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Jharkhand High Court
Central Coalfields Limited vs Sri Suresh Kumar Singh on 22 July, 2025
Author: Rajesh Kumar
Bench: Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:20125-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.504 of 2024
------
1. Central Coalfields Limited, a Subsidiary of Coal India Limited,
through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director, having its office at
Darbhanga House, PO-GPO, PS-Kotwali, District-Ranchi
(Jharkhand), and also through its H.O.D. (Legal) Sri Jobe V.P., aged
about 53 years, S/o. Late V.V. Philip, residing at 396/B, Road No.4-
C, Ashok Nagar, PO-Doranda, PS-Argora, District-Ranchi
(Jharkhand), who is also representing the other appellants herein.
2. Director (Personnel), Central Coalfields Limited having office at
Darbhanga House, P.O. G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali, District-Ranchi
3. General Manager, Dhori Area, Central Coalfields Limited, P.O.
Dhori, P.S. Bermo, District-Bokaro.
4. Project Officer/Disciplinary Authority, AADOCM, Dhori Area,
Central Coalfields Limited, P.O. Dhori, P.S. Bermo, District-Bokaro.
5. Manager (Personnel), AADOCM, Dhori Area, Central Coalfields
Limited, P.O. Dhori, P.S. Bermo, District-Bokaro.
6. Project Officer, Amlo Project, Central Coalfields Limited, P.O.
Dhori, P.S. Bermo, District-Bokaro.
7. Chief Manager (Civil), Central Coalfields Limited/Enquiry
Officer, Dhori Area, Central Coalfields Limited, P.O. Dhori, P.S.
Bermo, District-Bokaro. …. …. Respondents/Appellants
Versus
Sri Suresh Kumar Singh, aged about 55 years, son of late
Rameshwar Singh, Resident of Quarter No.B-161, Central Colony,
P.O. Makoli, P.S. Chandrapur, District Bokaro (Jharkhand)
…. …. Writ Petitioner/Respondent
CORAM : HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
——
For the Appellants : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Atanu Banerjee, Advocate
——
C.A.V. on 01.07.2025 Pronounced on 22.07.2025
1 LPA No.504/2024
2025:JHHC:20125-DB
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J.
Prayer
The instant appeal preferred by the C.C.L. under Clause-10
of Letters Patent is directed against the judgment/order dated
08.04.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in
W.P.(S) No.177 of 2023, whereby and whereunder, while
allowing the writ petition, the learned Single Judge has passed
an order with a direction that “the petitioner is directed to be
reinstated with continuity of service and with 25 % back wages
within 3 months from the date of communication of the
judgment.”
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the
writ petition, required to be enumerated, which read as under:
3. It is the case of the writ petitioner that one Rameshwar
Singh was appointed on the post of Security Guard with the
appellant company on 10.11.1973. Rameshwar Singh was issue
less and as such the writ petitioner was adopted. The deed of
adoption was registered subsequently on 25.01.1985 and the
ex-employee of the respondent-CCL, i.e., Rameshwar Singh
declared the petitioner as his dependent in his service excerpts
also. Sometime in the year 1988, Rameshwar Singh applied for
voluntary retirement on account of medical unfitness and as
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2025:JHHC:20125-DB
per the provision of the National Coal Wage Agreement, the
petitioner was offered employment. The petitioner had taken his
Class-X examination in the year 1985 and all formalities for
taking the exams were completed before adoption wherein he
had declared the name of his biological father.
4. The application for the appointment of the petitioner in
terms of NCWA on account of the voluntary retirement of
Rameshwar Singh on medical grounds was filed by the
petitioner on 03.05.1989 and ultimately the petitioner was
granted appointment and by this time the petitioner had
attained the age of 18 years. The petitioner passed Class-X
examination in the year 1985, Class- XII examination in the
year 1987, and passed his Bachelor of Arts in the year 1989. In
the year 1993, the petitioner was issued the College Leaving
Certificate. As per Class-X certificate, the date of birth of the
petitioner is 05.12.1969.
5. The writ petitioner continued to work and on 8/9.06.2016,
the petitioner was issued a show cause as contained in
Annexure-4 to which the petitioner responded and ultimately
charge-sheet dated 1/2.02.2017 as contained in Annexure-5
was issued to the petitioner wherein two allegations were made
against the petitioner; (i) the deed of adoption as son by Shri
Rameshwar Singh was signed on 25.01.1985 and on that date
the petitioner had already crossed the legal age (fifteen years)
3 LPA No.504/2024
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for valid adoption, which makes the writ petitioner’s adoption
void as per Clause 10(iv) of the Adoption Act 1956; (b) The
educational certificates obtained by the petitioner in the year
1987, 1989 and 1993 after the adoption bears the name of the
biological father of the petitioner, namely, Ram Lakhan Singh.
6. With these allegations, it was alleged that the available
records established that the petitioner cheated the company
and managed to get employment in CCL through an invalid and
pseudo-adoption deed. The petitioner responded to the same
vide Annexure-6 dated 09.02.2017 and denied the charges.
