Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Choppa Ramachandra Reddy vs P.Rangaiah Naidu And 29 Others on 16 June, 2025
APHC010135962018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3397]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY ,THE SIXTEENTH DAY OF JUNE
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA
KRISHNA RAO
I.A.NO.1/2024 & I.A.NO.2/2024
IN/AND
SECOND APPEAL NO: 231/2018
Between:
Choppa Ramachandra Reddy ...APPELLANT
AND
P Rangaiah Naidu and 29 others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. P GANGA RAMI REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1.
2. N ASHWANI KUMAR
The Court made the following:
COMMON JUDGMENT:
–
This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(“C.P.C.” for short) is filed aggrieved against the Judgment and decree, dated
22.12.2017 in A.S.No.71 of 2011, on the file of the VI Additional District Judge
(Fast Track Court), Tirupati (“First Appellate Court” for short) confirming the
Judgment and decree, dated 11.02.2011 in O.S.No.345 of 2006, on the file of
the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati (“Trial Court” for short).
2. The appellant herein is the defendant and the respondents 1 to 18
herein are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.345 of 2006.
During the pendency of first appeal, respondents 6, 16 and 3 are died
and their legal representatives are brought on record as respondents 19 to 21;
22 to 25 and 26 to 30 respectively.
3. The plaintiffs initiated action in O.S.No.345 of 2006, on the file of the
Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati, with a prayer for granting permanent
injunction restraining the defendant and his men, etc., from in any way
interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint „A‟ to „R‟
schedule properties and for costs of the suit.
4. The learned trial Judge decreed the suit. Felt aggrieved of the same,
the unsuccessful defendant in the above said suit filed A.S.No.71 of 2011, on
the file of the VI Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Tirupati. The
learned First Appellate Judge dismissed the appeal confirming the decree and
judgment passed by the learned trial Judge.Aggrieved thereby, the defendant
approached this Court by way of second appeal.
5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the appeal will be
referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit.
6. The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in
O.S.No.345 of 2006, is as follows:
The schedule mentioned properties are the vacant sites and originally
belonged to one Adimulam Rajagopal which is his ancestral property and he
was cultivating the same by raising crops and the said Rajagopal and his son
A. Srinivasulu have jointly sold away the suit properties to one Chakkilala
Narasimhaiah under a registered sale deed, dated 22.01.1941. Since then,
he had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. The said
Narasimhaiah sold away the suit properties in favour of A. Srinivasulu under a
registered sale deed, dated 16.09.1950. Since then, he had been in
possession and enjoyment of the said properties without any interruption and
the said Srinivasulu sold away the suit properties in favour of D.
Subramanyam under a registered sale deed, dated 05.12.1960. Since then,
the said Subramanyam had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit
property and after the death of Subramanyam, his legal representatives i.e.,
wife Sarojamma and his sons have been enjoyment of the same and they
have sold away the suit property in favour of K. Parthasarathy under a
registered sale deed, dated 02.05.1983 and since then the said Parthasarathy
had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties and
later, the said land was converted into house sites and sold the same to
various persons including the plaintiffs herein under different registered sale
deeds in different dates by specific metes and bounds and since then they
have been in possession and enjoyment of the said house plots and the
plaintiffs have constructed a common compound wall with cement bricks
covering the entire suit schedule property to avoid encroachment. Except the
plaintiffs, nobody has any right and interest over the suit schedule property
and on 12.07.2006 at 11 a.m., the defendant, who is a professional land
grabber and migrated from Kadapa and came to suit schedule properties with
his men and tried to demolish the common compound wall and the plaintiffs
resisted the high handed acts of the defendant with the help of neighbours
and the defendant left the place and that the plaintiffs are constrained to file
the suit.
7. The defendant filed written statement before the trial Court denying
the material averments made in the plaint. The brief averments in the written
statement are as follows:
The suit Sy.No.65/1 along with other items were sold by A.T.M.
Rangaramanujam and MogiliMunaswany to P. Appa Rao under a registered
sale deed, dated 29.06.1960 and since then the said Appa Rao has been in
possession and in recognition of his title, the Assistant Settlement Officer,
Chittoor granted ryotwari patta to him under Section 15 of the Estate Abolition
Act. Against the said ryotwari patta, N. Gangi Reddy, V. Pokkal Reddy, M.
