Allahabad High Court
C/M Karmyog Sewa Samiti Thru. Auth. … vs State Of U.P. Thru. Its Prin. Secy. … on 19 August, 2025
Author: Pankaj Bhatia
Bench: Pankaj Bhatia
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation: 2025:AHC-LKO:48314
Reserved: 13.08.2025 & 14.08.2025
Pronounced: 19.08.2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
(LUCKNOW)
Court No.- 6
WRIT - C No.7273 of 2025
C/M Karmyog Sewa Samiti Thru. Auth. Sign. Sri Rajendra Kumar Soni
.... Petitioners
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Its Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Tech. Edu. Lko. And 5 Others
....Respondents
Counsel for Petitioner(s):
Paavan Awasthi, Parth Anand, Savita Jain, Vatsal Rastogi
Counsel for Respondent(s):
C.S.C., Aditi Tripathi, Atul Kumar Dwivedi, Ravi Singh
A N D
WRIT - C No. 7834 of 2025
Adharshila College Of Pharmacy Thru. Chairman Dr. Tahsildar Singh
.... Petitioners
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Technical Education Lko. And 4 Others
....Respondents
Counsel for Petitioner(s):
Anand Prakash Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s):
C.S.C., Atul Kumar Dwivedi, Ravi Singh
CORAM: HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.
J U D G M E N T
1. In both the writ petition, common questions are involved, as such, they are being decided by means of this common judgment.
2. For the sake of brevity, facts of Writ – C No.7273 of 2025 are being taken up.
3. The petitioner is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and has established an institute with an aim to impart education in various courses of Pharmacy and has incurred substantial expenses. It is stated that respondent no.2/University is the examining body for the B.Pharma Course, respondent no.4 is the Pharmacy Council of India (hereinafter referred to as ‘the PCI’) established under the Pharmacy Act and respondent no.5 is the Board of Technical Education which is the affiliating and examining body for the D.Pharma Course. It is stated that the primacy of the PCI for grant of approval is fairly well settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Pharmacy Council of India v. Dr. S.K. Toshniwal Education Trusts Vidharbha Institute of Pharmacy and Ors.; (2021) 10 SCC 657.
4. It is argued that by Government Order dated 05.01.2024, the State Government has laid down a procedure for grant of NOC and for affiliation for technical courses including B.Pharma and D.Pharma for the academic session 2024 – 25 (Annexure – 5). It is also argued that the PCI, a body empowered to grant approval, has issued a circular prescribing the grant of NOC by the State Government. It is argued that there is no prescription for obtaining an NOC either under the Pharmacy Act or under the Uttar Pradesh Technical University Act. It is stated that the petitioner instituted applied for affiliation in B.Pharma Course before the University and for D.Pharma Course before the Board for the academic session 2024 – 25 on which a report was submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer recommending that an NOC can be granted (Annexure – 7). However, the District Magistrate observed that the petitioner was not suitable for grant of NOC. The said report of the District Magistrate was communicated to the University on 16.04.2024. Challenging the said action, the petitioner preferred a writ petition being Writ – C No.4134 of 2024 which came to be allowed and the matter was relegated to the District Magistrate to submit a fresh report within a period of three weeks (Annexure – 10).
5. It is stated that in pursuance to the directions issued, a fresh report was submitted on 31.05.2024 and once again a decision was taken not to grant NOC to the petitioner. It is stated that once again the petitioner preferred a writ petition being Writ – C No.6371 of 2024, however, as the academic session of 2024 – 25 had come to an end, the writ petition lost its efficacy and the Court granted the petitioner a fresh liberty to apply for the academic session 2025 – 26 for grant of NOC. The petitioner submitted fresh applications for the academic session 2025 – 26 for grant of NOC for running B.Pharma and D.Pharma before the University as well as the Board and the requisite fee was also paid to the PCI.
6. It is stated that initially a letter was sent to the petitioner that the petitioner may apply for grant of NOC on U Rise Portal once the procedure is framed. It is stated that no action is being taken on the said applications. It is further stated that vide an order dated 09.05.2025 passed in Miscellaneous Application No.711 of 2025 in Civil Appeal No.9048 of 2012, the Supreme Court had extended the last date for completion of approval process for pharmacy institutions up to 31.08.2025; the other dates were also extended. As no decision was being taken, the petitioner once again preferred a writ petition being Writ – C No.4789 of 2025 wherein it was informed that a decision has been taken that for the academic session 2025 – 26, B.Pharma Course has been declared a zero period.
