Telangana High Court
City Union Bank Ltd vs M/S Asian Securities And Estates Ltd. on 9 June, 2025
Author: G. Radha Rani
Bench: G. Radha Rani
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE G. RADHA RANI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1762 of 2019
ORDER:
This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioner – defendant No.10
challenging the order passed by the learned II Additional District Judge,
Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar in I.A.No.1264 of 2017 in O.S.No.291 of
2017 dated 22.04.2019.
2. I.A.No.1264 of 2017 is filed by the petitioner – defendant No.10 under
Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of CPC to direct the plaintiffs to value
the suit on the outstanding balance of Rs.18,77,85,093.20 ps., and to pay the
proper Court fee on the said amount, and in case of failure, to reject the plaint.
3. The petitioner – defendant No.10 was a banking company incorporated
under the Company’s Act, 1956 represented by its Managing Director. The
Branch Manager of A.S.Rao Nagar Branch of the petitioner bank filed an
affidavit in support of the petition stating that the suit was filed by the plaintiff
against defendants 1 to 4 seeking the relief of declaration of various sale deeds
as illegal, null and void and not binding on the plaintiff and for perpetual
injunction restraining the defendants from transferring or conveying or creating
any third party right on the schedule properties. The defendant No.9 created an
equitable mortgage in plaint “C” schedule property by depositing relevant title
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deeds namely development agreement – cum – General Power of Attorney (for
short “GPA”) bearing document No.4460 of 2007, original additional
supplementary development agreement dated 22.07.2015, original
supplementary development agreement dated 19.03.2015 and original registered
sale deed bearing document No.2829 of 2016 with the defendant bank and
confirmed the same by executing registered Memorandum of Deposit of title
deeds dated 15.03.2016 bearing document No.3276 of 2016 and extension of
mortgage by way of a memorandum dated 05.08.2016. Thus, a valid mortgage
was created on the plaint “C” schedule property as security to the loan facility
availed by him of Rs.20,00,00,000/- in total as on the date of filing of the suit i.e.
by 31.03.2017. The plaintiff was challenging the said mortgage in the above
suit and prayed for declaration of the sale deed document No.2829 of 2016,
memorandum of deposit of title deeds, etc., as illegal, null and void, etc. Since
the mortgage created on plaint “C” schedule property was offered as security for
the loan facility of Rs.20.00 crores and the outstanding amount due and payable
under the said loan facility as on the date of the suit was Rs.18,77,85,093.20ps.,
the plaintiff ought to have valued the relief of declaring the sale deed document
No.2829 of 2016 and memorandum of deposit of title deed bearing document
No.3276 of 2016 as null and void on the outstanding amount due and payable.
However, the plaintiff erroneously and wrongly valued the suit for the reliefs
including the said relief at Rs.1,00,000/- only and paid Court fee of Rs.3,426/-
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only, which was illegal and against the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Court Fee
& Suit Valuation Act, 1956 (for short “the Act”, 1956).
4. The respondent – plaintiff filed a counter affidavit in the said I.A.
contending that the documents such as additional supplementary development
agreement dated 22.07.2015 and original supplementary development
agreement dated 19.03.2015 referred by the petitioner claimed to have been
deposited by respondent – defendant No.9 were rank forged and fabricated, as
the respondent – plaintiff never executed such documents. The said documents
would need to be put to test of authenticity by referring the same to expert study
or forensic examination. The petitioner – defendant No.10 bank should take
steps to ascertain the truth of the documents and to initiate proceedings under
criminal law against its alleged borrowers, who filed them before it. Such
action by the petitioner – defendant No.10 would demonstrate the sincerity and
honesty of the petitioner. The respondent – plaintiff contended that when the
title of respondent – defendant No.9 was under scanner, the question of
mortgaging it would not arise. The petitioner in collusion with respondent –
defendant No.9 was figuring the amounts as per their whims and fancies
without there being any such scrutiny regarding the entitlement of respondent –
defendant No.9. The allegation that the respondent – plaintiff wrongly valued
the suit was false and incorrect. The respondent – plaintiff valued the suit on
proper verification as per the provisions of the Act, 1956. Therefore, the
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question of improper valuation of suit would not arise. The Office of the Court
upon due scrutiny and inspection accepted the validation rendered by the
respondent – plaintiff and registered the suit. The ingredients contained in the
petition would not come under the ambit of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC and
prayed to dismiss the petition.
