Telangana High Court
Cmr Engineering Educational Society, vs State Of Telangana, on 3 July, 2025
THE HONOURABLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL
AND
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE RENUKA YARA
WRIT APPEAL Nos.572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 601
and 602 of 2025
COMMON JUDGMENT:
(Per the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice Sujoy Paul)
Learned Senior Counsel Sri D. Prakash Reddy and learned
Senior Counsel Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, representing Sri Tarun
G. Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants; Sri A. Sudarshan
Reddy, learned Advocate General assisted by Sri S. Rahul Reddy,
learned Special Government Pleader appearing for respondent
Nos.1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 and Sri M.Mehboob Ali, learned Standing
Counsel for All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), for
respondent No.4.
2. Regard being had to the similitude of the questions involved,
on the joint request of learned counsel for the parties, the matters
are analogously heard and decided by this common judgment.
3. In W.A.Nos.572, 573, 574, 575, 576 and 577 of 2025, the
challenge mounted is to the common order passed by learned
Single Judge in W.P.No.23539 of 2024 and batch, dated
02.05.2025, which were disposed of along with other writ petitions.
In W.A.Nos.601 and 602 of 2025, the challenge mounted is to the
2
common order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.23541
and 23654 of 2024, dated 13.06.2025.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
4. Admittedly, for present dispute between the parties, the
parties have fought a long drawn battle in the corridors of the
Court. The matter has a chequered history. However, for
adjudication of these writ appeals, it is not necessary to go beyond
the previous order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in
W.A.No.953 of 2024 and batch decided on 13.08.2024.
5. In nutshell, in W.A.No.953 of 2024, which was the second
visit of the appellants to this Court, the challenge was to the order
dated 26.07.2024, whereby the prayer of the appellants for increase
in intake of the seats in existing courses was declined.
6. Indisputably, the All India Council for Technical Education
(AICTE) approved the demand of intake of seats in the appellants’
institutions. The Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University (JNTU)
gave No Objection Certificate (NOC) on 21.03.2024. Despite the
approval of AICTE and NOC of JNTU, since the request of
additional intake of seats was rejected, the writ petition was filed,
3which came to be dismissed and the order of the learned Single
Judge was called in question in W.A.No.953 of 2024 and batch.
7. In W.A.No.953 of 2024, this Court found that the decision
making process adopted in passing the impugned order was
defective and therefore, the said order was set aside by directing
the respondents therein to take a fresh decision on the claim of the
appellants in accordance with law. In turn, the respondents
therein passed the order dated 24.08.2024, which became the
subject matter of challenge in the instant writ petitions. The
learned Single Judge, after hearing both the parties, dismissed the
writ petitions, which became the subject matter of challenge in this
round of litigation in the writ appeals.
CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANTS:
8. It is the common stand of Sri D. Prakash Reddy and
Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, that the
constitutionality of Section 20 of the Telangana Education Act,
1982 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Education Act‘), is not called
in question and the said provision has already been declared as
intra vires by the Supreme Court. The impugned order is called in
question mainly on twin grounds: i) the respondents have not
4prepared any policy for the purpose of taking a decision as per
Section 20 of the Education Act; ii) On one hand, the request of the
appellants for additional intake of seats in Computer Science
Engineering (CSE) and Information Technology (IT) has been
rejected and on the other hand, in the same District of
Medchal-Malkajgiri, such increase of seats was permitted for
various collages.
9. The whole argument relating to discrimination is founded
upon a table/statement showing the approved admission intakes of
CSE and CSM branches in respect of Medchal-Malkajgiri District
for the academic year 2024-25 as on 20.08.2024 and further after
internal sliding on 23.08.2024.
10. Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, submits that
in order to transparently apply the power flowing from Section 20 of
the Education Act, it was obligatory for the State to prepare a
policy. In absence of such a policy, there exists a scope for
arbitrariness and discrimination and hence arbitrary exercise of
power without there being any policy is bad in law.
