CLAT PG Mock Legal Practice Questions February 2025

Legal Bites brings you the CLAT PG Mock Legal Practice Questions – February 2025, designed to help you refine your preparation strategy and boost your legal aptitude. With the rising competition and evolving exam patterns, consistent practice with quality questions is essential to stay ahead.

(This extract is taken from State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore, Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 16358 of 2024)

1. Which of the following scenarios would not justify the registration of a second FIR as per the Supreme Court’s reasoning in State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore?

A. A second FIR relating to the same incident, merely expanding on the facts already known in the first FIR.

B. A second FIR where the accused files a counter-version of the event in question.

C. A second FIR exposing a larger conspiracy not covered by the original FIR.

D. A second FIR revealing hitherto unknown facts by a new informant.

2. According to the judgment, which principle best governs the maintainability of a second FIR?

A. Rule of sub judice

B. Principle of finality

C. Test of sameness

D. Doctrine of prospective overruling

3. The High Court quashed the second FIR primarily because:

A. It was filed without court permission.

B. It concerned the same type of offence and was committed close in time to the first.

C. It lacked supporting evidence.

D. It named the same accused as the first FIR.

4. The use of the expression “inter alia” in the opening line of the passage implies that:

A. The list of principles provided is exhaustive.

B. The principles mentioned are the only ones recognized by law.

C. There are additional principles beyond those expressly listed.

D. Only the first and last principles are relevant to the case.

5. In T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 181], the Supreme Court held that registration of a second FIR for the same offence is generally impermissible. Which constitutional right does the Court say this would violate?

A. Article 14 – Right to Equality

B. Article 19 – Freedom of Speech and Expression

C. Article 20 – Protection against Double Jeopardy

D. Article 21 – Right to Life and Personal Liberty

II. “If custodial interrogation of an accused is not necessary in connection with the investigation of a case, can a court of law grant anticipatory bail in all cases? If the maximum punishment that can be imposed for the offence alleged in a case is below seven years, whether a court of law can grant bail to an accused in a case without considering the allegation against the accused and the antecedents of the accused? These are the questions to be decided in this case…

The apex court said that, if a police officer before arrest, in such cases has to be further satisfied that such arrest is necessary to prevent such person from committing any further offence.

Custodial interrogation can be one of the relevant aspects to be considered along with other grounds while deciding an application seeking anticipatory bail. There may be many cases in which the custodial interrogation of the accused may not be required, but that does not mean that the prima facie case against the accused should be ignored or overlooked and he should be granted anticipatory bail.”

(This extract is taken from P.C. George v. State of Kerala & Anr., B.A. No. 1874 of 2025)

6. What was the main legal issue considered in P.C. George v. State of Kerala?

A. Whether hate speech is protected under Article 19(1)(a)

B. Whether anticipatory bail can be granted solely on the ground that custodial interrogation is not necessary

C. Whether political speech can be criminalised under BNS

D. Whether Section 196 BNS is constitutional

7. Which of the following offences were alleged against P.C. George in the 2025 case?

A. Sections 196(1)(a) and 299 of the BNS, and Section 120(o) of KP Act

B. Sections 153A and 295A IPC

C. Sections 499 and 500 IPC

D. Sections 120B and 420 IPC

8. What do the term “antecedents” primarily refer to in criminal law?

A. Family background of the accused

B. Educational qualifications of the accused

C. Previous criminal history, including convictions and allegations

D. Behaviour of the accused during the trial

9. What does the judgment emphasise about the nature of bail?

A. Bail is a fundamental and unrestricted right

B. Bail must be granted in all bailable offences

C. Bail is not an absolute right and must be weighed against public interest

D. Bail decisions cannot consider prior allegations

10. Why must courts consider antecedents while deciding bail applications?

A. To assess the economic status of the accused

B. To balance equity among co-accused

C. To ensure that habitual offenders are not given undue leniency

D. To delay the proceedings intentionally

III. What is discernible from the record is that despite Tribunal’s order dated 01.12.2003 directing the Collector to cause a departmental inquiry in respect of the appellant’s allegations to the effect that though she joined the office and signed the attendance register she was not allowed to perform her duties and was not paid salary from May, 1987 onwards, no such inquiry was ever conducted by the respondents/authorities. Even though the order passed by the respondents/authorities on 19.05.2011 that her unauthorized absence is treated as extraordinary leave and her service is regularized was not challenged subsequently, the fact remains that the appellant has been condemned unheard without subjecting her to any departmental inquiry despite Tribunal’s order. Any observation by the Tribunal or the High Court in subsequent proceedings that the appellant failed to demonstrate that she was prevented from performing her duties would not enure to the benefit of the respondents for the simple reason that the said fact could have been established either for or against the appellant only in a duly constituted departmental inquiry. The respondents’ failure to conduct an inquiry as per Tribunal’s order cannot shift the burden on the appellant to prove that she was prevented from working. Denial of pensionary benefits to an employee must emanate from any rule enabling the government for such denial. When the services have been regularized by treating the same as extraordinary leave the same cannot be treated as unauthorised leave for denying the pensionary benefits.

(This extract is taken from Jaya Bhattacharya v. State of West Bengal & Ors., 2025 INSC 270)

11. On what grounds did the Court find the denial of pension unjustified?

A. Because she had worked for 25 years

B. Because the appellant was a woman

C. Because the authorities regularized her absence without inquiry

D. Because she had political connections

12. Which of the following best reflects the Court’s criticism of the authorities?

A. The authorities overcompensated the appellant

B. The authorities failed to conduct a departmental inquiry as ordered

C. The authorities illegally promoted the appellant

D. The authorities refused to consider her resignation

13. What principle did the Court stress regarding denial of pensionary benefits?

A. Benefits can be denied based on public opinion

B. Such denial must arise from a valid government rule

C. Pensions are discretionary and can be denied without reasons

D. Denial is valid if the employee has no political backing

14. How did the Court address the appellant’s claim after finding no inquiry was conducted?

A. Dismissed the appeal for delay

B. Ordered criminal action against the officials

C. Directed finalisation of pension within three months, without arrears

D. Referred the case back to the Tribunal

15. Which of the following best describes the Court’s stance on departmental inquiry?

A. It is unnecessary if the employee is absent

B. It is optional and at the discretion of authorities

C. It is mandatory if the employee alleges wrongful denial of work

D. It should only be held after High Court directions

IV. The Petitioner tried to upload an online application on the Web portal of the State Government, known as “Aaple Sarkar”. However, she could not complete the application and upload it since she prayed for a caste certificate on the basis of her mother’s caste. “Aaple Sarkar” Web Portal accepts only the details of the father. Hence, it is prayed that a direction be issued not only to grant a caste certificate to the Petitioner based on her mother’s caste, but the Government be directed to modify “Aaple Sarkar” Web Portal and give a choice to the candidates for tendering details of the caste/social status even by relying upon the mother’s status.