7. The show cause reply has been submitted wherein, the
reason for maintaining the name of the biological father in the
certificates of educational qualification has been given in the
show cause reply by stating that the petitioner was registered
for appearing in Class-X before the date of adoption and as
such the name of biological father appeared in his certificates.
8. The plea of the petitioner was not accepted by the inquiry
officer and the inquiry officer recorded a finding that the
petitioner continued to maintain dual identity as son of his
biological father also. The authorities have recorded that any
adoption made in contravention of the provision of the Adoption
Act is null and void ab initio and that the petitioner could not
prove any custom or usage applicable to him that permitted
adoption beyond 15 years of age. Thereafter, 2nd show cause
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notice was issued to the petitioner and ultimately the
disciplinary authority passed the impugned order of dismissal
of the writ petitioner.
9. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the aforesaid
order of dismissal, has preferred a writ application being
W.P.(S) No.177 of 2023 challenging the order of dismissal. The
learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration aforesaid
aspects of the matter, has allowed the writ petition by quashing
and setting aside the impugned order of dismissal, against
which, the instant appeal has been preferred.
Arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant-CCL
10. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the appellant
has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned
order passed by the learned Single Judge that: –
(i) The learned Single Judge has not appreciated the
fact that the claim which has been made on the basis of the
adoption deed dated 25.01.1985, which cannot be treated
to be valid and on consideration of the aforesaid aspect of
the matter, the departmental proceeding has been initiated
in which the charge pertaining to validity of the adoption
deed has been answered against the respondent/writ
petitioner. The said part of the finding recorded by the
inquiry officer has not been taken into consideration in
right perspective, rather, the writ petition has been allowed
5 LPA No.504/2024
2025:JHHC:20125-DBwith a direction to appoint the writ petitioner on based
upon the adoption deed.
(ii) The writ petitioner has been given ample opportunity
to defend his case before the inquiry officer but the inquiry
officer has found the charge proved which has been
accepted by the disciplinary authority and based upon that
the order of punishment of dismissal from service has been
passed.
(iii) The learned Single Judge has not appreciated the
fact about jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India by way of exercising the
power of judicial review which mandates the least
interference in the decision taken by the administrative
disciplinary authority.
(iv) The learned Single Judge has also not appreciated
the fact that the writ petitioner even after his adoption by
the adoptive father, namely, Sri Rameshwar Singh, the
former employee, has taken care of his own mother which
suggests that he cannot be said to be actual adopted son of
the adoptive father, the former employee (now deceased).
(v) The learned Single Judge has also not appreciated
the fact that the said adoption deed has solely been created
for the purpose of getting appointment on the medical
unfitness ground of the deceased employee.
6 LPA No.504/2024
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(vi) Learned counsel for the appellants, based upon the
aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the judgment
impugned passed by the learned Single Judge therefore
suffers from an error, hence, it is fit to be set aside.
Arguments of the learned counsel for the Respondent
11. Per Contra, Mr. Atanu Banerjee, learned counsel appearing
for the respondent-writ petitioner has defended the impugned
judgment by taking the following grounds: –
(i) The learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ
petition has not committed any error, reason being that,
the appointment was made sometime in the year, 1989,
based upon the adoption deed dated 25.01.1985. The said
appointment was made after being satisfied in all corner by
verifying the documents. The writ petitioner was allowed to
continue in service for about more than 30 years and all of
a sudden, sometime in the year, 2017 the departmental
proceeding has been initiated for the purpose of initiating
disciplinary proceeding as to why the writ petitioner be not
dispensed with the service since the service has been
obtained on the basis of invalid adoption deed.
(ii) The contention has been raised that the said
adoption deed is dated 25.01.1985 and hence, questioning
the validity of the said deed after lapse of more than 30
years is per-se illegal.
7 LPA No.504/2024
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(iii) The learned Single Judge has taken into
consideration the aforesaid aspects of the matter and hence
interfered with the impugned order of dismissal from
service.
(vi) Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds,
has submitted that if in these pretexts, the learned Single
Judge since has passed the impugned judgment, the same
requires no interference and accordingly, the present
appeal is fit to be dismissed.
Analysis
12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
gone across the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in
the impugned order as also gone through the pleadings made
on their behalf.
13. The admitted facts in the present case are that the writ
petitioner was adopted by the former employee by virtue of
adoption deed dated 25.01.1985. The recital of said deed
speaks that prior to execution of the said adoption deed under
the Registration Act, the adoption process had been conducted
by way of ceremony and thereafter, the legal shape has been
given by virtue of the adoption deed dated 25.01.1985 by the
adoptive father and the biological father.
14. The writ petitioner has claimed appointment on the
medical unfitness ground of his adoptive father on the basis of
8 LPA No.504/2024
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adoption deed dated 25.01.1985. All the other relevant
documents including the documents pertaining to birth
certificate has been submitted before the appointing authority.
