Orissa High Court
Chandramani Mahar vs State Of Orissa (Vig) …. Opp. Parties on 26 August, 2025
Author: Chittaranjan Dash
Bench: Chittaranjan Dash
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLA No. 266 of 2012
(Arising out of the judgment of conviction dated 11th of April, 2012
passed by Shri Niranjan Sahu, Special Judge (Vigilance),
Bhawanipatna, District-Kalahandi in G.R. (Vig.) Case No. 23 of
2007/T.R. No. 27 of 2011, for the offences under Section 7 and
Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988)
Chandramani Mahar .... Petitioner
Mr. H. K. Mund, Advocate
-versus-
State of Orissa (Vig) .... Opp. Parties
Mr. M. S. Rizvi,
Standing Counsel (Vig.)
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
Date of Judgment: 26.08.2025
Chittaranjan Dash, J.
1. The present Appeal is directed against the judgment and
order dated 11.04.2012 passed by the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Bhawanipatna, District-Kalahandi in G.R. (Vig.) Case
No.23 of 2007 corresponding to T.R. Case No.27 of 2011, whereby
the Appellant was convicted under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year
and to pay a fine of ₹1,500/-, in default to undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 7 of the
Act; and further to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of
one year and six months and to pay a fine of ₹2,500/-, in default to
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 1 of 19
undergo further rigorous imprisonment for four months for the
offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act,
with a direction that the substantive sentences shall run concurrently.
2. The factual matrix of the case is that the Appellant, who was
working as a Revenue Inspector in the Tahasil Office, Bhawanipatna,
was dealing with OLR Case No.12 of 2005, pending in the name of
the Complainant. It was alleged that on 05.07.2007, the Appellant
demanded a sum of ₹400/- from the Complainant as illegal
gratification for processing and issuing necessary orders in
connection with the said OLR case. The Complainant, being
unwilling to pay the bribe, approached the Vigilance Police and
lodged a written report, whereupon a trap was organized. As per the
trap arrangement, the Complainant tendered the tainted currency
notes of ₹400/- to the Appellant in his office, which the Appellant
allegedly accepted and kept inside the case record. Immediately
thereafter, the Vigilance team entered, conducted hand-wash and
file-wash tests, which turned pink, and seized the tainted notes from
the possession of the accused.
3. In course of the investigation, the Vigilance Police seized the
relevant documents, prepared the pre-trap and post-trap memoranda,
recorded the statements of witnesses, obtained sanction for
prosecution from the competent authority, and forwarded the
chemical examination report which confirmed the presence of
phenolphthalein in the hand-wash and file-wash solutions. Upon
completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the
Appellant under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 2 of 19
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, leading to his trial before the
learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Bhawanipatna.
4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses in support of its
case. P.W.1, the in-charge Tahasildar, proved that the OLR case
record was pending with the accused at the relevant time. P.W.2 was
the scribe of the written complaint lodged before the Vigilance
Police. P.W.3, the Additional District Magistrate, deposed to having
granted sanction for prosecution of the accused. P.W.4, the
independent witness to the trap, corroborated the pre-trap and post-
trap proceedings and stated that the accused had demanded and
accepted ₹400/- from the Complainant, which was recovered from
the OLR case record maintained by him. P.W.5, the Trap Laying
Officer, supported the version of P.W.4 and proved the seizure,
recovery, and preparation of memoranda. P.W.6, another
independent official witness, also corroborated the recovery of
tainted notes and the hand-wash turning pink. P.W.7, the
Complainant, however, resiled from his earlier statement and did not
support the prosecution on the aspect of demand, though he admitted
to having kept the money in the file. P.W.8, the Investigating Officer,
spoke about the completion of investigation, seizure of documents,
receipt of sanction order, and submission of charge-sheet.