In catena of Judgements, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has cautioned that such certificate can be granted after a proper scrutiny and due verification of the records. In our view, while dealing with such matters, we have to be conscious of the fact as regards the purpose and object of seeking such a caste certificate on the basis of the mother’s social status, since the mother belongs to the reserved category. More so, if we notice that the facts are being distorted by the Petitioner for self-serving purpose.

(This extract is taken from Swanubhuti Jeevraj Jain v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025:BHC-AS:7837-DB)

16. According to the Court, a caste certificate based on the mother’s caste can be granted:

A. Automatically, if the mother belongs to a reserved category

B. Without scrutiny, if the child chooses to rely on the mother’s caste

C. Only after proper scrutiny and verification of records

D. When both parents agree to it

17. What does the Court suggest about the purpose of seeking a caste certificate based on the mother’s caste?

A. It should always be granted if the mother is from a backward class

B. It must be scrutinized to check for genuine intent

C. The father’s caste must always prevail

D. It can be assumed without inquiry

18. Which portal did the petitioner use that allowed only the father’s caste to be entered?

A. e-Citizen Portal

B. MahaOnline

C. Bharat Caste Registry

D. Aaple Sarkar

19. What was the petitioner’s primary reason for seeking the caste certificate based on her mother’s OBC status?

A. To obtain a scholarship

B. To contest local body elections

C. To claim reservation in competitive exams due to age relaxation

D. To inherit property reserved for OBCs

20. According to the judgment, which key factor disqualified the petitioner from claiming her mother’s caste?

A. Her mother’s caste certificate was issued outside Maharashtra

B. Her father had already applied for an OBC certificate

C. She was financially and educationally supported by her father throughout

D. Her school records showed no caste

V. Now the law of prospective and retrospective operation is absolutely clear. Whereas a law made by the legislature is always prospective in nature unless it has been specifically stated in the statute itself about its retrospective operation, the reverse is true for the law which is laid down by a Constitutional Court, or law as it is interpretated by the Court. The judgment of the Court will always be retrospective in nature unless the judgment itself specifically states that the judgment will operate prospectively. The prospective operation of a judgment is normally done to avoid any unnecessary burden to persons or to avoid undue hardships to those who had bona fidely done something with the understanding of the law as it existed at the relevant point of time. Further, it is done not to unsettle something which has long been settled, as that would cause injustice to many.

(This extract is taken from Kanishk Sinha & Another v. State of West Bengal & Another, SLP (Crl.) Nos. 8609–8614 of 2024)

21. According to the Supreme Court in Kanishk Sinha v. State of West Bengal, which of the following statements is correct regarding the retrospective application of judicial decisions?

A. All judicial decisions are prospective unless expressly stated otherwise.

B. Judicial decisions are generally retrospective unless stated to be prospective.

C. Only decisions of the legislature have retrospective effect.

D. There is no distinction between retrospective and prospective application of laws.

22. What judicial principle is primarily being clarified in the passage?

A. Audi alteram partem

B. Doctrine of prospective overruling

C. Doctrine of eclipse

D. Doctrine of pith and substance

23. Which part of the Priyanka Srivastava judgment did the Kanishk Sinha Court rely on to show prospective application?

A. “In the interest of justice…”

B. “This requirement shall apply from 2005…”

C. “A stage has come in this country…”

D. “Henceforth, all complaints will be dismissed without affidavit.”

24. Under both CrPC Section 156 and BNSS Section 175, who is primarily empowered to investigate cognizable offences without Magistrate’s order?

A. Magistrate of the First Class

B. Officer-in-charge of the police station

C. Public Prosecutor

D. District Collector

25. What is the primary difference introduced in Section 175 of BNSS, 2023 as compared to Section 156 of CrPC?

A. It removes the role of the Magistrate altogether.

B. It requires mandatory judicial supervision for all investigations.

C. It adds a supervisory clause involving the Superintendent of Police.

D. It changes the definition of “cognizable offence.”

VI. If an offence takes place inside the four walls of a house and in such circumstances where the accused has all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in the circumstances of its choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead direct evidence to establish the guilt of the accused. It is to resolve such a situation that Section 106 of the Evidence Act exists in the statute book. In the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra), this Court observed that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. The Court proceeded to observe that a Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character, which is almost impossible to be led, or at any rate, extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence, which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.

(This extract is taken from State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, Criminal Appeal No. 1669 of 2012)

26. What is the main legal principle behind invoking Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, as explained in the passage?

A. To compel the accused to explain facts within their exclusive knowledge

B. To permit the Court to shift the burden of proof in public interest

C. To allow the prosecution to demand confessions from the accused

D. To permit the police to file supplementary chargesheets

27. According to the Supreme Court, what is the role of a Judge during a criminal trial?

A. To ensure neither an innocent is punished nor a guilty escapes

B. Only to ensure a fair trial for the prosecution

C. Only to protect the rights of the accused

D. To prioritise speedy disposal of cases

28. What concern is reflected by the quote: “a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished”?

A. Concern for media trials

B. Emphasis on preventing wrongful acquittal

C. Suggestion to do away with presumption of innocence

D. Promotion of alternative dispute resolution

29. Which of the following sections under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 corresponds to Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?

A. Section 123

B. Section 124

C. Section 126

D. Section 129

30. In which of the following cases did the Supreme Court observe that a child witness is not to be rejected outright but must be scrutinised with caution?

A. Satpal v. State of Haryana (1998)

B. Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra (1997)

C. State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2006)

D. Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra (1979)

VII. Thus, the requirement of informing the person arrested of the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional requirement. Article 22 is included in Part III of the Constitution under the heading of Fundamental Rights. Thus, it is the fundamental right of every person arrested and detained in custody to be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as possible. If the grounds of arrest are not informed as soon as may be after the arrest, it would amount to a violation of the fundamental right of the arrestee guaranteed under Article 22(1). It will also amount to depriving the arrestee of his liberty. The reason is that, as provided in Article 21, no person can be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The procedure established by law also includes what is provided in Article 22(1). Therefore, when a person is arrested without a warrant, and the grounds of arrest are not informed to him, as soon as may be, after the arrest, it will amount to a violation of his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 as well.