Nancharamma and D. Subramanyam filed appeal in A.S.No.63 of 1964 which
was dismissed on 24.06.1966 confirming the ryotwari patta granted to Appa
Rao in respect of suit survey number and other items. D. Subramanyam is no
other than the person who alleged to have been purchased the suit property
under a registered sale deed, dated 05.12.1960 from A. Srinivasulu and that
K. Parthasarathy is said to have been purchased the same from legal
representatives of Subramanyam and K. Parthasarathy cannot have better
title than that of his vendors whose claim for grant of patta was negatived and
as confirmed in A.S.No.63/1964 and C. Appa Rao claim has also been
recognized in theLand Reforms Tribunal in C.C.No.100/1975 by Additional
Revenue Divisional Officer, Land Reforms, Chandragiri and the Special
Deputy Tahsildar, Chandragiri has also issued a ryotwari patta passbook in
respect of suit schedule properties Sy.No.65/1 to an extent of Ac.1-39 cents
and in turn the said Appa Rao sold the suit Sy.No.65/1 to an extent of Ac.1-39
cents to T. Krishnaiah under a registered sale deed, dated 11.04.1984 and put
him in possession. After purchase, the patta was transferred to Krishnaiah by
Deputy Tahsildar, Chandragiri as per the proceedings, dated 29.04.1985. In
pursuance of which the said lands purchased were included in patta lands of
Krishnaiah as evidenced from settlement register and thereafter, T. Krishnaiah
is shown to be a person in possession and enjoyment of the suit land along
with other items in the village accounts from the date of purchase. Subsequent
to the death of Krishnaiah, his legal representatives Guravaiah and others
sold the schedule mentioned properties to the defendant under three
registered sale deeds vide document No.2627, dated 20.04.2005, rectification
deed document No.1558/2006, dated 17.03.2006; another document
No.1556/2006, dated 17.03.2006 and another document No.1557/2006, dated
17.03.2006 from the lawful owners and he has been in exclusive possession
and enjoyment of the same. The defendant is an exclusive possession and
enjoyment of Sy.Nos.65/1 and 65/3 comprising to an extent of Ac.1-51 cents
and that he prayed to dismiss the suit.
8. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned trial Judge framed the
following issues for trial:
(1) Whether the plaintiffs are in exclusive possession of the
schedule properties as pleaded?
(2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction as prayed for?
(3) To what relief?
9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs,
P.W.1 to P.W.10were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.30 were marked. On behalf
of the defendant, D.W.1 and D.W.2 were examined and Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.20
were marked.
10. The learned trial Judge after conclusion of trial, on hearing the
arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary
evidence on record, decreed the suit. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful
defendant filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.71 of 2011 wherein, the following
point came up for consideration:
Whether the judgment, dated 11.02.2011 passed by the learned trial
Judge in O.S.No.345 of 2006 granting permanent injunction restraining
the defendant and his men from interfering with the peaceful possession
and enjoyment of plaintiffs on suit „A‟ to „R‟ schedule properties suffers
with any infirmities due to lack of appreciation of evidence and if so,
whether the same is liable to be set aside as prayed for?
11. The learned First Appellate Judge after hearing the arguments,
answered the points, as above, against the defendant and dismissed the
appeal confirming the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge.
Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful defendant in O.S.No.345 of
2006 filed the present second appeal before this Court.
12. On hearing both sides counsel at the time of admission of the
appeal, on 15.06.2018, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
Hyderabad, framed the following substantial questions of law:
(1) Whether the suit for bare injunction is maintainable without
seeking relief for declaration when the title of plaintiffs and their
predecessors in title is under a cloud or in dispute and
defendant asserts his title to suit schedule property?
(2) Whether the findings of the Courts below that the
respondents/plaintiffs are in possession of suit land are based
on no evidence, contrary to the evidence on record and are
perverse?
(3) Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs jointly is bad for mis-
joinder of parties and cause of action, who have purchased
distinct and different plots under Ex.A.1, A.16 to Ex.A.30
without involvement of any joint interest of one others
purchased plots and hit by Order 2 Rule 3 of the CPC?
(4) Whether the plaintiffs acquired the title over the suit schedule
property when their vendor’s vendor had lot title over the suit
schedule property before Tribunal constituted under the
provisions of Estates Abolition Act, 1948?
13. Heard Sri P. Gangarami Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant
and heard Sri N. Ashwini Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents.
14. The law is well settled that under Section 100 of CPC the High
Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the First Appellate
Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such
findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or
its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court
or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence.
In a case of Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh1, the Apex Court held
as follows:
“The High Court was certainly entitled to go into the question as to
whether the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court which
was the final Court of fact were vitiated in the eye of law on account of
non-consideration of admissible evidence of vital nature.”
In a case of Kondira Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar2, the
Apex Court held as follows:
“The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the First
Appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the
lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory
provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of
pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon
inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.”
15. The legal position in this regard is well settled that when the
judgment of the First Appellate Court is based on mis-interpretation of
documentary evidence on consideration of inadmissible evidence or
ignoring material evidence, the High Court in second appeal is entitled
to interfere with the judgment of the Courts below. The legal position is
also well settled that admissions of the parties or their relevant basis of
evidence and should be given due weightage by the Courts. A finding of
fact ignoring such admissions are concessions is vitiated in law and can
be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal.
