Delhi District Court
Chander Pal Singh vs Meenakshi Chauhan on 4 January, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. SUNIL BENIWAL,
DISTRICT JUDGE-06, SOUTH DISTRICT,
SAKET COURTS, NEW DELHI.
CS DJ No.484/2023
CNR No.DLST01-008184-2023
Chander Pal Singh,
S/o Shri Kashi Ram,
R/o 54, Subhash Camp,
Dakshin Puri, New Delhi 110062. ....Plaintiff
VERSUS
Meenakshi Chauhan,
W/o Suraj Chauhan,
R/o House No.19/186,
First Floor, Dakshin Puri Extension,
New Delhi. .....Defendant
Date of Institution : 23.08.2023
Date of arguments : 05.12.2024
Date of Judgment : 04.01.2025
Suit for defamation and recovery of damages of Rs.10,00,000/-
JUDGMENT
BRIEF FACTS:
1. The plaintiff has instituted the present suit for the tort of Civil
Defamation, and recovery of damages of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten
Lac) against the defendant herein.
2. The Plaintiff is a practicing Advocate enrolled with The BAR
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 1 of 43
Council of Delhi. As averred, the plaintiff is the owner and landlord
of a property bearing address No. 19/186, First Floor, Dakshinpuri
Extension, New Delhi-110062 (tenanted premises).
3. As averred, the defendant herein was a tenant of the plaintiff,
and is presently residing at the tenanted premises, allegedly as a
trespasser, as the plaintiff has already terminated the lease of the
defendant vide his legal notice dated 21.03.2023.
4. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant and her husband
approached the plaintiff for taking the tenanted premises on rent.
Since the defendant is a distant relative of the plaintiff, the plaintiff
accordingly considered her aforesaid request favourably, and let out
the tenanted premises on lease @ Rs 4,000/- per month.
5. As averred, initially, the defendant paid the agreed rent amount
for the first three months. Subsequently, the defendant stopped
paying the rent. Further, after the expiry of 11 months, neither did the
defendant pay the rental arrears, nor did she and her husband vacate
the tenanted premises.
6. It has been alleged by the plaintiff that the defendant has not
paid rent qua the tenanted premises for more than 33 months. Further,
whenever the plaintiff used to ask the defendant about the rent, she
used to avoid paying the same on one pretext or another.
7. Subsequently, the relation between the parties became
strained. As stated by the plaintiff, whenever the plaintiff used to
inquire about the rent arrears, the defendant used to start arguing with
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 2 of 43
the plaintiff. Further, as alleged, the defendant has also extended
threats of implicating the plaintiff in false criminal cases. It has also
been stated by the plaintiff that, in order to grab the tenanted
premises, the defendant has also filed a false and frivolous case
against the plaintiff before the Ld. Sr. Civil Judge, South District,
Saket.
8. As averred, the present suit, is arising out of the case filed by
the defendant, wherein the defendant has made defamatory
allegations and imputations qua the plaintiff herein.
9. As alleged, the defendant has referred to the plaintiff as a land
grabber. Further, the defendant has also stated in her suit that the
plaintiff has indulged in criminal activities, and has encroached upon
public and private land. The defendant has also stated in her suit that
the plaintiff, allegedly, deals in disputed properties.
10. The exact allegations have been reproduced herein under;
“…. That as per the knowledge of the Plaintiff the defendants are
known to each other and are the land grabbers of the area, who has
indulged in illegal activities of encroaching upon the government as
well as private land and also deals in disputed properties….”
11. The plaintiff has stated that the said allegations and averments
are unfounded, untrue, false and malicious which tantamount to
mudslinging, character assassination and casting of aspersions on the
character and integrity of the plaintiff.
12. As alleged, the defendant has attempted to project the plaintiff
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 3 of 43
as a criminal, a goon and a law breaker with a view to demean and
denigrate the plaintiff by alleging that the plaintiff is involved in
unlawful act of extorting money, land grabbing, and is a rank
encroacher.
13. As alleged, due to the said allegations, the image of the
plaintiff has been tarnished beyond redeem. As a result, the plaintiff
felt shame and humiliation, became worried, upset, worried. Further,
as alleged, the defendant herein went on to spread various unfounded
and false rumours against the defendant in the locality in order to
tarnish and diminish his reputation in the estimation of his friends,
relatives, peers and the society at large. As alleged, all the allegations
and imputations were defamatory per-se.
14. It is alleged further that when the friends and relatives of the
plaintiff read the contents of the plaint as filed by the defendant, they
started to avoid the plaintiff. As averred in the plaint, over a passage
of years, the plaintiff had built his reputation in the area, and earlier
he was known as a person of impeccable integrity, honesty, hard
work, sincerity and morality.
15. Further, due to intentional acts of the defendant, the long
standing esteem, prestige and reputation of the plaintiff has been
shattered beyond repair. As averred, the reputation of the plaintiff has
been lowered in the eyes of his relatives, parents, friends, colleagues,
peers and the society at large.
16. Allegedly, there is an apparent slur and odium on the conduct,
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 4 of 43
integrity, character of the plaintiff. As a result of the alleged wanton
allegations imputed by the defendant, the plaintiff allegedly became
distressed and depressed, and as such could not devote his time
towards his family and profession giving rise to the present cause of
action.
17. As alleged, the defendant has made deliberate and wilful false
statements against the plaintiff to lower down the plaintiffs character
in the eyes of the public at large.
18. As a result, the plaintiff was constrained to issue and address a
legal notice to the defendant dated 12.07.2023 seeking damages
amounting to Rs 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lac) on account of
defamation. Further, the plaintiff has not received any reply to the
said legal notice.
19. Accordingly, the Court vide its order dated 31.01.2024 framed
the below mentioned issues, namely:
1. Whether there is no cause of action in favour of plaintiff and
against the defendant? OPD
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree of damages of Rs 10
Lacs against the defendant for defaming the plaintiff? OPP
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to pendent-lite and future
interest @18% per annum on the decreetal amount? OPP
4. Relief
20. PER CONTRA, vide order dated 08.12.2023; the defendant
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 5 of 43
had filed her written statement. The same was taken on record subject
to costs of Rs 3,000/-, as the same was beyond the statutory period of
limitation.