(This extract is taken from Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr., 2025 INSC 162)

31. Article 22 of the Indian Constitution is part of which section of the Constitution?

A. Directive Principles of State Policy

B. Part II – Citizenship

C. Part III – Fundamental Rights

D. Part IV – Fundamental Duties

32. The phrase “procedure established by law” appears in which Article of the Indian Constitution?

A. Article 21

B. Article 20

C. Article 19

D. Article 22

33. What does Section 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) correspond to in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?

A. Section 47 CrPC

B. Section 50A CrPC

C. Section 50 CrPC

D. Section 41 CrPC

34. According to the passage, the fundamental right to be informed of grounds of arrest is essential to:

A. Conducting a fair investigation

B. Enabling the Magistrate to grant remand

C. Validating the arrest and ensuring constitutionality

D. Ensuring conviction and sentencing

35. What is the constitutional status of the requirement to inform an arrestee of the grounds of arrest?

A. It is a mandatory requirement under a constitutional guarantee

B. It is a discretionary practice followed by courts

C. It is a statutory obligation derived from the CrPC

D. It applies only to cases involving preventive detention

VIII. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with penal consequences involving coercive measures, which can be permitted only when specific act(s) which constitute offences punishable under the penal code or any other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the accused and a prima facie case is made out. It applies with equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without specific allegations and credible materials to support the same may have disastrous consequences for the institution of family, which is built on the premise of love, affection, cordiality and mutual trust.

Thus, when family relationships are sought to be brought within the ambit of criminal proceedings rupturing the family bond, courts should be circumspect and judicious, and should allow invocation of criminal process only when there are specific allegations with supporting materials which clearly constitute criminal offences.

… mere general allegation of harassment without pointing out the specifics against such perpetrators would not suffice, as is the case in respect of the present appellants.

(This extract is taken from Gedddam Jhansi & Anr. v. State of Telangana & Ors., Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.9556 of 2022)

36. According to the Supreme Court in Gedddam Jhansi v. State of Telangana, what is required before the criminal process is invoked in domestic disputes?

A. A complaint by any family member

B. Specific acts constituting a penal offence with supporting materials

C. A judicial order from the Magistrate

D. Evidence of discord in the family

37. What risk does the Court identify if general allegations are used to initiate criminal proceedings in domestic settings?

A. Overburdening police machinery

B. Distorting property rights

C. Disastrous consequences for the institution of family

D. Undermining the Evidence Act

38. The Court in the judgment emphasizes that family relationships are built on:

A. Legal obligation and property rights

B. Love, affection, cordiality, and mutual trust

C. Religious and customary norms

D. Economic interdependence and statutory duties

39. Which of the following is not a reason stated by the Court for being cautious in criminalising domestic disputes?

A. Family bonds are sacred and emotionally significant

B. Emotional outbursts can lead to exaggerated allegations

C. All family members should be held responsible equally

D. Some relatives may be implicated without specific acts

40. What does the Court imply about the evidentiary standard in domestic violence cases?

A. Only direct evidence is acceptable

B. Hearsay evidence is always admissible

C. Courts should rely on panchayat decisions

D. Specific instances with supporting material are necessary

IX. Once we hold that the accused is entitled to challenge his arrest under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, the court to examine the validity of arrest must catechise both the existence and soundness of the ‘reasons to believe’, based upon the material available with the authorized officer. It is difficult to accept that the ‘reasons to believe’, as recorded in writing, are not to be furnished. As observed above, the requirements in Section 19(1) are the jurisdictional conditions to be satisfied for arrest, the validity of which can be challenged by the accused and examined by the court. Consequently, it would be incongruous, if not wrong, to hold that the accused can be denied and not furnished a copy of the ‘reasons to believe’. In reality, this would effectively prevent the accused from challenging their arrest.

(This extract is taken from Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 272)

41. What is the legal consequence of not furnishing the “reasons to believe” to the accused, as per the Supreme Court’s interpretation?

A. It is merely a procedural lapse with no legal consequence

B. It may render the arrest illegal as it prevents judicial review

C. It only affects bail, not the legality of arrest

D. The accused can be remanded without knowing the reasons

42. Which principle of natural justice is reinforced by the requirement to provide “reasons to believe” to the arrested person?

A. Nemo dat quod non habet

B. Audi alteram partem

C. Res ipsa loquitur

D. Qui facit per alium facit per se

43. According to the Court, who has the burden to justify redactions in the “reasons to believe” document if claimed?

A. The Magistrate

B. The accused

C. The Directorate of Enforcement

D. The arresting officer’s counsel

44. What statutory standard must be met before arrest under Section 19(1) of the PMLA or similar provisions under Customs/GST Acts?

A. FIR must be registered

B. Magistrate must approve the arrest

C. “Reasons to believe” must be formed and recorded in writing

D. The accused must refuse to cooperate with the investigation

45. In judicial review of arrest, which of the following is the court not permitted to examine?

A. Whether “reasons to believe” exist

B. Sufficiency of the material considered

C. Whether vital facts were ignored

D. Whether the arrest complied with jurisdictional preconditions

X. The appellant’s inability to travel to India and appear in Miscellaneous Case No. 440 of 2022, filed by the respondent under Section 26 of the DV Act, stemmed from the impoundment of his passport, a circumstance beyond his control. Consequently, the order of the learned JMFC directing the initiation of extradition proceedings against the appellant as a consequence of his non-appearance, despite being aware of the fact of impounding of the passport of the appellant, is untenable and unsustainable in the eyes of the law. Otherwise also, as noted above, there is no requirement for the personal presence of any party in the proceedings under the DV Act, because they are quasi-criminal in nature and do not entail any penal consequences except when there is a breach of a protection order, which is the only offence provided under Section 31 of the DV Act.

(This extract is taken from Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta & Ors., Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4297 of 2023)

46. According to the Supreme Court, which of the following is a valid reason that makes the order of extradition against the appellant unsustainable?

