Case Brief: Attorney General of India v Lachma Devi

Introduction:

Attorney General of India v. Lachma Devi is a well-known case from 1985 that the Indian Supreme Court decided. It deals with the right to be shielded from public hanging. The legitimacy of public hanging and the protection of the rights to life and personal liberty guaranteed by the Indian Constitution have been scrutinised in light of this case. In the analysis that follows, we will look at the particulars of the case, the legal questions presented, the arguments made by each side, and the court’s decision. This case raises significant issues regarding the legality of a certain method of execution and its compliance with constitutional norms, international human rights standards, and evolving standards of decency. The court’s decision in this case would have implications for the treatment of convicts and the methods of execution in the context of India’s legal system.

Facts:

The topic at hand in the Attorney General v. Lachma Devi case—also referred to as Lichhamadevi vs. State of Rajasthan—is public hanging in India. Lachma Devi was found guilty of murder and given the execution by hanging punishment by the Bikaner, Rajasthan, Additional Sessions Judge. Her conviction and imprisonment were affirmed by the Rajasthan High Court. In retaliation, Lachma Devi contested the legitimacy of public hanging by filing a writ suit under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution. The Indian Attorney General said that one of the criminal justice system’s key deterrents for preventing crime is public hanging. It was argued that the legislature had choice over the form of execution and that the Indian Constitution did not forbid the death penalty. Furthermore, it was asserted that public hanging was in line with Indian social and cultural norms and had been a long-standing tradition in the nation. However, Lachma Devi argued that public hanging was a cruel and brutal practise that went against her fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. She maintained that the constitutional values of humanity and dignity were violated by public hanging, which she described as a painful, inhumane, and humiliating form of punishment. Lachma Devi further claimed that since India had accepted several international treaties against torture, public hanging constituted to torture, which was forbidden under international law.

Issues: 

1. The primary legal issue in this case is whether public hangings were permitted under the constitution.
2. Whether it is violated the rights to life and liberty guaranteed by the Indian Constitution.
3. Whether the court also investigated the necessity of public hanging as a part of India’s criminal justice system.

Arguments of both parties:

The Court emphasised during its discussion that the State must carry out the death penalty in a way that respects human dignity. This suggests that the penalty should not cause the victim needless anguish or dehumanise the one receiving it. The Court places a critical restraint on the State’s power by highlighting the need to treat prisoners with respect and protect their natural dignity.

The Court took an even stronger stand, openly denouncing the use of gallows for executions, especially when they happen in public. It declares that such a behaviour is barbarous and that it is inappropriate for a civilised society. This vehement condemnation illustrates the Court’s steadfast stance against execution techniques meant to demean and humiliate the victim in public undergoing the punishment.

As a result, the legal precept that guided the court’s ruling in this particular case is known as the ratio decidendi, and it states that the right to life protected by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution includes the freedom to pass away with honour. The Court states that this basic right is violated by public hanging since it is cruel and dehumanising. By stating that public hanging is an abhorrent form of punishment and emphasising the significance of upholding human dignity even in the context of the death sentence, this pronouncement sets a precedent.

Petitioner’s Arguments:

Public hanging, according to India’s Attorney General, is a crucial part of the criminal justice system since it deters criminal activity. According to the reasoning, the Indian Constitution does not specifically forbid the death penalty, hence the government is free to choose how it will be carried out. Moreover, the Attorney General said that public hanging was consistent with long-standing Indian customs and national cultural and social values.

Respondent’s Arguments:

In response, Lachma Devi said that public hanging violated her fundamental rights as stated in the Indian Constitution and was a cruel and barbaric practise. Her main point was that, in violation of the constitution’s values of humanity and dignity, public hanging amounted to a harsh, dehumanising, and inhumane punishment. Furthermore, Lachma Devi maintained that public hanging constituted torture, which is expressly forbidden by international law. She emphasised the contradiction between public hanging and these international accords by pointing out that India has accepted a number of conventions that specifically forbade torture.

Judgement:

The Dec. 13, 1985, decree clearly states that the Bench has decided to withdraw the earlier order directing the execution of the death penalty by public hanging. The Jail Rules’ lack of provisions allowing for such an execution procedure served as the impetus for the reversal. The Bench made it clear that unless the State Government changes the regulations to allow it during the execution procedure, the death sentence should not be carried out by public hanging. Crucially, the Bench did not decide to rescind the previous ruling because it thought public hanging was intrinsically barbarous. The Court reaffirmed its position that the right to life and personal liberty are protected by Article 21 of the Constitution, which states that public hanging is a barbarous practise. The Court noted with notable delight that not a single State in the nation had public hanging in its Jail Manual, a disgusting practise harking back to earlier ages. The Court said that if any regulation were to be amended to allow for public hanging, it would be found illegal, and any Jail Manual that did so would be in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.The Court completely and totally repealed the order for public hanging, even while it acknowledged the heinousness of the act and decisively rejected the idea that a barbaric crime should be punished with a barbaric punishment like hanging.

The Court emphasised that even if the State has the right to execute someone, it must do it in a way that respects human dignity and doesn’t cause the prisoner needless pain or disgrace. The Court declared that the use of gallows for execution—especially in public—is a barbarous custom that has no place in a civilised society. The underlying legal concept (ratio decidendi) established in this case is that public hanging is an inhumane and degrading form of punishment that breaches the right to die with dignity, which is protected by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Lachma Devi won her case when the Supreme Court declared public hanging to be illegal and against the fundamental rights protected by the Indian Constitution. The Court ruled that the right to life and personal liberty are fundamental rights and that any legal process that restricts these rights must be fair, reasonable, just, and consistent with natural justice principles. In addition, the Court stressed how vital dignity is to the right to life and personal freedom, finding public hanging to be at odds with this idea.

Analysis and Conclusion:

A turning point in Indian criminal law was the ruling in the Attorney General of India v. Lachma Devi case, which emphasised the inviolability of everyone’s right to life and dignity, including those who had been found guilty of crimes. The decision ended public hangings in India and recognised the State’s obligation to guarantee that the death sentence is carried out in accordance with human dignity standards.

The Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a convicted murderer’s right to public hanging may be considered violated of their fundamental rights in the 1985 case, which centred around the controversial subject of the right to hang in public in India. The Court held that hanging was a lawful mode of execution even if the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution did not include the right to die. The Court did, however, also state that public hanging would potentially violate the rights to human dignity and the prohibition of cruelty, both of which are protected under Article 21, the Court created rules governing the use of the death sentence, including the need that it be carried out in secret and that the convicted person be given the opportunity to consult with their family and legal counsel before to being put to death. The case serves as a reminder of the difficult balancing act between the protection of fundamental human rights and the punishing element of crime. The Attorney General of India v. Lachma Devi case gave rise to the Court’s rules, which continue to influence how the death sentence is applied in India and emphasise the value of protecting human dignity and avoiding brutality throughout the execution procedure.