Bombay High Court
Chanchal Deepak Shewale Alias Malti … vs Kashinath Motiram Paitl Died Thr Lrs … on 5 August, 2025
2025:BHC-AUG:20706
WP-1844-2014.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 1844 OF 2014 WITH
CA/14319/2023
1. Kashinath Motiram Patil,
Died through LRs,
Tulshiram Kashinath Patil,
Age: 74 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
2. Narayan Manku Gawali,
Died through LRs,
2A- Ramesh Narayan Gawali (Beedkar),
Age: 50 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
3. Mahadu Manku Gawali,
Died through LRs,
3-A) Tukaram Mahadu Gawali (Beedkar),
Age: 47 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
3-B) Yamunabai Mahadu Gawali (Beedkar),
Age: 65 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
4. Subhash Shankar Patil,
Age: 60 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
5. Suresh Shankar Patil,
Age: 55 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
6. Manjulabai Gulab Patil,
Died through Lrs,
6-A) Anusayabai Pandurang Patil,
Age: 76 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
6-B) Wanubai Vedu Patil
Age: 70 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
7. Yashwant Kautik Patil,
Age: 65 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
8. Prakash Atmaram Patil,
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Age: 59 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
Petitioner No. 1 to 8 All
R/o: Mahindale, Tq. & Dist. Dhule
9. Yasin Shaikh Bagwan,
Died through LRs,
Manubi Shaikh Yasin
Died Through L.Rs,
9-A) Rabiyabi Shaikh Yusuf
Age 50 years Occu: Household
R/o: Dhule, Tq. & Dist. Dhule
9-B) Nasimbi Isak
Age 45 years, Occu: Household
R/o: Dhule, Tq. & Dist. Dhule
10. Gajmal Mahadu Patil,
Died through LRs,
10A Himmatrao Gajmal Patil,
Age: 60 yrs, Occ: Agriculture
R/o: Mahindale, Tq. & Dist. Dhule
11. Rambhau Sambhu Bhoi,
Died through LRs,
11-A)Sitabai Rambhau More,
Age: 75 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
11-B)Vasant Rambhau More
Age: 55 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
11-C)Mohan Rambhau More
Age: 60 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
11-D)Shailabai Subhash Shinde
Age: 62 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
11-E)Suresh Rambhau More
Age: 50 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
11-F)Ramesh Rambhau More
Age: 52 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
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11-G)Ganesh Rambhau More
Age: 45 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
11-H)Sanjay Rambhau More
Age: 46 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
All R/o: Dhule Tq. & Dist. Dhule
11-1)Mangala Anil Wadekar
Age: 40 yrs, Occ: Household,
R/o: Nashik, Tq. & Dist. Nashik
11-J)Vandana Yuvraj Wadekar
Age: 45 yrs, Occ: Household,
R/o: Nashik, Tq. & Dist. Nashik
12. Sadashiv Baburao Patil,
Age: 77 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
R/o: Mahindale, Tq. & Dist. Dhule
13. Govind Arjun Patil,
Age: 73 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
R/o: Mahindale, Tq. & Dist. Dhule
14. Dhrupadabai Arjun Patil
(Through G.P.A.)
14-A Govind Arjun Patil,
Age: 73 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
R/o: Mahindale, Tq. & Dist. Dhule
15. Dayaram Bhaga Patil,
Died through LRs,
15-A)Girjabai Dayaram Patil, (died thro LRs]
Age:-yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
15-B)Kasturabai Vishwas Patil
Age: 70 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
15-C)Sumanbai Punwant Patil
Age: 65 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
15-D)Venubai Vitthal Patil
Age: 60 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
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15-E)Vatsalabai Bhagwan Patil
Age: 55 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
15-F)Dhanubai Bhikanrao Patil
Age: 52 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
15-G)Nawal Dayaram Patil
Age: 58 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
15-H)Kailas Dayaram Patil
Age: 55 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,
All R/o: Dhule Tq. & Dist. Dhule ...Petitioners
VERSUS
1. The Collector,
Dhule District, Dhule.