5. The trial court on considering the arguments of the counsel of the
petitioner and respondent No.1 – plaintiff and considering the citations relied by
them, observed that as plaintiff was not a party to the document, there was no
necessity for him to pay the Court fee as per Section 37 of the Act, 1956. The
payment of Court fee on notional value was between the plaintiff and the Court.
The Court at any time by giving notice could enhance the notional value and
collect the deficit Court fee. The petitioner – defendant No.10 could not contend
that the outstanding amounts were to a tune of Rs.18.00 crores and odd relating
to “C” schedule property, as such could not seek for a direction to the plaintiff
to pay the Court fee on the outstanding amount. No tenable reasons were there
to reject the plaint and accordingly dismissed the petition.
6. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the petitioner – defendant No.10
preferred this revision.
7. Heard Sri Ambadipudi Satyanarayana, learned Senior Counsel
representing on behalf of Smt.Ch.Laxmi Chaya, learned counsel for the
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petitioner on record and Ms.D.Shivani Reddy, learned counsel for the
respondent No.1 – plaintiff on behalf of M/s.Resu Law Office.
8. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that when the
plaintiff was seeking the relief to set aside the sale deed, the valuation of the suit
ought to be the value of the property mentioned in the document, but not on
notional value. Since the sale deed has been deposited with the bank and a
mortgage has been created in favor of the bank and virtually the plaintiff was
seeking the relief of setting aside the mortgage, in such circumstances, valuing
the suit for the said relief notionally on Rs.1,00,000/- was not correct. As per
Section 37 of the Act, 1956, the value ought to have been mentioned as the
value mentioned in the deed. When the sale deed and consequential mortgage
deed were sought to be cancelled, the value must be the amount mentioned in
the deed and not on notional value of Rs.1,00,000/-. The suit was not properly
valued. The trial Judge being the custodian of the Court fee to be paid, ought to
have directed the plaintiff to value the suit properly and in case of failure ought
to have rejected the plaint. But the trial court erroneously dismissed the petition.
An enquiry need to be conducted by the Court whether the “C” schedule
property fell to the share of defendant No.1 or plaintiff. If it fell to the share of
defendant No.1, the defendant No.1 should seek for cancellation of the
document, but not the plaintiff. The plaintiff was not the owner of the property.
He was a developer. If the property fell within the share of the plaintiff then
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only he had the right to seek for cancellation. The plaintiff being a constructive
party to the document, the said document was binding on him. As such, he
should ask for cancellation under Section 37 of the Act, 1956, but not under
Section 24(d) of the said Act. There was no pleading in the plaint whether the
“C” schedule property would fall under 43% or 57% and relied upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in J.Vasanthi & Others v. N.Ramani
Kanthammal (Dead) represented by Legal Representatives & Others 1 and
of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Nade Ali Mirza & Others v.
Mrs.Khalida Mohammed Salim Dawawala & Others 2.
9. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 – plaintiff on the other hand
contended that the defendant No.1 without having any right alienated an extent
of 44000 square feet of constructed area to defendant No.9. The defendant No.9
mortgaged to defendant No.10 for Rs.20.00 crores. Three sets of alienations
were made by defendant No.1 over and above as to what he was entitled. As
such, the plaintiff filed the suit for declaration and consequential injunction.