5. Mr. H. K. Mund, learned counsel for the Appellant,
submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational
facts of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, which are
sine qua non for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act. He urged that the Complainant
(P.W.7) clearly deposed before the court that the Appellant never
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 3 of 19
demanded any bribe and that he himself had kept the tainted money
in the file in the absence of the Appellant. Thus, the very substratum
of the prosecution case is destroyed. Mr. Mund further argued that
reliance placed by the prosecution on P.W.4, the so-called shadow
witness, is misplaced. P.W.4 admitted in cross-examination that he
had acted as a Vigilance witness in three to four cases earlier,
thereby showing that he is a “stock witness” and not an independent
person. His testimony is also contradicted by P.W.7 and is
unsupported by any independent corroboration. The alleged
overhearing from the verandah is highly doubtful. In such
circumstances, mere recovery of money from the file is insufficient
to bring home guilt, as held in State of Kerala Vs. C.P. Rao1 and K.
Shanthamma Vs. State of Telangana2.
Learned counsel further submitted that the phenolphthalein
test on the Appellant’s hand wash was negative, which itself shows
that the Appellant never accepted the money. The presumption under
Section 20 of the P.C. Act cannot be invoked in the absence of proof
of demand, as reiterated in the Constitution Bench decision of Neeraj
Dutta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)3. On the issue of sanction, it was
urged that P.W.3, who was only in routine charge as ADM, had no
authority to remove the Appellant from service and therefore was
incompetent to grant sanction. The sanction being invalid, the
cognizance itself stands vitiated. This amounts to a failure of justice
as contemplated under Section 19(3) of the Act, rendering the trial
illegal. Placing reliance on Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi),
1
(2011) 6 SCC 450
2
(2022) 4 SCC 574
3
(2023 SCC OnLine SC 280)
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 4 of 19
State of Goa Vs. Babu Thomas4, and Sushil Kumar Pati Vs. State
of Odisha5, learned counsel submitted that the conviction cannot be
sustained merely on recovery, especially when demand is unproved,
hand wash is negative, and sanction is defective. He prayed that the
impugned judgment be set aside and the Appellant acquitted.
6. Mr. Rizvi, learned counsel for State (Vigilance), submitted
that the prosecution has successfully proved the demand, acceptance,
and recovery of illegal gratification from the Appellant beyond all
reasonable doubt. He contended that the evidence of P.W.4, P.W.5,
and P.W.6, consistently established that the accused had demanded
and accepted ₹400/- from the Complainant, which was recovered
from the file kept on his table. The phenolphthalein test on the hand-
wash and file-wash yielded positive results, and the FSL report
(Ext.18) further corroborated the prosecution case. It was urged that
even though the Complainant (P.W.7) turned partially hostile, he
admitted to having kept the money inside the file of the accused,
which, coupled with the testimony of the independent witnesses,
sufficiently proves acceptance. Reliance was placed on the
presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act, as once acceptance of
tainted money is proved, the burden shifts to the accused to explain
the same, which he has miserably failed to do.
Mr. Rizvi further argued that the defence plea of false
implication at the instance of an Advocate is an afterthought, not
suggested to any witness during cross-examination, and finds no
place in the detection report. He submitted that minor discrepancies
4
(2005) 8 SCC 130
5
(2018) 1 ILR (Cuttack) 1118
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 5 of 19
in trap procedure do not dislodge the core prosecution story. On the
issue of sanction, it was submitted that in view of Section 19(3)(a) of
the P.C. Act, the Appellant is estopped from challenging its validity
in appellate proceedings unless failure of justice is shown, which is
absent in the present case. Placing reliance on the decisions in
Raghubir Singh Vs. State of Haryana6, Shankar Prasad Vs. State
of A.P.7, Vinod Kumar Garg Vs. State (GNCT of Delhi)8, and the
recent in Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (Supra), Mr. Rizvi
argued that even in the absence of direct support from the
Complainant, conviction can be sustained if other reliable evidence
proves demand and acceptance. He contended that the trial court has
meticulously appreciated the evidence and returned well-reasoned
findings, and no perversity or illegality warrants interference by this
Court.
7. On perusal of the case record and hearing learned counsels
for both the parties, this Court finds it pertinent to bring its own
analysis.
8. It is by now trite law that proof of demand of illegal
gratification is the gravamen of the offences under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Constitution
Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4
SCC 731, has reiterated the following –
“68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
summarised as under:
(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by
the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish
6
(1974) 4 SCC 560
7
(2004) 3 SCC 753
8
(2020) 77 OCR (SC) 310CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 6 of 19
the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections
7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and(ii) of the Act.