1
AIR 1993 SC 398
2
AIR 1999 SC 471
16. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the suit
filed by the plaintiffs jointly is bad for misjoinder of parties and cause of action,
who have purchased the distinct and different plots under separate registered
sale deeds. In the case on hand, all the plaintiffs joined together and filed a
suit for seeking relief of permanent injunction against sole defendant, but
valued the reliefs separately, therefore, the suit is maintainable.
17. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that vendor‟s
vendor of the plaintiffs are legal representatives of D. Subramanyam. The
claim of the plaintiffs is that D. Subramanyam purchased the total extent of
Ac.1-39 cents in Sy.No.65/1 of Gollavanigunta village from A. Srinivasulu
under a registered sale deed, dated 05.12.1960 under original of Ex.A.4, after
death of Subramanyam, his legal representatives alienated the total extent of
Ac.1-39 cents, as stated supra, to the vendor of all the plaintiffs K.
Parthasarathy under a registered sale deed, dated 02.05.1983 under original
of Ex.A.5 and the claim of Subramanyam is negatived by the Assistant
Settlement Officer, Chittoor. The defendant further pleaded that the vendor‟s
vendor of the plaintiffs i.e., Subramanyam and others filed appeal in
A.S.No.63 of 1964 against the order of Settlement Officer and the same was
dismissed on 24.06.1966 confirming the orders passed by the Settlement
Officer, Chittoor and patta granted in favour of P. Appa Rao was conferred by
the Appellate authority and therefore, the serious title dispute is involved in
this case, therefore, the simple suit for bear injunction is not maintainable
without seeking the relief of declaration of title and that the appeal may be
allowed.
18. The case of the plaintiffs is that the suit schedule property is
situated in Sy.No.65/1 of Gollavanigunta village and total extent is Ac.1-39
cents. The plaintiff Nos.1, 3 to 7, 9, 11 to 14 and 18 are in possession of
Ac.0-04 1/6 cents and plaintiff Nos.2, 8, 10, 15 to 17 are in possession of
Ac.0-07 cents by virtue of several registered sale deeds obtained from K.
Parthasarathy and all the plaintiffs purchased the vacant sites from K.
Parthasarathy. The plaintiffs further pleaded that originally Parthasarathy
purchased Ac.1-39 cents from legal representatives of D. Subramanyam by
name Sarojamma and her two sons under a registered sale deed and later
Parthasarathy converted cultivable lands into house sites and sold the same
by way of registered sale deeds to various persons including the plaintiffs.
19. The specific stand taken by the defendant from the beginning in the
written statement itself is that the defendant purchased the property of Ac.1-39
cents in Sy.No.65/1 from legal representatives of T.Krishnaiah and T.
Krishnaiah purchased Ac.1-39 cents in Sy.No.65/1 from P. Appa Rao and
after purchase, Deputy Tahsildar, Chandragiri transferred patta in favour of T.
Krishnaiah and the defendant also relied on the documentary evidence Ex.B.1
to Ex.B.20. The defendant specifically pleaded in the written statement itself
that the suit is bad for not seeking relief for declaration of title.
20. As seen from the material on record, P.W.1 is 1st plaintiff, P.W.2 is
8th plaintiff, P.W.3 is 12th plaintiff, P.W.4 is 5th plaintiff, P.W.5 is 9th plaintiff,
P.W.6 is 10th plaintiff, P.W.7 is 6th plaintiff, P.W.8 is 15th plaintiff, P.W.9 is 18th
plaintiff and P.W.10 is 13th plaintiff. Except examining them as P.W.1 to
P.W.10 respectively, no other oral evidence is produced by the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs also marked Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.30 documents. Ex.A.6 to Ex.A.15
alleged land revenue receipts of vendor‟s vendor of the plaintiffs. The survey
number and extent is not there in land revenue receipts. Ex.A.6 to Ex.A.15 are
no way helpful to prove that the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of
the schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit. The schedule
property is situated at Gollavanigunta village. The village of Gollavanigunta is
notified as an Inam Estate and taken over by the Government on 05.02.1959.
The sale deeds of the plaintiffs are of the year 1989. It is relevant to say that
P. Appa Rao made a claim before the Assistant Settlement Officer, Chittoor in
the year 1963 under Ex.B.2 in which the vendor‟s vendor of the plaintiffs
Subramanyam is one of the respondents in the said Ex.B.2 proceedings.The
total extent of Sy.No.65/1 Ac.1-39 cents is also the schedule property in
Ex.B.2 proceedings. The claim of the vendor‟s vendor of the plaintiffs
Subramanyam is negatived by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Chittoor.
Aggrieved by the orders passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Chittoor,
an appeal was filed by the vendor‟s vendor of the plaintiffs vide A.S.No.63 of
1964 and the said appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Authority.