A. Appellant was acquitted in the original DV case

B. The JMFC had no jurisdiction to hear the DV matter

C. The appellant’s passport was impounded, making his appearance impossible

D. The extradition was not ordered through the Ministry of External Affairs

47. Which of the following statements is TRUE as per the Supreme Court’s observations?

A. Extradition can be initiated against a party who fails to appear in any civil matter.

B. Personal presence is always mandatory in proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act.

C. Proceedings under the DV Act are criminal in nature and require custodial trials.

D. Proceedings under the DV Act are quasi-criminal and personal presence is not mandatory unless Section 31 is involved.

48. What legal characterisation did the Supreme Court give to the order requiring the appellant’s presence in the DV Act proceedings?

A. Valid due to public interest

B. Procedurally justified

C. Grossly erroneous

D. Constitutionally mandated

49. Which of the following best reflects the nature of proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, as explained by the Court?

A. Purely civil and compensatory

B. Strictly penal requiring mandatory detention

C. Quasi-criminal with limited penal consequences

D. Administrative and non-binding

50. Under which provision does the Domestic Violence Act prescribe a penal consequence for violating a protection order?

A. Section 12

B. Section 26

C. Section 18

D. Section 31

XI. We cannot but observe that the learned Single Judge has not endeavoured to elicit the child’s attitude towards his father. Admittedly, the child, after his birth, was with his parents for about 10 years till the death of his mother. He was separated from the father in 2021 and has been living with his grand-parents, who cannot have a better claim than the father, who is the natural guardian. There is no allegation of any matrimonial dispute when the mother of the child was alive nor a complaint of abuse perpetrated against the wife or son. The father, the natural guardian, we reiterate, is well employed and educated and there is nothing standing against his legal rights; as a natural guardian, and legitimate desire to have the custody of his child. We are of the opinion that the welfare of the child, in the facts and circumstances of this case, would be best served if custody is given to the father.

(This extract has been taken from Vivek Kumar Chaturvedi & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2025 INSC 159)

51. Which of the following best reflects the ratio decidendi in the judgment excerpted above?

A. Custody of a minor must be determined only by the Family Court under the Guardians and Wards Act.

B. Welfare of the minor child may override the minor’s stated preference in custody cases.

C. Grandparents always have a better claim over custody than a remarried parent.

D. Visitation rights cannot be granted in habeas corpus proceedings.

52. Which constitutional provision was invoked by the father in seeking custody of the minor child?

A. Article 21

B. Article 32

C. Article 226

D. Article 227

53. In the context of the judgment, what does the Court say about the remarriage of the father?

A. It disqualifies him from obtaining custody.

B. It raises questions of moral fitness.

C. It cannot be a ground to deny custody if otherwise fit.

D. It necessitates a re-evaluation by the Child Welfare Committee.

54. Which earlier Supreme Court judgment was cited to support maintainability of habeas corpus in child custody disputes?

A. Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu

B. Tejaswini Gaud v. Shekhar Tewari

C. Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal

D. Smt. Chandrika v. Keshav

55. In what circumstances did the Court order delayed custody transfer to the father?

A. The father was facing criminal allegations.

B. The academic year of the child was nearing completion.

C. The grandmother had challenged visitation rights.

D. The child was under trauma and needed counselling.

XII. The law on Section 306 IPC is well settled. In Swamy Prahaladdas vs. State of M.P. (1995 Supp (3) SCC 438), the appellant remarked to the deceased that ‘go and die’ and the deceased thereafter committed suicide. This Court held that:

‘…Those words are casual nature which are often employed in the heat of moment between quarrelling people. Nothing serious is expected to follow thereafter. The said act does not reflect the requisite mens rea on the assumption that these words would be carried out in all events…’

By a long line of judgments, this Court has reiterated that in order to make out an offence under Section 306 IPC, specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring about the suicide of the person concerned as a result of that abetment is required. It has been further held that the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for attracting Section 306 IPC. Further, the alleged harassment meted out should have left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life and that in cases of abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to commit suicide.

(This extract is taken from Ayyub & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., 2025 INSC 168)

56. According to the Supreme Court in Ayyub v. State of U.P., which of the following is not sufficient to constitute abetment of suicide?

A. Harassment so severe that it leaves no alternative but death

B. Repeated threats backed by coercion

C. A casual statement like “go and die”

D. Active instigation to end life

57. Under Section 107 of the IPC, which of the following does not constitute abetment?

A. Instigating a person to do something

B. Engaging in a conspiracy to commit an offence

C. Intentionally aiding the doing of an act

D. Reporting a crime to the police

58. In Swamy Prahaladdas vs. State of M.P., what was held about casual utterances like “go and die”?

A. They do not reflect requisite mens rea and are not abetment per se.

B. They are punishable under Section 304 IPC.

C. They constitute abetment of suicide.

D. They are admissible only if supported by dying declaration.

59. Which of the following best reflects the standard set by the Court in abetment of suicide cases?

A. The accused must be angry with the deceased.

B. The deceased must have been insulted publicly.

C. The FIR must be filed within 24 hours of death.

D. The harassment must be of such nature that it leaves no option but suicide.

60. What procedural direction did the Supreme Court give in Ayyub regarding investigation?

A. To close the investigation entirely

B. To form a Special Investigation Team (SIT) for re-investigation

C. To transfer the matter to the CBI

D. To convict the accused on the basis of the current charge-sheet

XIII. We are also inclined to conclude that considering the overall circumstances, the nature of the weapon and the nature of the injury (fracture of the head of distal phalanx of left ring finger), the offence alleged, on facts, does not fall in that category of cases where the court should deny relief in the event of a settlement. At the highest, the offence alleged could be one under Section 326 of IPC. It could not be said, on facts, considering all the circumstances that this is a crime which has such an harmful effect on the public and that it has the effect of seriously threatening the well-being of the society. We make it clear that we are saying so on the facts of the present case. We are also firmly of the opinion that proceeding with the trial, when parties have amicably resolved the dispute in the present case, would be futile and the ends of justice require that the settlement be given effect to by quashing the proceedings. It would be a grave abuse of process to let this trial remain pending under the above circumstances, particularly when the dispute is settled and resolved.