2. The Deputy Collector/
Special Land Acquisition Officer,
(General) Patbandhare Project, Dhule.
3. The Commander Special Reserve Force (S.R.P.)
Group No.6, in front of S.P.Office, Dhule
...Respondents
***
• Mr. A. B. Kale, Advocate for the Petitioners
• Mr. S. K. Shirse, AGP for the Respondents/State
• Mr. S. S. Wagh h/f Mr. S. T. Shelke, Advocate for
Applicant in CA/14319/2023
***
CORAM : R. M. JOSHI, J
RESERVED ON : JULY 30, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : AUGUST 05, 2025
ORDER :
1. Petitioners take exception to the order dated
29.07.2008 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division,
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Dhule dismissing the references filed by the
Petitioners under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’) and order dated
07.09.2012 passed by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer/Deputy Collector (for short ‘SLAO’) rejecting
Applications of the Petitioners under Section 28-A of
the Act on the ground that there is no award passed by
the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act in
order to allow the same compensation to the Petitioner
under Section 28-A of the Act.
2. The facts, which led to the filing of this
Petition, can be narrated in brief as under:
Petitioners are agriculturist and their land
came to be acquired for special reserved police camps.
The acquisition proceedings were initiated by issuing
notification under Section 4 of the Act on 11.09.1979.
An award came to be passed on 09.09.1986 by the SLAO.
The Petitioners challenged the land acquisition
proceedings before Civil Court by filing RCS No.
359/1989. This suit was dismissed in default on
16.09.1995. Petitioners thereafter filed reference
under Section 18 of the Act on 28.04.1992. An
Umesh PAGE 5 OF 25
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contending that the claims are filed within limitation.
The Registry of the Reference Court objected to the
registration of the references on the ground of
limitation. The 2nd CJSD, Dhule passed order dated
30.08.2000 on applications for condonation of delay
directed the Registry to register the references. The
record indicates that references came to be registered
in the year 2000. The statement of claim was resisted
by the Respondent on merit as well as taking exception
to the maintainability of the reference on the point of
limitation. The reference Court framed issues including
issue of maintainability of the reference on the point
of limitation. There was no objection raised by the
parties to the issues framed. The parties led evidence.
Reference Court by judgment dated 29.07.2008 dismissed
references on the ground of bar of limitation.
3. Petitioners applied for the certified copy of
the said order passed by the Reference Court on
01.10.2008 and received copy on 26.04.2009. Thereafter,
not only the order of Reference Court was not
challenged but an application was moved before the SLAO
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under Section 28-A of the Act claiming the compensation
as determined by the Reference Court in the reference,
which was dismissed on the ground of bar of limitation.
The SLAO by impugned order dated 07.09.2012 rejected
the application by holding that said application would
be maintainable only in case where there is order in
reference under Section 18 of the Act and other
agriculturists/land owners in the common acquisition
can make application for the same compensation.
Petitioner are now challenging the said order of SLAO
of refusing to exercise powers under Section 28-A and
to grant relief and also the order dated 29.07.2008
passed by the CJSD dismissing the reference under
Section 18 of the Act.
4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submit
that the Petitioners have lost their agricultural lands
and that they are entitled for reasonable compensation.
It is his submission that the Reference Court though
has rejected references, however, has determined the
market value of the lands which is more than award
passed by SLAO. It is his submission that such enhanced
compensation having been determined by the Reference
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Court, there was no justification for SLAO to reject
the applications under Section 28-A of the Act. It is
his submission that the interpretation of Section 28-A
needs to be done in such manner keeping in mind
legislative intent to benefit the agriculturist who
have lost their land in compulsory acquisition.
5. Without prejudice to the said submissions, it
is argued that the order passed by the Reference Court
rejecting the reference on the point of bar of
limitation is not tenable for the reason that it was
not open for the Reference Court to review the order
passed by the same Court in miscellaneous applications
condoning the delay. According to him, since such order
of condonation of delay was not challenged by the
Respondent, there occurred no occasion for the
Reference Court to enter upon the issue of limitation
and hence, the order of reference Court rejecting the
references deserve interference and that references be
allowed. In support of his submissions, he placed
reliance on following judgments: Shrimant Vithoba Koli
(Since Deceased) vs. State of Maharashtra and Others,
2018 SCC OnLine Bom 7244 & Union of India vs. Hansoli
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Devi and Others, Appeal (Civil) No. 9477/1994.