The writ petitioner was appointed under the provision of clause-
9.4.2. of the National Coal Wage Agreement (in short ‘N.C.W.A.’)
which provides that on the ground of medical unfitness of the
employee, the service is to be provided to the dependent of the
medically unfit employee, for ready reference, clause-9.4.2 of
the N.C.W.A. is being quoted as under: –
“९.४.२ सेवा अवधि में मरने वाले श्रममकों के एक आधश्रत को नौकरी:
(१) इसके लिये आश्रितों की िेणी में fuEufyf[kr आवेंगे
:-
पत्नी/पतत जो भी हो, अवववाहहत पुत्री, पुत्र तथा कानूनी
दत्तक पुत्र । यहद नौकरी के लिये उपरोक्त आश्रित
उपिब्ध नहीीं हो तो मत ृ क का छोटा भाई, ववधवा
पुत्री/ववधवा पुत्र-वधू अथवा दामाद जो मत
ृ क के साथ
रहता आ रहा हो तथा उसी की आमदनी पर पूणरू ण पेण
परवररश के लिये आश्रित हो, तो उन्हें मत
ृ क के आश्रित
के रूप में ववचार ककया जा सकता है।
(२) जो शारीररक रूप से दक्ष हो तथा ३५ वर्ण से अश्रधक
का नहीीं हो वैसे आश्रित को काम दे ने का ववचार ककया
जायगा । आश्रित में पत्नी अथवा पतत होने से उम्र सीमा
की कोई पाबन्दी नहीीं रहे गी।”
15. The appellant-CCL, on consideration of all the relevant
documents, has provided appointment in favour of the
respondent-writ petitioner on 03.05.1989. The respondent-writ
petitioner has started discharging his duty without any
complaint from any quarter. He has been allowed to continue in
9 LPA No.504/2024
2025:JHHC:20125-DBservice for about more than 30 years but all of a sudden, a
memorandum of charge has been issued against the writ
petitioner making the irregularities by inflicting the following
charges, which reads as under: –
“CHARGE SHEET
After Shri Rameshwar Singh, Security Guard,
Kalyani Project, Dhori Area, CCL was declared
medically unfit, you as his adopted son applied
and were appointed in the year 1989 in CCL as a
Typing Trainee, Cat. I under the provisions of
clause 9.4.2. of National Coal Wage Agreement
(NCWA). On scrutiny of the records, it is seen
that: –
i) The deed of your adoption as son by Shri
Rameshwar Singh was signed on 25.01.1985
and on this date you had already crossed the
legal age (fifteen years) for valid adoption, which
makes your adoption void as per Clause 10 (iv) of
the Adoption Act 1956.
ii) The educational certificates obtained by you in
1987, 1989 and 1993, after the adoption bears
the name of your biological father, Shri Ram
Lakhan Singh.
The available records establish that you cheated
the company and managed to get employment in
CCL through invalid and pseudo adoption deed.
Hence the Charge:
The above omissions and commissions on your
part, if proved, would tantamount to misconduct
in terms of Clause 26.22, 26.41 of the certified
standing order of CCL as applicable to you. The
details of which are as follows: –
26.22: Any wilful and deliberate act which is
subversive of discipline or which may be
detrimental to the interest of the company.
26.41: Violation of any clause of this standing
order.
You are, therefore directed to submit your
explanation in writing within a week of receipt
hereof stating as to why appropriate disciplinary
action should not be taken against you for the
aforesaid misconducts.
Should you fail to submit your explanation within
the time stipulated above, it will be presumed
that you have no explanation to offer in your
defence and thereafter the Management will
10 LPA No.504/2024
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initiate further appropriate action as it may deem
fit without any further reference to you.
Receipt of this charge-sheet should be
acknowledged.”
16. The writ petitioner was asked to participate in the inquiry
proceeding before the duly appointed inquiry officer. He has put
his defence by negating the charge as has been alleged against
the writ petitioner as per memorandum of charge by taking the
ground that adoption deed cannot be said to be invalid and
appointment has been made on the basis of the adoption deed.