7. Challenging the said, present petitions have been filed.
8. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that in terms of the law it is fairly well settled that all the issues with regard to grant of approval and other decisions are vested in the PCI which is the apex body regulating the field of pharmacy education. It is stated that the issue was decided in the case of Parshvanath Charitable Trust and Ors. v. All India Council for Technical Education and Ors.; (2013) 3 SCC 385, in respect of similar institute framed for regulating technical education in which the Supreme Court had decided that where both the parliament and State legislature have the power to legislate, the central act would prevail over the State act. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya and Ors.; (2006) 9 SCC 1.
9. It is further argued that the right to establish and manage educational institution is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as held in the case of Pharmacy Council of India v. Rajeev College of Pharmacy and Ors.; (2023) 3 SCC 502.
10. Learned Standing Counsel has produced instructions stating that as there was huge mushrooming of institutes and the percentage of students was less than 50%, a decision was taken by the State Government to declare the academic session 2025 – 26 as zero period and thus, the request of the petitioner cannot be granted. It also bears from the instructions that the moratorium of the State has been enforced till Deloite India Consultant gives its report with regard to permission to establish the pharmacy colleges.
11. Considering the law, it is fairly well settled that the right to establish institution is a part of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and that the technical institutes including the Pharmacy Council established under the Pharmacy Council of India Act have supremacy.
12. It is also gainful to note the relevant paragraphs of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. S.K. Toshniwal Education Trusts Vidharbha Institute of Pharmacy (supra), which read as under:
“12.4. In exercise of powers vested in the Pharmacy Act, PCI has framed a number of regulations for prescribing minimum standards of education as well as regulating the subject of pharmacy in India, including:
(a) The Education Regulations, 1991;
(b) The Pharm. D Regulations, 2008;
(c) The Minimum Qualification for Teachers in Pharmacy Institutions Regulations, 2014;
(d) The Bachelor of Pharmacy (B. Pharm) Course Regulations, 2014;
(e) The Master of Pharmacy (M. Pharm) Course Regulations, 2014;
(f) The Bachelor of Pharmacy (Practice) Regulations, 2014;
(g) The Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015.
12.5. Thus, considering the various provisions of the Pharmacy Act and the regulations made therein, it can be said that the Pharmacy Act is a complete code in itself in the subject of pharmacy. PCI has been constituted as a body empowered to regulate the education and profession of pharmacy in India. It cannot be disputed that the subject of pharmacy is a special and not a general subject. From the relevant provisions of the Pharmacy Act, more particularly, the provisions referred to hereinabove, the Pharmacy Act exclusively covers all areas inclusive of approval of courses, laying down course content, eligibility conditions for students as well as teachers, evaluation standards of examination, grant of registration, entry of higher qualification in the same discipline, taking action for infamous conduct, etc. It also contains a penal provision. Thus, the legislative intent in enacting the Pharmacy Act seems to be to ensure that there is seamless regulation of the profession. To carry out the objective and purpose for enacting the Pharmacy Act, the legislature has established under the statute the autonomous statutory authority i.e. Pharmacy Council of India. Thus it can be said that in the field of pharmacy, the Pharmacy Act is a special law.
20. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, it is held that in the field of pharmacy education and more particularly so far as the recognition of degrees and diplomas of pharmacy education is concerned, the Pharmacy Act, 1948 shall prevail. The norms and regulations set by PCI and other specified authorities under the Pharmacy Act would have to be followed by the institutions concerned imparting education for degrees and diplomas in pharmacy, including the norms and regulations with respect to increase and/or decrease in intake capacity of the students and the decisions of PCI shall only be followed by the institutions imparting degrees and diplomas in pharmacy. The questions are answered accordingly.”