(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the
prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal
gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a
matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either
by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral
evidence or documentary evidence.
(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can
also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the
absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.
(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the
public servant, the following aspects have to be borne
in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without
there being any demand from the public servant and
the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the
illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as
per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need
not be a prior demand by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a
demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and
tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is
received by the public servant, it is a case of
obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior
demand for illegal gratification emanates from the
public servant. This is an offence under Section 13
(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the
bribe giver and the demand by the public servant
respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a
fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or
receipt of an illegal gratification without anything
more would not make it an offence under Section
7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the
Act.
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 7 of 19
Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to
bring home the offence, there must be an offer which
emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by
the public servant which would make it an offence.
Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when
accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a
payment made which is received by the public
servant, would be an offence of obtainment
under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.
(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand
and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal
gratification may be made by a court of law by way of
an inference only when the foundational facts have
been proved by relevant oral and documentary
evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis
of the material on record, the Court has the discretion
to raise a presumption of fact while considering
whether the fact of demand has been proved by the
prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is
subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence
of rebuttal presumption stands.
(f) In the event the Complainant turns ‘hostile’, or has
died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during
trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by
letting in the evidence of any other witness who can
again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary
evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by
circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor
does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused
public servant.
(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on
the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates
the court to raise a presumption that the illegal
gratification was for the purpose of a motive or
reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said
presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal
presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the
said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section
20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) (i) and (ii) of
the Act.
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 8 of 19
(h) We clarify that the presumption in law
under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from
presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as
the former is a mandatory presumption while the
latter is discretionary in nature.
Earlier precedents such as P. Satyanarayana Murthy v.
District Inspector of Police9 and B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P.10 have
also consistently held to the same effect and relied on in Neeraj
Dutta (Supra). Thus, the primary question before this Court is
whether the prosecution has been able to prove, beyond reasonable
doubt, that the Appellant had made a demand of ₹400/- from the
Complainant.
9. Turning to the evidence, the Complainant (P.W.7) did not
support the prosecution on the crucial aspect of demand. In his
testimony before the trial court, he categorically stated that the
Appellant never demanded any bribe and that he had placed the
tainted money inside the case record on his own, at the instance of
his Advocate. The prosecution declared him hostile, and he was
confronted with his previous statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.,
wherein he had spoken about demand. However, it is well settled that
a prior statement under Section 164 is not substantive evidence
unless duly proved by examining the Magistrate who recorded it. In
the present case, the Magistrate was not examined, and therefore the
alleged statement under Section 164 cannot be relied upon
substantively. What remains is only the testimony in court, where
P.W.7 resiled from his earlier version.
9
(2015) 10 SCC 152
10
(2014) 13 SCC 55
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 9 of 19
The prosecution has sought to prove demand through P.W.4,
the shadow witness. P.W.4 stated that he overheard the Appellant ask
the Complainant about the demanded amount and that the
Complainant replied affirmatively. However, his testimony suffers
from inherent infirmities. He admitted in cross-examination that he
had earlier acted as a witness in three to four Vigilance cases,
thereby branding himself as a “stock witness,” and diminishing the
credibility of his independence. Moreover, P.W.4 himself stated that
he was standing in the verandah adjacent to the Revenue Section at
the relevant time, which makes it doubtful whether he could have
either heard the conversation or seen the Complainant placing the
notes inside the file. This renders his version vulnerable. The other
so-called independent witness (P.W.6) does not speak directly to the
demand, but only corroborates the recovery and post-trap
proceedings.
It is also significant to mention that the Complainant, while
turning hostile on demand, has at least admitted that he kept the
money in the file himself. If his version is accepted, it completely
negates the prosecution story of any demand having been made by
the Appellant. On the other hand, the version of P.W.4, standing
alone without corroboration, is unsafe to be relied upon, more so
when the Complainant himself has exonerated the Appellant. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala Vs. C.P. Rao (Supra) held
that when the Complainant does not support the case of demand, and
there is no other reliable evidence, conviction cannot be sustained.
