Chekka Shiva And Another vs The State Of Telangana on 17 April, 2025

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Telangana High Court

Chekka Shiva And Another vs The State Of Telangana on 17 April, 2025

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      THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER
                        AND
     THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE E.V. VENUGOPAL
       CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.2634 & 2604 OF 2018
COMMON JUDGMENT:

(per Hon’ble Sri Justice K.Surender)

1. Heard Sri P. Prabhakar Reddy, the learned counsel for

the appellants-accused Nos.2 and 3 in Criminal Appeal

No.2634 of 2018, Sri G. Jithender Reddy, the learned counsel

for the appellant-accused No.4 in Criminal Appeal No.2604 of

2018, and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for

respondent.

2. Both the appeals are filed, aggrieved by the judgment

dated 31.08.2018 in S.C.No.237 of 2012, passed by the V

Additional Sessions Judge, at Bhongir District convicting the

appellants/accused Nos.2 to 4 for the offence under Sections

302 r/w 34 of IPC and sentencing them to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- each, in

default of which they shall undergo simple imprisonment for

one month.

3. The case of the prosecution is that the appellants-

accused Nos.2 to 4 are the brothers-in-law of accused No.1

(acquitted). There were differences between accused No.1 and

one Maragani Venkataiah (deceased). The deceased was

running a kirana shop-cum-tent house at Rusthapur village
2

and also in the neighboring village at Vadaparthy. The

deceased developed illegal intimacy with the wife of accused

No.1. Accused No.1 noticed it and several times he warned

his wife as well as the deceased to mend their ways.

However, the relationship continued and a panchayath was

also held, and the deceased was admonished.

4. On 17.11.2011 evening, the deceased was proceeding

from Rusthapur to Vadaparthy on a scooter. When he

reached Vadaparthy rice mill, at 6.00 P.M., accused Nos.2

and 3, who are the brothers-in-law of accused No.1, came in

an auto from the opposite direction and dashed it against the

scooter of the deceased. When the deceased fell to the

ground, they beat him with their hands indiscriminately. In

the meanwhile, accused No.1 joined accused Nos.2 and 3.

Accused No.1 collected a fuel bottle from the auto and

handed it over to accused No.3. Accused No.3 poured it over

the deceased, while accused No.2 set him ablaze. The

deceased, with burn injuries, was later shifted to the area

hospital, Bhongir. At the first instance, the doctor-P.W.17

examined the deceased around 07.30 P.M. He recorded the

dying declaration/Ex.P.23. In the said dying declaration

recorded by P.W.17 at 07.30 P.M., on 17.11.2011, the

deceased stated as follows:

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” My name is M. Venkatest, S/o. Veeraiah,
Age:50 years, R/o. Rusthapuram village.

I have been maintaining friendship with one Vani
who is the wife of Neella Yadagiri for eight years.
Due to which Yadagiri used to pick up quarrels with
me and his wife Vani. Because of that Yadagiri
developed grudge against me. Today., i.e., on
17.11.2011 at 6.00 p.m., after completion of my
works when I was returning from Rusthapuram
village and proceeding towards Vadaparthi on my
scooter, near the Vadaparthi village some persons
i.e., brothers-in-law of Yadagiri namely Shiva, Raju,
and Narasimha came from Alair in auto, dashed to
my scooter, got me down, beat me severely with
hands, in the meanwhile poured petrol on my body
and the three persons set me on fire and escaped
from there in their auto. On hearing my hue and
cries, the persons who were passing on the way
(names not known to me) doused flames, shifted me
to Area Hopsital, Bhongir in auto”.

5. The deceased was shifted to Gandhi Hospital at

Hyderabad. P.W.18 was given a requisition by P.W.19 for the

purpose of recording the dying declaration. According to

P.W.18/Magistrate, he received the requisition on 17.11.2011

at 11.00 P.M. Immediately, he went to the Gandhi Hospital

and recorded the dying declaration of the deceased. One of

the questions posed by the Magistrate and the corresponding

answer given by the deceased is as follows:
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“Q.1. How did you sustain burn injuries?
Please explain in detail

Ans: I am resident of Rusthapuram village. I
run provisions shop and I am having a tent
house also. I have two sons and one daughter.

