Delhi High Court
Casablanca Apparels Pvt Ltd vs Polo/ Lauren Company L.P on 30 July, 2025
Author: C. Hari Shankar
Bench: C. Hari Shankar
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 23 July 2025
Judgment pronounced on: 30 July 2025
+ FAO (COMM) 59/2024 & CM APPL. 25591/2024
CASABLANCA APPARELS PVT LTD .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Manu T.R. and Ms. Shalini
Sukumaran, Advs.
versus
POLO/ LAUREN COMPANY L.P. .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Anirudh Bakhru, Mr. Rishi
Bansal, Ms. Kanupriya Sabharwal and Ms.
Shruti Manchanda, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT
% 30.07.2025
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
CM APPL. 18671/2024 (for delay)
1. This is an application filed on behalf of the appellant under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of
73 days in filing the present appeal interdicting an order dated
20.10.2023 passed by the learned District Judge (Commercial court-
02), South, Saket Courts, New Delhi in CS (COMM) No. 523/2022.
By the said common order, the learned District Judge has allowed
application XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC filed by respondent herein and
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dismissed the application of appellant filed under section XXXIX
Rule 4 CPC.
2. Since, the present appeal is delayed by 73 days as mentioned in
the delay application, it would be apposite to quote the relevant
provisions governing the filing of the present appeal and the
prescribed period of limitation. In terms of section 13(1-A) of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 an appeal arising from any judgment or
order passed by the Commercial Court must be filed within a period of
sixty days. The relevant portion of the section is reproduced.
“13. Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and
Commercial Divisions.–(1) Any person aggrieved by the judgment
or order of a Commercial Court below the level of a District Judge
may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Court within a period of
sixty days from the date of judgment or order.
(IA) Any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a
Commercial Court at the level of District Judge exercising original
civil jurisdiction or, as the case may be, Commercial Division of a
High Court may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of
that High Court within a period of sixty days from the date of the
judgment or order.”
3. Before adverting to the merits of the case, we must point out
that the admitted date of filing of appeal is 01.03.2024 as claimed by
the appellant. However, as per the record available on the official
website of the Delhi High Court, the present appeal was filed on
22.03.2024. In any case, the appellant has admitted to 73 days of delay
in the delay application and as such we without entering into any
controversy as to the date of actual filing of the present appeal,
proceed further considering 73 days of delay beyond the prescribed 60
days, in filing the present appeal, in terms of Section 13(1-A) of the
Commercial Court Act, 2015.
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4. In the present case, the impugned order was passed on
20.10.2023 by the learned District Judge (Commercial Court-02),
South, Saket Courts, New Delhi. Since the appeal was not filed within
the prescribed 60 days period, which came to expire on 19.12.2024,
but came to be filed only on 01.03.2024 with a 73 days delay or on
22.03.2024, with a delay of 91 days. The appeal is obviously time-
barred.
5. Though appellant has also contended that some time was
consumed by him to obtain certified copy of impugned order but it has
been submitted in reply of the respondent that he has not filed on
record certified copy of the impugned order and rather moved an
application seeking exemption from filing of certified copy of
impugned order, thus the ground for exclusion of some days in
obtaining certified copy of the impugned order does not come to any
rescue to the appellant. Thus, this court is brought to the sole ground,
which the appellant has adduced, while seeking condonation of delay
in filing of this appeal. According to the appellant, he is based in
Mumbai and had to identify his advocate and take opinion about the
merits of the case and chances of success in the appeal. It has also
been submitted that it took some time to identify his previous counsel
and call for the suit papers and copy of the orders from the advocate
who represented him before the learned District Judge, and in the
process, substantial time has elapsed. The said sole ground can be
curled out from paragraph No. 4 of the application, which inter-alia
states:
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“4. The Applicant/ Appellant respectfully submits that the delay has
occasioned due to the sufficient cause. The Appellant is based in
Mumbai and had to take identity its Advocate and take opinion about
the merit of the case and chances of success in the appeal and for the
same it has some time to identify its advocates and call the suit papers
and copy of the order from the advocate represented before the ltd
District judge and in the process substantial time has elapsed.”
6. The aforesaid submission of appellant has been controverted by
the respondent in its reply by submitting that the application fails to
disclose a “sufficient cause” for condonation of above huge and
inordinate delay in filing of this appeal and to substantiate this fact,
they also referred to a email dated 16.01.2024 from the appellant’s
present counsel on record, wherein the appellant proposed a settlement
between the parties, which indicates that the new counsels were
engaged and were already privy to the dispute much before the said
date of 16th January 2024. They have also enclosed copy of the said e-
mail along with their reply and it is a vehement contention of learned
Counsel for respondent that it is crystal clear from the contents of this
e-mail that the appellant’s present counsels (on record) were already
engaged by the appellant prior to the date of filing of the present
appeal.
7. The appellant also seeks to rely on medical grounds in the
rejoinder which the respondents have challenged with the fact that
they were never disclosed in the original application seeking
condonation of delay. These grounds, being introduced at this belated
stage, are opposed and their authenticity is denied by the respondent
and it has been argued that these grounds are merely an after-thought.