21. It is pertinent to observe at this stage that the defendant did not
comply with the directions as issued vide order dated 08.12.2023,
and failed to deposit the costs. As a result, this Court vide its order
dated 14.11.2024, ordered that the written statement of the defendant
be taken off the record. Further, right to lead DE was also closed
EVIDENCE
22. PW-1 Sh. Chander Pal Singh entered the witness box of
19.07.2024, and essentially re-affirmed the contents of the evidence
affidavit, and his plaint.
23. PW-2 Sh Gajraj Singh S/o Sh Shrawan Kumar, R/o C-85, A,
First Floor, Dakshinpuri, entered the witness box on 19.07.2024, and
tendered his evidence by way of affidavit.
24. PW-3 Sh Ravi Kumar S/o Lt. Sh Bhim Sain r/o DII-273,
Madangir entered the witness box on 19.07.2024, and tendered his
evidence by way of affidavit.
25. PW-4 Sh Mukesh Sawariya s/o Sh Om Prakash r/o B486,
Subhash Camp, Dr Ambedkar Nagar entered the witness box on
19.07.2024, and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit.
26. PW-1 relied on the exhibits EX. PW-1/A to EX. PW-1/O.
27. The remaining witnesses as examined by the plaintiff deposed
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 6 of 43
in consonance with the contents of the suit and the evidence of the
affidavit, thereby re-affirming the suit of the plaintiff. The witnesses
also deposed before the Ld. Predecessor Court as a result of reading
the contents of the suit, as filed by the defendant, the witnesses
started to avoid the plaintiff herein.
28. PW-2 further went on to state on oath that his family advised
him to keep distance from the plaintiff, else the defendant can level
similar allegations against him as well.
29. The other witness also stated on oath that the friends and
relatives of the plaintiff, as a result of the case filed by the defendant,
also started to avoid the plaintiff.
30. The plaintiff’ witnesses also stated on oath that as result of the
said imputations, the plaintiff became visibly distressed and
depressed. Other residents of the locality started to look down upon
the plaintiff.
31. The defendant also did not participate in the evidence
proceedings. Further, no DE was led on behalf of the defendant, nor
was the defendant, and/or her representative was present during the
entire proceedings.
SUBMISSIONS
32. The plaintiff advanced and concluded its final arguments on
05.12.2024. Written submission were also filed by the plaintiff,
wherein, the plaintiff has essentially reiterated the contents of his suit
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 7 of 43
and the evidence as led.
33. During the course of his submissions, the plaintiff has placed
reliance upon the following precedents:
Rajendra Kumar Vs State of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 2025
S. Narayanan Vs P. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1996 Mad 262
Copies of the judgments were not filed along with the submissions.
OBSERVATIONS & REASONING
34. Without repeating all the facts as mentioned herein above, it is
observed that the plaintiff is a practicing Advocate being an officer of
the Court. The plaintiff has exhibited his Saket BAR Association ID
card which bears the enrolment number D/2235/2023.
35. The entire case pertains to certain defamatory averments,
which the defendant herein has mentioned in her pleadings, in the
civil suit bearing no. CS SCJ 1105/2022 as filed before the Ld. Saket
District Court, South District. The same has been exhibited as
EX.PW-1/M.
36. Evidently, the defence of the defendants was struck off, and the
right to lead DE was closed.
37. As per the law of the land Order VIII CPC requires a party to
deny the averments in the plaint, else the same are deemed to be
admitted.
38. This Court vide its order dated 14.11.2024 directed that the
written statement of the defendant be taken off the record, and the
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 8 of 43
right to lead DE was closed as the defendant, despite receiving
several opportunities, failed to deposit Costs as imposed upon her.
Further, the said order has not been impugned, and hereby stands
confirmed. Evidently, the allegations and averments made qua the
defendant are deemed to be as admitted.
39. It is also observed that the defendant has not been appearing
before this Court for the last several dates. The lackadaisical conduct
on the part of the defendant is not appreciated and appears to be a
dilatory tactic.
40. To establish a cause of action for defamation, the plaintiff must
prove:
The words are defamatory by their natural and ordinary
meaning.
The words refer to the plaintiff.
The words were published to a third party
This Court is inclined to place reliance upon a very recent
judgment as authored by the Hon’ble High Of Jammu &
Kashmir & Ladakh, Srinagar Bench dated 20.07.2024SATYA PRAKASH ARYA v. SYED ABID JALALI
CRMC 129/ 2017 :”14. The law is well settled that when
pleadings containing defamatory material are relied before a
court of law, the same amounts to publication within the
meaning of Section 499 of RPC. In Thangavelu Chettiar vs.CS DJ No.484/2023 page 9 of 43
Ponnammal, (AIR 1966 Mad. 363), it has been ruled that filing
of a plaint or petition containing defamatory material amounts
to publication. Relying upon the aforesaid ratio of Madras
High Court, Madhya Pradesh High Court has, in the case of
Trichinopoly Ramaswami Ardhanani and others vs. Kripa
Shankar Bhargava, 1991 M.P.L.J 597, held that per se
defamatory statements in pleadings, petitions, affidavits etc. of
the parties to judicial proceedings constitute offence
punishable under Section 500 of IPC unless they fall within
the exceptions enumerated in Section 499 of IPC. Taking a cue
from this, it can safely be stated that even the arguments made
by a counsel upon instructions from his client, which are per se
defamatory in nature, can form basis for prosecution of such
client for offence under Section 499 of RPC. Therefore, the
contention of learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner that the submissions made by counsel for the
petitioner during the course of arguments on bail application
of the respondent before the Court at Jaipur cannot form basis
for prosecution of the petitioner for offence under Section 499
of RPC, is not tenable.”
41. The Hon’ble High Court of Kerala has held as under;
M.K. VARGHESE COR EPISCOPA V. STATE OF KERALA
AND ORS , 2020 (2) KLJ 359:
“10. The writ petition filed by the petitioner against the
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 10 of 43
complainant contained a statement that, the persons who were
accused in the case registered as Crime No. 472/2018 of
Nooranad police station, are the hired goons of the complainant.