My wife is Mehalatha. I sustained burn
injuries today evening at 6.00 P.M., or 6.30
P.M., Today evening when I was going from
Rusthapuram village to Vadaparthi village on
my scooter, when I reached Vadaparthi village,
one auto rickshaw dashed me and I fell down.
Thereafter three persons came and beat me
severely with hands. Their names are Raju,
Ravi, and Shiva. I came to know that they are
residents of Alair villag. Ravi asked to bring
petrol. Raju brought the petrol. Ravi poured
petrol. Shiva set me to fire. When I was
shouting Vadaparthi villagers came and doused
the flames.

Neela Yadagiri lodged a case against me
and it is on the file of Bhongir Court. The said
case is compromised. I was acquitted in the
said case. Raju, Ravi, Shiva and Yadagiri wife’s
brothers, Yadagiri wife Vani. One Pushpalatha
has one belt shop in front of my shop. I am
having disputes with Puspalatha and Papaiah
with regard to Elections.

Vani goes by the side of the shop of
Puspalatha. The said persons might have told
against me to Raju, Ravi, Shiva. Puspalatha
and Papaiah might have told against me to
Raju, Ravi and Shiva. Because of that they
poured kerosene on me and set me to fire.

One Ramachander is the brother-in-law
to Vani. He is also having a role in this
incident. Vani, her husband Yadagiri, Vani’s
brother-in-law Ramchander and Pushpalatha,
Papaiah were held responsible for pouring
kerosene on my body and set me to fire.

Prior to the incident, Neela Vani
telephoned to me and informed that the above
mentioned persons are planning to kill me and
the call was cut in the middle. She said to me
that she will call again. Then Yadagiri scolded
me on phone

(Right thumb impression of M. Venkataiah
Goud has taken)”

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6. At. 11.30.P.M., P.W.1 filed complaint/Ex.P.1 with the

police. In Ex.P.1, the names of Shiva-accused No.2, Ravi-

accused No.3, Raju-accused No.4 and one Narasimha (not

identified during investigation) were mentioned, as the

persons responsible.

7. P.W.17 stated that having recorded the dying

declaration at 07.30 P.M., he obtained the thumb impression

of the deceased. According to P.W.17, the deceased received

40% burns.

8. The relatives of the deceased, P.Ws.1 to 3, and others

took the deceased to Bhongir hospital and from there to

Gandhi Hospital. P.W.1 is the son of the deceased.

According to him, he was informed by Shivaiah (L.W.6, who

was not examined during the trial) that his father was lying

with burn injuries near the rice mill on the outskirts of

Vadaparthy village. Immediately, P.W.1 went to the place of

incident on his motorcycle, found burn injuries on the body

of the deceased and immediately shifted him to the

Government area hospital, Bhongir. After giving first aid, the

deceased was shifted to Gandhi Hospital at Secunderabad.

P.W.1, while questioning the deceased, was informed by the

deceased that it was Shiva, Ravi, Raju, i.e., accused Nos.2 to

4, who are the brothers-in-law of accused No.1, that poured
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petrol on him and set him ablaze. On 17.11.2011, at about

10.00 to 10.30 P.M, P.W.1 lodged a Telugu-written complaint

with the police, and the complaint was received by P.W.19 on

the same day at 11.30 P.M. While registering the crime,

P.W.19 sent a requisition to the Criminal Courts, Nampally,

to record the dying declaration of the deceased. P.W.17 was

working as Assistant Civil Surgeon in Bhongir Hospital.

According to the prosecution, after he recorded Ex.P.23-dying

declaration of deceased, the deceased was shifted to Gandhi

Hospital at Secunderabad.