11. The common ground taken by both the learned Senior
Counsel for the appellants is that a plain reading of the
5table/statement shows that for the appellants’ institutions whose
names find place at Sl.Nos.1 (CMR Technical Campus), 4 (CMR
Engineering College), 10 (CMR College of Engineering and
Technology), 12 (St.Martin’s Engineering College), 14 (Malla Reddy
College of Engineering and Technology), 17 (Malla Reddy College of
Engineering), 18 (CMR Institute of Technology) and 20 (MLR
Institute of Technology), the increased intake is shown as ‘0’,
whereas for other institutions whose names figure at Sl.Nos.3
(Nalla Narasimha Reddy Education Society’s Group of Institutions),
5 (ACE Engineering College), 6 (Nallamalla Reddy Engineering
College), 7 (St. Peter’s Engineering College), 9 (Hyderabad Institute
of Technology and Management), 15 (DRK Institute of Science and
Technology), 19 (Geetanjali College of Engineering and Technology),
21 (Kommuri Pratap Reddy Institute of Technology), 25 (Siddhartha
Institute of Technology and Sciences), 26 (Samskruthi College of
Engineering and Technology), 27 (Malla Reddy Engineering College
and Management Sciences), 28 (Vignan’s Institute of Management
and Technology for Women), 29 (Sreyas Institute of Engineering
and Technology), 30 (BVRIT College of Engineering for Women) and
31 (Narsimhareddy Engineering College), increase of seats were
permitted. Thus, the appellants were subjected to step-motherly
6treatment/discrimination. Even if the appellants could not place
any material to show that such discrimination was because of
political reason, the discrimination exists and pleadings and
evidence are available on record. It is pointed out that the aforesaid
statement (page No.305 of the material papers annexed to
W.A.No.573 of 2025) is culled out from the data prepared by the
State Government and averments were made in this regard in the
writ affidavit. There is an evasive reply to the said statement which
was duly pleaded and therefore it can be safely presumed that
there was no denial to the aforesaid data reproduced in the above
statement. Thus, it was strenuously contended that the appellants
in whose favour there exists an AICTE recommendation and NOC of
JNTU, the Government was not justified in rejecting the same.
12. It was further contended by learned Senior Counsel that the
learned Single Judge in the impugned order opined that the
recommendation given in favour of the appellants by AICTE is only
‘clarification’, whereas it should have been ‘inspection’. In other
words, the learned Single Judge doubted the correctness of AICTE’s
recommendation. It is the common argument that the correctness
and genuineness of the recommendation/approval of AICTE in
favour of the appellants was not the subject matter of challenge
7before the Writ Court and therefore, the learned Single Judge was
not justified in observing regarding the aforesaid in para No.48 of
the impugned judgment.
13. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge has
travelled beyond the scope of the finding given in the impugned
order dated 24.08.2024. In view of clear discrimination in the
matter of increase of intake of students, interference be made and
the order of learned Single Judge may be set aside and the
appellants’ prayer for additional intake as approved by A.I.C.T.E.
may be directed to be allowed. In addition, it is submitted that
although in W.A.No.1602 of 2024, it was directed that any
admission will remain subject to the final outcome of the matter in
WP.No.23539 of 2024, the fact remains that the candidates who got
admission pursuant to interim order have completed three years
and such students need to be protected.
14. Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, has taken
pains to contend that in different districts of the State for different
colleges, further seat intake was permitted and even merger of
seats of different colleges was permitted. Thus, impugned order is
bad in law.
8
CONTENTIONS OF THE STATE:
15. Learned Advocate General by placing reliance on
Section 20 (3) of the Education Act, urged that this provision got
stamp of approval from the Supreme Court and therefore, needs to
be read as such. The provision used the word “locality” and not
“district”. Therefore, it is within the province of the Government to
decide the question of increase of additional seats etc., on the basis
of requirement of the ‘locality’. Thus, when the State Government
followed the procedure meticulously, the Courts cannot sit in
appeal. This was clearly held in W.A.No.953 of 2025.