6. Learned AGP appearing for Respondents opposed
the said submissions by referring to provisions of
Section 28-A of the Act, which according to him would
apply only in case where there is already an award
passed by the Competent Court in favour of any of the
landholders in the same acquisition and it is only then
a person interested in all other lands covered by the
same notification and are aggrieved by the award of the
SLAO are entitled to seek the same amount of
compensation. It is his submission that since there is
no award passed in the references made by the
Petitioners, question of application of Section 28-A
does not arise. He placed reliance on the judgment of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India and
Another vs. Association of Unified Telecom Service
Providers of India and Others, (2011) 10 SCC 543 in
order to submit that Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 has no application to the reference under Section
18 of the Act. He argues that once admittedly there is
delay in filing the reference, the same ought to have
been dismissed without deciding the merit thereof.
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According to him, it is his submission that once the
reference itself was not maintainable, question of
considering the determination of the compensation would
not arise.
7. In order to appreciate the submissions sought
to be made by the rival parties, it would be relevant
to take into consideration certain relevant facts may
be at the cost of repetition which read as follows:
The Petitioners are landholders/agriculturists
of their respective lands situated at Mahindale. By
notification dated 11.09.1979 under Section 4 of the
Act the procedure of acquisition had commenced. Award
came to be passed on 09.09.1986. Admittedly,
Petitioners received the compensation in the year 1989,
which was accepted under protest. Thereafter, RCS No.
359/1989 came to be filed challenging the acquisition
itself and not the compensation paid against the said
acquisition to the Petitioners, nor it was not for
enhancement of compensation. This suit was dismissed
for want of prosecution on 16.09.1995. It is thereafter
references were sought to be made and miscellaneous
applications were filed in the year 1998 for seeking
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30.08.2000 condoned the delay and directed references
to be registered and put up for further orders and
disposal thereof in accordance with law. References
were registered in the year 2000. The statement of
claim of the Petitioners were resisted by the
Respondents on merit as well as on the point of
limitation.
8. Reference Court framed issues vide Exh. 24.
Amongst other issues on merit, issue of maintainability
of the reference is also framed. The Petitioners did
not challenged the said issue and proceeded to lead
evidence in the matter. After hearing both sides
considering the facts on record, though the Reference
Court has decided the market price of the acquired
land, however, consequently held that references itself
not maintainable and rejected the same. No award came
to be passed holding entitlement of the Petitioners of
the amount of compensation as determined.
9. The above facts clearly indicates that
Petitioners never objected to the framing of the issue
of limitation and subjected themselves to the
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jurisdiction of the said Court for the purpose of
decision on the issue. Thus, now Petitioners are
estopped from claiming that the issue of limitation,
which came to be decided against them, could not have
been gone into by the Reference Court while deciding
the references in view of previous order dated
30.08.2000.
10. Apart from this, perusal of the order passed
by the Reference Court indicates that Reference Court
had taken into consideration the settled position of
law, which does not permit the entertainment of
condonation of delay in preferring reference. At this
stage, it would be relevant to take note of provision
of Section 18 of the Act, which reads thus:
Section 18 – Reference to Court
(1) Any person interested who has not
accepted the award may, by written
application to the Collector, require that
the matter be referred by the Collector for
the determination of the Court, whether his
objection be to the measurement of the
land, the amount of the compensation, the
persons to whom it is payable, or the
apportionment of the compensation among the
persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds
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Provided that every such application shall
be made–
(a) if the person making it was present or
represented before the Collector at the
time when he made his award, within six
weeks from the date of the Collector’s
award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the
receipt of the notice from the Collector
under section 12, sub-section (2) or within
six months from the date of the Collector’s
award, whichever period shall first expire.