9. P.W.2, the wife of the deceased, stated that one

Shivaiah (L.W.6 who was not examined) went to the shop of

the deceased at Rusthapur and informed her about the

deceased lying in front of the rice mill with burn injuries.

According to P.W.2, she, along with P.Ws.1 and 3, went to the

place of the incident and shifted him to the hospital.

10. The Investigating Officer-P.W.21 took up the

investigation after the crime was registered by P.W.19. He

went to the Gandhi Hospital at Secunderabad and conducted

the inquest panchanama. Thereafter, the body was sent for

postmortem examination. Accused Nos.1 to 3 were arrested

on 14.12.2011 and were later sent to Judicial Custody. After
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competition of investigation of the case, a charge sheet was

filed against accused Nos.1 to 3.

11. The learned Sessions Judge took cognizance against

accused Nos.1 to 3 and framed charges on 25.02.2014. The

witness, P.Ws.1 to 12, were examined. Thereafter, the

prosecution filed a petition under Section 319 of Cr.P.C to

add accused Nos.4 to 7, since the witnesses have spoken

about their involvement in the said crime. The said petition

was allowed. Upon summoning accused Nos.4 to 7, the

learned Sessions Judge framed charges against accused

Nos.1 to 7 on 27.08.2014. After the framing of charges, the

additional accused (accused Nos.4 to 7) were given an

opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses as contemplated

under Section 217 of Cr.P.C.

12. The learned Sessions Judge examined witnesses P.Ws.1

to 21 and got marked Exs.P.1 to P.30. M.Os.1 to 10 were

also placed on record.

13. The learned Sessions Judge, having considered the

evidence on record, found that the prosecution had proven

the involvement of accused Nos.2 to 4 in the crime. However,

since accused Nos.1 and 5 to 7 were not found guilty of the
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offences, they were acquitted, relying upon the dying

declarations made by the deceased to P.Ws.17 and 18.

14. Learned counsel for the accused Nos.2 and 3 submitted

that there are several variations in the two declarations given

by the deceased, i.e., the first statement made to P.W.17

under Ex.P.23 and the second statement made to P.W.18

under Ex.P.25. The statement made to P.W.17 at the first

instance did not provide a complete narration of the incident.

The deceased stated that accused Nos.2, 3, and one

Narasimha were present and they burned him. However, in

the dying declaration made to the Magistrate, only the names

of accused Nos.2 to 4 were mentioned. The said variations

and contradictions in the dying declarations cannot be

accepted. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “State of Punjab

vs. Parveen Kumar” 1, wherein in paragraph No.10, it was

held as follows:

“While appreciating the credibility of the
evidence produced before the Court, the Court
must view the evidence as a whole and come to a
conclusion as to its genuineness and
truthfulness. The mere fact that two different
versions are given but one name is common in
both of them cannot be a ground for convicting

1
2005 (9) SCC 769
9

the named person. The Court must be satisfied
that the dying declaration is truthful. If there
are two dying declarations giving two different
versions, a serious doubt is created about the
truthfulness of the dying declarations. It may be
that if there was any other reliable evidence on
record, this Court could have considered such
corroborative evidence to test however, in the
instant case stand by themselves and there is no
other reliable evidence on record by reference to
which their truthfulness can be tested. It is
corroborate another piece of unreliable evidence.
The High Court while considering the evidence
on record has rightly applied the principles laid
down by
this Court in “Thurukanni Pompiah vs.
State of Mysore
” and “Khushal Rao vs. State of
Punjab
“.

Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of

theHon’ble Supreme Court in “Dandu Lakshmi Reddy vs.

State of A.P.” 2. While dealing with a situation where there

were two dying declarations, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

found that there was a material divergence between the two

dying declarations and, thus, the benefit of the doubt had to

be extended. In the said judgment, it was held as follows:

“In Ex.P.11 (which is a dying declaration given to
the Judicial Magistrate of the 1st class) the
context stated by the declarant was altogether
different. The relevant portion is extracted below:

2

1999 (7) SCC 69
10

My mother-in-law’s name is Narayanamma, my
husband;s name is Dandu Lakshmi Reddy. In
the morning at 6.00 A.M., when I was sweeping,
my mother-in-law Narayanamma and my
husband Lakshmi Reddy both poured kerosene
on me, lit the matchstick and set me to fire”.

