Kerala High Court
Cochin International Airport Limited vs The State Information Commission on 5 August, 2025
2025:KER:57823
1
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
"C.R"
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 45 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20387
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
M/S.COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT -
683 111, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY SRI.SAJI
K GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION, PUNNEN
ROAD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2025:KER:57823
2
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
2 JOHNY ANTONY
POOVELI (H), THABORE P.O., POOTHUMKUTTY, ERNAKULAM,
PIN - 683577
BY ADVS.
SHRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
SHRI.P.K.IBRAHIM
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.2012/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
3
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 2012 OF 2022
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20175
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
M/S. COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LTD
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT - 683 111,
REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY SRI.SAJI K.GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
SRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
PUNNEN ROAD, OFFICE OF STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001.
2 SRI.OUSEPH ANTONY
KARUMATHI (H), NAYATHODU P.O, ANGAMALY, ERNAKULAM, PIN
- 683572
2025:KER:57823
4
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
3 SRI.M.R.AJAYAN
S/O LATE M.K RAGHU, EDITOR AT GREEN KERALA NEWS,
MATTAPPILLY HOUSE, OCHANTHURUTH P.O, KOCHI, PIN -
682508
BY ADVS.
SHRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
SHRI.P.K.IBRAHIM
SRI.M.ABDUL RASHEED
SRI.K.P.PRASANTH
SMT.T.S.KRISHNENDU
SMT.ARCHANA SURESH
SMT.HARITHA HARIHARAN
SHRI.P.S.BIJU
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
5
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 46 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20214
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
M/S.COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM 683111
REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR. SAJI K GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
SRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION, PUNNEN ROAD,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001.
2 MR.CHACKAPPAN
KARUMATHY HOUSE, NEAR E COLONY, ANGAMALY, ERNAKULAM
DISTRICT, PIN - 683572
2025:KER:57823
6
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
BY ADV SRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
7
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 64 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20462
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM - 683111.
REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR. SAJI K GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION, PUNNEN
ROAD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 BABY P V
POOVELI HOUSE, NAYATHODE P.O., ANGAMALY, ERNAKULAM, PIN
- 683572
2025:KER:57823
8
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
BY ADV SHRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
9
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 73 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20373
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
M/S.COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM - 683111
REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR. SAJI K GEORGE
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
SRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION, PUNNEN
ROAD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 SRI. PETER P A
POOVELY HOUSE, NAYATHODU P.O. ERNAKULAM, PIN - 683572
2025:KER:57823
10
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
BY ADV SRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
11
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 80 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20432
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT -
683 111, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR. SAJI
K GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION, PUNNEN
ROAD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 RAJU VAZHAKKALA
PADAMUKAL, KAKKANAD, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682030.
2025:KER:57823
12
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
BY ADV SHRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMN
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
13
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 86 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20280
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT -
683 111, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR. SAJI
K GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION PUNNEN ROAD,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2025:KER:57823
14
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
2 SRI. KUNJUMON T T
THOMBRA (HOUSE) VAPPALASSERRY P.O., MAIKKAVU ERNAKULAM
DISTRICT, PIN - 683572.
BY ADV SHRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMISION.
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
15
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 88 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20528
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
M/S.COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT -
683111, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR. SAJI K
GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
SRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION PUNNEN ROAD,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2025:KER:57823
16
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
2 JOSEPH P.P.
POOVELI (H) NAYATHODU P.O. ANGAMALY, ERNAKULAM
DISTRICT, PIN - 683572.
BY ADV SHRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMN
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
17
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 91 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20452
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
M/S.COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT -
683111, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR. SAJI K
GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION, PUNNEN
ROAD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 LITHIN VARGHESE
GREEN HOME APARTMENTS, 401, C WING, ANAND NAGAR, MAROL
2025:KER:57823
18
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
PIPE LINE ROAD, (NEAR DR.SUNIL DEEKSHIT HOSPITAL),
ANDHERI EAST, MUMBAI, PIN - 400059
BY ADV SHRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
19
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 93 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20497
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
M/S.COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT -
683 111, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR. SAJI
K GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION PUNNEN ROAD,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2025:KER:57823
20
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
2 VARGHESE T. K
THAZHATHU VEETTIL HOUSE KONGOTHARA, MAIKAD P.O.
ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 683589.