16. By taking this Court to the decision making process, learned
Advocate General submits that the chart/table (Pg.305) is a
consolidated chart of institutions of Medchal-Malkajgiri District.
The said district is a big district of the State of Telangana which
contains different ‘localities’ such as Bandlaguda, Ibrahimpatnam,
Bachupally, Keesara, Patancheru, Bowrampet, and Kandlakoya.
Admittedly, the appellants-institutions are in the locality called as
‘Kandlakoya’. In Kandlakoya, except one institution, for none other
institutions additional intake of seats was allowed. The appellants
as per the argument advanced are claiming total 5730 more seats
in CSE (I.T), whereas in the entire area the total number of existing
9
seats in the CSE branch is 5610. The additional intake of 120
seats was permitted in favour of Narsimha Reddy Engineering
College with whom the appellants cannot claim any parity. By
previous orders the appellants were also permitted to increase the
seats and they enjoyed benefits arising thereto.
17. The learned Advocate General supported the impugned order.
18. In rejoinder submissions, the learned Senior Counsel
Sri D.Prakash Reddy placed heavy reliance on para Nos.3 and 4 of
the impugned order dated 24.08.2024 which reads thus:
“3. As seen from the data of Admission Statistics of
TGEAPCET-2024 before the internal sliding process as on
dt:20.08.2024 in the above Annexures, it is clear that there still
are vacancies in respect of the courses for which increase is
sought by the Appellant College, in the Colleges located in
Kandlakoya locality and in the Colleges located in Medchal
Malkajgiri District wherein the Appellant College is located.
Therefore, there is no discernible need to sanction for merger of
courses/increase in intake of B.Tech in CSE at this juncture.
4. The Appellant College has also not furnished proof of the
need for merger of courses/increase in intakes of B.Tech in CSE
for the A.Y.2024-25 in connection with the requirement of the
educational needs of the people in the locality. Further,
reduction of intakes in core branches is not in tune with the
policy of the Government.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
19. It is urged that a conjoint reading of these paragraphs makes
it clear that the respondents themselves treated and compared the
Kandlakoya ‘locality’ with Medchal-Malkajgiri ‘District’. Therefore,
10
it is not acceptable that the appellants cannot compare Kandlakoya
with Medchal-Malkajgiri District. More-so when ‘locality’ has not
been defined anywhere in the Education Act.
20. The parties confined their arguments to the extent indicated
above.
21. We have heard the parties at length.
22. Learned Single Judge placed reliance on the judgment of
Supreme Court in Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University
Registrar v. Sangam Laxmi Bai Vidyapeet 1, which is relevant and
reproduced below for ready reference:
“14. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions of Section 20(1)
makes it clear that the survey is conducted so as to identify
the educational needs of the locality would definitely
include within its ken how many institutions are operating
in the area and whether there is any further requirement of
opening educational institutions/new courses in existing
colleges, and it is also imperative under Section 20(3)(a)(i) that
educational agency has to satisfy the authority that there is a
need for providing educational facilities to the people in the
locality. In case there are already a large number of institutions
imparting education in the area the competent authority may be
justified not to grant the NOC, for permitting an institution to
come up in the area.
15. The provisions contained in Section 20 are wholesome and
intend not only to cater to the educational needs of the area but
also prevent the mushroom growth of the institutions/courses.