The writ petition also contained a statement that the crime
committed which led to the registration of Crime No. 472/2018 of
Nooranad police station is the handwork of the complainant and
that respondents 8 to 10 in the writ petition are the contract killers
hired by the complainant. Prima facie, these statements in the writ
petition filed by the petitioner, are defamatory to the complainant.
11. If the pleadings filed in the court contain defamatory
statements, it amounts to publication (See Thangavelu Chettiar v.
Ponnammal : (AIR 1966 Mad 363) . Once a statement is filed in a
court of law, it can be considered as published (See Prabhakaran
v. Gangadharan : 2006 (2) KLT 122).
12. There is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for
the petitioner that the statements made by the petitioner in the writ
petition filed before this Court enjoy absolute privilege. In
Shybimon v. Haridas : 2010 (2) KHC 607 : 2010 (2) KLT 158, it
has been held as follows:
If a party to a judicial proceeding is prosecuted for the criminal
offence of defamation in respect of a statement made in such
judicial proceeding either on oath or otherwise, his criminalCS DJ No.484/2023 page 11 of 43
liability must be determined by reference to the provisions of
Section 499 IPC alone. The English common law doctrine of
absolute privilege can be set up as a defence only in a suit for
damages under the Law of Torts. No such privilege is recognized
by the Indian Penal Code beyond the limits of the exceptions
embodied in Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. The said
provision together with its exceptions forms a complete code in
itself with regard to the criminal liability of a person accused of
the offence of defamation. Every defamatory statement not
coming within any of the 10 Exceptions to Section 499 IPC is
punishable under Section 500 IPC. The Court cannot engraft
thereupon any further exceptions derived from the common law
of England or based on grounds of public policy.
13. The privilege defined by the exceptions to Section 499 of the
Indian Penal Code must be regarded as exhaustive as to the cases
which they purport to cover and recourse cannot be had to the
English Common Law to add new grounds of exception to those
contained in the statute (See Tiruvengada Mudali v.
Tripurasundari Ammal: AIR 1926 Mad 906). If a party to a
judicial proceeding is prosecuted for defamation in respect of a
statement made therein on oath or otherwise, his liability must be
determined by reference to the provisions of Section 499 I.P.C.
and the court cannot engraft thereupon exceptions derived from
the Common Law of England or based on grounds of public
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 12 of 43
policy. Consequently, a person in such a position is entitled only
to the benefit of the qualified privilege (See Satis Chandra
Ckakrabarti v Ram Dayal : AIR 1921 Cal 1) .
14. The decision in Tiruvengada Mudali (supra) has been referred
to by the Supreme Court in M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Ponnan : AIR
1970 SC 1876 and it has been held as follows:
In Thiruvengadda Mudali v. Tripurasundari Ammal, LR 49
Madras 728 a Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed that
the exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C. must be regarded as
exhaustive as to the cases which they purport to cover and
recourse cannot be had to the English common law to add new
grounds of exception to those contained in the statute. A person
making libellous statements in his complaint filed in court is not
absolutely protected in a criminal proceeding for defamation, for
under the Eighth Exception and the illustration to Section 499 the
statements are privileged only when they are made in good faith.
There is therefore authority for the proposition that in
determining the criminality of an act under the Indian Penal Code
the courts will not extend the scope of special exceptions by
resorting to the rule peculiar to English common law.
15. Reliance on the decision in Gopalankutty Nair v. Sankunny
Ezhuthassan : 1971 KLT 393 made by the learned counsel for the
petitioner to claim absolute immunity from prosecution for
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 13 of 43
defamation in respect of the statements made by the petitioner in
the writ petition, on the ground that they are statements made in a
judicial proceedings, is misplaced. The aforesaid decision was
rendered in considering the maintainability of a suit filed for
realisation of damages for defamation.”
THANGAVELU CHETTIAR V. PONNAMMAL
AIR 1966 MAD 363
“4. The main ground urged by the learned advocate for the
petitioner is that there was no publication as the copy of the plaint
Ex. P. 1 was sent only to P. W. 1, Ponnammal. I am unable to
accept this contention. It was not argued in either of the courts
below or mentioned in the grounds of revision that there was no
publication in this case. The learned advocate for the petitioner
relied upon paragraph 14 of the appellate courts judgment in
support of his contention that the plea had been taken, but a
reading of that paragraph would show that the plea taken was that
the allegation would not amount to defamation. It is clear from
paragraph 4 of the complaint filed in this case that the defamation
complained of in this case was with regard to the allegation in the
plaint in S. C. 349 of 1963 on the file of the District Munsif Court,
Tirukoilur, and in the same paragraph the complainant has
referred to her having received a copy of the plaint Ex. P. 1. The
filing of the plaint in the court has been spoken to by P. W. 3, Sri.
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 14 of 43
P. R. Subramaniam, who filed the plaint on behalf of the
petitioner. Thus there can be no doubt that the defamation
contained in the plaint was published by the plaint being filed in
the court. Further even assuming that the complainant referred to
the allegation in Ex. P. 1, still there is publication. It is clear from
a scrutiny of the copy of the plaint Ex. P. 1, that it was prepared by
P. W. 3, and filed into court, and it bears the seal of the District
Munsifs Court, Tirukoilur. The copy of the plaint should be
compared with the original by the court before it is served on the
defendant by registered post. The learned advocate for the
petitioner relied on the decision in G. G. Jeramiah v. F. S. Vas, ILR
36 Mad 457, in support of his contention that there should be
publication and that the fact that a certain copy of a paper appears
to be printed and published by A is not proof of publication by
him. It is clear from what I have stated that the decision is hardly
applicable to the facts of the present case. The decision refers to a
publication in a paper and it should be proved that the accused
was responsible for the publication. But in this case, the
defamatory matter contained in the plaint was admittedly signed
and filed by the petitioner. There can be no doubt that there was
publication of the defamatory matter”.