21. The defendant relied the evidence of D.W.1 and D.W.2. D.W.1 is
the defendant and D.W.2 is the vendor of the defendant. The defence put forth
by the defendant in the written statement itself is that the suit schedule
property Sy.No.65/1 total extent is Ac.1-39 cents and the said Ac.1-39 cents
along with other items of the property were sold by A.T.M. Rangaramanujam
and Mogili Munaswamy to P. Appa Rao under a registered sale deed, dated
29.06.1960. Ex.B.1 proves the same. The defendant further pleaded that the
said Appa Rao had been in possession and enjoyment and recognizing of his
title, Assistant Settlement Officer, Chittoor granted ryotwari patta to him under
Section 15 of the Estate Abolition Act. Ex.B.2 proves the same. Ex.B.2
clearly goes to show that the entire village of Gollavanigunta was notified as
an Inam Estate and taken over by the Government on 05.02.1959 and the
Assistant Settlement Officer, Chittoor granted a ryotwari patta in favour of
Appa Rao under Section 15 of the Estate Abolition Act.
22. The material on record reveals against the orders passed by the
Assistant Settlement Officer, Chittoor, D. Subramanyam and others filed an
appeal in A.S.No.63 of 1964 which was dismissed on 24.06.1966 by the
appellate authority confirming the ryotwari patta granted to Appa Rao in
respect of suit schedule survey number and other items. Ex.B.3 proves the
same. Subramanyam is none other than the person who alleged to have
been purchased the property under a registered sale deed, dated 05.12.1960
from A. Srinivasulu. The alleged title of Subramanyam is negatived by the
Land Reforms Tribunal. It was also recognized by the Land Reforms Tribunal
in C.C.No.100 of 1975 by the Additional Revenue Divisional Officer, Land
Reforms, Chandragiri and the Special Deputy Tahsildar, Chandragiri also
issued a ryotwari patta in respect of suit schedule property in Sy.No.65/1 to an
extent of Ac.1-39 cents in favour of Appa Rao. The oral and documentary
evidence further proves in turn the said Appa Rao sold the entire extent of
Ac.1-39 cents in Sy.No.65/1 to T. Krishnaiah under a registered sale deed,
dated 11.04.1984 and put him in possession. The defendant specifically
pleaded that the patta was transferred to Krishnaiah by Deputy Tahsildar,
Chandragiri as per the proceedings, dated 29.04.1985 and the same was
endorsed in the settlement register and T. Krishnaiah was in possession.
Subsequent to the death of T. Krishnaiah, his legal representatives sold the
schedule mentioned total property to an extent of Ac.1-39 cents and other
property to the defendant under registered sale deeds. The documentary
evidence produced by the defendant supports the defence put forth by the
defendant in the written statement. Therefore, it is clear that there is a serious
cloud on the title of the vendor‟s vendor of the plaintiffs.
23. The case of the plaintiffs is that their vendor is D. Subramanyam,
since vendor is no more, his legal representatives alienated the property in
Sy.No.65/1 in Gollavanigunta village to the plaintiffs in the year 1983. The
documentary evidence goes to show entire village of Gollavanigunta was
notified as an Inam Estate and taken over by the Government on 05.02.1959,
Ex.B2 reveals the same. Prior to that Appa Rao purchased the total extent of
Ac.1-39 cents in R.S.No.65/1 and he made a claim before the Assistant
Settlement Officer, Chittoor under Ex.B.2 proceedings. In Ex.B2 proceedings,
the vendor‟s vendor of the plaintiffs by name Subramanyam is also one of the
respondents and he contested in the said proceedings before the Assistant
Settlement Officer, Chittoor and D. Subramanyam also gave evidence as
R.W.3 therein.The documents Ex.A.3 and A.4 filed by the plaintiffs herein in
the present suit is also got marked therein as Ex.R.7 and Ex.R.8 on behalf of
D. Subramanyam. The claim of P. Appa Rao was allowed by the Assistant
Settlement Officer, Chittoor, against which, an appeal is also filed by D.
Subramanyam and others vide A.S.No.63/1964 before the Estate Abolition
Tribunal, Chittoor, that appeal was also dismissed.
24. It is well settled that the proceedings under the Act concluded
by the judgment of the Tribunal under Section 15 of the Act cannot be
questioned in a Court of law and it is fairly settled that the judgment
given by the Tribunal under Section 15 of the Act is binding on the Civil
Court. When the estate is notified, the entire estate vests in the State
under Section 3 (b) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948.
25. In a case of T.V. Ramakrishna Reddy vs. M. Mallappa and
another3, the Apex Court held as follows:
The issue is no more res integra. The position has been crystalised by this
Court in the case of Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy[(2008) 4 SCC 594]
in paragraph 21, which read thus:
“21. To summarise, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction
relating to immovable property, is as under:
(a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff’s title and he does not have
possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a
consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff’s title is not in
dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for
possession with a consequential injunction.Where there is merely an
interference with the plaintiff’s lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it
is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter.
(b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession,
normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The
prayer for in junction will be decided with reference to the finding on
possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on
the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title
may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding
thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession.