The trial court rightly dismissed the petition as the respondent No.1 – plaintiff
was not a party to the document sought for cancellation. There was no illegality
in the order of the trial court to set aside the same and relied upon the judgments
of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh v. Randhir
1
(2017) 11 SCC 852
2
2016 (1) ALT 300
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Singh and Others 3 and of the same judgment relied by the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner in Nade Ali Mirza & Others v. Mrs. Khalida
Mohammed Salim Dawawala & Others (cited supra).
10. Perused the record.
11. As per the averments in the plaint, the plaintiff was a real estate company
and proposed to develop a project at Kothaguda Village, Serilingampally
Mandal, Rangareddy District into residential and commercial blocks and the
respective owners and possessors of land admeasuring Ac.6-26 guntas forming
part of Survey Nos.41, 42, 48, 49, 50 and 53 of Kothaguda Village had offered
him to develop their respective lands into residential / commercial blocks. The
defendant No.1 along with one P.Madhusudhan Reddy, who were owners and
possessors of the land admeasuring Ac.1-00 guntas forming part of Survey
Nos.41 and 42 situated at Kothaguda Village, having noticed that the plaintiff
was developing the land admeasuring Ac.6-26 guntas abutting their property
approached the plaintiff offering their land for development and requested to
develop the same commonly along with other abutting lands. The plaintiff
entered into a registered development agreement – cum – GPA dated 30.11.2006
bearing document No.4460 of 2007 for the entire land admeasuring Ac.7-26
guntas, which was shown as suit schedule “A” property. The plaintiff submitted
that the land owners of schedule “A” property including defendant No.1 and
3
AIR 2010 SC 2807
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P.Madhusudhan Reddy delivered physical possession of the land to the plaintiff
under the registered development agreement – cum – GPA dated 30.11.2006.
One of the terms included in the said development agreement specifies the
entitlement of shares to the plaintiff and land owners of schedule “A” property
as 47% share to the plaintiff and 53% share to the land owners of schedule “A”
property including defendant No.1 and P.Madhusudhan Reddy jointly. The
plaintiff obtained required permissions, procured construction material,
expertise manpower, etc., as required for the project and commenced the
construction in phase wise manner and the same was under progress. While so,
the defendants 2 to 8 issued a legal notice dated 31.10.2014 contending that
they entered into various registered instruments with defendant No.1 to
purchase his entitlement from and out of suit schedule “A” property and claimed
that they purchased individually various extents total accumulating to 44,914
square feet of constructed area along with proportionate undivided shares and
demanded for allocation of extents physically under a supplementary indenture.
The plaintiff contended that the said allocation demanded by defendants 2 to 8
was imaginary without there being any physical existence. The defendant No.1
had no opportunity to deliver any physical possession of schedule “B” property
to defendants 2 to 8 as defendant No.1 himself never acquired from the plaintiff
after the development agreement. The documents relied by defendants 2 to 8 in
respect of suit schedule “B” property were fabricated and invented in collusion
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with defendant No.1 without there being any true transaction. The plaintiff
issued a reply notice. The defendants 2 to 8 went upon speculative proceedings
got issued another legal notice dated 21.11.2014 invoking clause-42 of the
development agreement – cum – GPA dated 30.11.2016 contending that they
acquired the alleged rights from defendant No.1. On receipt of the said legal
notice, the plaintiff also got issued a reply notice dated 29.11.2014 that there
was no contractual obligation between the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 8. The
defendants 2 to 8 filed proceedings under Section 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 vide O.P.No.128 of 2015 on the file of the I Additional
District Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar against the plaintiff claiming
various reliefs in respect of schedule “A” property including a restraint order
pending disposal of arbitration proceedings. Apart from filing O.P.No.128 of
2015, the defendants 2 to 8 also filed an arbitration application No.44 of 2015
before the High Court under Section 11(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 for appointment of arbitrator against the plaintiff and several others.