13. Similarly, it is also gainful to note the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Parshvanath Charitable Trust (supra) in regard to interpretation of the statue governing the technical education, which read as under:
“24. The consistent view of this Court has been that where both Parliament and the State Legislature have the power to legislate, the Central Act shall take precedence in the matters which are covered by such legislation and the State enactments shall pave way for such legislations to the extent they are in conflict or repugnant. As per the established canons of law, primacy of the Central Act is indisputable which necessarily implies primacy of Aicte in the field of technical education. Statutes like the present one as well as the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, etc. fall within the ambit of this canon of law. Aicte is the authority constituted under the Central Act with the responsibility of maintaining operational standards and judging the infrastructure and facilities available for imparting professional education. It shall take precedence over the opinion of the State as well as that of the University. The department concerned of the State and the affiliating university have a role to play, but it is limited in its application. They cannot lay down any guidelines or policies in conflict with the Central statute or the standards laid down by the Central body. The State can frame its policies, but such policy again has to be in conformity with the direction issued by the Central body. Though there is no such apparent conflict in the present case, yet it needs to be clarified that grant of approval by the State and affiliation by the University for increased intake of seats or commencement of new college should not be repugnant to the conditions of approval/recommendation granted by Aicte. These authorities have to work in tandem as all of them have the common object to ensure maintenance of proper standards of education, examination and proper infrastructure for betterment of technical educational system.
25. It is also a settled principle that the regulations framed by the Central authorities such as Aicte have the force of law and are binding on all concerned. Once approval is granted or declined by such expert body, the courts would normally not substitute their view in this regard. Such expert views would normally be accepted by the court unless the powers vested in such expert body are exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or in a manner impermissible under the Regulations and the Aicte Act. In All India Council for Technical Education v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan [(2009) 11 SCC 726] , this Court, while stating the principles that the courts may not substitute their opinion in place of the opinion of the Council, held as under: (SCC pp. 732-33 & 736, paras 17-18 & 32)
“17. The role of statutory expert bodies on education and the role of courts are well defined by a simple rule. If it is a question of educational policy or an issue involving academic matter, the courts keep their hands off. If any provision of law or principle of law has to be interpreted, applied or enforced, with reference to or connected with education, the courts will step in. In J.P. Kulshrestha v. Allahabad University [(1980) 3 SCC 418 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 436 : (1980) 2 LLJ 175] this Court observed: (SCC pp. 424-26, paras 11-17)
’11. … Judges must not rush in where even educationists fear to tread…
* * *
17. … While there is no absolute ban, it is a rule of prudence that courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies.’
(emphasis supplied)
18. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth [(1984) 4 SCC 27 : (1985) 1 SCR 29] this Court reiterated: (SCC pp. 56-57, para 29)
’29. … the Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to what is wise, prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in preference to those formulated by professional men possessing technical expertise and rich experience of actual day-to-day working of educational institutions and the departments controlling them.’
* * *
32. This is a classic case where an educational course has been created and continued merely by the fiat of the court, without any prior statutory or academic evaluation or assessment or acceptance. Granting approval for a new course or programme requires examination of various academic/technical facets which can only be done by an expert body like Aicte. This function cannot obviously be taken over or discharged by courts. In this case, for example, by a mandamus of the court, a bridge course was permitted for four-year advance diploma-holders who had passed the entry-level examination of 10+2 with PCM subjects. Thereafter, by another mandamus in another case, what was a one-time measure was extended for several years and was also extended to post diploma-holders. Again by another mandamus, it was extended to those who had passed only 10+1 examination instead of the required minimum of 10+2 examination. Each direction was obviously intended to give relief to students who wanted to better their career prospects, purely as an ad hoc measure. But together they lead to an unintended dilution of educational standards, adversely affecting the standards and quality of engineering degree courses. Courts should guard against such forays in the field of education.”