The above material divergence between the two
dying declarations pertaining to the occasion for
launching the murderous attack on the deceased
did not create any impression in the minds of the
learned judges of the High Court, as they have
observed thus:

“Though there is a difference in the version of the
deceased as to what she was doing at the relevant
point of time the fact remains that A-1 and A-2
poured kerosene and lit fire to her. These aspects
are mentioned in Exs.P.11 and P.14. Therefore,
we are unable to agree with the contention of the
learned counsel for the accused appellants.”

Thus the High Court has sidelined such a
noticeable discrepancy looming large as between
the two different statements made by the same
person. When the sphere of scrutiny of the
dyeing declaration is a restricted area, the Court
cannot afford to sideline such a material
divergence relating to this very occasion of the
crime. Either the context spoken to in one was
wrong or that in the other was wrong. Both could
be reconciled with each other only with much
strain as it relates to the opportunity for the
culprit to commit the offence. Adopting such a
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strain to the detriment of the accused in a
criminal case is not a feasible course.”

Learned counsel further relied on the judgment of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Mehiboobsab Abbasabi Nadaf

vs. State of Karnataka” 3, wherein it was held as follows:

“In first dying declaration it is stated that her
husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law are
responsible for poring kerosene and burning. In
second dying declaration both father-in-law and
mother-in-law took the stove and pored kerosene
from me and lit fire. Thereafter, her husband and
father-in-law poured water on her body. The
deceased had taken contradictory and
inconsistent stand in the different dying
declarations. Therefore, the said DDs should not
be accepted on their face value.”

The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment

passed in “Jagbir Singh vs. State (NCT of Delhi)” 4, wherein

it was held as follows:

“If there are more than one dying declaration, the

dying declaration may entirely agree with another.

There may be dying declaration where

inconsistencies between the declarations emerge.

In view of complete inconsistency, the second or

the third dying declaration which is relied on by the

3
2007 (13) SCC 112
4
2019 (8) SCC 779
12

prosecution is demolished by the earlier dying

declaration.”

15. In the above mentioned judgments, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, while dealing with the cases where there

were more than one dying declarations, found them to be

contradictory to one another and accordingly extended benefit

of doubt to the accused.

16. Learned counsel for accused No.4 submitted that the

learned Magistrate had not followed the procedure laid down

under Rule 33 of the Criminal Rules of Practice. In the

absence of the compliance with the said procedure, the court

cannot rely on the dying declaration. The F.I.R was

registered at 11.30 P.M; however, the requisition to the doctor

was given at 11.00 P.M. itself, without the crime number

being mentioned in the requisitions/Exs.P.2 and P.3.

Moreover, in the dying declaration recorded by the

doctor/P.W.17 under Ex.P.23, the complaint appears to have

been written on a blank paper and subsequently filled in,

which is evident from the manner in which the document was

prepared. Though the statement occupies only half of the

page, however, the thumb impression is at the bottom of the

page. It is apparent that the statement of the deceased was

concocted. Secondly, the dying declaration recorded by the
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Magistrate is in printed proforma. Such a printed proforma

cannot be used to record a dying declarations. It is for the

Magistrate to record his satisfaction after asking questions to

the person giving the declaration regarding their condition. If

it is a printed format and the questions are confined to the

printed format, it does not reflect that the Magistrate had

taken due precaution in recording satisfaction about the

mental capacity of the declarant. Learned counsel for

accused No.4 relied on the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in

“Sundarapalli Satyanarayana @ Sattibabu vs. State of

Andhra Pradesh and another” 5. This Court, while dealing

with the manner in which the dying declaration was recorded

without following Rule 33 of the Criminal rules of Practice,

found that such deviation for the prescribed procedure

should lead to an adverse inference, and should be read

against the prosecution and in favour of the accused.