11.1. During the pendency of O.P.No.128 of 2015, the defendants 2 to 8 jointly
issued legal notice dated 12.02.2017 to defendant No.1 along with plaintiff and
defendants 9 to 24 alleging that defendant No.1 ignoring the transactions made
in their favor with regard to schedule “B” property had further transferred the
property in the shape of residential plots to defendant No.9 under registered sale
deed dated 05.03.2016 bearing document No.2829 of 2016. Keeping the
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transaction with defendants 2 to 8 in respect of schedule “B” property apart, the
defendant No.1 further indulged in multiplying documents while entering into
transaction with defendant No.9 in respect of schedule “C” property. The
defendant No.9 inturn mortgaged the said property in favor of defendant No.10
without any right or qualification.
11.2. The plaintiff further averred that defendant No.1 apart from making the
above said transactions further executed and entered into various transactions
with defendants 11 to 24 in respect of various properties delineated as items 1 to
10 in the schedule “D” property.
11.3. The notice dated 12.02.2017 issued by defendants 2 to 8 would refer to
the above said documents executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendants 11
to 24 and the same would show that there were unregistered supplementary
agreements dated 19.03.2015 and 08.08.2016 executed by plaintiff in favor of
defendant No.1 to the registered development agreement – cum – GPA dated
30.11.2006. The plaintiff contended that he never executed any supplementary
agreements to the registered development agreement – cum – GPA dated
30.11.2006. The defendant No.1 with a malicious intention had forged,
fabricated and invented the said supplementary agreements to play fraud on
everybody. The defendant No.1 without there being any physical allotment of
shares either in the shape of flats or otherwise from and out of suit schedule “A”
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property was having no right or occasion to make any indentures either as
schedule “B”, schedule “C” or schedule “D” properties. The defendants 2 to 8
in the said notice demanded the plaintiff to cancel the non-existing forged
supplementary agreements.
11.4. The plaintiff having seen the confusion and multiplication of dispute
made enquires before the Registrars concerned and noticed that defendant No.1
though not qualified to execute any transaction in favor of defendants 2 to 8
with regard to schedule “B” property colluded with defendant No.9 and created
registered sale deed dated 08.03.2016 bearing document No.2829 of 2016 as if
the suit schedule “C” property was alienated to him, who in turn charged the
same before defendant No.10 for money playing fraud with public money. So
also the defendant No.1 executed various registered instruments to defendants
11 to 24 in respect of suit schedule “D” property though not entitled for the
same. As such, filed the suit for cancellation of the above documents and
seeking the consequential relief of perpetual injunction.
12. The suit was filed by the respondent No.1 – plaintiff seeking declaration
to declare the registered sale deed documents executed by defendant No.1 in
favor of defendants 2 to 8 with regard to suit schedule “B” property as null and
void, illegal and that they were not binding on the plaintiff and to declare the
registered sale deed document dated 08.03.2016 bearing document No.2829 of
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2016 alleged to have been executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant
No.9 with regard to schedule “C” property, consequently the memorandum of
deposit of title deed dated 15.03.2016 bearing document No.3276 of 2016
executed by defendant No.9 in favor of defendant No.10 as null and void, illegal
and would not bind upon him and to declare the registered agreement of sale –
cum – GPAs, assignment deeds, sale deeds., etc., executed by defendant No.1 in
favor of defendants 11 to 24 in respect of items 1 to 10 of schedule “D” property
derived from suit schedule “A” property as null and void, illegal and would not
bind upon him and consequently for perpetual injunction restraining the
defendants jointly and severally from interfering with his possession and
construction over the suit schedule “A” property, which included suit schedule
B to D properties. The suit was notionally valued at Rs.1,00,000/- on each
document under Section 24(d) of the Act, 1956 and a Court Fee of Rs.3,426/-
each was paid, which together comes to Rs.75,372/-. The relief of perpetual
injunction with regard to suit schedule “A” property was notionally valued at
Rs.5,00,000/- under Section 26(c) of the Act, 1956, for which a Court fee of
Rs.7,426/- was paid. For all the reliefs, a total Court fee of Rs.82,798/- was
paid.