DECISION
42. Appreciation of evidence is the most important part of the
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 15 of 43
adjudication in a civil suit where the court weighs in claims of parties
to the suit based on the evidence adduced by them, both oral and
documentary. More often than not, the rights and liabilities of the
parties in a civil suit are determined by the way the documentary
evidence adduced by them is appreciated. Courts take the aid of
legislative enactments and judicial pronouncements of various High
Courts and Supreme Court which have laid down the rules of
interpretation that must be adopted and the procedure that must be
followed. It is the essential the duty of the Courts to determine the
clear and explicit meaning of the words or phrases when they are not
clear, express and unambiguous. In the process of adjudication,
Courts should test the evidence on the basis of probabilities as the
standard of proof in civil cases is preponderance of probabilities.
It is basically determining which fact or evidence is more
likely to happen.
This concept does not involve elimination of all doubts rather
it weighs the two presented facts based on which has greater
likelihood.
It is contrasting to the principle of proving beyond reasonable
doubt.
In civil cases the party having burden of proof has to show that
their side of story is more plausible than the other side.
43. A fact is relevant to another fact when the existence of the one
can be shown to be the cause or the effect of the existence of the
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 16 of 43
other, or when the existence of the one, either alone or together with
other facts, renders the existence of the other highly probable or
improbable, according to the common course of events. When such a
connection is discernible, the one fact is said to be relevant to another.
On such relevant facts, evidence may be given. Above principle is
embodied in Section 5 of Indian Evidence Act which states that,
evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the existence or
non-existence of every fact in issue, and of such other facts as are
hereinafter declared to be relevant and of no others.
44. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Postgraduate Institute
of Medical Education and Research v. Jaspal Singh, (2009) 7 SCC
330 which held as under: “17. In Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka
(1980) 1 SCC 30 this Court dealt with in details the distinction
between negligence in civil law and in criminal law. It has been held
that there is a marked difference as to the effect of evidence, namely,
the proof, in civil and criminal proceedings. In civil proceedings, a
mere preponderance of probability is sufficient, and the defendant is
not necessarily entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt; but
in criminal proceedings, the persuasion of guilt must amount to such
a moral certainty as convinces the mind of the court, as a reasonable
man, beyond all reasonable doubt.”
45. In Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530, the
Supreme Court of India stated that “It was necessary to be borne in
mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 17 of 43
particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants.
The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone
of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt could not have been applied.”
46. At this juncture, it is imperative to go back the basic tenets of
the law.
Essentials of pleadings
A pleading should
(a) state material facts and not the evidence on which the party
seeks to rely on, (b) state such facts in a concise form,
and (c) provide all particulars where they are required.
47. These conditions are contained in Order VI Rule 2 of the CPC,
and the requirement to state all material facts has time and again been
emphasized by the Supreme Court. For instance, in Udhav Singh v
Madhav Rao Scindia AIR 1976 SC 744, wherein it was clarified that
all the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to
establish the existence of a cause of action or his defence, are material
facts.
48. The failure to disclose material facts can even attract the grave
consequence of the suit being dismissed in its entirety, making the
observations of the Supreme Court in Virender Nath v. Satpal Singh
2007 (3) SCC 617 pivotal:
“…it is however absolutely essential that all basic and primary
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 18 of 43
facts which must be proved at the trial by the party to establish
existence of a cause of action or defence are material facts and
must be stated in the pleadings by the party.”
UDHAV SINGH V. MADHAV RAO SCINDIA
AIR 1976 SUPREME COURT 744
“28. All the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by
a party to establish the existence of a cause of action or his
defence, are “material facts”. In the context of a charge of
corrupt practice, “material facts” would mean all the basic
facts constituting the ingredients of the particular corrupt
practice alleged, which the petitioner is bound to substantiate
before he can succeed on that charge. Whether in an election-
petition, a particular fact is material or not, and as such
required to be pleaded is a question which depends on the
nature of the charge leveled, the ground relied upon and the
special circumstances of the case. In short, all those facts
which are essential to clothe the petitioner with a complete
cause of action, are “material facts” which must be pleaded
and failure to plead even a single material fact amounts to
disobedience of the mandate of sec. 83(1)(a). “Particulars”, on
the other hand, are “the details of the case set up by the party”.
“Material particulars” within the contemplation of clause (b)
of s. 83(i) would therefore mean all the details which areCS DJ No.484/2023 page 19 of 43
necessary to amplify, refine and embellish the material facts
already pleaded in the petition in compliance with the
requirements of clause (a). Particulars serve the purpose of
finishing touches to the basic contours of a picture already
drawn, to make it full, more detailed and more informative.
29. The distinction between material facts and material
particulars” was pointed out by this Court in several cases,
three of which have been cited at the bar. It is not necessary to
refer to all of them. It will be sufficient to close the discussion
by extracting what A. N. Ray J. (as he then was) said on this
point in Hardwari Lals case (supra):
“It is therefore vital that the corrupt practice charged against
the respondent should be a full and complete statement of
material facts to clothe the petitioner with a complete cause of
action and to give an equal and full opportunity to the
respondent to meet the case and to de fend the charges. Merely,
alleging that the respondent obtained or procured or attempted
to obtain or procure assistance are extracting words from the
statute which will have no meaning unless and until facts are
stated to show what that assistance is and how the prospect of
election is furthered by such assistance. In the present case, it
was not even alleged that the assistance obtained or procured
was other than the giving of vote. It was said by counsel for the
respondent that because the statute did not render the giving ofCS DJ No.484/2023 page 20 of 43
vote a corrupt practice the words “any assistance” were full
statement of material fact. The submission is fallacious for the
simple reason that the manner of assistance, the measure of
assistance are all various aspects of fact to clothe the petition
with a cause of action which will call for an answer. Material
facts are facts which if established would give the petitioner
the relief asked for. If the respondent had not appeared, could
the court have given a verdict in favour of the election
petitioner. The answer is in the negative because the
allegations in the petition did not disclose any cause of action.”
The facts are to be proved in accordance with the provisions of
The Indian Evidence Act, which have been reproduced herein;
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Relevant Provisions:
101. Burden of proof.
Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal
right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he
asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is
bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the
burden of proof lies on that person.