11. Section 18(2) provides that the application
taking objection to the award shall be filed within 6
weeks from the date of Collector’s award when the
person making it was present or represented before the
Collector at the time of award. As per clause (b), in
other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the
notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section
(2) or within six months from the date of Collector’s
award, whichever period shall first expire. Section
12(2) requires the Collector to give notice of his
award to such person interested who are not personally
present or represented when the award is made. Thus, as
per the said provision, depending upon the
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contingencies as explained therein, the maximum period
of limitation for filing the application for objecting
the award has been provided and in any case, this six
months in maximum from the date of award passed by
Collector. Here in this case, admittedly, in the year
1989 itself the amount of compensation was received by
the Petitioners though under protest. The order passed
by the CJSD dated 30.08.2000 indicates that admitted
delay of 2 years, 3 months and 13 days came to be
condoned. In this regard a reference can be made to the
judgment of Supreme Court in case of State of Karnataka
vs. Laxuman, 2006 (1) Land Acquisition Cases 13/(2005
(8) SCC 709), which has been relied upon by Reference
Court in its order. Thus, it was not open for the said
Court to condone the delay in view of provision of
Section 18(2) and settled position of law by the
Supreme Court.
12. Now question arises as to whether it would be
open for the Petitioners to take exception to the order
of Reference Court and answer thereto would be in
negative for more than one reasons. As recorded
earlier, the Petitioners have never raised objection
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for framing of issue of limitation afresh and subjected
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court to that
extent. Thus, there was acquiescence on the part of
Petitioners and once no objection was raised then, it
would not be open for the Petitioners now to claim that
the Court had no jurisdiction to decide the said issue,
after it came to be decided against the Petitioners.
Secondly, there was no jurisdiction vested into the
Court to condone delay by applying Section 5 of
Limitation Act. Moreover, the circumstances as they
appear from the record also indicate that the
Petitioners have practically accepted the said judgment
of the Reference Court and therefore, filed an
application under Section 28-A of the Act on the basis
of determination of the market price of the acquired
land. The Petitioners, therefore, are estopped from
taking exception to the order dated 29.07.2008 by
filing Petition in the year 2014 i.e., after over a
period of six years. The principles applicable for
condonation of delay, by keeping in mind the nature of
legislation, cannot be applied to the stage of filing
reference in view of period of limitation prescribed
therefor.
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13. Now coming to the issue raised by the
Petitioners with regard to the applicability of Section
28-A of the Act to the present case, it would be
relevant to refer to said provision, which reads thus:
28A. Re-determination of the amount of
compensation on the basis of the award of
the Court.-
(1) Where in an award under this Part, the
Court allows to the applicant any amount of
compensation in excess of the amount
awarded by the Collector under section 11,
the persons interested in all the other
land covered by the same notification under
section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also
aggrieved by the award of the Collector
may, notwithstanding that they had not made
an application to the Collector under
section 18, by written application to the
Collector within three months from the date
of the award of the Court require that the
amount of compensation payable to them may
be re-determined on the basis of the amount
of compensation awarded by the Court:
Provided that in computing the period of
three months within which an application to
the Collector shall be made under this sub-
section, the day on which the award was
pronounced and the time requisite for
obtaining a copy of the award shall be
excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an
application under sub-section (1), conduct
an inquiry after giving notice to all the
persons interested and giving them a
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make an award determining the amount of
compensation payable to the applicants.(3) Any person who has not accepted the
award under sub-section (2) may, by written
application to the Collector, require that
the matter be referred by the Collector for
the determination of the Court and the
provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so
far as may be, apply to such reference as
they apply to a reference under section 18.
14. A plain reading of the said provision
indicates that it has been brought to the statute book
by way of amendment in the year 1984 by Act 68 of 1984
in order to give benefit of the award passed by the
Reference Court on determination of any amount of
compensation over and above award passed by the
Collector under Section 11 to all other persons
interested in the said lands covered by the said
notification were entitled to the same compensation
without afresh determination, if application is filed
within three months from the date of the award of the
Court. The Collector after receipt of said application
is required to give notice to all person interested and
giving them opportunity of being heard to make an award
determining the amount of compensation payable to them.