13. As seen from the contents of the plaint, the plaintiff was not a party to
any of the documents, which he was seeking to be declared as null and void and
not binding upon him.
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14. The High Court of Telangana at Hyderabad while deciding in Nade Ali
Mirza & Others v. Mrs.Khalida Mohammed Salim Dawawala & Others
(cited supra) in C.R.P.No.4485 of 2012 on 27.10.2015 almost on a similar issue
while considering whether the Court fee payable on the relief of declaration
sought whether payable on market value of property or notional value in a suit
for perpetual injunction and for declaring 107 registered sale deeds and
agreements of sale – cum – GPAs executed by some of the defendants in favor of
other defendants as null and void, while considering the judgment of the Privy
Council in Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Srimati Krishna Mahishi Debi 4 and
Ramaswamy Iyengar v. Rangacharyar 5 , which were followed in
Mohammed Ikramuddin v. Sangram Bosle and Others [2007 (5) ALT 607],
held that:
“39. In Mohd. Ikramuddin [2007 (5) ALT 607], the plaintiff
had filed a suit for declaration of title and recovery of
possession of plaint schedule properties. He also sought a
declaration that a sale deed executed by 2nd defendant in
favour of 1st defendant is null and void. Since it was a suit for
declaration of title and recovery of possession, he paid court fee
under Section 24 (d) of the Act.
40. The said provision states :
24. Suits for declaration : —
4
34 ILR (Kolkata) PC 329
5
1940 AIR (Madras) 113
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(d) In other cases, whether the subject-matter of the suit is
capable of valuation or not, fee shall be computed on the
amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or at
which such relief is valued by the Court whichever is higher.
41. The trial court took an objection about the payment of court
fee and directed him to pay court fee under Section 37 of the
Act since he is asking for declaration that a registered sale deed
was null and void and not binding on him. This was questioned
in Revision before this Court. This Court held that since the
plaintiff was not a party to the registered sale deed, he need not
ask for cancellation of it and he is perfectly justified in asking
for consequential relief of declaration that the sale deed is not
binding on him. It held that merely because, to be on the safe
side, the plaintiff sought for the relief for declaration that the
sale deed is null and void and paid the court fee under Section
24 (d) of the Act, it did not mean that the suit falls under
Section 37 and not Section 24 (d). It further held that such a
prayer for declaration or cancellation could as well be ignored
and court fee need not be paid thereon. It held that according to
the plaint, when the plaintiff is not a party to the sale deed, he
need not ask for cancellation of the sale deed as the
cancellation implies that the person suing should be an actual or
constructive party to a valid or operative document. It held that
a third party like the plaintiff is not bound by a document of the
description in question and is not obliged to sue for
cancellation. It set aside the order of the court below directing
the plaintiff to pay court fee under Section 37 of the Act but not
under Section 24 (d) and held that since according to the
plaintiff it is a sham transaction, he need not pray for its
cancellation and even if such a prayer is made, he need not pay
court fee.”
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15. The Court further held that:
“42. … Since they are not parties to the 107 sale
deeds/agreements of sale cum GPAs mentioned in the plaint,
and they contend that they are sham, invalid, null and void and
collusive documents and have sought a declaration that they are
null and void and not binding on them, they not only need not
seek relief that these documents be cancelled, but they are also
not bound to pay any court fee on this relief of declaration in
view of the decisions in Bijoy Gopala Mukerji (2
supra), Radha Rani (24 supra), Ramaswami Ayyengar (1
supra), Nagappan (26 supra) and Mohd. Ikramuddin (3
supra).
43. Therefore conclusion of the court below that the petitioners
are bound to pay court fee for the said relief on the market
value of the plaint schedule properties as indicated in Ex.A.1
market value certificate dt.27.07.2011, is unsustainable.