In case institutions are permitted to run each and every course
that may affect the very standard of education and may1
(2019) 17 SCC 729
11ultimately result in sub-standard education. There is already a
paucity of well-qualified teachers in a large number of
institutions and the available seats in Pharmacy course in
Hyderabad City are remaining vacant every year in spite of the
reduction in a number of seats. It had not been possible to fill up
the available vacancies due to non-availability of students. Thus,
it is apparent that when 30 institutions in Hyderabad City are
already running Pharmacy course, the refusal to grant NOC by
the University was wholly justified.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
23. As noticed above, learned counsel for both the parties fairly
admitted that Section 20 of the Education Act has been declared as
intra vires by the Supreme Court. Thus, the impugned order of the
Government needs to be decided on the basis of Section 20 of the
Education Act as it exists. The relevant portion reads thus:-
“20(3). Any educational agency applying for permission under
sub-section (2), shall,-
(a) before the permission is granted, satisfy the authority
concerned,-
(i) that there is need for providing educational facilities to
the people in the locality;
(ii) that there is adequate financial provision for continued
and efficient maintenance of the institution as prescribed by the
competent authority;
(iii) that the institution is proposed to be located in sanitary and
healthy surroundings;”
(Emphasis Supplied)
24. A minute reading of sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the
Education Act makes it clear that in the event an application is
preferred for permission under sub-section (2), before a decision is
being taken to grant permission, the authority needs to satisfy itself
12
regarding need for providing educational facilities to the people ‘in
the locality’. The lawmakers did not use the word ‘District’ and
instead used the word people in the ‘locality’. In the Education Act,
the word ‘locality’ has not been defined. Thus, in common
parlance, it is open to the State Government to treat each one of
different localities of a particular district as independent ‘locality’.
In the instant case, they have done so and treated different
localities as separate locality. The names whereof are mentioned
for example in paragraph No.16 of this order.
25. While interpreting Section 20 of the Education Act in Sangam
Laxmi Bai Vidyapeet (supra), the Supreme Court, in no uncertain
terms, made it clear that survey needs to be conducted so as to
identify the educational needs of the locality (paragraph No.14).
26. It is apt to consider the Dictionary meaning of the word
‘locality’. In Black’s Dictionary, 1976, ‘locality’ is defined as under:
“LOCALITY is definite region in any part of space; geographical
position. Warnock V. Kraft, 30 Cal.App.2d 1, 85 P.2d 505, 506.
‘Place’, ‘vi-cinity’, ‘neighborhood’ and ‘community’. Con ley v.
Valley Motor Transit Co., C.C.A. Ohio, 139 F.2d 692, 693;
Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, 107 F. 2d 627, 631, 70 App.D.C.
354.”
27. In P.M.Bakshi – The Law Lexicon 2008 Vol-2, the word
‘locality’ is defined as under:
13
“LOCALITY- ‘Locality’ means a place with an area which is
reasonably small and compact so that it has come to exist and
be treated as one unit. A reference to which sufficiently
identifies the area and the persons therein. Ordinarily such unit
has acquired a name by which it is referred and identified.”
28. The Apex Court in Amarendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bhadur
Prajapati 2 held as under:
“Dictionaries can be taken as safe guides for finding out
meanings of such words as are not defined in the statute.
However, dictionaries are not the final words on interpretation.
The words take colour from the context and the setting in which
they have been used. It is permissible to assign a meaning or a
sense, restricted or wider than the one given in dictionaries,
depending on the scheme of the legislation wherein the word has
been used. The court would place such construction on the
meaning of the words as would enable the legislative intent being
effectuated. Where the object of the legislation is to prevent a
mischief and to confer protection on the weaker sections of the
society the court would not hesitate in placing an extended
meaning, even a stretched one. on the word, if in doing so the
statute would succeed in attaining the object sought to be
achieved. We may refer to Principles of Statutory Interpretation
by Justice G.P. Singh (Eighth Edition, 2001) wherein at pp. 279-
280 the learned author states- ”
. . . . .in selecting one out of the various meaning of a word,
regard must always be had to the context as it is a fundamental
rule that ‘the meanings of words and expressions used in an Act
must take their colour from the context in which they appear’.
therefore, ‘when the context makes the meaning of a word quite
clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a
particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is
capable of, according to lexicographers’. . …. Judge Learned
Hand cautioned ‘not to make a fortress out of the dictionary’ but
to pay more attention to ‘the sympathetic and imaginative
discovery’ of the purpose or object of the statute as a guide to its
meaning.”