17. It has also been contended that the issue of age, i.e., more
than 15 years is also not fit to be accepted, although, the
adoption deed is dated 25.01.1985 but as would be evident
from its recital, the ceremony of adoption had already taken
placed, which would be evident from the relevant part of the
recital, which is being referred hereinbelow: –
“नाम मोकिर :- श्री रामेश्वर क िंह वल्द श्री राम कि ुन क िंह स्वर्गवा
िौम ब्रह्मन भुकमहार ाकिन ग्राम जैतपुर थाना ह पुरा कजला औरिं र्ाबाद
पे ा िास्तिारी वो नौिरी।
नाम मोकिरअलेहः – श्री ूरेश िुमार क िंह पे र नावालीर् श्री ररामलखन
क िंह बव लायत वो र्ार जीपन श्री राम लखन क िंह कपता िायम िौम ब्रह्मन
भुकमहार कनवा ग्राम जैतपुर थाना ह पुरा प्रर्ना अनछा कजला औरे र्ाबाद
ऐ ा िास्तािरी।
ि ीम वीिा :- र्ोदनामा
तायदाद मालीयत :-
रायत े र्ोदनामा :-
यह िे मन मोकिन िी स्त्री िो स्वर्गवा िर र्यी वो उम्र िरीब 48
ाल िा होरहा है वो आज ति अपना तन े िोई औलाद लड़िा, पोता
इया परपोता नहीिं है वो नहीिं आईन्दा िोई उमीद है हाला िे कि ी प्रिार
िा कबमारी मान ीि इया शारीरीि नहीिं है किन्तु अपना आईन्दा कजवन वो11 LPA No.504/2024
2025:JHHC:20125-DBआिवद िो बनाने िे बारे में हमेशा ोचा िरते हैं वो आईन्दा धाकमगि
िंस्कार वो आत्मा िे शान्तन्त बनाने वास्ते पीिंड दानि बारे में अपना कनजी पुत्र
िा होना जरुरी है इ बात िो अपना होदर भाई राम लखन क िंह तथा
उनिे पत्नी अपनी भौजाई े लाह किया कि अपना बड़ा लड़िा याने
मोकिर अलेह िो मुझे र्ोद िे रुप में दे दीजये कि हमरा भी अिवद बन
जाये इ बात िो दोनोिं माता वो कपता मोकिर अलेह िे िबुल वो मिंजुर
किये।
यह िे मान मोकिर वहालात ेहत जात वो वाल अिल वदु रुस्तर्ी
हो वो हवा बोला डराने वो धमिाने वो फु लाने वोदने दावा नाजायज
कि ी र्ैर िे अपना नफा व नुि ान िो बखूबी मझ वो बुझिर खु ी वो
राजी िे ाथ मोकिर अलेह िो र्ोद लीया वो अपना पुत्र बनाया वो र्ोदनामा
लीखने िो आये।
यह िे मोकिरअलेह िे अलावो और कि ी दू रे लड़िे िो आज
ति र्ोद नहीिं लीया हूँ।
यह िे मोकिर अलेह हम ा मन मोकिर िे फरमावरदारी वो ेवा टहल में
लर्े रहते हैं वो उकमद है हि आईन्दा भी इ ी तरह े ेवा टहल तथा वाद
मरने िे दाह िंस्कार, श्राद्ध इया पीिंडदान िर दें र्ें वो अकधिारी होिंर्ें चुिे
कबना इ िायग िे हुये कहन्दु शास्त्र िे मुताबीि आत्मा िी शािंन्तन्त नहीिं
मीलती है। यह ोच कवचार िर धाकमगि िंस्कार रुप े र्ोद िा िायग पहले
ही हो चुिा है इ में कि ी प्रिार िा नहीिं है चुिे इ बात िो बहुत े लोिंर्ोिं
िो जानिारी है।
यह िे मोकिर अलेह िा उम्र िरीब 14 ाल िा है किन्तु अभी ति
अकववाहीत तथा कबना जर्ो पवीत िा हूँ ता हम मोकिर अलेह िे माता कपता
ने धाकमगि िंस्कार द्वारा अपनी अपनी राजी खु ी े अपने लड़िे िो र्ोद में
कदये वो इ िायग िो िबुल मिंजुरी किये। वाज रहे िे मोकिर वो मोकिर
अलेह िे कपता आप में होदर भाई हैं तथा एि ही जाती िे हैं कि ी दू रे
द्वारा र्ोद नहीिं लीया जा रहा है।
यह िे र्ोदनामा िा अ र धाकमगि िंस्कार द्वारा र्ोद लेने िे कदन े
ही है।
यह िे अब र्ोद िंस्कार धाकमगि रुप े म्पन्न हो जाने िे बाद
मोकिर अलेह मन मोकिर िा खा लड़िा हो चुिा वो उनिे िुल म्पती
चल अचल जो हा ील है इया आइन्दा हा ील होर्ा। वह िुल म्पकत वजीन
ाहु कपता िे मोकिर अलेह िो हुवा तथा उनिे मरने िे बाद पुत्र िे ऐ ा
अकधिार हा ील हुवा वो रहेर्ा वो बाद मरने मनमोकिर उनिा दाह िंस्कार
श्राद्ध वो कपिंडदान िा अकधिारी मोकिर अलेह िा हुवा वो जब मन िोकिर
अपना नौिरी े रीटायर िर जायेंर्ें तो उ स्थान पर मोकिर अलेह िो पुरा
अकधिार प्राप्त है िे वजीन ाहु पुत्र िे मुताबीि बहाल होिर िाम िरें ।
वो मोकिर अलेह मन मोकिर िे पुत्र िे नाम े पुिारा जायेर्ा। वे कहन्दु
मीटाि रा िानुन िे अनु ार मोिर जायदाद में मोकिर आलेह िा हि
हाक ल हुआ।
इ वास्ते यह र्ोदनामा ाथ नेि कनयती िे कलख दीया िे मय पर
िाम आवे।
आज तारीख 25-01-1985 ई०”
18. Hence, the ground has been taken that the adoption deed
12 LPA No.504/2024
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cannot be said to be invalid and since the appointment has
been made on the basis of said adoption deed, hence, there is
no mis-representation or suppression of new fact, rather, he
has been provided appointment on the basis of all disclosure of
certificates during the time of appointment but the inquiry
officer has found the charge proved and forwarded it to the
disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has inflicted
the punishment for dismissal from service.