Illustrations
(a)A desires a Court to give judgment that B shall be punished
for a crime which A says B has committed. A must prove that B
has committed the crime.
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 21 of 43
(b)A desires a Court to give judgement that he is entitled to
certain land in the possession of B, by reason of facts which he
asserts and which B denies, to be true. A must prove the
existence of those facts.
102. On whom burden of proof lies.
The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person
who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.
Illustrations
(a) A sues B for land of which B is in possession, and which, as
A asserts, was left to A by the will of C, B’s father. If no
evidence were given on either side, B would be entitled to
retain his possession. Therefore the burden of proof is on A.
103. Burden of proof as to any particular fact.
The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person
who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is
provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any
particular person.
104. Burden of proving fact to be proved to make evidence
admissible.
The burden of proving any fact necessary to be proved in order
to enable any person to give evidence of any other fact is on the
person who wishes to give such evidence.
Illustrations
(a)A wishes to prove a dying declaration by B. A must prove
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 22 of 43
B’s death.
(b)A wishes to prove, by secondary evidence, the contents of a
lost document. A must prove that the document has been lost.
106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.
When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any
person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
Illustrations
(a)When a person does an act with some intention other than
that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest,
the burden of proving that intention is upon him.
(b)A is charged with travelling in a railway without a ticket.
The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.
109. Burden of proof as to relationship in the cases of partners,
landlord and tenant, principal and agent.
When the question is whether persons are partners, landlord
and tenant, or principal and agent, and it has been shown that
they have been acting as such, the burden of proving that they
do not stand, or have ceased to stand, to each other in those
relationships respectively, is on the person who affirms it.
110. Burden of proof as to ownership.
When the question is whether any person is owner of anything
of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving
that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is
not the owner.
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 23 of 43
111. Proof of good faith in transactions where one party is in
relation of active confidence.
49. Where there is a question as to the good faith of a transaction
between parties, one of whom stands to the other in a position of
active confidence, the burden of proving the good faith of the
transaction is on the party who is in a position of active confidence.
50. At this juncture, this Court is inclined to rely upon another
landmark judgment, as propounded by The Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi at New Delhi SANJEEV KUMAR MITTAL V. THE STATE
174 (2010) DLT 214 :
“6.6. If there is falsehood in the pleadings (plaint, written statement
or replication), the task of the Court is also multiplied and a lis that
could be decided in a short time, then takes several years. It is the
legal duty of every party to state in the pleadings the true facts and if
they do not, they must suffer the consequences and the Court should
not hold back from taking action.
6.7. A similar sentiment had been expressed by the Karnataka High
Court in A. Hiriyanna Gowda v. State of Karnataka, 1998 Cri.L.J.
4756:
1. The present application is filed under Section 340, Cr. P.C. and
undoubtedly involves a power that the Courts have been seldom
exercising. It has unfortunately become the order of the day, for false
statements to be made in the course of judicial proceedings even onCS DJ No.484/2023 page 24 of 43
oath and attempts made to substantiate these false statements through
affidavits or fabricated documents. It is very sad when this happens
because the real backbone of the working of the judicial system is
based on the element of trust and confidence and the purpose of
obtaining a statement on oath from the parties or written pleadings in
order to arrive at a correct decision after evaluating the respective
positions. In all matters of fact therefore, it is not only a question of
ethics, but an inflexible requirement of law that every statement
made must be true to the extent that it must be verified and correct to
the knowledge of the person making it. When a client instructs his
learned Advocate to draft the pleadings, the basic responsibility lies
on the clients because the Advocate being an Officer of the Court acts
entirely on the instructions given to him, though the lawyer will not
be immune from even a prosecution. If the situation is uncertain it is
for his client to inform his learned Advocate and consequently if false
statements are made in the pleadings the responsibility will devolve
wholly and completely on the party on whose behalf those statements
are made.
2. It has unfortunately become common place for the pleadings to be
taken very lightly and for nothing but false and incorrect statements
to be made in the course of judicial proceedings, for fabricated
documents to be produced and even in cases where this comes to the
light of the Court the party seems to get away because the Courts do
not take necessary counter-action. The disastrous result of suchCS DJ No.484/2023 page 25 of 43
leniency or indulgence is that it sends out wrong signals. It creates
almost a licence for litigants and their lawyers to indulge in such
serious malpractices because of the confidence that no action will
result. To my mind, therefore, the fact that the petitioner has pressed
in this application requires to be commended because it is a matter of
propriety and it is very necessary at least in a few glaring cases that
an example be made of persons who are indulging in such
malpractices which undermine the very administration of justice
dispensation system and the working of the Courts. This will at least
have a deterrent effect on others.
5. It is true that the power that is now being exercised is seldom
exercised, but I am firmly of the view that in the interest of the purity
of the working the Courts that it is absolutely essential to take such
corrective action whenever an instance of the present type arises.
6.8. A Division Bench of this court over two decades back in
Rajendra Jaina Towers (P) Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority 33
(1987) DLT 216 held as under:
27. All the statements in paragraph 11, to which I have referred, were
material for the purpose of taking a decision in the case. As I have
tried to show, they were deliberately made and carefully worded.
Their object was to mislead and overreach the court. The perjury was
daring and atrocious. Probably, Mr. Rajender Jain thought it was
worth taking the risk because the courts are so reluctant to prosecute
for perjury. That is the general impression which has caused perjury
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 26 of 43
to become so rampant in our courts and resulted in vexatious
litigation. It is clearly expedient in the interests of justice, that Mr.
Rajender Jain be prosecuted for the statements made in paragraph 11
of the petition, which he has incorporated by reference in his
affidavit.
The Court ordered the Registrar of this court to make a complaint in
writing against Mr. Rajender Jain, for having committed offences
under Sections 191, 192 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code to the
Magistrate having jurisdiction.
6.9. If this Court were to go by a general impression, the position has
not improved but only worsened. It is time to take appropriate action
so that parties, when they file their pleadings, do so with a sense of
responsibility and if averments therein, or any evidence in support, is
found to be false, the wrongdoer is not able to escape the punishment
prescribed by law.