(emphasis in original
14. This Court had also taken a decision to the effect in the case of HMS College of Pharmacy and Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors.; 2023:AHC-LKO:63945, wherein the following was observed:
“31. Thus, in view of the two entries it is clear that the Central Government which is empowered to frame rules in respect of technical education and the powers of the State Government to frame laws are restricted by the language used in Entry No.25 of List III (Concurrent List) as quoted herein above and is subject to provisions of entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I. Although, the prescriptions of requirement in terms of the infrastructure etc., are similar in terms of Regulations of 2020 framed by the PCI and the Regulations of 2000 framed by the State, however, once the approval was granted by the PCI after verifying the parameters as specified in Appendix – A to the 2020 Regulations, the State Government has almost no role to play insofar as it relates to the verification of the conditions based upon which the approvals are granted by the PCI. This view is also fortified by the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Parshvanath Charitable Trust and Ors. (supra) in the following paragraphs:
“24. The consistent view of this Court has been that where both Parliament and the State Legislature have the power to legislate, the Central Act shall take precedence in the matters which are covered by such legislation and the State enactments shall pave way for such legislations to the extent they are in conflict or repugnant. As per the established canons of law, primacy of the Central Act is indisputable which necessarily implies primacy of Aicte in the field of technical education. Statutes like the present one as well as the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, etc. fall within the ambit of this canon of law. Aicte is the authority constituted under the Central Act with the responsibility of maintaining operational standards and judging the infrastructure and facilities available for imparting professional education. It shall take precedence over the opinion of the State as well as that of the University. The department concerned of the State and the affiliating university have a role to play, but it is limited in its application. They cannot lay down any guidelines or policies in conflict with the Central statute or the standards laid down by the Central body. The State can frame its policies, but such policy again has to be in conformity with the direction issued by the Central body. Though there is no such apparent conflict in the present case, yet it needs to be clarified that grant of approval by the State and affiliation by the University for increased intake of seats or commencement of new college should not be repugnant to the conditions of approval/recommendation granted by Aicte. These authorities have to work in tandem as all of them have the common object to ensure maintenance of proper standards of education, examination and proper infrastructure for betterment of technical educational system.
25. It is also a settled principle that the regulations framed by the Central authorities such as Aicte have the force of law and are binding on all concerned. Once approval is granted or declined by such expert body, the courts would normally not substitute their view in this regard. Such expert views would normally be accepted by the court unless the powers vested in such expert body are exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or in a manner impermissible under the Regulations and the Aicte Act. In All India Council for Technical Education v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan [(2009) 11 SCC 726], this Court, while stating the principles that the courts may not substitute their opinion in place of the opinion of the Council, held as under: (SCC pp. 732-33 & 736, paras 17-18 & 32)
“17. The role of statutory expert bodies on education and the role of courts are well defined by a simple rule. If it is a question of educational policy or an issue involving academic matter, the courts keep their hands off. If any provision of law or principle of law has to be interpreted, applied or enforced, with reference to or connected with education, the courts will step in. In J.P. Kulshrestha v. Allahabad University [(1980) 3 SCC 418 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 436 : (1980) 2 LLJ 175] this Court observed: (SCC pp. 424-26, paras 11-17)
’11. … Judges must not rush in where even educationists fear to tread….
* * *
17. … While there is no absolute ban, it is a rule of prudence that courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies.’
(emphasis supplied)
18. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh kumar Sheth [(1984) 4 SCC 27 : (1985) 1 SCR 29] this Court reiterated: (SCC pp. 56-57, para 29)
’29…. the Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to what is wise, prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in preference to those formulated by professional men possessing technical expertise and rich experience of actual day-to-day working of educational institutions and the departments controlling them.’
* * *
32. This is a classic case where an educational course has been created and continued merely by the fiat of the court, without any prior statutory or academic evaluation or assessment or acceptance. Granting approval for a new course or programme requires examination of various academic/technical facets which can only be done by an expert body like Aicte. This function cannot obviously be taken over or discharged by courts. In this case, for example, by a mandamus of the court, a bridge course was permitted for four-year advance diploma-holders who had passed the entry-level examination of 10+2 with PCM subjects. Thereafter, by another mandamus in another case, what was a one-time measure was extended for several years and was also extended to post diploma-holders. Again by another mandamus, it was extended to those who had passed only 10+1 examination instead of the required minimum of 10+2 examination. Each direction was obviously intended to give relief to students who wanted to better their career prospects, purely as an ad hoc measure. But together they lead to an unintended dilution of educational standards, adversely affecting the standards and quality of engineering degree courses. Courts should guard against such forays in the field of education.”