46. The reliance on Section 24 by the court below in this regard
also cannot be sustained since the provisions therein would be
attracted only if the petitioners have sought a declaration of
their title and sought relief of possession/injunction or if they
sought for a declaration that documents to which they are
parties are null and void or a declaration of any nature other
than one sought for in the plaint. The said provision would have
no application in a situation where the petitioners are not
parties to the documents which they wish to be declared as null
and void and not binding on them.”
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16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment relied by the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner in J.Vasanthi v. N.Ramani Kanthammal (dead)
represented by Legal representatives (cited supra) held that the plaintiff was a
party to the transaction and filed a suit for declaration for treating the documents
as null and void, considered it as amounting to seeking the relief of cancellation
of documents under Section 40 of the Tamilnadu Court Fee and Suit Valuation
Act, 1955.
16.1. The Hon’ble Apex Court further referring to a 2-Judge Bench case in
Sri Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt. Vimla [AIR 1961 SC 1299], held that:
“26. In this context, we have been commended to the decision
in A. Nawab John and others v. V.N. Subramaniyam
[(2012) 7 SCC 738]. On a careful perusal of the said decision,
we find that the said authority nowhere addresses the issue that
is involved in the case at hand. Proper valuation of the subject
matter or under valuation is an aspect which can be contested
by the defendant, but the said contest is limited. In this regard,
the two-Judge Bench has reproduced two passages from
Rathnavarmaraja v. Vimla [AIR 1961 SC 1299] which we
think seemly to reproduce:
“2. “The Court Fees Act was enacted to collect revenue for the
benefit of the State and not to arm a contesting party with a
weapon of defence to obstruct the trial of an action.” By
recognizing that the defendant was entitled to contest the
valuation of the properties in dispute as if it were a matter in
issue between him and the plaintiff and by entertaining
petitions preferred by the defendant to the High Court in
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crp_1762_2019exercise of its revisional jurisdiction against the order
adjudging court fee payable on the plaint, all progress in the
suit for the trial of the dispute on the merits has been effectively
frustrated for nearly five years. We fail to appreciate what
grievance the defendant can make by seeking to invoke the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court on the question
whether the plaintiff has paid adequate court fee on his plaint.
“Whether proper court fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a
question between the plaintiff and the State”. How by an order
relating to the adequacy of the court fee paid by the plaintiff,
the defendant may feel aggrieved, it is difficult to appreciate.
Again, the jurisdiction in revision exercised by the High Court
under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly
conditioned by clauses (a) to (c) thereof and may be invoked on
the ground of refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in the
subordinate court or assumption of jurisdiction which the court
does not possess or on the ground that the court has acted
illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The defendant who may believe and even honestly
that proper court fee has not been paid by the plaintiff has still
no right to move the superior courts by appeal or in revision
against the order adjudging payment of court fee payable on the
plaint. But counsel for the defendant says that by Act 14 of
1955 enacted by the Madras Legislature which applied to the
suit in question, the defendant has been invested with a right
not only to contest in the trial court the issue whether adequate
court fee has been paid by the plaintiff, but also to move the
High Court in revision if an order contrary to his submission is
passed by the court. Reliance in support of that contention is
placed upon sub-section (2) of Section 12.
—-
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3. But “this section only enables the defendant to raise a
contention as to the proper court fee payable on a plaint and to
assist the court in arriving at a just decision on that question”.
Our attention has not been invited to any provision of the
Madras Court Fees Act or any other statute which enables the
defendant to move the High Court in revision against the
decision of the court of first instance on the matter of court fee
payable in a plaint. The Act, it is true by Section 19 provides
that for the purpose of deciding whether the subject-matter of
the suit or other proceeding has been properly valued or
whether the fee paid is sufficient, the court may hold such
enquiry as it considers proper and issue a commission to any
other person directing him to make such local or other
investigation as may be necessary and report thereon. The
anxiety of the legislature to collect court fee due from the
litigant is manifest from the detailed provisions made
in Chapter III of the Act, but those provisions do not arm the
defendant with a weapon of technicality to obstruct the
progress of the suit by approaching the High Court in revision
against an order determining the court fee payable.”