19. The writ petitioner has approached to this Court by filing
writ petition being W.P.(S) No.177 of 2023 challenging the order
of dismissal from service.
20. The learned Single Judge, on consideration of the adoption
deed, its veracity and other documents as also the decision of
the dismissal, being taken after lapse of more than 30 years,
has interfered with the impugned order of dismissal from
service and directed the writ petitioner to be reinstated in
service, which is the subject matter of the present appeal.
21. This Court, before appreciating the argument advanced on
behalf of the parties, is of the view that since the case is totally
based upon the issue as has been taken by raising the issue of
validity of adoption deed, therefore, thought it proper to refer
the certain provisions bearing in the said issue as provided
under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, for
ready reference, Sections 7, 10 & 16 of the Act, 1956 are being
13 LPA No.504/2024
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referred as under:-
“7. Capacity of a male Hindu to take in
adoption. ―Any male Hindu who is of sound mind
and is not a minor has the capacity to takes on or a
daughter in adoption:
Provided that, if he has a wife living, he shall
not adopt except with the consent of his wife unless
the wife has completely and finally renounced the
word or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been
declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of
unsound mind.
Explanation.―If a person has more than one
wife living at the time of adoption, the consent of all
the wives is necessary unless the consent of any
one of them is unnecessary for any of the reasons
specified in the preceding proviso.
10. Persons who may be adopted.―No
person shall be capable of being taken in adoption
unless the following conditions are fulfilled,
namely:―
(i) he or she is a Hindu;
(ii) he or she has not already been adopted;
(iii) he or she has not been married, unless
there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties
which permits persons who are married being taken
in adoption;
(iv) he or she has not completed the age of
fifteen years, unless there is a custom or usage
applicable to the parties which permits persons who
have completed the age of fifteen years being taken
in adoption.
14 LPA No.504/2024
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16. Presumption as to registered
documents relating to adoption.―Whenever any
document registered under any law for the time
being in force is produced before any court
purporting to record an adoption made and is signed
by the person giving and the person taking the child
in adoption, the court shall presume that the
adoption has been made in compliance with the
provisions of this Act unless and until it is
disproved.”
22. It is evident from the provision of Section 16 of the Act,
1956 that the presumption under the law is that once the
adoption deed has been signed by the nature of guardian of
adopted son as well as other persons, it is to be treated to be
valid, subject to conditions as stipulated under Section 10(i),
(ii), (iii) & (iv).
23. The issue of validity of the adoption deed based upon the
presumption of law as provided under Section 16 has been
taken into consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case
of Bijendra and Anr. Vrs. Ramesh Chand and Ors., reported
in (2016) 12 SCC 483, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court while
taking into consideration the ratio of the judgment rendered in
the case of Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva, (2013) 4 SCC 97 has
observed as under: –
“7. The High Court while construing the said adoption deed has
taken the view that the persons who had given the appellant-
15 LPA No.504/2024
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defendant in adoption to Nanuwa had not signed the adoption
deed as executants thereof and had appended their signatures
thereto as attesting witnesses. The said finding of fact does not
appear to be correct on a perusal of the copy of the adoption
deed which is on record. We have noticed from a perusal of the
adoption deed that apart from the natural guardians of the
appellant-defendant who had given the appellant-defendant in
adoption to Nanuwa there were other persons who had signed
the deed. Even otherwise, the view taken by the High Court
with regard to the deed in question and the provisions of
Section 16 of the Act appears to be contrary to what has been
said by this Court in Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva, (2013) 4
SCC 97, particularly what has been recorded in paras 31 and
34 of the Report which may be reproduced as under: (SCC pp.
111 & 112)
“31. Mere technicalities therefore, cannot defeat the purpose
of adoption, particularly when the respondent-defendants
have not made any attempt to disprove the said document.
No reference was ever made either by them, or by their
witnesses, to this document i.e. registered adoption deed.
Undoubtedly, the natural parents had signed along with 7
witnesses and not at the place where the executants could
sign. But it is not a case where there were no witnesses
except the executants. Instead of two witnesses, seven
attesting witnesses put their signatures.