BY ADV SHRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
21
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 102 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20435
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
M/S.COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED ,
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT -
683 111, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR. SAJI
K GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION,
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION PUNNEN ROAD,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2025:KER:57823
22
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
2 BABY T. V.,
THEKKANATH (H) VAPPALASSERRY P. O., THURUTH, ERNAKULAM,
PIN - 683572
BY ADV SHRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
23
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 108 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20201
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
M/S.COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT -
683 111, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR. SAJI
K GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION, PUNNEN
ROAD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2025:KER:57823
24
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
2 ANTONY K O
KARUMATHY HOUSE, NAYATHODE P O, ANGAMALY, ERNAKULAM
DISTRICT, PIN - 683572.
BY ADVS.
SHRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMN
SHRI.P.K.IBRAHIM
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
25
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 109 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20383
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
M/S.COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT -
683 111, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR. SAJI
K GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
SRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION, PUNNEN
ROAD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2025:KER:57823
26
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
2 ANTU P.V.
POOVELIL HOUSE, NAYATHODE.P.O, ANGAMALY, ERNAKULAM
DISTRICT, PIN - 683572
BY ADV SHRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
27
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 117 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.20209
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
M/S.COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM
DISTRICT-683 111, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY
MR. SAJI K GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
SRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION PUNNEN ROAD,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2025:KER:57823
28
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
2 VARGHESE M.M.
MOOZHAYIL (H) AKAPARAMBU, VAPPALASSERRY P.O. ERNAKULAM,
PIN - 683572
BY ADV SHRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
29
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 134 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.19656
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
M/S.COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT -
683 111, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR. SAJI
K GEORGE.
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION PUNNEN ROAD,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 SUNIL NALIYATH
DAKSHINA, 19 ULLAS NAGAR, THEKKUMBHAGAM, THRIPPUNITHURA
2025:KER:57823
30
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
P.O, ERNAKULAM-, PIN - 682301
BY ADVS.
SHRI.M.AJAY, SC, STATE INFORMATION COMMN
SHRI.C.E.UNNIKRISHNAN
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:57823
31
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TUESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 289 OF 2023
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 02.12.2022 IN WP(C) NO.19452
OF 2019 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/2ND RESPONDENT:
COCHIN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIMITED
AGED 54 YEARS
KOCHI AIRPORT P.O., NEDUMBASSERY, ERNAKULAM,
REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY MR. SAJI K GEORGE,
PIN - 683111
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
RESPONDENTS/PETITIONER & 1ST RESPONDENT:
1 JOHN GEORGE NECHUPADOM
S/O. C.J. GEORGE, NECHUPADOM, KADAYIRUPPU P.O.,
KOLECHERRY, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682311
2025:KER:57823
32
W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
2 THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION PUNNEN ROAD,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
BY ADVS.
SHRI.PAUL JACOB
SHRI.M.AJAY
SHRI.LEO LUKOSE
SRI.ENOCH DAVID SIMON JOEL
SRI.S.SREEDEV
SRI.RONY JOSE
SRI.KAROL MATHEWS SEBASTIAN ALENCHERRY
SHRI.DERICK MATHAI SAJI
SHRI.KARAN SCARIA ABRAHAM
SHRI.ITTOOP JOY THATTIL
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 08.07.2025,
ALONG WITH WA.45/2023 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
05.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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JUDGMENT
[WA Nos. 45/2023, 2012/2022, 46/2023, 64/2023, 73/2023, 80/2023,
86/2023, 88/2023, 91/2023, 93/2023, 102/2023, 108/2023, 109/2023,
117/2023, 134/2023, 289/2023]
Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J.
Heard Sri.S.Sreekumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the appellant with Adv.Sri.S.Harikrishnan, and Sri.M.Ajay and
Sri.Paul Jacob, learned counsel appearing for respondents.
2. Taking into consideration the facts and the similitude of
the controversy involved in these batch of appeals, they have been
heard analogously and decided by this common judgment.
3. The facts of W.A No.45 of 2023 are taken up for
consideration for deciding the batch of appeals.
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4. The present appeals arise against the final judgment dated
02.12.2022 passed by the learned Single Bench of this Court in
W.P.(C) No. 20387 of 2019 and connected cases (Cochin International
Airport Ltd. v. The State Information Commission & Another), wherein
the Court after undertaking a meticulous analysis concluded that
the Cochin International Airport Authority Ltd. (for short, ‘CIAL’),
is a ‘public authority’ within the confines of Sec. 2(h)(d)(i) of the
Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short, ‘RTI Act‘) and therefore
amenable to obligations of disclosure of information held by it to
third parties and public at large, approaching it for divulging
various heads of information sought by them vide the applications
filed under Sec. 6 of the RTI Act.