Similarly, in K. Shanthamma Vs. State of Telangana (Supra), it was
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 10 of 19
reiterated that proof of demand cannot rest on suspicion or doubtful
testimony.
10. In the present case, therefore, the prosecution has failed to
establish the foundational fact of demand. The Complainant has not
supported the case; his prior statement is legally inadmissible; the
testimony of P.W.4 is unreliable and stands contradicted by the
Complainant; and there is no other independent corroboration of
demand. In such circumstances, this Court is constrained to hold that
the charge of demand of illegal gratification has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
11. On the question of acceptance and recovery, the prosecution
has strongly relied on the fact that the tainted currency notes were
recovered from inside the OLR case record kept on the Appellant’s
table, and that the file wash turned pink, which, according to learned
counsel for Vigilance, clearly establishes that the Appellant had
accepted the bribe money and kept it in his file. Mr. Rizvi, learned
counsel for State (Vigilance), argued that once recovery of tainted
notes is established, and the chemical test corroborates the presence
of phenolphthalein, the presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act
comes into play, shifting the burden on the accused to explain the
recovery. He emphasised that the Appellant has not offered any
plausible explanation for the presence of money in his file and that
the defence plea of planting at the instance of the Complainant’s
Advocate is an afterthought, not put to the witnesses during cross-
examination. On the other hand, Mr. Mund, learned counsel for the
Appellant contended that the Complainant has categorically stated
that he himself kept the money inside the file without the knowledge
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 11 of 19
of the Appellant, and the very fact that the phenolphthalein test on
the Appellant’s hand wash yielded a negative result establishes that
the Appellant never touched the money and therefore did not accept
it. He urged that when the Complainant’s version rules out
acceptance, and the recovery is capable of being explained as a
planting of money, the presumption under Section 20 does not arise.
12. It is noted that the testimony of P.W.4 and P.W.6 is of
limited assistance in this regard. P.W.4 stated that he saw the
Complainant place the money inside the file, but his statement does
not specifically establish that the Appellant himself accepted the
money. His evidence in fact tends to corroborate the Complainant’s
version that the money was placed by P.W.7 himself. P.W.6, the
other official witness, corroborates the post-trap recovery, tally of
numbers, and chemical test but likewise does not speak to the
Appellant physically accepting the money. The trap officer (P.W.5)
proved the recovery of notes from the file and the positive test on the
file wash, but he too admits that the hand wash of the accused was
negative.
Thus, the prosecution’s case on acceptance hinges on whether
keeping of the money inside the Appellant’s file by the Complainant
can be treated as acceptance by the Appellant. The trial court
reasoned that since the file belonged to the Appellant and the money
was found in it, acceptance was proved. However, as urged by
learned counsel for the Appellant, the absence of phenolphthalein on
the Appellant’s hands weakens this inference, because if he had
actually handled the tainted notes, traces ought to have been found.
Furthermore, the Complainant himself testified that the Appellant
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 12 of 19
was absent when he placed the money, thereby rendering the theory
of voluntary acceptance by the accused doubtful.
13. The next issue is whether the statutory presumption under
Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act can be invoked in the
facts of this case. Section 20 provides that where it is proved that an
accused has accepted or obtained any gratification other than legal
remuneration, the Court shall presume that such gratification was
accepted as a motive or reward, unless the contrary is proved. The
sine qua non for drawing this presumption, however, is proof of the
foundational fact of voluntary acceptance by the accused. As
clarified in B. Jayaraj Vs. State of A.P. (Supra), P. Satyanarayana
Murthy Vs. D.I. of Police (Supra), and reiterated in Neeraj Dutta
(Supra), mere recovery of tainted currency notes does not suffice; the
prosecution must first prove beyond doubt that the accused
voluntarily accepted the money.