***
34. The trial court in this regard has held that the fact that
16 LPA No.504/2024
2025:JHHC:20125-DBthe natural parents of the adoptive child had signed along
with seven other witnesses as attestants to the deed, and
not as its executors, would not create any doubt regarding
the validity of the adoption, or render the said registered
document invalid, as they possessed sufficient knowledge
with regard to the nature of the document that they were
executing, and that additionally, no challenge was made to
the registration of the document, immediately after its
execution. The first appellate court took note of the deposition
of Shri Vasant Bhagwantrao Pandav (PW 1), who had
deposed that the adoption deed had been scribed, and that
the signatures of the parties and witnesses to the deed had
been taken on the same, only after the contents of the said
documents had been read over to Smt Laxmibai, the adoptive
mother, and then to all parties present, Smt Laxmibai,
appellant-plaintiff was in good health, both physically and
mentally, at the time of the adoption. The validity of the
adoption deed, however, was being challenged on the basis
of the mere technicality, that only interested witnesses had
been examined and the court finally rejected the authenticity
of the said document, observing that witnesses who wanted
to give weight to their own case, could not be relied upon.”
24. It is evident from the quoted part of the aforesaid
paragraphs as referred hereinabove that mere technicalities
therefore, cannot defeat the purpose of adoption, particularly
when the respondent-defendants have not made any attempt to
disprove the said document. No reference was ever made either
17 LPA No.504/2024
2025:JHHC:20125-DB
by them, or by their witnesses, to this document i.e. registered
adoption deed. Undoubtedly, the natural parents had signed
along with 7 witnesses and not at the place where the
executants could sign. But it is not a case where there were no
witnesses except the executants. Thus, subject to compliance of
the condition of signature having been there in the adoption
deed or the biological father and the person who is to adopt, the
presumption under the law in view of the provision of Section
16 would be that the adoption deed is valid.
25. Further, the presumption of validity is there under the
statutory command as provided under Section 16 of the Act,
1956 and as such, the issue of validity if it is being doubted by
a party, the onus is upon the said party to question the
adoption deed by filing the suit before the competent court of
civil jurisdiction.
26. The aforesaid requirement is mandatory to have the
declaration by the competent court of civil jurisdiction for the
purpose of giving declaration of invalidity of the adoption deed
so as to the competent court of civil jurisdiction may arrive to
the conclusion on appreciation of the evidence which will be led
by the parties.
27. This Court has also considered the issue of validity of the
aforesaid adoption deed on the touchstone of the provision of
Section 90 of the Evidence Act wherein, the other presumption
18 LPA No.504/2024
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is there that if the document is more than 30 years old then the
presumption would be the validity of the said document.
28. Here, the reference of Section 90 of the Evidence Act is
required, since, it is the admitted case of the appellants, CCL
that the adoption deed is dated 25.01.1985 but the issue of
invalidity has been raised after lapse of more than 30 years.
29. Further, Schedule 57 of the Limitation Act is also
required to be referred herein which provides the period of
limitation of three years to obtain a declaration that an alleged
adoption is invalid, or never, in fact, took place.
30. Further as per schedule 56 of the Limitation Act the
period of limitation is of three years to declare the forgery of an
instrument issued or registered from the date when the issue or
registration becomes known to the plaintiff.
31. Further, the issue of validity cannot be allowed to be
arrived at by the executing authority or by the quasi-judicial
functionary, rather, it is under the exclusive domain of the
competent court of civil jurisdiction so as to come to the issue
of validity/invalidity of the deed on the basis of the evidence
which will be laid by the parties concerned.
32. It needs to refer herein that the giving and receiving are
absolutely necessary to the validity of an adoption. They are the
operative part of the ceremony, being that part of it which
transfers the boy from one family to another but the Hindu Law
19 LPA No.504/2024
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does not require that there shall be any particular form so far
as giving and acceptance are concerned. For a valid adoption all
that the law requires is that the natural father shall be asked
by the adoptive parent to give his son in adoption, and that the
boy shall be handed over and taken for this purpose, reference
in this regard may be made to the Judgment rendered by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of L. Debi Prasad v. Tribeni
Devi, (1970) 1 SCC 677. For ready reference, the relevant
paragraph is being quoted as under:
“8. That is also the view expressed in Mayne’s Hindu
Law wherein it is observed that the giving and
receiving are absolutely necessary to the validity of
an adoption; they are the operative part of the
ceremony, being that part of it which transfers the
boy from one family to another; but the Hindu Law
does not require that there shall be any particular
form so far as giving and acceptance are concerned;
for a valid adoption all that the law requires is that
the natural father shall be asked by the adoptive
parent to give his son in adoption, and that the boy
shall be handed over and taken for this purpose.”
33. The words in Section 11 (vi) of the Act 1956 “with intent to
transfer the child from the family of its birth to the family of its
adoption” are merely indicative of the result of actual giving and
taking by the parents and guardians concerned. Where an
20 LPA No.504/2024
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adoption ceremony is gone through and the giving and taking
takes place there cannot be any other intention. The very
ceremony of giving and taking is in itself symbolic of
transplanting the adopted son from the family of his birth to
the adoptive family, reference in this regard be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kartar
Singh v. Surjan Singh, (1974) 2 SCC 559.
34. Further, as discussed hereinabove that under Section 16
of the Act, 1956 presumption as to registered documents
relating to adoption has been stipulated wherein it has been
stated that whenever any document registered under any law
for the time being in force is produced before any court
purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the
person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the
court shall presume that the adoption has been made in
compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is
disproved.
35. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kamla Rani v.
Ram Lalit Rai, (2018) 9 SCC 663 has observed that though
the factum of adoption and its validity has to be duly proved
and formal ceremony of giving and taking is an essential
ingredient for a valid adoption, long duration of time during
which a person is treated as adopted cannot be ignored and by
itself may in the circumstances carry a presumption in favour
21 LPA No.504/2024
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of adoption. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment
is being quoted as under:
“6. We cannot lose sight of the principle that though
the factum of adoption and its validity has to be duly
proved and formal ceremony of giving and taking is
an essential ingredient for a valid adoption, long
duration of time during which a person is treated as
adopted cannot be ignored and by itself may in the
circumstances carry a presumption in favour of
adoption. In this regard, we may refer to the
observations of this Court in L. Debi Prasad v. Tribeni
Devi [L. Debi Prasad v. Tribeni Devi, (1970) 1 SCC
677] : (SCC pp. 681-82, para 9)
“9. There is no doubt that the burden of proving
satisfactorily that he was given by his natural father
and received by Gopal Das as his adoptive son is on
Shyam Behari Lal. But as observed by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in Rajendro Nath
Holdar v. Jogendro Nath Banerjee [Rajendro Nath
Holdar v. Jogendro Nath Banerjee, 1871 SCC OnLine
PC 11 : (1871-72) 14 Moo IA 67] ; that although the
person who pleads that he had been adopted is
bound to prove his title as adopted son, as a fact yet
from the long period during which he had been
received as an adopted son, every allowance for the
absence of evidence to prove such fact was to be
favourably entertained, and that the case was
analogous to that in which the legitimacy of a person
in possession had been acquiesced in for a
considerable time, and afterwards impeached by a
party, who had a right to question the legitimacy,
where the defendant, in order to defend his status, is
allowed to invoke against the claimant every
presumption which arises from long recognition of his
legitimacy by members of his family; that in the case22 LPA No.504/2024
2025:JHHC:20125-DBof a Hindu, long recognition as an adopted son,
raised even a stronger presumption in favour of the
validity of his adoption, arising from the possibility of
the loss of his rights in his own family by being
adopted in another family. In Rup Narain v. Gopal
Devi [Rup Narain v. Gopal Devi, 1909 SCC OnLine PC
3 : (1908-09) 36 IA 103] the Judicial Committee
observed that in the absence of direct evidence much
value has to be attached to the fact that the alleged
adopted son had without controversy succeeded to
his adoptive father’s estate and enjoyed till his death
and that documents during his life and after his
death were framed upon the basis of the adoption. A
Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Balinki
Padhano v. Gopakrishna Padhano [Balinki
Padhano v. Gopakrishna Padhano, 1963 SCC OnLine
Ori 33 : AIR 1964 Ori 117] ; held that in the case of an
ancient adoption evidence showing that the boy was
treated for a long time as the adopted son at a time
when there was no controversy is sufficient to prove
the adoption although evidence of actual giving and
taking is not forthcoming. We are in agreement with
the views expressed in the decisions referred to
above.”
36. Adverting to the factual aspect of the present case,
admittedly herein, the adoption deed is dated 25.01.1985. It is
evident from the recital of the adoption deed that there is
reference of ceremony took place prior to execution of the
adoption deed, the relevant paragraph of the said recital has
already been referred hereinabove.
37. The ceremony of adoption was held prior to execution of
the adoption deed and it is also evident from the adoption deed
23 LPA No.504/2024
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that effect of adoption has been from the date of adoption itself.
38. The law is well settled that if any agreement has been
arrived at in between the parties for sale or an agreement for
adoption also and subsequent thereto, if the deed is being
executed under the Indian Registration Act, then the subject
matter of the registered deed will date back to the date of
agreement in between the parties.
39. It needs to refer herein that as under Section 16 of the
Act 1956, whenever any document registered under any law for
the time being in force is produced before any court purporting
to record an adoption made and is signed by the persons
mentioned therein, the court shall presume that the adoption
has been made in compliance with the provisions of the said
Act unless and until it is disproved and if anyone want to
disprove it then In view of Section 16 of the Act 1956 it is open
to him to disprove such deed of adoption but for that he has to
take independent proceeding, reference in this regard be made
to the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Deu v. Laxmi Narayan, (1998) 8 SCC 701. For ready
reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
“3. In view of Section 16 aforesaid whenever any document
registered under any law for the time being in force is produced
before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is
signed by the persons mentioned therein, the court shall
presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with24 LPA No.504/2024
2025:JHHC:20125-DBthe provisions of the said Act unless and until it is disproved.
According to us, it was not open to the defendants of the said
suit for partition to collaterally challenge the said registered
deed of partition. In view of Section 16 of the aforesaid Act it
was open to them to disprove such deed of adoption but for that
they had to take independent proceeding. The High Court was
fully justified in directing that the respondent be substituted in
place of Smt Phulla on the basis of the registered deed of
adoption produced before the court.”