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5. The CIAL in these appeals filed under Sec. 5 of the Kerala
High Court Act, 1958 and Rules assails the aforesaid judgment
primarily on the ground that as per the ingredients of Sec.2(h)(d)(i)
of the RTI Act, they are neither being ‘owned’, ‘controlled’, nor
‘substantially financed’ by the agency of the Government. We shall
advert to contentions at length a little later, however for the
present purpose, suffice to state that CIAL contends that it is not
‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution of India (for short,
‘COI’), being bereft of the trappings of a ‘State’, as explicated in the
judgments of Ajay Hasia & Ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors.
[(1981) 1 SCC 722] and other trail of precedents of the Supreme
Court following and developing the said concept.
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6. The respondents on the other hand, which are the State
Information Commission, Kerala (for short, ‘SIC, Kerala’) and Johny
Antony, one of the applicants seeking disclosures under the RTI
Act, contend that CIAL is to be classified as a ‘public authority’
under the RTI Act, amenable to binding obligations of disclosure
resting upon them in terms of the transparency enactment.
7. The arguments and contentions of the respondents shall
also be referred to at length a little later at the appropriate stage.
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
8. In view of the similitude of controversy and overlapping
subject matter of the entire batch of writ appeals, it would be
condign to frame the issues of our consideration and resolution at
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the outset, so as to cut short the prolix arguments made by the
contesting parties in the course of prolonged hearings. The
following issues arise for our consideration, which shall be
answered herein below:
I. Whether CIAL owes its existence to a notification issued or
order made by the ‘appropriate government’, thus
satisfying the first leg for the applicability of Sec. 2(h)(d)(i);
II. Whether CIAL can be treated as a body/entity ‘owned’ or/
and ‘controlled’ by the appropriate government, in a
manner to treat it as an authority answerable to the public
at large and third parties under the RTI Act;
III. Whether CIAL can be treated as an organisation/ entity
‘substantially financed’ by the appropriate government,
possessing a direct/ indirect financial and administrative
control of agencies of the State government.
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9. In view of the above exposition of the broad issues
which we intend to deal with and answer, it would be necessary
now to reproduce the admitted facts, documents and Government
Orders (GOs) between the parties, which have never been disputed
in the previous rounds of litigation before the SIC, Kerala or before
this Court.
ADMITTED FACTS & UNCONTESTED DOCUMENTS, GO’S OF THE
DISPUTE AT HAND
10. The CIAL was preceded by Kochi International Airport
Society (for short, ‘KIAS’), the members of which had mooted the
idea for establishment of a new airport at Nedumbassery,
Ernakulam District. It is not clear as to who exactly prepared the
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project report, nor either of the parties were able to answer
convincingly about the original drafting committee of the project
report. However, it has been admitted by both the contesting
parties that the District Collector, Ernakulam forwarded the
aforesaid project report to the Government of Kerala vide his letter
dated 01.02.1993.
11. On the basis of this letter of the District Collector,
Ernakulam, G.O. (Ms) No.42/93/PW&T dated 19.05.1993 was passed,
through which it was directed that KIAS (the predecessor of CIAL)
must be constituted. An interesting feature of this GOM dated
19.05.1993 is that KIAS was to be constituted of Government
nominees and Government officers in majority, having a
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predominant say in the decision-making and administration of
assets of KIAS. Apropos, the Chief Minister of Kerala and the State
Minister for Transport were nominated as the Chairman and
Vice-Chairman of KIAS, respectively. Shri V.J Kurian, District
Collector was nominated as the Special Coordinating Officer for
implementing the whole project. Shri.V.J Kurian is considered to be
the moving brain and the implementer of the whole vision and
dream of Cochin International Airport, what it stands today. This
is luminescent from the fact that the official booklet/ brochure of
CIAL titled as ‘Insignia of a Dream’ has dedicated not only a chapter
specifically acknowledging the contribution of Shri.V.J Kurian, but
also abundantly mentioned his role as the facilitator, executor and
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W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
the actual brain behind the conception of the whole idea of Cochin
International Airport. Clearly, Shri.V.J Kurian himself was a
Government Officer, being the District Collector of Ernakulam who
was drawing his salary and perks from the State exchequer.
12. However, when the KIAS started facing shortage of funds
in achieving the dream of establishment of the airport, various
interested stakeholders including private citizens, used their good
connections to attract funds from NRIs to the tune of Rs.200 to 250
crores. However, it must be mentioned that the said idea failed to
take off as there was a lukewarm response from the prospective
investors for various reasons, one of them being the very
uncertainty of the airport in being established finally. At this stage,
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again the Government of Kerala (for short, ‘GOK’) was approached
by the private citizens, association of industrialists and
businessmen, which under the chairmanship of the erstwhile Chief
Minister proposed the incorporation of a company in the name and
style of CIAL. The entire asset structure, including the land base,
capital and funds of KIAS were then transferred to CIAL on its
incorporation. After incorporation of CIAL, in March 1994, the
share redistribution also took place, in which KIAS had 70%
shareholding and remaining for private citizens and industrial and
business houses. This fact assumes relevance at a later stage when
we shall be dealing with the first issue.