(emphasis supplied)
16.2. and held that:
“27. On a perusal of the decision in Rathnavarmaraja (supra),
we find the controversy had arisen with regard to proper
valuation and the stand of the defendant was that the court fee
had not been properly paid and in that context, the Court has
held what as we have reproduced hereinabove. The issue being
different, the said decision is distinguishable. We may reiterate
that proper valuation of the suit property stands on a different
footing than applicability of a particular provision of an Act
under which court fee is payable and in such a situation, it is
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crp_1762_2019not correct to say that it has to be determined on the basis of
evidence and it is a matter for the benefit of the revenue and the
State and not to arm a contesting party with a weapon of
defence to obstruct the trial of an action. It is because the Act
empowers the defendant to raise the plea of jurisdiction on a
different yardstick.”
17. In the present case also, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner
contended that the payment of Court fee is a mixed question of fact and law and
the same has to be decided on the basis of evidence. Evidence was required to
consider whether the “C” schedule property fell to the share of defendant No.1
or plaintiff and if it falls to the share of defendant No.1, it was defendant No.1,
who should seek for cancellation of the document. If the property falls within
the share of plaintiff, then only he has the right to seek for cancellation. The
plaintiff was also a constructive party to the alleged documents and that the
documents were binding upon him and as such he should ask for cancellation
under Section 37 of the Act, 1956 on the entire value of the property, but not
taking a notional value.
18. This Court does not accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioner with regard to the applicability of Section 37 of the Act, 1956,
as the plaintiff is not a party to the said document and not sought for
cancellation of the documents. He was only seeking the relief that they were
not binding upon him.
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19. In Sri Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt.Vimla case, the Hon’ble Apex Court
held that the matter of Court fee was primarily a question between the plaintiff
and the State and the defendant who believes that proper Court fee has not been
paid by the plaintiff has no right to move the superior Courts by appeal or in
revision against the order adjudging Court fee payable on the plaint. The
provisions of the Act do not arm the defendant with a weapon of technicality to
obstruct the progress of the suit by approaching the High Court in revision,
against an order determining the Court fee payable.
20. Thus, the defendant has no right to file this revision on the adjudgment
made by the trial court with regard to the payment of Court fee payable on the
plaint.
21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Suhrid Singh alias Sardool Singh v.
Randhir Singh and Others (cited supra) in a suit for declaration that sale deed
executed by plaintiff’s father is null and void and for joint possession, held that,
it was not a suit for cancellation of sale deed, Court fee need not be paid on sale
consideration mentioned in sale deed and that the Court fee was computable
under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 as amended in Punjab. The
Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case observed that:
“7. In this case, there is no prayer for cancellation of the sale
deeds. The prayer is for a declaration that the deeds do not bind
the “coparcenery” and for joint possession. The plaintiff in the
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Dr.GRR, J
crp_1762_2019suit was not the executant of the sale deeds. Therefore, the
court fee was computable under section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. The
trial court and the High Court were therefore not justified in
holding that the effect of the prayer was to seek cancellation of
the sale deeds or that therefore court fee had to be paid on the
sale consideration mentioned in the sale deeds.
22. In the present case also, the plaintiff had not sought for cancellation of the
documents executed by defendant No.1 in favor of all the other defendants, but
only sought that they were not binding upon him. As cancellations can be
sought only by the party to the document, this Court does not find any illegality
or irregularity in the order passed by the trial court to set aside the same.
23. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed confirming the order
passed by the learned II Additional District Judge, Rangareddy District in
I.A.No.1264 of 2017 in O.S.No.291 of 2017 dated 22.04.2019. No order as to
costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending in this petition, if any,
shall stand closed.
_____________________
Dr. G.RADHA RANI, J
Date: 09.06.2025
Nsk