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15. The intention of the statute, therefore, is
that once in an acquisition to any landholder amount
has been granted by way of compensation over and above
compensation granted by Collector, there accrues right
in favour of other land owners/holders from same
acquisition, to seek such compensation determined by
invoking Section 28-A of the Act. At this stage, it
would be relevant to take note of Full Bench judgment
of Supreme Court in case of Union of India and Another
vs. Hansoli Devi and Others, (2002) 7 SCC 273, wherein
it is held that even in case of dismissal of an
application seeking reference under Section 18 of the
Act, on ground of delay, it amounts to not having made
an application. Thus, in case an application is
dismissed on ground of delay or other technical ground,
such person would be entitled to maintain an
application under Section 28-A of the Act. It would be
fruitful to reiterate paragraphs 9 to 11 of the said
judgment, which reads thus:
9. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to
what would be the correct interpretation of
Section 28-A, we think it appropriate to
bear in mind certain basic principles of
interpretation of statute. The rule stated
by Tindal, CJ in Sussex Peerage case,Umesh PAGE 18 OF 25
WP-1844-2014.odt(1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 : 8 ER 1034, still
holds the field. The aforesaid rule is to
the effect: (ER p. 1057)“If the words of the statute are in
themselves precise and unambiguous, then no
more can be necessary than to expound those
words in their natural and ordinary sense.
The words themselves do alone in such cases
best declare the intent of the lawgiver.”
It is a cardinal principle of construction
of statute that when language of the
statute is plain and unambiguous, then the
court must give effect to the words used in
the statute and it would not be open to the
courts to adopt a hypothetical construction
on the ground that such construction is
more consistent with the alleged object and
policy of the Act. In Kirkness v. John
Hudson & Co. Ltd. 1955 (2) ALL ER 345, Lord
Reid pointed out as to what is the meaning
of “ambiguous” and held that: (All ER p.366
C-D)
“A provision is not ambiguous merely
because it contains a word which in
different context is capable of different
meanings and it would be hard to find
anywhere a sentence of any length which
does not contain such a word. A provision
is, in my judgment, ambiguous only if it
contains a word or phrase which in that
particular context is capable of having
more than one meaning.”
It is no doubt true mat if on going through
the plain meaning of the language of
statutes, it leads to anomalies, injustices
and absurdities, then the court may look
into the purpose for which the statute has
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been brought and would try to give a
meaning, which would adhere to the purpose
of the statute. Patanjali Sastri, CJ in the
case of Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose
. 1953 SCR 1, had held that it is not a
sound principle of construction to brush
aside words in a statute as being
inapposite surplusage, if they can have
appropriate application in circumstances
conceivably within the contemplation of the
statute. In Quebec Railway, Light Heat &
Power Co. v. Vandray AIR 1920 PC 181, it
had been observed that the Legislature is
deemed not to waste its words or to say
anything in vain and a construction which
attributes redundancy to the legislature
will not be accepted except for compelling
reasons. Similarly, it is not permissible
to add words to a statute which are not
there unless on a literal construction
being given a part of the statute becomes
meaningless. But before any words are read
to repair an omission in the Act, it should
be possible to state with certainty that
these words would have been inserted by the
draftsman and approved by the legislature
had their attention been drawn to the
omission before the Bill had passed into a
law. At times, the intention of the
legislature is found to be clear but the
un-skillfulness of the draftsman in
introducing certain words in the statute
results in apparent ineffectiveness of the
language and in such a situation, it may be
permissible for the court to reject the
surplus words, so as to make the statute
effective. Bearing in mind the aforesaid
principle, let us now examine the
provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, to
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answer the questions referred to us by the
Bench of two learned Judges. It is no doubt
true that the object of Section 28-A of the
Act was to confer a right of making a
reference, (sic on one) who might have not
made a reference earlier under Section 18
and, therefore, ordinarily when a person
makes a reference under Section 18 but that
was dismissed on the ground of delay, he
would not get the right of Section 28-A of
the Land Acquisition Act when some other
person makes a reference and the reference
is answered. But the Parliament having
enacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial
provision, it would cause great injustice
if a literal interpretation is given to the
expression “had not made an application to
the Collector under Section 18” in Section
28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expression
would mean that if the land-owner has made
an application for reference under Section
18 and that reference is entertained and
answered. In other words, it may not be
permissible for a land owner to make a
reference and get it answered and then
subsequently make another application when
some other person gets the reference
answered and obtains a higher amount. In
fact in Pradeep Kumari’s case the three
learned Judges, while enumerating the
conditions to be satisfied, whereafter an
application under Section 28-A can be
moved, had categorically stated (SCC p.743,
para 10) “the person moving the application
did not make an application to the
Collector under Section 18“. The expression
“did not make an application”, as observed
by this Court, would mean, did not make an
effective application which had been
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entertained by making the reference and the
reference was answered. When an application
under Section 18 is not entertained on the
ground of limitation, the same not
fructifying into any reference, then that
would not tantamount to an effective
application and consequently the rights of
such applicant emanating from some other
reference being answered to move an
application under Section 28-A cannot be
denied. We, accordingly answer question No.