(c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless
there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title (either
specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar v. Alagammal, (2005) 6
SCC 202] ). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and
where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or
examine or ren der a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even
where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter in volves
complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate3
(2021) 13 Supreme Court Cases 135
the parties to the remedy by way of com prehensive suit for declaration of title,
in stead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction.
(d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate
issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is
simple and straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding
title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the
normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But
persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be
driven to the costlier and more cumber some remedy of a suit for declaration,
merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or
tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion
carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will
refer to the plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending
upon the facts of the case.”
In a case of Jharkhand State Housing Hoard v. Didar Singh4, the Full
Bench of Apex Court held as follows:
“It is well settled by catena of judgments of this Court that in each and every
case where the defendant disputes the title of the plaintiff it is not necessary
that in all those cases the plaintiff has to seek the relief of declaration. A suit
for mere injunction does not lie only when the defendant raises a genuine
dispute with regard to title and when he raises a cloud over the title of the
plaintiff, then necessarily in those circumstances, the plaintiff cannot maintain
a suit for bare injunction.”
Herein the present case on hand, the defendant produced the oral
evidence as well as documentary evidence before the trial Court and raises a
genuine dispute with regard to the title and he also raises a serious cloud over
the title of the plaintiffs, therefore, the simple suit for bear injunction is not at
all maintainable.
26. The learned counsel for the respondents placed a reliance of State
of Madhya Pradesh vs. Sabal Singh (dead) by Legal Representatives and
others5, wherein the Apex Court held as follows:
“About entries in revenue record Trial Court and First Appellate Court, have
recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the land was not under personal
4
(2019) 17 SCC 692
5
(2019) 10 Supreme Court Cases 595
cultivation. It was not open to the High Court to interfere with the findings of
fact, which was based on the proper appreciation of evidence on record. Even
the plaintiff was unable to state whether there was any crop in the relevant
year 2007 before Zamindari abolition. Such finding of fact based on proper
appreciation of evidence could not have been interfered with by the High
Court within the ken of Section 100 CPC.”
The learned counsel for the respondents placed another reliance of
Karnataka Board of Wakf vs. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan 6 ,
wherein the Apex Court held as follows:
“A perusal of this question hardly gives an impression that the said question
involves any question of law much less a substantial question of law. In the
ordinary course, what we have stated above, would have sufficed for the
disposal of this appeal. However, the approach of the High Court in this case
has been in total contravention of the law laid down by this Court in a catena
of decisions.
This Court had repeatedly held that the power of the High Court to interfere in
second appeal under Section 100 of the C.P.C. is limited solely to decide a
substantial question of law, if at all the same arises in the case. It has
deprecated the practice of the High Court routinely interfering in pure findings
of fact reached by the courts below without coming to the conclusion that the
said finding of fact is either perverse or not based on materialonrecord.”
The learned counsel for the respondents placed another reliance of
Narayanan Rajendran and another vs. Lekshmy Sarojini and others 7 ,
wherein the Apex Court held as follows:
“In Gurdev Kaur and Others v. Kaki and Others (2007) 1 SCC 546 in which
one of us (Bhandari, J.) was party to that judgment crystallized the entire legal
position but unfortunately even thereafter in the number of cases it has come
to our notice that the law declared by this court is not followed in a large
number of cases by the High Courts.
6
(1999) 6 Supreme Court Cases 343
7
(2009) 5 Supreme Court Cases 264
Once again we are making serious endeavour to recapitulate the legal
position with the fond hope that the High Courts would keep in mind the legal
position before interfering in a case of concurrent findings of facts arrived at
by the trial court and upheld by the first appellate court.
In Gurdev Kaur (supra), this court exhaustively dealt with the cases before
and after 1976 Amendment of CPC. This court clearly observed that the
scope and ambit of section 100 CPC has been drastically changed after the
amendment.
It is a matter of common experience in this court that despite clear enunciation
of law in a catena of cases of this court, a large number of cases are brought
to our notice where the High Court under section 100 CPC are disturbing the
concurrent findings of fact without formulating the substantial question of
law.”
The learned counsel for the respondents placed another reliance of
Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others 8, wherein
the Apex Court held as follows:
“It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on
which findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first
appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily
reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even
where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no
ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate
court had given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a
given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the
lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting
any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its
opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the
conclusions drawn by the tower appellate court were erroneous being
contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable of its settled position on8
(1999) 3 supreme Court Cases 722
the basis of pronouncements made by the apex Court, or was based upon in
inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.”
The learned counsel for the respondents placed another reliance of
Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur vs. Punjab State Electricity Board and
others9, wherein the Apex Court held as follows:
“The issue of perversity itself is a substantial question of law and,
therefore, Section 103 C.P.C. can be held to be supplementary to Section
100 C.P.C., and does not supplant it altogether. Reading it otherwise, would
render the provisions of Section 100 C.P.C. redundant. It is only an issue that
involves a substantial question of law, that can be adjudicated upon by the
High Court itself instead of remanding the case to the court below, provided
there is sufficient evidence on record to adjudicate upon the said issue and
other conditions mentioned therein stand fulfilled. Thus, the object of the
Section is to avoid remand and adjudicate the issue if the finding(s) of fact
recorded by the court(s) below are found to be perverse. The court is under
an obligation to give notice to all the parties concerned for adjudication of the
said issue and decide the same after giving them full opportunity of hearing.”