(This extract is taken from Naushey Ali & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 660 of 2025)

61. According to the Court, which of the following best justifies why the case should not proceed to trial?

A. The FIR was never registered, making the trial void.

B. The nature of the injury and weapon used do not reflect the gravity required under Section 307 IPC.

C. The settlement between parties makes the offence compoundable by law.

D. The accused had no mens rea to commit the crime.

62. The Court’s conclusion that allowing trial to proceed would be a “grave abuse of process” is primarily based on:

A. Procedural lapses in charge-sheet filing

B. Absence of medical evidence proving fracture

C. The existence of an out-of-court settlement and lack of societal harm

D. The High Court’s lack of jurisdiction

63. The Court clarified that its opinion on quashing was:

A. A general rule for all cases under Section 326 IPC

B. A discretionary conclusion strictly confined to the facts of this case

C. A one-time exception under Article 142 of the Constitution

D. Binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution

64. Which doctrine or principle of criminal procedure is most directly invoked when the Court says, “the ends of justice require that the settlement be given effect to by quashing the proceedings”?

A. Doctrine of severability

B. Principle of presumption of innocence

C. Rule against double jeopardy

D. Inherent powers of High Court under Section 482 CrPC

65. Which of the following is not considered a “dangerous weapon or means” under Section 118 BNS?

A. Acid

B. Sword

C. Bare hands

D. Fire

XIV. The High Court having been duly informed of the death of Satish Chandra, and substitution having been prayed by the heirs of the deceased, it ought to have proceeded to consider such application and pass an order bringing the heirs of the deceased respondent on record. This, the High Court omitted to order, perhaps, due to inadvertence whereby pendency of the application for substitution filed by the heirs of Satish Chandra escaped its notice. Therefore, the order dated 2nd January 2007 vide which the second appeal was dismissed as having abated cannot sustain and will have to be set aside. The said order, though not under challenge before this Court, there is no bar for this Court to erase defective orders by setting them aside, even in the absence of any challenge thereto.

There is another equally important aspect, which merits our attention. The second appeal was restored by the High Court vide order dated 25th May, 2018. This order, restoring the second appeal, was recalled vide order dated 11th January 2019. The reason given was that, in the absence of an application praying for setting aside the abatement, the second appeal could not have been ordered to be restored.

(This extract is taken from Om Prakash Gupta alias Lalloowa (Now Deceased) & Ors. v. Satish Chandra (Now Deceased) & Ors., 2025 INSC 183)

66. Under which provision of the CPC is the substitution of legal heirs in case of death of a sole respondent governed?

A. Order XXII Rule 3

B. Order XXII Rule 4

C. Order XXII Rule 5

D. Order XXII Rule 10A

67. What did the Supreme Court hold regarding the obligation to file a separate substitution application by the appellant in this case?

A. Mandatory under all circumstances

B. Required only if the court directs

C. Not required if substitution has already been prayed by respondent’s heirs

D. Must be filed within 30 days

68. According to the Court, what is the correct sequence of applications after death of a respondent?

A. Substitution application → Appeal hearing

B. Condonation of delay → Substitution application

C. Application to set aside abatement → Substitution → Delay condonation

D. Substitution → Application to set aside abatement → Condonation of delay if needed

69. What is the total period available for filing substitution and setting aside abatement before limitation ends?

A. 90 days

B. 120 days

C. 150 days

D. 180 days

70. Which provision of CPC casts a duty on a pleader to inform the court about the death of a party?

A. Order XXII Rule 3

B. Order XXII Rule 4

C. Order I Rule 10

D. Order XXII Rule 10-A

XV. The second sub-issue pertains to the real objective sought to be achieved by offering compassionate appointment. We have noticed the objectives of the scheme of 1993 and construe such objectives as salutary for deciding any claim for compassionate appointment. The underlying idea behind compassionate appointment in death-in-harness cases appears to be that the premature and unexpected passing away of the employee, who was the only bread earner for the family, leaves the family members in such penurious condition that but for an appointment on compassionate ground, they may not survive. There cannot be a straitjacket formula applicable uniformly to all cases of employees dying-in-harness which would warrant appointment on compassionate grounds. Each case has its own peculiar features and is required to be dealt with bearing in mind the financial condition of the family. It is only in “hand-to-mouth” cases that a claim for compassionate appointment ought to be considered and granted, if at all other conditions are satisfied. Such “hand-to-mouth” cases would include cases where the family of the deceased is ‘below poverty line’ and struggling to pay basic expenses such as food, rent, utilities, etc., arising out of lack of any steady source of sustenance. This has to be distinguished from a mere fall in standard of life arising out of the death of the bread earner.

The observation in Kunti Tiwary (supra) noted above seems to assume significance and we draw inspiration therefrom in making the observation that no appointment on compassionate ground ought to be made as if it is a matter of course or right, being blissfully oblivious of the laudable object of any policy/scheme in this behalf.

(This extract is taken from Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 INSC 184)

71. According to the passage, which of the following statements best describes the essential condition for a compassionate appointment?

A. Loss of income due to the death of an employee is sufficient for such an appointment.

B. Any family member of a deceased employee may claim compassionate appointment.

C. The family must be in “hand-to-mouth” condition and face immediate financial crisis.

D. All retired employees are entitled to appoint a dependent.

72. In the context of the judgment, what does the term “struggling to pay basic expenses” imply regarding compassionate appointment?

A. Financial insolvency of the deceased employee.

B. Inability of the family to manage basic survival without state aid.

C. Legal eligibility of the dependent regardless of financial status.

D. Automatic entitlement based on emotional hardship.

73. What did the Court say about delayed judicial process in deciding claims of compassionate appointment?

A. Delay weakens the legal right to compassionate appointment.

B. Time taken by courts should not prejudice the applicant’s claim.

C. It automatically invalidates the claim for appointment.

D. Applicant must seek monetary compensation instead.

74. The judgment distinguishes between a “mere fall in standard of life” and a situation warranting compassionate appointment. Which of the following reflects this distinction?

A. Standard of living is never relevant in assessing financial distress.

B. Compassionate appointment is only for cases of total financial destitution.

C. Families with declining lifestyles are entitled to compensation, not jobs.

D. Employment may be given to all dependents with a fall in lifestyle.

75. Which of the following judicial principles did the Court emphasise regarding the purpose of compassionate appointment?