1(a) by holding that the dismissal of an
application seeking reference under Section
18 on the ground of delay would tantamount
to not filing an application within the
meaning of Section 28-A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894.
10. So far as question 1(b) is concerned,
this is really the same question, as in
question 1(a) and, therefore, we reiterate
that when an application of a land owner
under Section 18 is dismissed on the ground
of delay, then the said land owner is
entitled to make an application under
Section 28-A, if other conditions
prescribed therein are fulfilled.
11. Coming to the second question for
reference the receipt of compensation with
or without protest pursuant to the award of
the Land Acquisition Collector is of no
consequence for the purpose of making a
fresh application under Section 28-A. If a
person has not filed an application under
Section 18 of the Act to make a reference,
then irrespective of the fact whether he
has received the compensation awarded by
the Collector with or without protest, he
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would be a person aggrieved within the
meaning of Section 28-A and would be
entitled to make an application when some
other land owner’s application for
reference is answered by the reference
Court. It is apparent on the plain language
of the provisions of Section 28-A of the
Act. Otherwise, it would amount to adding
one more condition, not contemplated or
stipulated by the Legislature itself to
deny the benefit of substantial right
conferred upon the owner.
16. It is thus clear that for the purpose of
application of Section 28-A i.e. for re-determination
of amount of compensation on the basis of award of the
Court, the pre-condition is that there is an award of
the Court which allows compensation in cases of the
amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 of the
Act. Thus, the determination of quantum of compensation
is not contemplated but what is relevant is that the
Court allows to the Applicant any amount of
compensation in cases of amount awarded by the
Collector. This could be done in case where reference
is maintainable. In the event the reference is not
tenable on the point of limitation, such determination
of market value is of no consequence. Such
determination is done only for the reason that in an
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Appeal, if the reference is held within limitation,
there is determination on merit. Thus, unless the
reference is allowed and the Application is allowed the
compensation in cases of the amount as determined by
the Collector, the question of applying the same to
other person does not arise. Moreover, the said
provision more than sufficiently indicates that Section
28-A would have application to the other person than
the one an application in the reference. Thus,
Petitioners would have been justified in making
application under this provision, provided there was
some other land owner’s application is answered by the
Reference Court. By no stretch of imagination, an
application can be maintained by Petitioners whose
application on reference is rejected and there is no
other order in respect of any other land owners.
17. In the light of above facts, the Petitioners
have failed to make out the case to cause interference
into the order passed by the SLAO under Section 28-A of
the Act so also the Petitioners having been estopped
from taking exception to the order passed by the
Reference Court and even otherwise, in view of non
Umesh PAGE 24 OF 25
WP-1844-2014.odt
application of Section 5 of Limitation Act to
Reference, are not entitled for any relief.
18. As a result of above discussion, Petition
stands dismissed. Pending application(s), if any,
stands disposed of.
(R. M. JOSHI, J.)
Umesh PAGE 25 OF 25
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