14. Learned counsel for the State (Vigilance) urged that since the
tainted notes were admittedly recovered from the file belonging to
the accused and the file wash tested positive, the factum of
acceptance must be taken as established. He submitted that once
recovery is proved, the presumption arises automatically, and the
burden shifts to the accused to explain how the tainted money
reached his possession. Learned counsel for the Appellant, however,
countered that the very premise for drawing the presumption is
missing in this case. He submitted that the Complainant (P.W.7) has
denied any demand or voluntary acceptance by the Appellant, and
has instead deposed that he placed the money inside the file without
the accused’s knowledge. He highlighted that the phenolphthalein
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 13 of 19
test on the Appellant’s hands was negative, which conclusively
shows that the Appellant never touched the tainted notes.
15. On a careful scrutiny of the evidence, this Court finds that
while recovery from the Appellant’s file is undisputed, the evidence
of acceptance is contested and doubtful. The Complainant has denied
that the Appellant ever accepted the money; P.W.4 and P.W.6 do not
speak to actual handling by the Appellant; and the hand wash being
negative fortifies the defence stand. In such a factual backdrop, the
foundational requirement for raising the presumption of voluntary
acceptance by the accused remains unproved. Consequently, the
statutory presumption under Section 20 cannot automatically be
drawn on the basis of recovery alone. The burden, therefore, cannot
be said to have shifted to the Appellant, and the prosecution must
stand or fall on the strength of its own evidence.
16. On the testimony of the Complainant and reliability of trap
witnesses, a pivotal feature of the present case is that the
Complainant (P.W.7), who was the star witness for the prosecution,
turned hostile during trial. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that
the accused never demanded money from him and that he himself
had placed the tainted notes inside the file at the instance of his
Advocate, even asserting that the accused was not present in the
office at that time. This version, if accepted, strikes at the very root
of the prosecution case. The learned counsel for the Appellant has
urged that in corruption cases, when the Complainant does not
support the allegation of demand and acceptance, the foundation of
the prosecution collapses. Learned counsel for Vigilance, however,
argued that P.W.7’s testimony cannot be read in isolation. He
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 14 of 19
pointed out that the Complainant had earlier given a consistent
version in his written report and his statement under Section 164
Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate, wherein he had categorically stated
about the demand and acceptance.
17. In this context, the prosecution has leaned heavily on P.W.4
and P.W.6. P.W.4, the shadow witness, stated that he overheard the
accused asking the Complainant about the demanded amount and
saw the Complainant keep the notes inside the file. P.W.6
corroborated the post-trap proceedings, including tally of the notes
and positive chemical tests. However, learned counsel for the
Appellant contended that P.W.4 admitted in cross-examination that
he had acted as a Vigilance witness in three to four earlier cases,
thereby rendering him a “stock witness” whose independence is
doubtful. Further, P.W.4’s position in the verandah makes it
questionable whether he could have overheard the alleged
conversation inside the office. P.W.6, on the other hand, did not
speak to any demand or acceptance but only to the recovery, which
by itself, in the absence of proof of demand, cannot establish the
offence.
18. It is true that a hostile witness can still be relied upon to the
extent his testimony finds corroboration from other evidence. Yet, in
the present case, P.W.7’s admission is limited to his own act of
placing the money in the file, which supports recovery but
simultaneously negates acceptance by the accused. P.W.4’s evidence
on demand is weakened by his status as a repeated Vigilance witness,
and P.W.6’s evidence is confined to recovery and chemical wash.
However, the absence of direct testimony from the Complainant on
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 15 of 19
demand, coupled with the infirmities in P.W.4 and the limited scope
of P.W.6, makes the prosecution version doubtful.
19. Furthermore, the sanction for prosecution in the present case
was accorded by P.W.3, who was then functioning as the Additional
District Magistrate, Kalahandi. P.W.3 deposed that he had verified
the materials placed before him and was satisfied that a prima facie
case was made out against the accused, whereafter he accorded
sanction under Section 19 of the P.C. Act. The defence, however, has
seriously challenged the validity of this sanction. Learned counsel for
the Appellant contended that the Appellant was serving as a Revenue
Inspector and the appointing and removing authority was the
Collector, not the ADM. Since P.W.3 was only in routine charge and
did not possess the power of removal, he was incompetent to grant
sanction, and as such the cognizance itself is vitiated. Learned
counsel for Vigilance, on the other hand, submitted that sanction is
an administrative act and not a quasi-judicial function. He argued
that P.W.3, as ADM, was duly authorized to exercise the powers of
the Collector in his absence, and therefore the sanction cannot be
termed invalid. Moreover, Section 19(3)(a) of the P.C. Act makes it
clear that any irregularity in sanction will not ipso facto vitiate the
proceedings unless it has resulted in a failure of justice.