(emphasis in original)
32. The scope and effect of two entries being Entry No.66 of List-I of the VIIth Scheduled and the Entry No.25 of List-III of the Concurrent List came up for interpretation before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of T.N. and another vs Adhiyaman Education & Research Institute and others; (1995) 4 SCC 104. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the various arguments advanced and after discussion of rival contentions held as under:
“27. The provisions of the State Act enumerated above show that if it is made applicable to the technical institutions, it will overlap and will be in conflict with the provisions of the Central Act in various areas and, in particular, in the matter of allocation and disbursal of grants, formulation of schemes for initial and in-service training of teachers and continuing education of teachers, laying down norms and standards for courses, physical and institutional facilities, staff pattern, staff qualifications, quality instruction assessment and examinations, fixing norms and guidelines for charging tuition and other fees, granting approval for starting new technical institutions and for introduction of new courses or programmes, taking steps to prevent commercialisation of technical education, inspection of technical institutions, withholding or discontinuing grants in respect of courses and taking such other steps as may be necessary for ensuring compliance of the directions of the Council, declaring technical institutions at various levels and types fit to receive grants, the constitution of the Council and its Executive Committee and the Regional Committees to carry out the functions under the Central Act, the compliance by the Council of the directions issued by the Central Government on questions of policy etc. which matters are covered by the Central Act. What is further, the primary object of the Central Act, as discussed earlier, is to provide for the establishment of an All India Council for Technical Education with a view, among others, to plan and coordinate the development of technical education system throughout the country and to promote the qualitative improvement of such education and to regulate and properly maintain the norms and standards in the technical education system which is a subject within the exclusive legislative field of the Central Government as is clear from Entry 66 of the Union List in the Seventh Schedule. All the other provisions of the Act have been made in furtherance of the said objecti27. The provisions of the State Act enumerated above show that if it is made applicable to the technical institutions, it will overlap and will be in conflict with the provisions of the Central Act in various areas and, in particular, in the matter of allocation and disbursal of grants, formulation of schemes for initial and in-service training of teachers and continuing education of teachers, laying down norms and standards for courses, physical and institutional facilities, staff pattern, staff qualifications, quality instruction assessment and examinations, fixing norms and guidelines for charging tuition and other fees, granting approval for starting new technical institutions and for introduction of new courses or programmes, taking steps to prevent commercialisation of technical education, inspection of technical institutions, withholding or discontinuing grants in respect of courses and taking such other steps as may be necessary for ensuring compliance of the directions of the Council, declaring technical institutions at various levels and types fit to receive grants, the constitution of the Council and its Executive Committee and the Regional Committees to carry out the functions under the Central Act, the compliance by the Council of the directions issued by the Central Government on questions of policy etc. which matters are covered by the Central Act. What is further, the primary object of the Central Act, as discussed earlier, is to provide for the establishment of an All India Council for Technical Education with a view, among others, to plan and coordinate the development of technical education system throughout the country and to promote the qualitative improvement of such education and to regulate and properly maintain the norms and standards in the technical education system which is a subject within the exclusive legislative field of the Central Government as is clear from Entry 66 of the Union List in the Seventh Schedule. All the other provisions of the Act have been made in furtherance of the said objectives. They can also be deemed to have been enacted under Entry 25 of List III. This being so, the provisions of the State Act which impinge upon the provisions of the Central Act are void and, therefore, unenforceable. It is for these reasons that the appointment of the High Power Committee by the State Government to inspect the respondent-Trust was void as has been rightly held by the High Court.ves. They can also be deemed to have been enacted under Entry 25 of List III. This being so, the provisions of the State Act which impinge upon the provisions of the Central Act are void and, therefore, unenforceable. It is for these reasons that the appointment of the High Power Committee by the State Government to inspect the respondent-Trust was void as has been rightly held by the High Court.