A. It is a humanitarian exception to regular public employment procedures.

B. It is a mechanism of equal employment opportunity under Article 16.

C. It ensures promotion parity with the deceased employee.

D. It is a vested legal right of all deceased employees’ families.

XVI. Section 504, IPC consists of two parts. Firstly, the actus reus- being the intentional insult which gives rise to the provocation. Secondly, the mens rea, i.e., the intention or knowledge on the part of the accused that such intentional provocation is likely to cause the person insulted to break public peace or commit any other offence. The animus nocendi in Section 504, IPC is that the accused should ‘intentionally insult’ the other person with the intention or knowledge that the provocation caused by such insult is likely to result in the commission of breach of public peace or any other offence by the person who has been so insulted. The offence is said to be complete once the accused person makes ‘intentional insult’ with the aforesaid mens rea. Hence, intention or knowledge on the part of accused person that his actions of making ‘intentional insult’ have the potential to provoke the person insulted is sine qua non for the commission of the offence under Section 504, IPC.

(This extract is taken from B.V. Ram Kumar v. State of Telangana & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 7887 of 2024)

76. What is the actus reus in the offence under Section 504, IPC?

A. Using criminal force to provoke someone

B. Intentionally insulting someone

C. Causing public nuisance

D. Making defamatory statements in public

77. What must the accused have knowledge or intention of, under Section 504 IPC?

A. That the insult will go unnoticed

B. That the insult may provoke the person to breach peace or commit an offence

C. That the insult will be forgiven

D. That the insult will be recorded

78. What does the term animus nocendi refer to in the context of Section 504, IPC?

A. The provocation of the victim

B. The public disturbance caused

C. The knowledge that the insult may lead to breach of peace

D. The use of obscene language

79. The expression sine qua non is best interpreted as:

A. A crime committed without evidence

B. A term used for repeated offences

C. A necessary precondition

D. A minor procedural error

80. In legal terms, what does actus reus represent?

A. The physical act or conduct element of a crime

B. The intention behind a criminal act

C. The result of a legal proceeding

D. The defence raised by the accused

XVII. An apprehension is the expression by the learned counsel for the appellant that if it is held that Section 25 of the 1955 Act also applies to void marriages, it will lead to a ridiculous result. He gave an example of a wife whose first marriage is subsisting, inducing another man to marry her. He also gave an example of a daughter getting married to her father. We must note that Sub-Section 1 of Section 25 uses the word ‘may’. A grant of a decree under Section 25 of the 1955 Act is discretionary. If the conduct of the spouse who applies for maintenance is such that the said spouse is not entitled to discretionary relief, the Court can always turn down the prayer for the grant of permanent alimony under Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Equitable considerations do apply when the Court considers the prayer for maintenance under Section 25. The reason is that Section 25 lays down that while considering the prayer for granting relief under Section 25, the conduct of the parties must be considered.

(This extract is taken from Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur & Ors., 2025 INSC 197)

81. Which of the following best explains why Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is said to be discretionary in nature?

A. Because the provision mentions a fixed rate of maintenance

B. Because only a woman can apply for maintenance under this section

C. Because the word “may” is used in the provision, giving the Court freedom to decide

D. Because it applies only to valid marriages declared by a competent Court

82. In which situation might the Court deny permanent alimony under Section 25 despite a decree being passed?

A. If the respondent fails to appear in court

B. If the petitioner is unable to pay court fees

C. If the marriage was conducted in a temple

D. If the applicant induced the marriage by suppressing facts

83. The term “equitable considerations” as used in the judgment refers to:

A. Taking into account fairness, conduct, and circumstances before awarding maintenance

B. Calculating equal maintenance for both spouses

C. Ensuring the maintenance is based solely on earning capacity

D. Dividing property equally during separation

84. What judicial value did the Court assign to the term “conduct of parties” in Section 25?

A. It is a mere formality to be stated in the order

B. It is central to the decision of granting or denying alimony

C. It is used only to punish guilty spouses

D. It refers only to post-decree behaviour

85. Which of the following best reflects the policy objective behind allowing alimony under Section 25 even in void marriages?

A. Promoting the sanctity of second marriages

B. Preventing women from claiming under other Acts

C. Ensuring that economically dependent spouses are not left destitute

D. Encouraging conversion to other religions for valid marriages

XVIII. The High Court spurned this argument by highlighting that the previous decision was restricted to those claims which actually accrued and were admissible in terms of the notification dated 30.09.1991. However, if the power supply itself has not been availed of within the period during which the notification dated 30.09.1991 was in force, the foundation for the challenge itself is shaky and without any legal basis.

First, the notification dated 30.09.1991 made the rebate available for five (5) years from the date on which electric supply was effected to the appellant-companies. As seen in the table above, supply of electricity was effected to all the appellant-companies, except M/s Karthik Alloys, on varying dates beyond 31.03.1995; however, the notification dated 30.09.1991 had life till 31.03.1995 whereafter it stood rescinded, leaving no option but to decline acceptance of their pleas.

(This extract is taken from Puja Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Goa and Ors., 2025 INSC 217)

86. Based on the Court’s reasoning, which of the following conditions is essential for claiming rebate under the 1991 Notification?

A. The company must have entered into a power supply agreement before 30.09.1991

B. The company must have commenced industrial activity before 31.03.1995

C. The company must have availed power supply before 01.04.1995

D. The company must have applied for power connection before 15.05.1996

87. The Court termed the foundation for the appellants’ challenge as “shaky” primarily because:

A. They had not applied for power supply in time.

B. The 1991 Notification was never operational.

C. They relied on a repealed statute.

D. They received power supply after the repeal of the 1991 Notification.

88. Which legal doctrine, though not named in this passage, is implicitly being discussed in terms of its application being inapplicable due to failure of a key condition?

A. Res judicata

B. Legitimate expectation

C. Promissory estoppel

D. Sub judice

89. If a company had applied for power before 01.04.1995 but received connection after that date, would it be entitled to the rebate?

A. No, because the right crystallises only upon availing supply.

B. Yes, because the notification was amended in 1996.

C. Yes, because the application was made before the cut-off.

D. Only if the State waived the cut-off date.

90. What did the Court imply when it said the challenge lacked a legal foundation?

A. The factual basis for entitlement under the notification was absent.

B. The petitioners lacked standing.

C. The petitions were time-barred.

D. The High Court never decided such an issue before.

XIX. Section 34, IPC, as contrasted with Section 149, IPC, therefore, balances the individual and the general aspect, although while taking into account the individual aspect it conceives it as part and parcel of the general aspect. In this sense, Section 34, IPC, is far more restricted than Section 149, IPC. If, therefore, a person is charged with an offence with the application of Section 34, IPC, and convicted for the substantive offence only, it is not so easy for him to advance the plea that he was not aware that the matter had any individual aspect.