2
AIR 2004 SC 3782
14
29. The similar view is taken by the Apex Court in Commissioner
of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Taj Mahal Hotel,
Secunderabad 3 and Kichha Sugar Company Limited the
Gen.Mang. v. Tarai Chini Mill Majdoor Union, Uttarakhand 4.
Thus, we find substance in the argument of learned Advocate
General that ‘locality’ cannot be equated with the ‘district’.
30. The sheet anchor of argument of learned Senior Counsel for
the appellants is based on discrimination. In order to establish
discrimination they urged that they categorically pleaded in the writ
affidavit about the discrimination and in support thereof, filed a
statement (Page No.305) (Annexure-P24) to show the hostile
discrimination and stepmotherly treatment meted out to them. If
we treat the Mechal-Malkajgiri District as a ‘locality’, perhaps the
argument of learned Senior Counsel for the appellants will gather
strength but as discussed above, we are unable to treat a ‘district’
as a ‘locality’ in view of clear language employed in Section 20 of
the Education Act and intention of lawmakers behind it.
31. The comparison for the purpose of discrimination mentioned
in the statement (Annexure-P24) is a wholesome description of
3
1971 INSC 196
4
AIR 2014 SC 898
15
adjustment/increased intakes. As per Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, comparison can be made between similarly
situated institutions of same locality. In the instant case,
admittedly, the appellants’ institutions are in the locality
‘Kandlakoya’. On a specific query from the Bench, Sri D. Prakash
Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, fairly admitted
that all the appellants’ institutions are situated in Kandlakoya
locality. Thus, although Kandlakoya locality falls within the
Medchal-Malkajgiri District, needless to mention that the said
district is a large district consisting of various localities mentioned
hereinabove. Thus, the exercise undertaken by the State locality
wise is in consonance with the scheme and object of Section 20 of
the Education Act. The appellants cannot claim parity with an
institution existing in a difference locality for the simple reason that
the need of the locality has to be seen locality wise and not district
wise.
32. Interestingly, in the previous round in W.A.No.953 of 2023,
this Court made it clear that scope of interference in a case of this
nature is very limited. It is apposite to refer to relevant paragraphs,
which read as under:
16
“18. This Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the
Constitution is basically concern with the validity and
correctness of the decision making process. It is within the
province of the department to take a decision regarding demand
about change of intake of seats and merger of courses. This
Court cannot sit in an appeal to decide the aforesaid aspects. We
have no hesitation to say that this Court has no expertise on
aforesaid aspects and the respondent Department is best suited
to take a decision on the aforesaid aspects.
19. So far as decision making process is concerned, as noticed
above, it runs contrary to the principles of natural justice. There
is no finding as to why the approvals given by AICTE and JNTUC
were to be discarded. No reason is assigned as to why the
particular claim of the appellants could not find favour with the
respondents. The ‘reasons’ are held to be heart beat of
‘conclusions’. In absence of ‘reasons’, ‘conclusion’ cannot
sustain judicial scrutiny (see M/s.Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. v.
Masood Ahmed Khan {(2010) 9 SCC 497}.