30. A comparison of the Central Act and the University Act will show that as far as the institutions imparting technical education are concerned, there is a conflict between and overlapping of the functions of the Council and the University. Under Section 10 of the Central Act, it is the Council which is entrusted with the power, particularly, to allocate and disburse grants, to evolve suitable performance appraisal systems incorporating norms and mechanisms for maintaining accountability of the technical institutions, laying down norms and standards for courses, curricula, staff pattern, staff qualifications, assessment and examinations, fixing norms and guidelines for charging tuition fee and other fees, granting approval for starting new technical institutions or introducing new courses or programmes, to lay down norms or granting autonomy to technical institutions, providing guidelines for admission of students, inspecting or causing to inspect colleges, for withholding or discontinuing of grants in respect of courses and programmes, declaring institutions at various levels and types fit to receive grants, advising the Commission constituted under the Act for declaring technical educational institutions as deemed universities, setting up of National Board of Accreditation to periodically conduct evaluation on the basis of guidelines and standards specified and to make recommendations to it or to the Council or the Commission or other bodies under the Act regarding recognition or de-recognition of the institution or the programme conducted by it. Thus, so far as these matters are concerned, in the case of the institutes imparting technical education, it is not the University Act and the University but it is the Central Act and the Council created under it which will have the jurisdiction. To that extent, after the coming into operation of the Central Act, the provisions of the University Act will be deemed to have become unenforceable in case of technical colleges like the engineering colleges. As has been pointed out earlier, the Central Act has been enacted by Parliament under Entry 66 of List I to coordinate and determine the standards of technical institutions as well as under Entry 25 of List III. The provisions of the University Act regarding affiliation of technical colleges like the engineering colleges and the conditions for grant and continuation of such affiliation by the University shall, however, remain operative but the conditions that are prescribed by the University for grant and continuance of affiliation will have to be in conformity with the norms and guidelines prescribed by the Council in respect of matters entrusted to it under Section 10 of the Central Act.
34. Shri Rao also contended that in practice, the prescription of higher standards by the State may not be in conflict with the standards laid down by the Council under the Central Act. To bring this home, he gave an illustration that where several institutions apply for starting technical institution and the State Government chooses the one which has the best equipment, infrastructure and resources, compared to others who merely fulfil the minimum requirements laid down under the Central Act, it cannot be said that the preference given to the institution by the State Government was contrary to or inconsistent with the Central statute. Yet another illustration he gave was where the Central Act prescribes minimum marks for admission to a technical institution or minimum qualifications for the teaching staff, but among the applicants, there are enough number of students or teachers with higher marks or qualifications, respectively, than the minimum prescribed to compete for the limited number of seats. In such cases, when a technical institution selects those with more than minimum marks or qualifications, it cannot be said that there is a non-compliance with the provisions of the Central Act. It is true that, in practice, it may happen that institutions with higher resources and students and teachers with higher marks and qualifications, respectively, than are prescribed apply and compete for the places, seats or vacancies as the case may be. However, it is equally true that when the vacancies are available for institutions or students or teachers as the case may be, the applicants cannot be denied the same on the ground that they do not fulfil the higher requirements laid down under the State Act, if they are qualified under the Central Act. Similarly, the institutions cannot be de-recognised or disaffiliated on the ground that they do not fulfil the higher requirements under the State Act although they fulfil the requirements under the Central Act. So also, when the power to recognise or de-recognise an institution is given to a body created under the Central Act, it alone can exercise the power and on terms and conditions laid down in the Central Act. It will not be open for the body created under the State Act to exercise such power much less on terms and conditions which are inconsistent with or repugnant to those which are laid down under the Central Act.
41. What emerges from the above discussion is as follows:
(i) The expression ‘coordination’ used in Entry 66 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution does not merely mean evaluation. It means harmonisation with a view to forge a uniform pattern for a concerted action according to a certain design, scheme or plan of development. It, therefore, includes action not only for removal of disparities in standards but also for preventing the occurrence of such disparities. It would, therefore, also include power to do all things which are necessary to prevent what would make ‘coordination’ either impossible or difficult. This power is absolute and unconditional and in the absence of any valid compelling reasons, it must be given its full effect according to its plain and express intention.
(ii) To the extent that the State legislation is in conflict with the Central legislation though the former is purported to have been made under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List but in effect encroaches upon legislation including subordinate legislation made by the Centre under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List or to give effect to Entry 66 of the Union List, it would be void and inoperative.
(iii) If there is a conflict between the two legislations, unless the State legislation is saved by the provisions of the main part of clause (2) of Article 254, the State legislation being repugnant to the Central legislation, the same would be inoperative.
(iv) Whether the State law encroaches upon Entry 66 of the Union List or is repugnant to the law made by the Centre under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List, will have to be determined by the examination of the two laws and will depend upon the facts of each case.