40. It is also evident from the deed of adoption that the same
has been made in between the biological father, namely,
Ramlakhan Singh and the adoptive father, namely, Rameshwar
Singh (now deceased) in presence of the witnesses, as would be
evident from the face of the said registered deed, appended as
Annexure-1 to the paper book.
41. Therefore, the requirement which is to be there for the
purpose of presumption of the deed to be valid as required to be
there under Section 10 of the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act, 1956 is available herein, i.e., the adoption
deed is in between the adoptive father and the biological father
made in presence of the witnesses, hence, the principle of
presumption of the deed to be valid is being attracted herein.
42. The ground has been taken by the learned counsel for the
appellant regarding the applicability of Section 10 of the Act,
1956, for ready reference the Section 10 of the Act, 1956 is
being reiterated as under:
“10. Persons who may be adopted.–No person shall
25 LPA No.504/2024
2025:JHHC:20125-DBbe capable of being taken in adoption unless the
following conditions are fulfilled, namely–
(i) he or she is a Hindu;
(ii) he or she has not already been adopted;
(iii) he or she has not been married, unless there is a
custom or usage applicable to the parties which
permits persons who are married being taken in
adoption;
(iv) he or she has not completed the age of fifteen
years, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to
the parties which permits persons who have completed
the age of fifteen years being taken in adoption.”
43. We, on consideration of the aforesaid issue, have found
that the law provides that there cannot be any adoption
beyond/above the age of 15 years as provided under Section 10
of the Act, 1956.
44. But, this Court after going through the recital wherein, the
specific reference has been made of the adoption ceremony
taken place prior to execution of the deed with the further
recital that the adoption will be from the date of adoption itself.
45. Therefore, the applicability of Section 10 of the Act, 1956
in view of the recital having been there in the adoption deed of
the adoption ceremony which is beyond the age of 15 years of
the writ petitioner, hence, it is not a case where Section 10 of
the Act 1956 is applicable.
46. The writ petitioner, after getting the appointment on the
basis of said adoption deed, based upon the scrutiny of all
relevant documents way back on the date of appointment, had
26 LPA No.504/2024
2025:JHHC:20125-DB
been done by the appellants-CCL. The writ petitioner,
thereafter, was provided appointment. The writ petitioner
started discharging his duty and after completion of service of
more than 30 years, the doubt has been created by the
appellants-CCL regarding the issue of validity of the adoption
deed after lapse of 30 years.
47. The Evidence Act provides a provision under Section 90
thereof that a document if is more than 30 years old, there will
be presumption in the law of validity of the said document. No
such declaration can even be taken by filing a suit due to the
period of limitation as provided under Schedule 57 of the
48. It is also settled position of law that a document which is
to be declared to be valid or invalid is exclusive domain of the
competent court of civil jurisdiction and as such, it is not
available for the quasi-judicial authority while discharging his
duty as an inquiry officer in the departmental proceeding to
give a finding by holding that the adoption deed is invalid as
has been given by the inquiry officer in the present case.
49. The inquiry officer can only give a finding regarding
genuineness of the document or commission of element of fraud
but he has got no authority to hold a deed created by way of
instrument under the statutory provision herein under the
Indian Registration Act, 1908 to come out with a finding of
27 LPA No.504/2024
2025:JHHC:20125-DB
invalidity of the said instrument created under the statutory
provision, rather, the same is only to be assessed by the
competent court of civil jurisdiction by giving a finding to that
effect by way of declaration.
50. The appellants-CCL since is raising the doubt about the
issue of invalidity of the adoption deed and as such, it is onus
upon the appellants-CCL to get a declaration to that effect by
filing a suit before the competent court of civil jurisdiction but
of course not after lapse of the period of 30 years in view of the
issue of limitation as provided under schedule item 57 of the
51. This Court, on the basis of the discussion made
hereinabove, is of the view that the issue which has been
formulated hereinabove is being answered.
52. This Court, after having answered the issue, has gone
through the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and
found therefrom that the learned Single Judge has taken into
consideration of jurisdiction of the inquiry officer to come out
with the finding by holding the adoption deed to be invalid and
the same led to interfere with the impugned order.
53. The learned Single Judge has also considered the issue of
applicability of the provision of Section 10 of the Act, 1956.
54. The learned Single Judge has come out with the finding
that since it has been referred in recital of the adoption
28 LPA No.504/2024
2025:JHHC:20125-DB
ceremony having been taken place prior to date of execution of
deed when he was age of less than 15 years, hence, the plea of
applicability of Section 10 of the Act, 1956 has been negated.
55. The learned Single Judge has also taken into
consideration by taking the adverse view due to non-production
of the appointment file, due to which, serious prejudice has
been said to be caused to the appellant.
56. This Court, based upon the aforesaid consideration and
based upon the discussion made by this Court, is of the view
that the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge requires
no interference.
57. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is, dismissed.
58. In consequent to dismissal of the instant appeal, pending
interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J.)
I agree
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Rohit/-A.F.R.
29 LPA No.504/2024
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