Chattisgarh High Court
Chandan Prasad Sah vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 5 March, 2025
1
2025:CGHC:10748
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 1625 of 2025
1 - Chandan Prasad Sah S/o Bigu Sah Aged About 29 Years R/o Village- Khara
Kona (Bargedi), Tahsil- Lundra, Distt. - Surguja (C.G.)
... Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - The Secretary, Department Of Higher
Education, Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur, Distt. - Raipur (C.G.)
2 - The Commissioner Surguja Division, Ambikapur, Distt. - Surguja (C.G.)
3 - The Collector Balrampur, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj (C.G.)
4 - The District Education Officer Balrampur, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj (C.G.)
5 - The Principal Swami Atmanand Govt. Upgraded (English Medium) Higher
Secondary School - Rajpur, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj (C.G.)
... Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. A.N. Pandey, Advocate
For Respondents/State : Mr. Suyashdhar Badgaiya, Dy. G.A.
SB: Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Order on Board
05/03/2025
1. By way of this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for
following reliefs:
“10.1. That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to direct the Respondent No. 3 to
SHUBHAM
reinstate the petitioner on the post of Teacher at
DEYDigitally
signed by
SHUBHAM
DEY
2Swami Atmanand Upgraded (English Medium)
Higher Secondary School, Rajpur, District –
Balrampur-Ramanujganj (C.G.) in pursuance of
the order passed by the learned Commissioner
Surguja Division, Ambikapur dated 29.11.2024
(Annexure P/7) within stipulated period.
10.2. Any other relief or reliefs may also be
granted to the petitioner which this Hon’ble Court
deems fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case.”
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a
Teacher and is appointed on contractual basis for teaching Social
Sciences in Swami Atmanand Excellence English Higher
Secondary School, Rajpur, District – Balrampur-Ramanujganj. He
was appointed on the said school vide order dated 18.04.2022
(Annexure P/1) and since then, the petitioner was working in the
said school with utmost care and caution. However, on
24.10.2024 (Annexure P/4), a stigmatic order of removal has been
passed against the petitioner stating that he has physically
assaulted 10 students of the said school and due to which, the
students have faced mental trauma and since then, those
students were having physical and mental issues. Hence, the
petitioner has violated his conduct of service and has also violated
the basic rights of the students for which, certain enquiry has been
conducted against him. Subsequently, during the course of
enquiry, it was prima facie found that the petitioner has violated
Rule 3 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965
as also, the rules prescribed under the Chattisgarh Civil Services
(Contractual Appointment) Rules, 2012 and accordingly, the
3
petitioner vide the impugned order dated 24.10.2024 (Annexure
P/4) the petitioner was removed from service by the respondents.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order dated
24.01.2024 (Annexure P/4) is a stigmatic order and is bad in law.
He submits that the respondents are required to provide an
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner by holding an enquiry,
which was not done by the respondents and without holding any
enquiry, the petitioner has been removed from service which is
arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice. In support of
his contention he places reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Swati Priyadarshini Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh & Ors. reported in (2024) SCC OnLine SC
2139 and submits that without there being any opportunity of
hearing, the petitioner cannot be removed from service in the
manner in which, the respondents authorities have passed the
impugned order.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
Respondents/State opposes the said submission of the counsel
for the petitioner and would submit that from the order itself, it
would appear that the petitioner has violated Rule 3 of the
Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 and thus, the
order impugned dated 24.10.2024 has rightly been passed by the
respondents. He also submits that the order has been passed on
24.10.2024 and the present petition has been filed after huge
4
delay and thus, the petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground
of delay and latches.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and
perused the documents placed on record.
6. The view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of
Swati Priyadarshini (Supra) goes to show that before passing
any stigmatic order for removal of any employee from service, a
departmental enquiry is required to be conducted, which has not
been done in the instant case. In para 34 of the said judgement,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned
Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal
Dhingra v. Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5:
“28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as
follows : Any and every termination of service is
not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A
termination of service brought about by the
exercise of a contractual right is not per se
dismissal or removal, as has been held by this
Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India
[(1953) 1 SCC 420 : 1953 SCR 655]. Likewise the
termination of service by compulsory retirement in
terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of
service is not tantamount to the infliction of a
punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as
has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v.
State of Uttar Pradesh [(1954) 1 SCC 572 : (1955) 1
SCR 26]. In either of the two abovementioned cases
the termination of the service did not carry with it the
penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances
under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true
that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other
disqualification may be the motive or the inducing
factor which influences the Government to take
action under the terms of the contract of employment
or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right
exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate
the service the motive operating on the mind of the
Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas
5Ganesh v. Union of India, [58 Bom LR 673 : AIR 1956
Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In short, if the
termination of service is founded on the right
flowing from contract or the service rules then,
prima facie, the termination is not a punishment
and carries with it no evil consequences and so
Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the
Government has, by contract or under the rules,
the right to terminate the employment without
going through the procedure prescribed for
inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal
or reduction in rank, the Government may,
nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if
the termination of service is sought to be
founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency
or other disqualification, then it is a punishment
and the requirements of Article 311 must be
complied with. As already stated if the servant has
got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the
contract of employment or the rules provide to
the contrary, his services cannot be terminated
otherwise than for misconduct, negligence,
inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A
termination of the service of such a servant on
such grounds must be a punishment and,
therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article
311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right
and he is visited with the evil consequences of
loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible
stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A
reduction in rank likewise may be by way of
punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the
government servant has a right to a particular rank,
then the very reduction from that rank will operate as
a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and
privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to
the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating
higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not
ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the
servant has no title to the post or the rank and the
Government has, by contract, express or implied, or
under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower
post does not mean that an order of reduction of a
servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any
circumstances be a punishment. The real test for
determining whether the reduction in such cases
is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if
the order for the reduction also visits the servant
with any penal consequences. Thus if the order
entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or
6allowances or the loss of his seniority in his
substantive rank or the stoppage or
postponement of his future chances of
promotion, then that circumstance may indicate
that although in form the Government had
purported to exercise its right to terminate the
employment or to reduce the servant to a lower
rank under the terms of the contract of
employment or under the rules, in truth and
reality the Government has terminated the
employment as and by way of penalty. The use of
the expression “terminate” or “discharge” is not
conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous
expressions, the court has to apply the two tests
mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant
had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether
he has been visited with evil consequences of the
kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case
satisfies either of the two tests then it must be
held that the servant has been punished and the
termination of his service must be taken as a
dismissal or removal from service or the
reversion to his substantive rank must be
regarded as a reduction in rank and if the
requirements of the rules and Article 311, which
give protection to government servant have not
been complied with, the termination of the
service or the reduction in rank must be held to
be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional
right of the servant.”.
7. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, submissions
made by the parties and further considering the aforesaid aspect
of the matter as also, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of Swati Priyadarshini (Supra), this Court is of the
opinion that the impugned order dated 24.10.2024 (Annexure P/4)
has not been passed in accordance with law. The petitioner, even
though he is a contractual employee is required to be given an
opportunity of hearing and the respondent authorities are under
an obligation to conduct an enquiry if prima facie, they find any
misconduct on the part of the petitioner, which in the present case
7
was not done. As such, the impugned order dated 24.10.2024
(Annexure P/4) is liable to be and accordingly, quashed.
However, the respondent authorities will be at liberty to initiate any
proceedings as available under the law by giving an opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner.
8. Accordingly, this petition stands disposed of with aforesaid
observations and directions.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Dey