for interest for delayed payment of invoice
dated 29-01-2015 which was paid only on 1-02-2022. At
the end of paragraph 9a, it is stated that the claimant is
entitled to interest from January 2015 to 31-01-2022 as
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quantified in document No. 6. The said document No. 6
of the claim statement is marked as Ex. P7, under which,
the due date for payment is stated as 15-03-2015 [45
days from date of invoice]. Therefore, according to the
claimant, the cause of action for claiming interest under
claim No. 1, accrued on 15-03-2015. Thereafter, there
may have been any number of correspondences,
representations, issuance of legal notices, etc. But the
law is well settled that no amount of correspondence,
representation, or exchange of legal notices can extend
the period of limitation. In this regard, reference may be
made to the law laid by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Union of India v. Har Dayal, (2010) 1 SCC 394
: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1837 at page 397, as follows;
10. The learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench have totally ignored the enormous delay
of more than 30 years on the part of the
respondent in approaching the court. This
Court has repeatedly held that merely
giving representation will neither extend
the limitation nor wipe out the delay and
laches. (See S.S. Rathore v. State of
M.P. [(1989) 4 SCC 582 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 50 :
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KABC170024392024(1989) 11 ATC 913 : AIR 1990 SC 10] ) Further,
the respondent and his brothers were
categorically informed in September 1989 that
due to non-availability of agricultural land,
they were entitled only to cash equivalent of
compensation as per the Rules and therefore,
Rs 383.50 each being their share of
compensation was to their credit and they
could draw the same. The respondent could
have challenged that order on the ground that
he was entitled to land and not cash. But he
did not do so.
(Emphasis Supplied)
51. Such being the case, the subsequent
correspondence will not furnish a fresh cause of action
nor extend the period of limitation.
52. Therefore, the claimant ought to have approached
the Facilitation Council under Section 18 (1) of the
MSMED Act within three years from the date on which
the cause of action accrued, which as already noted
Supra is 15-03-2015, that is, the claimant ought to have
approached the Facilitation Council on or before 15-3-
2018. However, as per the finding recorded in the award
itself at paragraph 18, the claimant approached the
41
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MSMED Facilitation Council only on 18-02-2019, which
was clearly beyond the period of limitation. Be it noted
that, as per the notice issued by the MSMED Facilitation
Council dated 23-09-2021, which is at Ex. P6, page 30 of
the Claim Petition, at paragraph 4 it is stated that the
claimant had filed application on 20-09-2018 under
section 18 of the MSMED Act.
53. Whether it is considered that, the claimant
approached the facilitation council on 18-02-2019 as
stated at paragraph 18 of the award or on 20-09-2018 as
stated in the said notice of facilitation council, the fact
remains that the claimant approached the facilitation
council subsequent to 15-03-2018 that is beyond the
period of three years from the date on which the cause of
action accrued. Therefore, the claim made by the
claimant before the facilitation council was barred by
limitation and such being the case, the claim ought to
have been dismissed by the Learned Arbitrator as barred
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by limitation and could not have been considered on
merits by the Learned arbitrator.
54. In conclusion, in considering the question of
limitation, the learned arbitrator rightly held that, it is
Article 113, which is the residuary article that is
applicable. However, the learned arbitrator committed an
error apparent on the face of the record by misconstruing
the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
Shakti Bhog Food Industries Limited v. Central Bank
of India case (SUPRA) by holding at paragraph 23 of the
award that it is only the denial response of the defendant
which gives rise to the cause of action. By so holding,
the learned arbitrator totally misunderstood the fact
situation in which the above law was laid down, wherein
the bank had given an assurance to the plaintiff of the
said case that his claim is being considered and a
decision will be arrived at shortly. It is for this reason
that the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the plaintiff was
justified in awaiting a favorable decision from the bank,
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and only when the bank gave a firm response denying the
claim, did the cause of action accrue to the plaintiff. The
fact situation of present case, being totally different and
the well-settled position of law being that no amount of
correspondence can extend the period of limitation or
furnish a fresh cause of action, the learned arbitrator
committed a serious error bordering on perversity in
holding that such a belated claim is within limitation.
55. At paragraph 24 of the award, the learned arbitrator
observes that the claimant believed that respondents
were considering his claim as there was no rejection of
the claim and went on requesting the respondent.
However, this finding is manifestly erroneous on the face
of the record because such a plea is not even put forth by
the claimant anywhere in the statement of claim.
Although in the claim statement reference is made to
various correspondences and representations and
reminder letters issued by the claimant, nowhere is a
statement made in the claim statement that the claimant
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kept quiet believing that his claim was being considered.
Even if such a statement were to be made in the claim
statement, the same would be of no avail because the
rejection of the claim by the opposite side will furnish the
cause of action only if on an earlier occasion an
assurance had been made by the opposite side that the
claim is being considered. Otherwise, belated and stale
claims could be raised on the ground that the plaintiff or
claimant was waiting, hoping that his claim would be
considered, which would render the Limitation Act
redundant.