6.10. The present case is a striking example of how the petitioner
could file the petition without any fear, keep it pending, and
disappear when he found the respondent did not succumb and
exposed the petitioner. The nonappearance by the petitioner at this
stage (27th April, 2010) appeared to be intentional and therefore a
number of opportunities were given (11th May, 2010, 14th May,
2010, 17th May, 2010 and 18th May, 2010), yet the petitioner or his
advocate did not appear. To have simply dismissed the petition for
default and not taken action would be allowing them to escape. It has
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 27 of 43
also been the experience that when falsehood has stood exposed, the
party tenders an apology and the courts tend to let off and take no
action. Such an approach emboldens others to do likewise.
6.11. On a related issue, in South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of
M.P. (2003) 8 SCC 648 : AIR 2003 SC 4482, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court said:
26. In law, the term restitution is used in three senses; (i) return or
restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii)
compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; and
(iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another.
6.12. In fact, restitution, which includes compensation, and levy of
costs, is not sufficient where there is, in the pleadings before the
Court, falsehood, concealment or reliance upon forged documents.
There it also calls for triggering into motion the penal laws, i.e.,
making of a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C. The more important
part is of punishment to prevent, in the first instance, litigants from
making false averments before a court of law. While the punishment
prescribed by law is deterrent, the probability of prosecution, and
thereafter conviction, should also be sufficient to deter such conduct.
6.13. A party, whether he is a petitioner or a respondent, or a witness,
has to respect the solemnity of the proceedings in the court and he
cannot play with the courts and pollute the stream of justice. It is
cases like this, with false claims (or false defences) which load the
courts, cause delays, consume judicial time and bring a bad name to
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 28 of 43
the judicial system. This case is a sample where the facts are glaring.
Even if they were not so glaring, once falsehood is apparent, to not
take action would be improper.
6.14. The judicial system has a right and a duty to protect itself from
such conduct by the litigants and to ensure that where such conduct
has taken place, the matter is investigated and reaches its logical
conclusion and depending on the finding which is returned in such
proceedings, appropriate punishment is meted out.
6.15. It is perhaps the general reluctance, as also noticed by the
Honble Supreme Court in Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5
SCC 668 :
36. Perjury has also become a way of life in the law courts. A trial
Judge knows that the witness is telling a lie and is going back on his
previous statement, yet he does not wish to punish him or even file a
complaint against him. He is required to sign the complaint himself
which deters him from filing the complaint……
that has made the situation reach such levels where pleadings contain
false averments and parties make false averments with impunity in
the hope that in all probability the opposite party will cough up
something, and even if he does not, in the end he will have the last
laugh, for a prosecution of perjury, although consciously committed
and persisted in, will have a probability of punishment as good as nil.
The gain far exceeds the risk.
6.16. In an effort to redeem the situation, not only realistic costs and
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 29 of 43
full compensation in favour of the winning party against the
wrongdoer are required, but, depending on the gravity of the wrong,
penal action against the wrongdoers is also called for. Unless the
judicial system protects itself from such wrongdoing by taking
cognizance, directing prosecution, and punishing those found guilty,
it will be failing in its duty to render justice to the citizens. Litigation
caused by false claims and defences will come to be placed before
the courts, load the dockets and delay delivery of justice to those who
are genuinely in need of it. Let us then examine the procedures in this
regard.
7. Of false evidence and offences against public justice
7.1. Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code is titled Of false evidence
and offences against public justice system. Section 191 defines
giving of false evidence as an offence while Section 193 prescribes
the punishment. There are also other provisions with regard to false
evidence, but at this stage, I need not go into details except that these
provisions are there to enable the Court to punish those who make
false averments in the pleadings or file forged documents and thus
serve to protect the stream of justice from being soiled.
7.2. Section 340 Cr.P.C. provides the procedure which reads as
under:
Section 340 – Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195.(1) When
upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court
is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that anCS DJ No.484/2023 page 30 of 43
inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of
sub-section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been
committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the
case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence
in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary
inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,
(a) record a finding to that effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance for the accused before
such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the
Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to
such Magistrate; and
(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such
Magistrate.
(2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of
an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a
complaint under subsection (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected
an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the
Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning
of sub-section (4) of section 195.
(3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed,
(a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such
officer of the Court as the Court may appoint;
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 31 of 43
(b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by such
officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing in this
behalf.
(4) In this section, Court has the same meaning as in section 195.
8. False averments in pleadings are sufficient to attract Chapter XI of
the Indian Penal Code
8.1. In the present case, the petitioner has filed a petition containing
false averments but he has not entered into the witness box. The
question arises whether a person who has made false averments in
pleadings but does not appear in the witness box, has committed any
offence.
8.2. Pleadings which are the foundation of the case, on the basis of
which the issues arise and the trial is held and are required to be
signed and verified. Order 6 Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure
reads as under:
Rule 15. Verification of pleadings. (1) Save as otherwise provided by
any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at
the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some
other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted
with the facts of the case.
(2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered
paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge
and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be
true.
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 32 of 43
(3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall
state the date on which and the place at which it was signed.
(4) The person verifying the pleading shall also furnish an affidavit in
support of his pleadings.
8.3. Section 282 of the Indian Succession Act [39 of 1925] also
provides for punishment for false averment in petition or declaration.
It reads as under:
Section 282 – If any petition or declaration which is hereby required
to be verified contains any averment which the person making the
verification knows or believes to be false, such person shall be
deemed to have committed an offence under Section 193 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).
8.4. The Code of Civil Procedure commentary by V.R. Manohar and
W.W. Chitaley, (Tenth Edition) Volume 3 at pp117 notes that the
object of verifying a pleading is to fix, on the party verifying,
responsibility for the statements that it contains. Further at pp 121, it
notes that pleadings, far from being mere formalities, are required by
law to be true. Verifications being made under the sanction of a
solemn declaration, a false verification will render the party
verifying liable to a prosecution for an offence under Sections 191
and 193, Indian Penal Code.
8.5. Similarly, in Code of Civil Procedure commentary by Justice
C.K. Thakker, at pp428 of Volume 3, it is stated:
Verification of pleading is a matter of great importance as possessing
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 33 of 43
security of being made under the sanction of a solemn declaration. A
person making false verification will, hence, render himself liable to
prosecution for an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code.