Learned counsel further relied on the judgment of Hon’ble

Supreme Court in “K. Ramachndra Reddy vs. Public

Prosecutor” 6, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while

dealing with a dying declaration recorded by a Magistrate,

held that it is necessary for the Magistrate to be satisfied that

the declarant is in a fit state of mind to give the statement.

5
2011 (1) ALD (Crl.) 641 (AP)
6
1976 Law Suit (SC) 214
14

Learned counsel for the accused No.4 further relied on the

judgment of this Court in “M/s. Garnet Finance Limited vs.

The Commissioner of Police” in Criminal Appeal No.1045

of 2014, wherein this Court held as follows:

“The statute provides for a thing to be done in a
particular manner, then it has to be done in that
manner and in no other manner.”

17. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public

Prosecutor argued that the names of accused Nos.2 and 3

are mentioned in the first dying declaration, and thereafter,

the name of accused No.4 is mentioned in the second dying

declaration. Both the dying declarations when considered

harmoniously, makes out the case of the prosecution.

Only for the reason that there is a discrepancy regarding

the deceased mentioning the name of accused No.4 in the

dying declaration, it cannot be concluded that the guilt of

accused No.4 does not arise.

18. P.Ws.1, 2, and 3, who are the son, wife, and nephew

of the deceased, respectively, stated that they received

information from one K. Shivaiah. The said K. Shivaiah

was examined as L.W.6 during the course of the

investigation. However, the witness was given up during
15

the trial. No reasons are given as to why L.W.6, a crucial

witness, was given up by the prosecution.

19. According to P.Ws.1 to 3, they went to the scene upon

being informed by the said Shivaiah, the deceased was

shifted to the Bhongir Hospital. P.W.17 is the doctor who

was working at the local hospital at Bhongir. In his

statement, he stated that some unknown persons shifted

the deceased to the area hospital at Bhongir. The version

of P.W.17 is also recorded in the dying declaration

/Ex.P.23. The evidence of P.W.17 assumes significance in

light of the claim made by P.Ws.1 to 3 that they had shifted

deceased to the hospital.

20. P.W.17 has written what was stated by the deceased,

which has been extracted above. In the said dying

declaration, the name of the accused No.2, accused No.3,

and one Narasimha were mentioned. P.W.19 is the

Inspector of Police who received the written complaint from

P.W.1. The said complaint was registered at 11.30 P.M.

According to P.W.19, after registering the complaint under

Sections 120-B and 302 r/w. Section 34 of IPC, he issued

the F.I.R and sent a requisition to the Nampally Court for

the purpose of recording the dying declaration. However,
16

P.W.18, who is the Magistrate that recorded the dying

declaration under Ex.P.25, stated that he received the

requisition at 11.00 P.M itself. His requisition is marked as

Ex.P.24. In the requisition there is no mention of the crime

number, the person, the concerned constable, or any police

official. It is merely stated that the S.H.O gave the

requisition at 11.00 P.M itself. The time stated by P.Ws.18

and 19 contradicts each other. If the complaint itself was

filed at 11.30 P.M, it is not explained how the requisition

could have been given to the Magistrate at 11.00 P.M.

21. P.W.18 is the Magistrate who recorded the dying

declaration. According to P.W.18, when he went to the

hospital, a number of relatives of the deceased were

present in the burns ward. After P.W.18 reached the burns

ward, he asked the relatives of the deceased to leave the

said place.

22. The Magistrate has recorded the dying declaration on

a printed proforma. In the printed proforma, the questions

are already typed in the Telugu language. Apart from the

printed questions, the learned Magistrate did not put any

other questions to the deceased to satisfy himself about the

mental condition of the deceased. In fact, it is mentioned
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in the dying declaration that the Magistrate introduced

himself and that he came to record the statement. Such a

typed, printed proforma and questionnaire give rise to

doubt as to whether the learned Magistrate applied his

independent mind to the situation or merely posed the

questions mechanically to satisfy himself about the mental

condition of the patient. Further, the Magistrate ought to

have questioned the deceased, to rule out any possibility of

tutoring, since the Magistrate admitted that several elders

were present when he went to the burns ward. Such

mechanical functioning by the learned Magistrate raises

doubt about the manner in which the dying declaration

was recorded.