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8. In the judgment of Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr.1,
the Supreme Court has made it clear that the foremost duty of the
Court, while considering a plea for condonation of delay, is to
examine the bona fides of the explanation offered by the applicant.
The relevant extract is reproduced below:
“31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to
first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the
main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the
delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally
balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider the
merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasised in several cases
that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity.
The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of
causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the
respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable
grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial
requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet”.
9. The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was enacted with the
objective of ensuring swift adjudication of high stakes commercial
disputes involving intricate factual and legal issues. Timely
resolution of such matters is intended to enhance the perception of
the Indian legal system as independent and efficient, thereby
strengthening global confidence, fostering economic growth, and
improving India’s standing in terms of justice delivery and legal
reliability. In Jharkhand UrjaUtpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v. M/s
Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited2, the Supreme Court emphasized
the objective of Commercial Court Act, 2015 to the following effect:
1
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093
2
2025 SCC OnLine SC 910
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“17. One of the avowed objects of the provisions of the
Commercial Courts Act read with amended provisions of CPC
applicable to the Commercial Courts is to ensure that there is no
unnecessary delay in disposal of the commercial suit. Once specific
time lines are fixed and there is a strict procedure provided in
terms of the Commercial Courts Act, parties are by the statute put
to notice that they have to very carefully contest the suits filed as
commercial suits and that failing to comply with statutory timelines
and a strict procedure, certain adverse consequences may flow on
account of lack of application by a contesting party”
10. Additionally, the Supreme Court, in Government of
Maharashtra v M/s Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt.
Ltd.3, has categorically held that the power to condone delay in
commercial matters is to be exercised by way of exception, and not as
a rule, and only where the party has acted in bona fide manner and
with due diligence, and not negligently or casually.
11. Given the object and scheme of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 and the law laid down by Supreme Court, which lays emphasis
on speedy resolution of high-value commercial disputes, the
expression “sufficient cause” must be interpreted strictly, and not
liberally.
12. Now adverting to facts of the present case, time taken and
explanation offered by the appellant is that time was taken to identify
his previous counsel and call for the suit papers and copy of the order
from the advocate who represented him before the learned District
Judge, does not inspire confidence. Recently, the Supreme Court in
3
(2021) 6 SCC 460
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Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. v. Ved Prakash4, relevant to the context,
held at paragraph 10 of the said judgment as follows:
“10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head
of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial
court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part
of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and
carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if
we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or
negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and
inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his
own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial
proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The
litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire
blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any
time and seek relief.”
13. The appellant is a private limited company with its office in
Mumbai and is managed by educated businessmen who know where
its records lies. It is evident from the records that the appellant was in
deep state of negotiation with the Respondent for settlement as is clear
from the email dated 16.01.2025 filed on record. Apparently, the
negotiations failed and it is quite possible that the failure of the said
negotiation might be one of the triggering points for preferring the
present belated Appeal. The conduct of the appellant appears to be
that of the fence sitters.
14. This court finds that the approach on the part of the appellant to
file the present appeal has been very negligent and lackadaisical. Even
presuming that the reasons mentioned for condoning the delay are to
be true, this court does not find the same to be bona fide or sufficient
enough to be included in the expression of “sufficient cause” under
4
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380
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section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The appellant has failed to show
any specific or bona fide circumstances that prevented it from timely
steps to be taken. The inaction appears to stem from internal
disorganization and lack of diligence, rather than any bona fide
difficulty. Applying the principles and the above discussed law as laid
down by the Supreme Court, this Court finds that the delay in filing
the appeal is not supported by any credible grounds or explanation to
include it in the expression of “sufficient cause”.
15. The Supreme Court has time and again reiterated that the
expression “sufficient cause” as mentioned under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 is not elastic enough to cover long delays and
must be interpreted strictly in the context of Commercial Courts Act,
2015 and that condonation of delay in such appeal has to be granted
by way of exception and not as a matter of rule, and that too only
when the party acted in a bona fide manner and not negligently. In the
present case, the submissions advanced by the appellant, when tested
on the anvil of this legal threshold, fall short of the standard required
for invoking this discretionary relief.
16. In any event, even if the grounds mentioned by the appellant for
condoning the delay are presumed to be genuine, the appellant’s
inaction in approaching the Court within the limitation period, coupled
with an evident lack of urgency in taking appropriate legal steps,
cannot be justified. The vague references to health emergencies at a
belated stage of “rejoinder” appears to be an afterthought and does not
inspire confidence or meet the threshold of “sufficient cause” under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
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17. For all the aforesaid reasons, the explanation furnished by the
appellant for the inordinate delay is vague, unsatisfactory, and fails to
meet the threshold as laid down under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 as interpreted in the above-mentioned Supreme Court
judgments. Accordingly, we find no “sufficient cause” to condone the
delay.
18. Hence, the application seeking condonation of delay is
dismissed being devoid of merit.
FAO (COMM) NO. 59/2024
19. As the application for condonation of delay is dismissed, the
appeal is also dismissed on the grounds of limitation, without going
into its merits.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
JULY 30, 2025/gunn/at
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