56. At paragraph 26, the learned arbitrator, by referring
to Silpi Industries v. Kerala State Road Transport
Corporation case (SUPRA), observes that the question of
limitation does not arise till MSME Council refers the
parties to arbitration, which is again an observation not
found in the said ruling. In fact, the law laid out in the
said ruling is that the Limitation Act applies to
arbitrations under the MSMED Act. Needless to state, in
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view of the said law, the claimant should approach the
Facilitation Council under Section 18 (1) within the
period of limitation. Otherwise, any arbitration initiated
under the Act would be barred by limitation.
57. At paragraph 27 of the impugned award, the
learned arbitrator has referred to Section 43 and 21 of
the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, and then at paragraph
28 observed that the question of request for dispute to be
referred to arbitration being received by the respondent
does not arise when there is statutory reference. This
observation is made in context of Section 21 of the Act,
which provides that the arbitration proceedings are
deemed to have commenced on the date on which the
request for the dispute to be referred to arbitration is
received by the respondent. However, in making this
observation, where the learned arbitrator has committed
error is in failing to appreciate that Section 2 Subsection
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4 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act provides as
follows:
“This part, except subsection 1 of Section
40, Section 41, and Section 43, shall
apply to every arbitration under any other
enactment for the time being in force as if the
arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration
agreement and as if that other enactment
were an arbitration agreement, except insofar
as the provisions of this part are inconsistent
with that other enactment or with any rules
made thereunder.”
58. In view of the above Section 2 Subsection 4 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, it follows that, that part
of Section 43 which is inconsistent with MSMED Act, is
inapplicable to arbitrations initiated under MSMED Act.
Therefore, Section 43 (2), which provides that arbitration
shall be deemed to have commenced on the date referred
to in Section 21, is strictly inapplicable to arbitrations
initiated under MSMED Act because it is a statutory
arbitration and there is no question of the claimant
issuing notice to the respondent requesting for dispute to
be referred to arbitration. Therefore, on harmonious
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construction of Section 18 (3) of the MSMED Act and
Section 2 Subsection 4 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, it follows that in case of arbitrations
initiated under MSMED Act, the arbitration shall
commence on the date on which the claimant makes a
reference to the Facilitation Council under Section 18 (1)
of MSMED Act.
59. Therefore, the observation of the learned arbitrator
that since there is no question of request for dispute to
be referred to arbitration being issued by the claimant
and received by the respondent, there is no question of
the claim being barred by limitation runs contrary to the
specific law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Silpi
Industries v. Kerala State Road Transport
Corporation referred to supra, that Limitation Act
applies to arbitrations initiated under MSMED Act.
60. At paragraph 25 of the impugned award, the
learned arbitrator has summed up his findings by
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holding that, “firstly, the claim is not barred by limitation,
and even otherwise, the MSME Council had referred the
matter for arbitration by exercising statutory power, hence
loss of time in prosecuting the matter before MSME Council
is saved and later, there is no question of any limitation as
there was reference by MSME Council for arbitration and
registration of this case, which is the present proceedings.”
The flaw in this finding of the learned arbitrator is that
the learned arbitrator has failed to note that, when the
cause of action arose to the claimant to seek the invoice
amount as on 15-03-2015 [45 days from date of invoice],
and when subsequent representations and legal notices
do not extend the period of limitation, then, the claimant
should have approached the Facilitation Council under
Section 18 (1) of the MSMED Act within three years from
15-03-2015, viz. on or before 15-03-2018. But
admittedly, in this case, as per the finding of the Learned
Arbitrator at Paragraph 18 of the award, the claimant
approached the Facilitation Council only on 18-02-2019,
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which was beyond the period of limitation. On this short
ground, the learned arbitrator should have rejected
the claim on the ground that it is barred by
limitation.
61. Therefore, for the above reasons, I hold that the
learned arbitrator has committed a patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award, in holding that the
claim was within limitation. In so holding, the learned
arbitrator has misconstrued and misapplied the
categorical law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court. In
holding that the claim was within time, not only has the
learned arbitrator committed a patent illegality and
recorded an erroneous finding whose error is apparent on
the face of the record, but in allowing a time-barred
claim, the learned arbitrator has passed an award which
is in conflict with fundamental policy of Indian law since
the fundamental policy of Indian law does not allow for
awarding of time-barred claims. Therefore, the award
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calls for interference under Section 34 (2) (b)(ii) for
being in contravention with fundamental policy of
Indian law, and also under Section 34 (2A), as the
award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the
face of the award.
62. There is another reason for setting aside the arbitral
award. As already noted supra, under the award, the
learned arbitrator has directed BBMP to pay Rs.