In the case on hand, no doubt both the Courts have given a concurrent
finding that the plaintiffs in the suit are entitled for discretionary relief of
permanent injunction. Admittedly, while deciding the case, the Courts below
had not properly appreciated the relevant evidence on record and both the
Courts below have ignored material evidence and this Court noticed there is a
perversity in findings of both the Courts below and appreciation of evidence by
both the Courts below suffers from material irregularities. Both the Courts
came to a wrong conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled a discretionary relief
of permanent injunction. In those circumstances, in a second appeal this
Court is having ample power to interfere with the concurrent findings
given by both the Courts below.
9
(2010) 13 Supreme Court Cases 216
27. In a case of Chandrabhan (deceased) through Lrs. And others
vs. Saraswati and others10, the Apex Court held as follows:
“The principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC relevant for this case may be
summarised thus:
(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a
question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question
of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of
law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a
document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document,
it gives rise to a question of law.
(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial
question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a
material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to
which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of
law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal
principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal
issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation,
where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of
law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either
ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases,
the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable,
but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled
position of law.
(iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of
facts arrived at by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the
well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored
material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong
inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the
courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision
based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth10
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1273
of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a
whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.”
In a case of Balasubramanian and another vs. M. Arockiasamy
(dead) through legal representatives11,the Full Bench of Apex Court held as
follows:
“13.2. In Ramathal v. Maruthathal [(2018) 18 SCC 303], the issue considered
was as to whether the High Court was wrong in interfering with the question of
fact in the second appeal. It was a case where both the courts below had
arrived at a concurrent finding of a fact and both the courts had disbelieved
the evidence of witnesses. In such a case where such concurrent factual
finding was rendered by two courts and in such situation, it had been
interfered by the High Court in a second appeal, this Court was of the view
that the interference was not justified. However, it is appropriate to notice that
in the said decision this Court had also indicated that such restraint against
interference is not an absolute rule but when there is perversity in findings of
the court which are not based on any material or when appreciation of
evidence suffers from material irregularity the High Court would e entitled to
interfere on a question of act as well.”
Therefore, considering the legal position as stated supra and for
the reasons stated above, I am of the considered view that the present
second appeal involves substantial questions of law and not mere
question of law. Therefore, certainly the High Court will interfere in a
second appeal, where it is found if the conclusions drawn by both the
Courts below were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory
provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of
pronouncement made by the Apex Court or was based upon
inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence.
11
(2021) 12 Supreme Court Cases 529
28. The learned counsel for the respondents placed a relianceof Rame
Gowda (dead) by LRs. Vs. M. Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRs. and
another12, wherein the Apex Court held as follows:
“It is settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which
would entitle him t protect his possession even as against the true owner. The
concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his
possession against the owner has come to be settled by a catena of
decisions. Illustratively, we may refer to Munshi Ram v. Delhi Admn., [(AIR
1968 SC 702], Puran Singh v. State of Punjab [(1975) 4 SC 518] and Ram
Rattan v. State of U.P. [ (1977) 1 SCC 188]. The authorities need not be
multiplied. In Munshi Ram case (supra) it was held that no one, including the
true owner, has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser
is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in
the due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the
rightful owner. But merely stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not
give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser
is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be settled possession,
extending over a sufficiently long period of time and acquiesced to by the true
owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting
the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may reenter and
reinstate himself provided he does not use more force than is necessary.
Such entry will be viewed only as resistance to an intrusion upon his
possession which has never been lost.”
In a case of Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by L.Rs.
and others13, the Apex Court held as follows:
“11.3) Where the plaintiff is in possession, but his title to the property is in
dispute, or under a cloud, or where the defendant asserts title thereto and
there is also a threat of dispossession from defendant, the plaintiff will have to
sue for declaration of title and the consequential relief of injunction. Where the
title of plaintiff is under a cloud or in dispute and he is not in possession or not12
(2004) 1 Supreme Court Cases 769
13
AIR 2008 Supreme Court 2033
able to establish possession, necessarily the plaintiff will have to file a suit for
declaration, possession and injunction.”