8.6. The learned amicus curiae cited the following decisions:-
8.6.1. State of Punjab v. I.M. Lall, ILR 1975 Delhi 332- That the
statutory provision for verification is to fix responsibility on the party
or person for statements made in the pleadings and to prevent false
pleadings being recklessly filed or false allegations being recklessly
made.
8.6.2. Sapna Singh Pathania v. Jagdish Chander Mehta, 75 (1998)
DLT 725 –
21. The object of this Rule is to fix responsibility for allegations
made in the plaint on the persons who verify and this is to ensure that
false allegations are not made freely and recklessly.
8.6.3. Sri Shamrao Rukamanna Talwar v. Smt. Suvarna, ILR 2008
Karnataka 1493 –
23. ….The object of signature and verification is to fix upon the party
the responsibility for the statements and to affirm the guarantee of
good faith.
8.6.4. Emperor v. Padam Singh, AIR 1930 Allahabad 490-
12. It is contended by counsel for the opposite party that a defendant
is not legally bound either by any express provision of law or in any
other way to file a written statement at all. That of course must at
once be conceded. But if he does desire to file a written answer to theCS DJ No.484/2023 page 34 of 43
plaint, he is by express provision of law bound to do something
further. He is bound to attach the verification which is called for by
Order 6, Rule 15, and his written statement is not, until that
verification is attached, a written statement in law at all and could not
be received for any purpose whatever. When, therefore, filing a
written statement he is bound by express provision of law to verify
the facts alleged in that written statement as being true either to his
own knowledge or to the best of his belief. It is contended that when
the law requires a defendant to verify his written statement it does not
necessarily require him to tell the truth. This contention, in our view,
is manifestly untenable. Words have a certain meaning and we have
only to give them their plain and ordinary meaning, in the absence of
any circumstances indicating that meaning is not permissible. The
ordinary dictionary meaning of the word verify used in the present
circumstances is: to confirm the truth or truthfulness of. It was
further contended on behalf of the opposite party that the mere fact
that in cases under the Income-tax Act and possibly other such Acts a
false verification was expressly to be declared to be punishable under
Section 177, I.P.C., or some other such section and the absence of any
such enactment in connation with Order 6, Rule 15, was sufficient to
show that a false verification in accordance with Order 6, Rule 15
could be made with impunity.
13. In other words, we were asked to hold that the legislature orders a
defendant to declare that his statements are true and, since it is furtherCS DJ No.484/2023 page 35 of 43
emphasised that the same legislature passed all these, in the same
breath says that it does not care whether the statements are true or not
and that no penalty shall follow the making of a false verification. It
is manifest that such an argument would be extremely dangerous. It
is not possible for one moment to know what was in the minds of
particular individuals when they were considering whether it was
necessary or whether it was merely desirable or whether it was
undesirable to add a clause declaring under what section of the penal
law a person infringing the law should be punishable. We confine
ourselves, therefore, to the simple question whether the facts of the
case come within Section 191. Here we find that there is an express
provision of law requiring the defendant to confirm the truth of the
statements made by him in the preceding clauses of his written
statement, and if he does so, knowing that verification is false, he is
declared by the legislature in Section 191 itself to be giving false
evidence. Whatever may or may not be connoted by the word
evidence in other sections, there can be no doubt about the meaning
in Section 191 and there can equally be no doubt that the words gives
false evidence in Section 193 are used in the same sense as the same
words in Section 191, and it has not of course been contended that if
Section 191 is applicable to the present case, Section 193 is not
applicable. We are, therefore, of opinion that so far as the legal point
is concerned the trial Court was right in holding that an offence had
been committed under Section 193, I.P.C.
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 36 of 43
8.6.5. Raj Kumar Dhar v. Colonel A. Stuart Lewis, AIR 1958
Calcutta 104-
3. Verification of pleadings is an important matter which may have
very serious consequences, as in case of false verification, the person
verifying may be liable to criminal prosecution. The object of
verification, as it has been pointed out in decisions of courts, is to fix
responsibility on the party verifying and to prevent false pleadings,
being recklessly filed or false allegations being recklessly made. It
must have some sanctity.
8.6.6. In re an attorney, AIR 1914 Calcutta 1924-
A verification is a matter of great importance:
Girdhari v. Kanhaiya Lal ILR [1892] 15 All 59 (1892) A.W.N. 235,
and has been described by a Full Bench of this Court as possessing
the security of being made under the sanction of a solemn declaration
for which the person making it would be liable to the penalties
attaching to the crime of giving false evidence if the declaration were
false to his knowledge.
8.6.7. Dr. (Smt.) Shipra v. Shri Shanti Lal, AIR 1995 Rajasthan 50-
7. Section 83 deals with the contents of the election petition and
states that an election petition shall be signed by the petitioner and
verified in a manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the
verification of the plaint. Order 6, Rule 15, C.P.C. deals with the
verification of pleadings and states that the person verifying it shall
specify, by reference to numbered paragraphs of the pleadings, whatCS DJ No.484/2023 page 37 of 43
he/she verifies of his/her own knowledge and what is verified upon
the information received and believed to be true. The object of
verification is to test the genuineness and authenticity of the
averments made in the election petition and to fix responsibility for
the allegations made on the person who verifies it and to ensure that
false allegations are not made recklessly. A false verification has,
therefore, been made punishable under Sections 191 and 193 of the
Indian Penal Code.
8.7. Making false averment in the pleading pollutes the stream of
justice. It is an attempt at inviting the Court into passing a wrong
judgment and that is why it must be treated as an offence.
8.8. Where a verification is specific and deliberately false, there is
nothing in law to prevent a person from being proceeded for
contempt. But it must be remembered that the very essence of crimes
of this kind is not how such statements may injure this or that party to
litigation but how they may deceive and mislead the courts and thus
produce mischievous consequences to the administration of justice.
A person is under a legal obligation to verify the allegations of fact
made in the pleadings and if he verifies falsely, he comes under the
clutches of law.