23. In the statement made to the Magistrate, the

deceased gave a version that is contradictory to what was

stated at the earliest point in time, which was recorded by

P.W.17. In the statement made to P.W.17, the deceased

mentioned the names of accused No.2, accused No.3, and

one Narasimha. The said Narasimha was not identified by

the Investigating Officer during the course of the

investigation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in “Dandu

Lakshmi Reddy vs. State of A.P.“, in a similar situation,
18

held that a noticeable discrepancy made by the very same

person was overlooked by the High Court and the High Court

could not afford to sideline such material discrepancy. In the

present case, firstly, the recording by P.W.17 is doubtful as

seen from Ex.P.23. It would appear from Ex.P.23 that the

thumb impression was taken first and the statement was

written later. It is clear from the document that the reasons

regarding the condition of the patient were filled in later and

written in English. It is also evident that the statement of the

deceased covers only half of the page, while the thumb

impression is at the bottom of the page while the condition of

the deceased was later filled up.

24. The motive attributed to the commission of offence is

that the deceased was having an affair with wife of accused

No.1. For the reason of said illicit intimacy, it is alleged that

the appellants herein, accused Nos.2 to 4, who are the

brothers-in-law of accused No.1, assaulted the deceased and

set him on fire.. As already discussed, the version given by

P.Ws.1 to 3 that the deceased was found with burns near the

rice mill and, upon their enquiry, they discovered the

involvement of accused Nos.2 to 4 and others, after which the

deceased was shifted to the hospital at Bhongir, is

contradicted by the independent witness-P.W.17. P.W.17
19

ruled out the presence of P.Ws.1 to 3 at the Bhongir Hospital.

According to him, some unknown persons brought the

deceased to the hospital and left.

25. Thereafter, as already discussed, the written complaint

was filed at 11.30 P.M. The requisition to the Magistrate was

given at about 11.00 P.M. Learned Magistrate received the

requisition at 11.00 P.M and went to record the dying

declaration in a printed format, and found several relatives

with the deceased. The deceased received 40% burn injuries.

However, while undergoing treatment, he died.

26. When all these circumstances are viewed in its entirety,

the version of the prosecution becomes doubtful. Each and

every circumstance of the case has to be proved beyond

reasonable doubt by the prosecution. When the above said

circumstances are considered in the present case, they not

only give rise to doubt but also suggest that the earliest

version was suppressed by the prosecution. The implication

of accused Nos.2 to 4 is on the basis of the alleged

information given by the deceased to P.Ws.1 to 3, who had

taken the deceased to the hospital. Thereafter, in the second

dying declaration given to the learned Magistrate, the

deceased gave a different version, excluding the name of one

Narasimha and adding the name of accused No.3.
20

27. In view of the foregoing discussion, relying on the

judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited supra, since

the prosecution failed to prove the involvement of accused

Nos.2 to 4 in the murder of the deceased beyond reasonable

doubt, the appellants/accused Nos.2 to 4 in both the criminal

appeals succeed.

28. In the result, both the Criminal Appeals are allowed.

29. The sentence and conviction imposed against the

appellants/accused Nos.2 to 4 in judgment dated

31.08.2018 in S.C.No.237 of 2012, passed by the V

Additional Sessions Judge, at Bhongir District, is hereby set

aside. Since the appellants are in jail, they shall be

released forthwith, if they are not required in any other

case.

_________________
K.SURENDER, J

______________________
E.V.VENUGOPAL,J

Date: 17.04.2025
Bw
Note: Registry is directed to dispatch
the order forthwith.

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