Participation of the individual offender in the criminal act in some form or the other which is the leading feature of Section 34, IPC differentiates it not only from Section 149, IPC, but also from other affiliated offences like criminal conspiracy and abetment.

A mere agreement, although it might be a sufficient proof of the common intention, would be wholly insufficient to sustain a conviction with the application of Section 34, IPC, unless some criminal act is done in furtherance of the said common intention and the accused himself has in some way or the other participated in the commission of the said act.

(This extract is taken from Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. v. State of Karnataka, 2025 INSC 221)

91. Which of the following best describes the Court’s reasoning regarding Section 34 IPC?

A. Physical presence alone is sufficient

B. Common intention alone is sufficient

C. Both participation and common intention are essential

D. Prior agreement alone constitutes liability

92. According to the Court, which of the following is NOT sufficient to attract Section 34 IPC liability?

A. Being a mere spectator

B. Participating actively in the act

C. Sharing a common intention and doing an overt act

D. Facilitating the offence

93. Which Section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 corresponds to Section 34 of the IPC?

A. Section 2

B. Section 3(5)

C. Section 34

D. Section 149

94. Which of the following best illustrates the application of Section 3(5), BNS?

A. Two people planning but not executing a robbery

B. One person watches while another stabs a victim

C. Two people simultaneously attack a victim with the intention to kill

D. A person joins a crowd without knowing their intent

95. Which of the following best demonstrates the requirement of “common object” rather than “common intention”?

A. A person assists another in strangling the victim

B. A group of 7 people attack a village based on hatred toward a community

C. A man provides a knife to his friend for self-defence

D. A woman encourages her husband to commit suicide

XX. The power under Section 432 of the CrPC is to be exercised in a fair and reasonable manner. If there is neither a policy nor any Regulations for exercising the power under Section 432 of the CrPC, there is a possibility that the authorities will not exercise their power in a fair and rational manner. To ensure that the power is not exercised in an arbitrary manner, all the States that do not have an exhaustive policy on this aspect must come up with an exhaustive policy within two months from today. It can be either a separate policy or it can be incorporated into the prison manuals.

On a plain reading of sub-Section (1) of Section 432 of the CrPC and the corresponding provision under the BNSS, the appropriate Government has the power to grant remission without imposing any condition or subject to certain conditions. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that a conditional order can be passed by the appropriate Government granting permanent remission. Different States have different provisions in this regard. Rule 40 of Karnataka Prison Rules, 1974 provides for an appropriate government granting remission under Section 432 unconditionally, and once it is granted, it cannot be forfeited under any circumstances. Under Rule 547 of the Kerala Prison Rules, 1958, conditions have been incorporated for the grant of remission, such as executing a bond and regular reporting to the Probation Officer, etc. There are provisions made in the policies of some other States incorporating the requirement of passing conditional orders of permanent remission.

(This extract is taken from In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 4 of 2021)

96. According to the Supreme Court, the absence of a remission policy under Section 432 CrPC could lead to:

A. Enhanced powers of the judiciary

B. Violation of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution

C. Arbitrary exercise of remission power by authorities

D. Automatic release of convicts after 14 years

97. The Supreme Court directed that States without an existing remission policy must:

A. Wait for directions from the President under Article 72

B. Apply only the Model Prison Manual

B. Submit the issue to the Law Commission

D. Frame an exhaustive remission policy within 2 months

98. The necessity for a remission policy arises primarily to:

A. Avoid duplication of judicial orders

B. Ensure every convict is compulsorily released after 10 years

C. Maintain uniformity in all bail applications

D. Prevent arbitrary and unfair use of remission powers

99. The Court’s directive that remission policies be incorporated in prison manuals implies:

A. States must ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

B. Remission policy is a constitutional requirement

C. Prison manuals must be drafted by the judiciary

D. Policies may be either standalone or part of prison manuals

100. Section 432 of the CrPC deals with which of the following powers of the government?

A. Framing guidelines for custodial interrogation

B. Suspension or remission of sentences

C. Parole and furlough rights of undertrials

D. Detention under preventive detention laws

XXI. The provisions of Section 437(6), as such, cannot be considered to be mandatory in nature and cannot be interpreted to grant an absolute and indefeasible right of bail in favour of accused.

The factors which are quoted above by this Court are only illustrative and not exhaustive.

Applications under Section 437 (6) have to be given a liberal approach and it would be a sound and judicious exercise of discretion in favour of the accused by the Court concerned more particularly where there is no chance of tampering of evidence e.g. where the case depends on documentary evidence which is already collected; where there is no fault on part of the accused in causing of delay; where there are no chances of any abscondence by the accused; where there is little scope for conclusion of trial in near future; where the period for which accused has been in jail is substantial in comparison to the sentence prescribed for the offence for which he is tried.

(This extract is taken from Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) INSC 242)

101. What did the Court mean when it said the listed factors were “illustrative and not exhaustive”?

A. Only the listed factors can be used to decide bail.

B. Additional factors beyond the list may be considered.

C. The Court discouraged use of listed factors.

D. Bail should never be granted after 60 days.

102. Why did the Supreme Court impose a monetary deposit condition for bail in this particular case, despite criticising such practices?

A. Because the accused refused to cooperate.

B. Because the Trial Court mandated it.

C. Due to the peculiar facts and scale of the alleged scam.

D. Because the accused had a prior conviction.

103. Which Article of the Constitution is directly invoked when bail is sought in a habeas corpus petition against illegal detention?

A. Article 19

B. Article 32

C. Article 20

D. Article 16

104. Which of the following rights under CrPC is most closely linked to the principle of ‘bail not jail’?

A. Section 451

B. Section 200

C. Section 437

D. Section 154

105. Which of the following best represents the Court’s reasoning in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)?

A. Personal liberty can be curtailed arbitrarily by the State.

B. A law interfering with personal liberty must meet the test of reasonableness and fairness.

C. Preventive detention is constitutional in all circumstances.

D. Liberty is subordinate to national interest.

XXII. Our attention is invited to a decision of a coordinate Bench in the case of Union of India through the Assistant Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad. After having perused the judgment, we find that this was a case where the decisions of this Court in the case of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb and in the case of V. Senthil Balaji were not applicable on facts. Perhaps that is the reason why these decisions were not placed before the coordinate Bench. The respondent-accused therein was arrested on 18th September, 2023 and the High Court granted him bail on 6th May, 2024. He was in custody for less than 7 months before he was granted bail. There was no finding recorded that the trial is not likely to be concluded in a reasonable time. In the facts of the case, this Court cancelled the bail granted by the High Court. Therefore, there was no departure made from the law laid down in the case of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb and V. Senthil Balaji.

