Cholamandalam M.S. General Insurance vs Niman Tairas Kerketta on 17 January, 2025

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Chattisgarh High Court

Cholamandalam M.S. General Insurance vs Niman Tairas Kerketta on 17 January, 2025

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  Digitally signed
  by REKHA
  SINGH
                                                      2025:CGHC:3075

                                                                     NAFR

                 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

                              MAC No. 2442 of 2024
1 - Cholamandalam M.S. General Insurance Through Branch Manager,
Branch Office, First Floor, Hinduja Complex, 22 Paras Nagar Chowk, Near
Railway Line, Devendra Nagar Raipur, Tahsil And District - Raipur (C.G.)
                                                                ... Appellant
                                   versus
1 - Niman Tairas Kerketta S/o Late Dhanam Singh Kerketta Aged About 61
Years Resident Of Village Lodam, Jashpur, At Present - Shanti Nagar,
Bankimongra, Thana Bankimongra, Tahsil Katghora, Dist.- Korba (C.G.)

2 - Smt. Letaren Kerketta W/o Late Tairas Kerketta Aged About 60 Years
Resident Of Village Lodam, Jashpur, At Present - Shanti Nagar,
Bankimongra, Thana Bankimongra, Tahsil Katghora, Dist.- Korba (C.G.)

3 - Jitesh Bhagat S/o Babulal Bhagat Aged About 25 Years R/o Lodam,
Lohapara, Police Chowki - Lodam, Thana - Jashpur, Dist. And Tahsil Jashpur
(C.G.)

4 - Pradeep Prasad Sahu S/o Kheleshwar Sahu Aged About 50 Years R/o
Vikas Nagar, Batauli, Gumla, Thana - Gumla, Dist. - Gumla (Jharkhand)
                                                           ... Respondents

For Appellant : Ms. Pragya Mishra, Advocate

Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Judgment on Board
17/01/2025

1. Heard on admission.

2. In the present appeal, the appellant has challenged the award passed

by the learned First Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,

Katghora, District Korba (C.G.) in Claim Case No. 153/2021 dated

11.03.2024, whereby the learned Tribunal has passed an award in

favour of the claimants to the tune of Rs.12,67,694/- and the amount of

compensation shall carry interest @ 7% per annum.
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3. Claimants No.1 & 2 are the parents of the deceased who filed a claim

case under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming

therein compensation to the tune of Rs.79,10,000/- before the learned

Claims Tribunal.

4. The appellant/Insurance Company has moved an application (I.A. No.

01/2024) for condonation of delay as there is a delay of 175 days in

filing the instant appeal.

5. Ms. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance

Company/appellant would submit that the appeal is filed with a delay of

175 days as the certified copy of the award was not supplied within

limitation. She would further submit that after obtaining permission from

the Head Office, the appeal was preferred. She would contend that the

Court should take a lenient view while dealing with an application for

condonation of delay.

6. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the records.

7. Admittedly, the appellant has preferred this appeal against the award

passed by the learned Claims Tribunal dated 11.03.2024. In the

application for condonation of delay, it is stated as under:-

“3.That the instant appeal is filed with a delay of about 15 days.
It is respectfully submitted that after the award was passed the A
tribunal, handed over the copy of award to the counsel of the
appellant and the same was sent to the appellant company at
Indore.

4. That the copy of impugned award was sent to the Regional
Office of the appellant company at Indore and it was suggested
by the Regional Office to seek legal opinion with regard to filing
of the appeal from the local counsel and from the counsel of the
High Court. Hence again the copy and all other relevant papers
were sent to the counsel at Bilaspur.

5. Thereafter the opinion of the counsel was received and the
same was forwarded to regional office Indore for taking final
decision with regard to filing of the appeal. Thereafter decision to
file the instant appeal was taken by the head office of the
appellant company. It is humbly submitted that in these
circumstances the 1175). appeal became barred by limitation of
about 1741 175 days.

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6. There was no deliberate delay or dilatory tactics adapted by
the appellant to file the instant appeal beyond limitation. The
reasons assigned of about 75 days delay in filing the appeal
constitute sufficient cause and there is no deliberate delay. The
Hon’ble Court may kindly take liberal approach in this regard in
the interest of justice.”

From a perusal of the application for condonation of delay, it

appears that there is no description of the date when the application

was moved before the learned Tribunal to obtain certified copy and

when it was supplied to the appellant. It is also nowhere stated that

when the matter was forwarded to the Regional Office and when the

permission was granted by the Regional Office to prefer the appeal and

thus, in the opinion of this Court, the appellant/Insurance Company has

not explained the delay properly.

8. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati

Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy

Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR

241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In

para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act

were considered and it was observed thus:-

“10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of
convenience, is reproduced herein-below:

3. Bar of limitation. – (1) Subject to the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit
instituted, appeal preferred, and application made
after the prescribed period shall be dismissed,
although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit,
appeal and application but since in this case we are
concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be
mentioning about the appeal only in context with the
limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the
delay in its filing is liable to be condoned. ”

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9. The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of

Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which

are reproduced herein-below:-

“19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap
Narain Singh and Ors
, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had
been held that the court cannot grant an exemption
from limitation on equitable consideration or on the
ground of hardship. The court has time and again
repeated that when mandatory provision is not
complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily
and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone
the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.

20. In this connection, a reference may be made to
Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and
Ors
, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing,
as above, this Court further laid down that if some
person has obtained a relief approaching the court
just or immediately when the cause of action had
arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the
same by approaching the court at a belated stage
simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and
compassion.

21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors.
,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC
363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory
explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed
the applications for condonation of delay, this Court
held that the High Court failed to exercise its
discretion in a reasonable and objective manner.
High Court should have exercised the discretion in a
systematic and an informed manner. The liberal
approach in considering sufficiency of cause for
delay should not be allowed to override substantial
law of limitation. The Court observed that the
concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented
approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be
employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.

22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand
& Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors.
, AIR
2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be
considered while dealing with the application for
condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer
, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14
SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously
based upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring
in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally
interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide
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is writ large. It was also observed that even though
limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it
has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed
under the statute as the courts have no choice but to
apply the law as it stands and they have no power to
condone the delay on equitable grounds.

10. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati

Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the

above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:-

“26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions
of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this
Court, it is evident that:

(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that
there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the
right to remedy rather than the right itself;

(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised
or availed of for a long time must come to an end or
cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to
be construed liberally;

(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though
liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause
of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the
same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary
in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient
cause is established for various factors such as,
where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want
of due diligence;

(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled
to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with
the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided
on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay
and condoning the delay for the reason that the
conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to
disregarding the statutory provision.”

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11. In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the

delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of

the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case

for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is

reproduced herein-below:-

“30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as
imposition of conditions are not warranted when
sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the
delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned
merely because some persons have been granted relief
on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in
such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent
or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the
delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been
deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that
they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not
a correct approach, particularly when both the above
decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier
pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra). “

12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy

(supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-

oriented approach’ and ’cause for the advancement of substantial

justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to

allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived

and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

13. Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid

down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba

Reddy (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the application for

condonation of delay is liable to be and is hereby rejected.

14. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. No cost(s).

Sd/-

(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
Rekha

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