Admittedly, in the case on hand, except relying on the evidence of some
of the plaintiffs, i.e., P.W.1 to P.W.10, no other evidence is produced by the
plaintiffs to establish their possession and enjoyment in the plaint schedule
properties. The land revenue receipts Ex.A.6 to Ex.A.15 produced by the
plaintiffs in the name of D. Subramanyam are no way helpful to the plaintiffs to
prove the possession of the plaintiffs in the suit schedule property. Admittedly,
there is no evidence on record to establish the possession of the plaintiffs as
on the date of suit. Moreover, the alleged title of the vendor‟s vendor of the
plaintiffs D. Subramanyam is negatived by the Assistant Settlement Officer,
Chittoor, which was confirmed by the Estate Abolition Tribunal, Chittoor and
therefore, the judgment of the Tribunal under Section 15 of the Act cannot be
questioned in a Court of law and the same is binding on the Civil Court. When
the estate is notified by the Government by way of gazette, the entire estate
vests in the State Government under Section 3 (b) of the Andhra Pradesh
(Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948.
29. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds that the title of the
vendor‟s vendor of the plaintiffs is under cloud and also in dispute, therefore,
the suit for bear injunction is not maintainable. Both the Courts below misread
the evidence on record and failed to record correct findings, therefore, those
findings are liable to be set aside. Therefore, the second appeal is liable to be
allowed.
I.A.No.1 of 2024 in S.A.No.231 of 2018
30.This application is filed under Order 41 Rule 27 r/w Section 151 of
CPC to receive the judgment and decree in O.S.No.1042 of 2006, O.S.No.295
of 2013 and O.S.No.583 of 2014 as additional evidence in S.A.No.231 of
2018.
31. The contention of the petitioner in brief is as follows:
The above second appeal has been filed against the judgment in
AS.No.71 of 2011 connected with O.S.No.345 of 2006. One of the pleas taken
in the written statement filed by the petitioner that the suit simpliciter for
injunction is not maintainable when the title of plaintiffs and their vendor is
under cloud. The suit O.S.No.345 of 2006 was filed by 18 plaintiffs, who are
said to have been purchased house plots in Sy.No.65/1 under different sale
deeds on different dates for permanent injunction against the petitioner. The
other persons, who claimed house sites in Sy.No.65/1 filed separate suits,
O.S.Nos.1042 of 2006, 295 of 2013 and 583 of 2014 for permanent injunction.
The trial Court on consideration of the evidence on record and the contentions
of both parties, dismissed the suits on the ground that when an issue of title is
involved between the parties, the plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief of
permanent injunction. The petitioner further contended that the judgment in
the suits, O.S.Nos.1042 of 2006, 295 of 2013 and 583 of 2014 is relating to
Sy.No.65/1 and the petitioner is defendant in all the suits. The judgment in all
the suits became final and no appeals are pending and that the petitioner is
constrained to file the present application.
32. The case of the respondents in brief is as follows:
The petitioner, with the intent to unnecessarily prolonged the
proceedings in the present second appeal, has intentionally filed the present
I.A.No.1 of 2024, seeking to introduce documents as additional evidence.
These documents, specifically the copies of decrees and judgments in
O.S.No.1042 of 2006, O.S.No.295 of 2013 and O.S.No.583 of 2014, relate to
separate suits involving properties distinct from the subject property in the
present second appeal. Moreover, the plaintiffs in the aforesaid suits are
different individuals, and none of the respondents in the present appeal are
parties to those suits. It is further contended that the suits in question were
dismissed in the years 2014 and 2018, long before filing of the present second
appeal and another suit in the year 2002 was dismissed. The petitioner failed
to file these documents in the first appeal in AS.No71 of 2011 or along with
the second appeal in S.A.No.231 of 2018 or after filing of the second appeal,
after the huge unordinary delay, he intentionally filed those documents now as
additional evidence.
33. Heard both sides counsel on record.
34. Order XLI Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code reads as under:
27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.- (1)
The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional
evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But
if–
(a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has
refused to admit evidence which ought to have been
admitted, or(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence,
establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due
diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or
could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced
by him at the time when the decree appealed against was
passed, or
(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be
produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to
pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the
Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to
be produced, or witness to be examined.
(2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to the produced, by
an Appellate Court, the court shall record the reason for its
admission.
The general principle is that the appellate Court should not travel
outside the record of the trial Court and cannot take any evidence in appeal.
However, as an exception under Order 41 Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code,
enable the appellate Court to take evidence in exceptional circumstances
only. The proviso under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. permits the party to produce
additional evidence before the appellate Court provided it has to be come
under the ambit of order 41 Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code.
35. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed a reliance of Anisetti
Bhagyavathi vs. Andaluri Satyanarayana and others14, wherein the Apex
Court held as follows:
“The High Court while hearing second appeal cannot go into the question of
fact. Therefore, the application for admitting additional evidence in a review
petition in second appeal, whether such evidence was within the knowledge of
the party seeking production of the same, or could not have been produced
with due diligence at the time the decree was passed in second appeal cannot
be entertained. Order 42 C.P.C. which says that the provisions of Order 41
would apply to second appeal, has qualified the same by adding the
expression “as far as may be”. Therefore, the contention that in view of the
provisions of Order 41, Rule 27 C.P.C. additional evidence has to be
permitted in second appeal, cannot be accepted.”