(This extract is taken from Udhaw Singh v. Enforcement Directorate, Criminal Appeal No. 799 of 2025)

106. In Udhaw Singh v. ED, why did the Supreme Court observe that K.A. Najeeb and V. Senthil Balaji cases were not applicable in Kanhaiya Prasad’s case?

A. Because they were overruled.

B. Because the accused in Kanhaiya Prasad had already been acquitted.

C. Because the facts of Kanhaiya Prasad did not involve prolonged custody or delay in trial.

D. Because Kanhaiya Prasad was a civil dispute.

107. According to the Supreme Court in Udhaw Singh, how long was the respondent-accused in custody in Kanhaiya Prasad before bail was granted?

A. Less than 1 year

B. Less than 7 months

C. More than 1 year

D. Around 15 months

108. Which principle did the Supreme Court reaffirm while distinguishing Kanhaiya Prasad?

A. Bail as a matter of right in economic offences

B. Custody duration and delay in trial must be factually established for bail under Najeeb and Senthil Balaji

C. Bail can be granted even if trial is expeditious

D. Bail must be denied in all PMLA cases

109. Which of the following statements best reflects the Court’s reasoning in cancelling bail in Kanhaiya Prasad?

A. The bail order was contrary to Section 439 CrPC.

B. The High Court did not apply K.A. Najeeb and Senthil Balaji because the factual basis for delay was absent.

C. The accused was a habitual offender.

D. The trial was indefinitely postponed by the ED.

110. What inference can be drawn about the role of precedent applicability from this paragraph?

A. Precedents must be strictly applied even if facts differ.

B. Precedents are irrelevant in bail matters.

C. Precedents like Najeeb and Senthil Balaji apply only if facts align, especially regarding custody and trial delays.

D. Once cited, precedents automatically bind all courts.

XXIII. At this juncture, before parting, we deem it fit to note that public employment is a duty entrusted by the Constitution of India with the State. Therefore, it becomes imperative that the rigours of Articles 14 and 16 are not ignored by the State in relation to the matter concerning public employment. Arbitrariness in public employment goes to the very root of the fundamental right to equality. While no person can claim a fundamental right to appointment, it does not mean that the State can be allowed to act in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The State is accountable to the public at large as well as the Constitution of India, which guarantees equal and fair treatment to each person. Public employment process thus, must always be fair, transparent, impartial and within the bounds of the Constitution of India. Every citizen has a fundamental right to be treated fairly and impartially, which is an appendage of right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A violation of this guarantee is liable to judicial scrutiny as well as criticism.

(This extract is taken from Amrit Yadav v. State of Jharkhand & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 13950–13951 of 2024)

111. According to the Supreme Court in Amrit Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, what is the primary constitutional implication of arbitrariness in public employment?

A. It breaches the financial accountability of the State

B. It is a violation of the right to form associations under Article 19

C. It violates the fundamental right to equality under Article 14

D. It restricts the power of the legislature under Article 245

112. What did the Court say about the fundamental right to appointment in public service?

A. Every citizen has an enforceable right to be appointed if qualified

B. Appointment is a part of the right to life under Article 21

C. Reservation is mandatory under Article 16(4) and must be enforced

D. There is no fundamental right to appointment, but State action must be non-arbitrary

113. Which of the following BEST reflects the constitutional duties of the State in matters of public employment as laid down in the judgment?

A. Ensure fair, impartial, and constitutionally compliant recruitment

B. Give priority to those with political recommendations

C. Ensure job security to all contract employees

D. Avoid transparency to preserve administrative discretion

114. According to the Supreme Court, what legal consequence arises if the State violates Articles 14 and 16 during the recruitment process?

A. The violation is curable through post-facto ratification

B. The appointments may be regularized after training

C. The process is a nullity and liable to be struck down

D. The burden shifts to the appointees to justify the appointment

115. Which of the following statements is INCORRECT as per the ruling?

A. The State has a duty to act within constitutional limits in recruitment.

B. Public employment is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

C. Arbitrary hiring practices can violate fundamental rights.

D. No one can claim a right to be appointed unless legally selected.

XXIV. It is a well-established position of law that the term ‘partners’ extends to and would include their legal heirs, representatives, assigns or legatees, etc. Persons claiming under the rights of a deceased person are the representatives of the deceased party, and therefore, both the parties to the agreement and their legal heirs are entitled to enforce an arbitral award and are bound by it. In light of Section 40 of the Act of 1996 the existence of an arbitration agreement is not affected by the death of a party to the arbitration agreement. As a consequence, the right to sue for rendition of account also survives, ensuring that the legal representatives can assert or defend claims arising from the partnership agreement.

(This extract is taken from Rahul Verma & Ors. v. Rampat Lal Verma & Ors., SLP (C) No. 4330/2025)

116. According to the passage, what is the legal effect of the death of a partner on an arbitration agreement in the context of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

A. The arbitration agreement automatically becomes void.

B. It continues to be enforceable only by surviving partners.

C. It remains enforceable by or against the legal representatives of the deceased.

D. It must be re-executed by the legal heirs to be valid.

117. What is the scope of the term ‘partners’ as clarified by the Supreme Court in the judgment?

A. It includes only the individuals who originally signed the partnership deed.

B. It includes legal heirs, representatives, assigns, or legatees of the deceased partner.

C. It excludes anyone who is not a signatory to the arbitration clause.

D. It includes only the managing partners of the firm.

118. Which of the following is not a consequence of the continuation of an arbitration clause after the death of a partner?

A. Legal heirs can enforce arbitral awards.

B. Arbitration clause requires fresh consent from legal heirs.

C. Legal heirs are bound by the arbitration clause.

D. The right to sue for rendition of accounts survives.

119. Which statutory provision was relied upon by the Supreme Court to affirm that the arbitration clause survives the death of a party?

A. Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

B. Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

C. Section 48 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932

D. Section 40 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

120. In the context of arbitration and succession, which statement is incorrect?

A. The legal representatives can assert rights arising under the arbitration agreement.

B. Arbitration agreements stand discharged on the death of a party.

C. Legal heirs can be bound by arbitral awards.

D. The term “partners” may include assigns or legatees under law.

Answers