(v) When there are more applicants than the available situations/seats, the State authority is not prevented from laying down higher standards or qualifications than those laid down by the Centre or the Central authority to short-list the applicants. When the State authority does so, it does not encroach upon Entry 66 of the Union List or make a law which is repugnant to the Central law.(vi) However, when the situations/seats are available and the State authorities deny an applicant the same on the ground that the applicant is not qualified according to its standards or qualifications, as the case may be, although the applicant satisfies the standards or qualifications laid down by the Central law, they act unconstitutionally. So also when the State authorities de-recognise or disaffiliate an institution for not satisfying the standards or requirement laid down by them, although it satisfied the norms and requirements laid down by the Central authority, the State authorities act illegally.”
33. Although, in the case of Parshvanath Charitable Trust and Ors. (supra), the observations were made in context of AICTE, the same would squarely apply to the present case also as the powers of the Pharmacy Council are pari materia the same under which the AICTE acts. Even otherwise by virtue of Article 254 of the Constitution of India, the laws made by the Parliament will have supremacy over the laws made by the State Government to the extent that they are repugnant to the Central Act. Although, the said repugnancy does not arise in the present case insofar as it relates to prescribing the standards required by the institutions, in view of the law as explained in the case of Parshvanath Charitable Trust and Ors. (supra), the requirements for approval as specified by the Pharmacy Council shall have supremacy over the requirement as specified by the Board in terms of the 2000 Regulations. Thus, to that extent, the inescapable conclusion is that once the approval is granted by the PCI, the affiliation is to be granted by the Board unless the Board, in particular cases, moves an application for withdrawal of the approval by invoking the powers under Section 13 of the Pharmacy Act, which admittedly has not been done.
34. To further clarify, as the issue is recurring one, to reconcile the two statutes i.e. The Pharmacy Act and the Regulations framed thereunder as well as The Uttar Pradesh Pravidhik Shiksha Adhiniyan, 1962 and the Regulations framed thereunder in the light of the Entry No.66 of List-I and Entry No.25 of List-III, which clearly provides that the power to legislate flowing from Entry No.25 of List-III is subject to the provisions of Entries No.63, 64, 65 and 66 of the List-I. It is held that the powers vested with the State Government by virtue of the 1962 Act and the Regulations framed thereunder, specifically the power conferred by Section 13(iv) and Section 13(v), the powers of the Board under Regulation 14 (c), Regulation 14(d), Regulation 14(e) and Regulation 14(g) shall give way to the powers conferred on the PCI by virtue of the Pharmacy Act and the Educational Regulation, 2020. The other powers conferred upon the Board by virtue of Regulation 14 shall only be used by the Board in future for collecting material to invoke the powers of the PCI under Section 13 of the Pharmacy Act seeking revocation of the affiliation granted to the particular Institution that too based upon cogent materials. To further clarify that in the future, the Board will have no powers in terms of the 1962 Act or the Regulations framed thereunder and referred to above, in respect of raising any objections pertaining to accommodation, staffs, museum, library and equipment, which are within the domain of the powers exercised by the Pharmacy Council of India and duly regulated by virtue of the 2020 Regulations.”
15. With regard to the moratorium imposed by the State Government through a policy decision till the Deloite India Consultant gives a report, the same is also violative of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajeev College of Pharmacy (supra) wherein a moratorium was enforced by PCI and was repelled by the Supreme Court in the light of rights enshrined under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Once the right of placing the pharmacy education under moratorium by the authority which is empowered has been repelled, a similar stand taken by the State Government which does not have any supremacy with regard to pharmacy courses cannot be held to be justified.
16. In view of the settled position, the position of the State Government declaring the academic session 2025 – 26 as zero period is clearly without jurisdiction and also violative of the rights enshrined under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Besides the same, the said decision with regard to establishing the course or declaring the zero period is also vested in the PCI by virtue of Section 11.
17. Thus, for all the reasons recorded above, the action of the State Government for declaring the academic session 2025 – 26 for the B.Pharma and D.Pharma as zero period is clearly violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and is accordingly set aside.
18. Respondents are directed to process the application of the petitioners for grant of approval without insisting on NOC of State Government within the timeline as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Parshvanath Charitable Trust (supra), in any case, within a period of ten days from today.
19. In case the approval is granted by the PCI, the University and the State shall take steps for grant of affiliation within the timeline fixed by the Supreme Court.
20. Present petitions stand allowed in above terms.
August 19th, 2025 [Pankaj Bhatia, J.]
Nishant