34,33,562 [less Rs. 1,95,000 paid by BBMP if not already
deducted]. It is crucial to note that, as per the claim
statement, 2 claims are raised. Claim No. 1 is for interest
for delayed payment of the invoice amount and the
quantification of the said claim is as per Ex. P7 which
discloses that, the interest from 15-03-2015 up to
January 2022 after deducting the principal amount is Rs.
19,33,562. Claim No. 2 is for the cost of the arbitration of
Rs 15 lakhs Therefore the total claim raised is
Rs.34,33,562. However, without appreciating that the
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said sum of Rs. 34,33,562 is for both claim No. 1 and
2, the learned arbitrator has proceeded as if the said
sum is only towards interest for delayed payment
(Claim No. 1).
63. In this regard, the learned arbitrator has held at
paragraph 34 of the award as follows;
“The claimant has produced the calculation of
interest at Ex. P7 and the same is not
challenged. It evidences the amount due by the
BBMP to the claimant, interest calculated up to
January 2022. There is no allegation of wrong
calculation of it. In view of the same, the
claimant is entitled to the amount claimed in
the claim petition. Hence, I hold this issue in
the affirmative.”
64. Again, at paragraph 35, the Learned Arbitrator has
held as follows;
“It may look that the claim seeking Rs.
34,33,562 when the principal amount payable
was only Rs. 1,95,000 is very huge. But the
object of the act and the loss of time in the
claimant recovering the said amount and the
impact of the same on a small industry should
also be seen.”
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65. Most importantly, it is seen that whereas at
paragraph (i) of the operative portion of the award, the
learned arbitrator has awarded Rs. 34,33,562, at
paragraph (ii), the learned arbitrator has awarded the
cost of arbitral proceedings by directing BBMP to pay to
the claimant all money deposited by the claimant
including any on behalf of the BBMP towards arbitrator’s
fee, administrative charges and sitting charges. From the
above, it is clear that the learned arbitrator has
separately awarded the cost of arbitration by directing
BBMP to pay all amount deposited by claimant towards
arbitrator’s fee, administrative charges, sitting charges
etc.
66. Therefore, the learned arbitrator has proceeded on
the assumption that the sum of Rs. 34,33,562 in the
claim petition is only the amount towards interest for
delayed payment without realizing and without looking
into the claim petition and Ex. P7 properly to appreciate
that, in fact, the said amount of Rs. 34,33,562 comprises
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of two parts viz. Rs. 19,33,562 towards delayed interest
and Rs. 15 lakhs towards the cost of arbitration.
Therefore, the award passed by the learned arbitrator
awarding Rs. 34,33,562 for delayed interest, without
realizing that the claim for delayed interest is only
Rs.19,33,562 shocks the judicial conscience. Even if
all the findings recorded by the learned arbitrator viz.
claim is within limitation etc, were accepted, even then,
the learned arbitrator could have only awarded a sum of
Rs.19,33,562 towards claim No. 1 whereas, the Learned
Arbitrator has awarded Rs. 34,33,562 towards claim No.
1 and separately awarded the cost of arbitration by
directing the BBMP to pay all amounts paid by the
claimant towards arbitration fee administrative charges
and sitting charges. There is no finding by the learned
arbitrator to show that, the learned arbitrator
appreciated the fact that Rs. 34,33,562 is being claimed
not only for delayed interest but also towards the cost of
arbitration. Therefore the only conclusion to be drawn is
54
CT 1390_Com.AP 139-2024_Judgment.doc
KABC170024392024
that, the award suffers from patent illegality appearing
on the face of the award because the award gives Rs.
34,33,562 towards interest for delayed payment [claim
No. 1] whereas the claim itself was for Rs. 19,33,562.
The law as it presently stands does not permit this
court to modify the award and therefore in view of this
patent error and illegality appearing on the face of the
award, the award is liable to be set aside on this ground
also in toto.
67. Accordingly, for the reasons noted above, the
present petition succeeds and answering the point for
consideration in the affirmative, I proceed to pass the
following :-
ORDER
The petition under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act is
allowed, with cost.
55
CT 1390_Com.AP 139-2024_Judgment.doc
KABC170024392024Consequently, the arbitral award
dated 04-5-2023 passed by Learned Sole
Arbitrator, namely Respondent No. 2 herein
in AC 10 of 2022, is hereby set aside.
Office to issue soft copy of this
judgment to both sides, by email, if
furnished.
[Dictated using Dragon Professional Speech Recognition
Software Version 15.3, transcript revised, corrected, signed
and then pronounced by me in open court on this the 20th
day of January, 2025]
Digitally signed by
SUDINDRA SUDINDRA NATH S
NATH S Date: 2025.01.22
10:36:04 +0530
(Sri. S. SUDINDRANATH)
LXXXIII ADDL.CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
COMMERCIAL COURT, BANGALORE.
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