20. On a careful appreciation of the record, it emerges that P.W.3
did not produce any specific order of delegation showing that he was
empowered to remove the Appellant from service. While the law
permits reliance on Section 19(3) to cure irregularities, the absence
of clear proof of competence, as highlighted by defence, does cast
doubt on the validity of sanction. Nevertheless, this Court also
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 16 of 19
cannot ignore that the trial proceeded to conclusion and no specific
prejudice has been established by the accused in his defence. Thus,
the issue of sanction, though debatable, may not by itself be
sufficient to vitiate the trial unless coupled with other infirmities in
the prosecution case.
21. Learned counsel for the Appellant has also pointed to several
infirmities in the trap proceedings. Mr. Rizvi, learned counsel for
Vigilance, countered that minor discrepancies in trap procedure
cannot be elevated to the level of fatal contradictions.
22. On consideration, while it is correct that not every procedural
lapse is fatal, certain lapses in the present case appear to be
substantive. The non-examination of the Magistrate weakens reliance
on the Complainant’s Section 164 statement; the negative hand wash
undermines the inference of physical handling by the accused and
contradictions among the trap witnesses make the exact sequence of
events uncertain. These infirmities must be weighed along with the
central question of demand and acceptance while assessing the
overall strength of the prosecution case.
23. Upon a careful consideration of the rival submissions and the
evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to
establish the essential ingredient of demand of illegal gratification by
the Appellant. The Complainant (P.W.7), who was the best person to
speak on the alleged demand, has categorically denied it in his
testimony, and his prior statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. remains
unproved for want of examination of the Magistrate, which could not
have been taken as substantive evidence otherwise. The evidence of
P.W.4, the shadow witness, is weakened by his admitted status as a
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 17 of 19
repeated Vigilance witness and by doubts about his capacity to
overhear the conversation from the verandah. P.W.6 speaks only to
recovery and chemical test, not to demand. The recovery of tainted
notes from the file of the Appellant, coupled with a positive file
wash, does establish that the tainted money was present in his office
file, however, the negative hand wash and the Complainant’s
testimony that he himself placed the money in the file create serious
doubt about voluntary acceptance by the Appellant. In such
circumstances, the presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act
does not arise. The sanction for prosecution is itself open to question,
as P.W.3 did not demonstrate clear competence as the removing
authority, though by virtue of Section 19(3), this irregularity may not
by itself vitiate the trial in the absence of prejudice. Nonetheless,
when seen cumulatively with the failure to prove demand, the
infirmities in acceptance, and procedural lapses in trap proceedings,
the prosecution case falls short of the stringent standard of proof
required in criminal jurisprudence. The finding of guilt recorded by
the learned trial court thus cannot be sustained.
24. In view of the foregoing analysis and findings, the Appeal
succeeds. The judgment and order dated 11.04.2012 passed by the
learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Bhawanipatna, District-Kalahandi
in G.R. (Vig.) Case No.23 of 2007 corresponding to T.R. Case No.27
of 2011 convicting the Appellant under Sections 7 and 13(2) read
with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 and sentencing him
thereunder, is hereby set aside. The Appellant is acquitted of all the
charges.
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 18 of 19
The Appellant, who is on bail, be discharged from the
liabilities of his bail bonds. A copy of this judgment be sent to the
Court concerned for information and necessary action.
(Chittaranjan Dash)
Judge
A.K.Pradhan/Bijau/Sarbani
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ANANTA KUMAR PRADHAN
Designation: Sr. Stenographer
Reason: Authentication
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Date: 26-Aug-2025 15:28:06
CRLA No.266 of 2012 Page 19 of 19