The learned counsel for the petitioner placed another reliance of Asha
Narang (Smt) vs. Dr. Ved Prakash Narang15, wherein the Apex Court held
as follows:
“It appears that the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC was filed at the
stage of the second appeal in the High Court only as an afterthought with a
view to delay the proceedings. There is not a whisper in the application filed
in the High Court that the counsel had no authority to close the evidence or
that she did not know about the closure of the evidence or even the dismissal
of the first appeal.
14
1992 SCC OnLine AP 19
15
(1997) 11 Supreme Court Cases 667
Similarly, it is nobody‟s case that the High Court required the documents to be
produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment
or for any other substantial cause, thus clause (b) would also not be
applicable.”
36. The documents to be received as additional evidence is subsequent
to the disposal of suit proceedings before the trial Court. The present suit
proceedings are instituted in the year 2006 and the plaintiffs herein are not
parties to the proceedings in suit in O.S.Nos.1042 of 2006, 295 of 2013 and
583 of 2014. It is well settled that in the absence of pleadings, evidence if any
produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally well settled
that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings and that all
necessary and material facts shall be pleaded by a party in support of the
case set up by it.
37. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any ground to allow the
present application, hence, the present application is liable to be dismissed.
38. In the result, I.A.No.1 of 2024 in S.A.No.231 of 2018 is dismissed.
I.A.No.2 of 2024 in S.A.No.231 of 2018
39.This application is filed to punish the respondent Nos.13 and 14 for
willfully violating the order in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in SA No.231 of 2018, dated
15.06.2018 as per the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and Order 39
Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure.
40. The contention of the petitioner is that the composite High Court of
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in S.A.No.231 of 2018,
dated 15.06.2018 has directed the respondents therein not to demolish or
change the existing physical features and to maintain status quo pending
second appeal. It is further contended that at the instance of respondents, the
unsocial elements along with JCBs and tractors came to the subject land on
11.11.2024 and tried to demolish the compound wall, on the same day, the
petitioner has given complaint to the police, since no action has been taken,
the petitioner filed W.P.No.26052 of 2024 before this Court and the same is
pending. It is further contended that the respondent Nos.13 and 14 have
applied for electricity service connection on 11.11.2024 and the Southern
Power Distribution Company has provided electricity service to the respondent
Nos.13 and 14.
41. The case of the respondents in brief as follows:
Despite the specific directions issued by this Court to both parties to
maintain the status quo, the petitioner has violated the same. The petitioner
alienated the subject property, which forms part of the suit schedule
properties, in favour of one G.Jaya Prakash, through a registered sale deed
bearing Document No.5529/2018, dated 15.10.2018. Subsequently, G. Jaya
Prakash, while suppressing the fact that the Court has passed an order of
status quo, fraudulently obtained building permission under permit
No.1012/0080/B/TIR/G/ 2022, dated 02.03.2022, and commenced
unauthorized construction on the said property. The respondents further
contended that upon noticing the commencement of construction, 14th
respondent immediately approached the Tirupati Municipal Corporation,
through a representation, dated 27.12.2024, highlighting that the building
permission obtained by G. Jaya Prakash had been procured by suppressing
the interim order passed by this Court in S.A.No.231 of 2018. The 14th
respondent sought the immediate cancellation of the said building permission.
However, the Tirupati Municipal Corporation failed to act upon the
representation. Consequently, the 14th respondent filed a writ petition,
W.P.No.31357 of 2024 before this Court and that they prayed to dismiss the
application.
42. Heard both sides counsel on record.
43. The material on record in the present application goes to show that
the petitioner levelled allegations against respondent Nos.13 and 14 and also
filed W.P.No.26052 of 2024 against respondent Nos.13 and 14 and the said
writ petition is pending. The respondents also levelled allegations against the
petitioner and also filed a W.P.No.31357 of 2024 against the petitioner. The
order passed by this Court is an interim order in the second appeal. The said
order is only an interim order but not a final order. Moreover, this Court has
not passed any interim injunction pending the second appeal. Both the parties
approached the writ Court and filed writ petitions against each other and those
writ petitions are pending. Moreover, the prima facie material produced by
both parties in this application is not sufficient to decide the subject matter in
the present application under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC.
44. With the above observations, this application in I.A.No.2 of 2024 in
S.A.No.231 of 2018 is dismissed.
S.A.No.231 of 2018:
45. In the result, the Second Appeal No.231 of 2018 is allowed. The
Judgment and decree, dated 22.12.2017 in A.S.No.71 of 2011, on the file of
the VI Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Tirupati and the Judgment
and decree, dated 11.02.2011 in O.S.No.345 of 2006, on the file of the
Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati are hereby set aside. Consequently, the
suit in O.S.No.345 of 2006 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge,
Tirupati is dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case,
each party do bear their own costs in the second appeal.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall
stand closed.
_________________________________________________________________________________
V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J
Date: 16.06.2025
PGR