8.9. Consequently, there cannot be any doubt that if a statement or
averment in a pleading is false, it falls within the definition of offence
under Section 191 of the Code (and other provisions). It is not
necessary that a person should have appeared in the witness box. The
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 38 of 43
offence stands committed and completed by the filing of such
pleading. There is need for the justice system to protect itself from
such wrongdoing so that it can do its task of justice dispensation.
9. What constitutes the offence
9.1. Inasmuch as on a complaint of Respondent No.2, a prosecution
of the Petitioner is pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate, the
question also arises as to what constitutes the offence because it may
be said that since prosecution is pending, why should a second
inquiry or prosecution be called for. On the face, such a contention
appears attractive, but there are more compelling reasons why the
Court must take cognizance and proceed as per law.
9.2. The learned amicus curiae, Dr. Arun Mohan has submitted that
the two offences are separate and are to be prosecuted and tried
separately. According to him, the first offence was of forging the
document and then using it before the DDA in order to cause injury to
the Respondent No.2. It was carried out by and before 12th March,
2004 when public notice was also published by Sanjeev Kumar
Mittal.
9.3. The complaint of 21st March, 2004 by Respondent No.2 was in
relation to that offence. If the matter had rested there, it would have
been one thing, but on 12th April, 2004, when the present petition
containing false averments and relying on forged documents (which
were also filed) was filed, a second offence stood committed. That
second offence was of: (1) making a false averment in the petition
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 39 of 43
duly verified and filing the same in court; and (2) asking the Court for
a judgment on the basis of false averments and forged documents.
9.4. The learned amicus curiae submits that if a person prepares a
petition containing false averments, relying on forged documents,
and signs and verifies it, and then comes to the Court, but on seeing
the building, develops cold feet and returns home, the second offence
would not have been committed. But when he presents these papers
at the filing counter, it is filing in court. The moment they cross the
window at the filing counter is precisely the point of time when the
second offence stands committed.
9.5. In Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370
[LQ/SC/2005/353] , the question before the Supreme Court was
when would the bar of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC be attracted. Their
Lordships held that the bar would be attracted only when the offences
enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect
to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in any court. Finding that the Will had been produced in
the Court subsequently, they held that the bar of Section 195(1)(b)(ii)
CrPC does not apply.
9.6. The rationale will equally apply to a situation where, as here, the
complaint will be in respect of subsequent and independent offences,
i.e., filing before a court of law, pleadings containing false averments
and also filing of documents that were forged as distinct from forgery
at home. It will also be contempt of Court.
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 40 of 43
10. Expedient in the interests of justice under Section 340 Cr. P.C.
10.1. When an inquiry for having committed an offence as listed in
Section 195 Cr.P.C. is proposed to be launched, Section 340 Cr.P.C.
provides for the procedure. One of the requirements in sub-section
(1) is that the court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of
justice that When is it expedient in the interests of justice On this
question, the following decisions were cited by the learned amicus
curiae:-
10.1.1. Mohd. Amjad Khan v. Jamia Millia Islamia, 55 (1994) DLT
463 –
Now coming to the show cause notice issued by us to the petitioner as
to why a complaint be not filed against him as it appeared to us that
he committed an offence punishable under section 193 Indian Penal
Code. In reply to this, the petitioner begs to tender an unconditional
apology for stating on 8 July 1994 that he did not receive any
communication. He says this wrong statement was made
unintentionally and without any desire to obtain a favourable order
by making such a statement. He said that the letter dated 8 July 1994
was collected by him in the University around lunch time and he did
not go through the same because he was in the midst of preparation
for examination and went to the library. We are unable to accept this
submission. This again does not appear to us to be true when on the
communication dated 8 July 1994 itself he has even noted the time of
his receipt by hand, and there was no question, at that time, for the
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 41 of 43
petitioner to prepare for the examination as he had been debarred
from taking the examination. We would reject his Explanation. We
are of the opinion that it is necessary in the interests of justice that a
complaint be filed against the petitioner as mentioned aforesaid. We,
therefore, direct the Joint Registrar (Appellate) of this Court to file a
complaint in writing against the petitioner for an offence under
section 193 IPC in the court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, New Delhi.”
51. In light of the above stated facts, circumstances, observations,
precedents, and reasoning, the issues as framed by the Ld.
Predecessors Courts are answered as follows.
52. Issue No.1:Whether there is no cause of action in favour of
plaintiff and against the defendant? OPD
Issue no.1 is answered in the negative. It is observed that the
defendant has failed to discharge its burden of proof.
53. Issue No.2:Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree of
damages of Rs 10 Lacs against the defendant for defaming the
plaintiff? OPP
Issue no.2 is decided and answered in favour of the plaintiff
and against the defendant. Evidently, the plaintiff has led satisfactory
evidence. All the elements qua the tort of defamation i.e. ‘the
statement should be made’, ‘the statement must refer to the plaintiff’,
‘the statement must be defamatory’, ‘intention of the person making
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 42 of 43
the statement’, ‘statement should be false’, ‘statement should not be
privileged’, ‘statement must be published’, ‘third party must believe
the statement to be true’, and ‘the statement must cause injury’; have
been found to be existing in the present suit.
54. Issue No.3: Whether the plaintiff is entitled to pendent-lite and
future interest @18% per annum on the decreetal amount? OPP
Issue no.3 is answered in the affirmative. This Court is of the
opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to interest on the decreetal amount
@6% per annum commencing from the date of filing of the suit, till
the date of its complete realization.
Relief
55. In view of above, suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff and
against the defendant for recovery of Rs.10 lakh for defaming the
plaintiff. Plaintiff is also held entitled to interest on the decreetal
amount @6% per annum commencing from the date of filing of the
suit, till the date of its complete realization.
56. No order as to costs. Decree sheet be drawn up accordingly,
upon payment of deficit court fees, if any.
57. File be consigned to record room.
Announced in open
court on 04.01.2025.
(Sunil Beniwal)
Digitally District Judge-06(South),
signed by
Saket Courts, New Delhi
Sunil Sunil beniwal
Date:
beniwal 2025.01.08
15:33:35
+0530
CS DJ No.484/2023 page 43 of 43