20. Since the impugned order is passed without examining the
case of each of the appellants on the anvil of relevant parameters
flowing from the Education Act, the same cannot sustain judicial
scrutiny. The learned single Judge, in our opinion, has erred in
not examining the validity of impugned order dated 26.07.2024
on the touchstone of principles laid down by the Constitution
Bench in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra). The impugned order was
required to be examined solely on the basis of reasons
mentioned in that order. Consequently, the order of learned
single Judge dated 09.08.2024 and the impugned order dated
26.07.2024 are set aside. The Higher Education Department is
directed to consider the claims of each of the appellants and take
a fresh decision in accordance with law expeditiously.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
33. So far the decision making process is concerned, the
respondents have considered the requests of the institutions for
increase of intake and requirements etc., ‘locality wise’. Thus, the
said decision making process cannot be said to be contrary to law
or in breach of Section 20 of the Education Act. For one institution
17
in Kandlakoya namely Narasimha Reddy Engineering College, the
said intake was permitted. However, the additional seat intake is
only for 120 seats. So far, the other institutions of Kandlakoya are
concerned, no institution was permitted to enjoy the benefit of
increased number of seats in CSE/IT. Learned Single Judge
opined that the decision making process is in accordance with law
and merely because the appellants are enjoying the approval of
AICTE and NOC of JNTU, they have no indefeasible right to get
benefit of increase of seats. Thus, it is prerogative of the State
Government to take decision based on relevant parameters as per
Section 20 of the Act.
34. So far discrimination is concerned, learned Single Judge
opined that if one institution got the benefit contrary to law, that
cannot become example for others to follow. In other words, the
learned Single Judge applied the doctrine of ‘Negative Equality’ and
rightly held that one such benefit cannot become example for
others to enjoy the benefit of increase of seats. In our opinion, the
view taken by the learned Single Judge in this regard in paragraph
Nos. 37 and 38 of the impugned order based on the judgment of
the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad
18
Singh 5 is a plausible view which does not warrant any interference
from us.
35. We will be failing in our duty, if we do not consider the
argument of Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, based
on paragraph Nos.3 and 4 of the impugned order dated
24.08.2024. He strenuously contended that in these paragraphs
the Higher Education Department itself treated Kandlakoya locality
to be within Medchal-Malkajgiri Districts and compared the both.
We do not see any force in this argument for the simple reason that
litmus test is laid down in the Section 20 of the Education Act
which is locality wise and the Supreme Court while upholding the
constitutionality of that provision, made it clear in Sangam Laxmi
Bai Vidyapeet (supra) that educational needs of the ‘locality’ needs
to be seen. In case of any ambiguity or confusion in the language
employed in paragraph Nos.3 and 4 of the impugned order, we
must examine the action on the touch stone of the Section 20 of
the Education Act. Putting it differently, it is Section 20 which
provides the test and the impugned action shows that the said test
was correctly applied. Thus, on this count also we find no reason
to interfere.
5
AIR 2000 SC 306
19
36. As discussed above, we find no illegality in the order of the
learned Single Judge which warrants interference in this
intra-Court appeal. However, there is another facet which requires
our attention.
37. Admittedly, pursuant to interim order passed by this Court,
in previous round certain seats were initially increased and
accordingly, seats were permitted to be filled up. Few students are
already enjoying the benefits and learned Advocate General fairly
admitted that if those students are permitted to either complete
their present course in the same institutions or they are directed to
be admitted in the other institution, the State will have no
objection. Learned counsel for the appellants informed that order
of this Court in W.A.No.1062 of 2024 and batch was although clear
that such admissions will remain subject to outcome of the matter
in W.P.No.23539 of 2024, it is noteworthy that the said order of
this Court was not interfered with in SLP (C) Nos.21322-21335 of
2024, decided on 20.09.2024. In furtherance of these orders, those
students have prosecuted their studies and now they are in the
third year. It is a four year course, and therefore, this aspect needs
consideration.
20
38. On humanitarian grounds and in exceptional circumstances
mentioned hereinabove, in the fitness of things, we deem it proper
to direct that those students who were admitted pursuant to
interim order of this Court shall be permitted to complete their
courses and order of learned Single Judge will not come in their
way in any manner. We give our stamp of approval to remaining
part of the order of learned Single Judge.
39. The Writ Appeals are disposed of with the observations
mentioned hereinabove. There shall be no order as to costs.
Interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.
____________________
SUJOY PAUL, ACJ
___________________
RENUKA YARA, J
03.07.2025
VS/SA/NVL/MYK/GVR/TJMR
Note:
L.R.copy be marked.
B/o.GVR