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13. In their booklet/brochure ‘Insignia of a Dream’
published by the CIAL, it has been stated that land acquisition was
the greatest challenge for the dream of Cochin Airport to take off.
It was the GOK only, which went ahead with the land acquisition
and acquired 1254 acres of land in the name of KIAS. This land
on conversion of KIAS into CIAL was transferred entirely under the
ownership and possession of the newly constituted company of
CIAL. Thus, it is clear that the entire asset and land base of CIAL
was consolidated at the behest of GOK only.
14. Through a subsequent G.O(Ms) No. 92/97/PW&T dated
29.08.1997, GOK decided to enhance its share capital participation
in CIAL to 51% of the authorised share capital. This share capital
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was decided to be enhanced and provided only to allow the airport
project to take off. Resultantly, the GOK provided an additional
amount of Rs.19 crores approximately through G.O. (Ms) No.
22/2000/Tran dated 17.09.2001. However, the participation of the
State Government stood only at 26% at this stage and not 51% with
the financial aid of around Rs.19 crores. This was a turning point
for the CIAL because GOK as a quid pro quo arrangement required
CIAL to suitably amend its Articles of Association (for short, ‘AoA’),
so as to empower the dominance of constitution, membership and
decision making in the Board of Directors (for short, ‘BOD’) of the
company.
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15. It is also admitted that through a subsequently issued
G.O. (Ms) No. 22/2000/Tran dated 17.09.2001, the GOK topped up its
shareholding from 26% to 34.96%, stating that it shall be
contributing funds in all future rights issues to maintain State’s
share at a constant figure of 34.96% of the total equity shares of the
company. Simultaneously, GOK also opened up the rights of other
States and Union PSUs to engage to become substantial
participants in the shareholding of CIAL to ensure that the airport
project doesn’t sink due to its own financial burden and sustains
the minimum required financial stability for its maintenance and
operation. Therefore, it is beyond any pale of doubt that public
funding and resources of the State exchequer were always treated as
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cardinal and centripetal to the sustenance, maintenance and
operation of CIAL.
16. As per documents available on record, not disputed by
the counsel for CIAL, the shareholding pattern of the company as
on June 2010 was as follows:
AGENCY Rs. IN CRORE % OF PAID UP
CAPITAL
STATE GOVERNMENT 98.68 33.33
STATE PSUS 5.4 1.82
CENTRAL PSUS 20.5 6.92
NATIONALISED BANKS 11 3.72
PRIVATE BANKS 6.5 2.2
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DIRECTORS & RELATIVES 112.38 37.96
OTHERS 41.59 14.05
TOTAL 296
17. From the above table, which depicts the financial status
of CIAL as in June 2010, the equity participation was around Rs.105
crores approximately (including the contribution of State PSUs),
which collectively constituted 35.15% of the total share capital of
Rs.296 crores. Central PSUs and nationalized banks, which also
hold public money in their corpus constituted approximately
around 10% of the total shareholding, aggregating to around
Rs.31.5 crores. Seen in its entirety, the public money and funds
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W.A No.45 of 2023 & conn. cases
infused in CIAL was thus clearly crossing 45% in aggregate of the
overall share capital. On a specific question being put to the
counsel for CIAL about such a high shareholding of the public
funds, it was impliedly conceded that without the support of State
and Central Governments and PSU, CIAL perhaps would have never
been able to stand on its own legs (if 45% of shareholding is not
taken into account). This amount doesn’t include miscellaneous
funds, grants and aid received randomly from other Central and
State authorities, one of them being a one-time grant of Rs.10
crores received from Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism, GOI in
July 2010.
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18. As mentioned supra, in view of G.O. (Ms) No.
22/2000/Tran dated 17.09.2001, when CIAL was directed to amend/
modify its AoA and Memorandum of Association (for short, ‘MoA’)/
Bye-laws, some of the provisions that underwent a cascading
change were Articles 95, 125, 185 and others, wherein Government
nominees were compulsorily inducted in the CIAL. The BOD of CIAL
thus came to possess majority of Government officials and
nominees by virtue of these amendments, which we shall be
referring to a little later. Thus with the dominance of the
nominees and representatives of GOK in the BOD of CIAL, it is
contended that important decisions came under the control and
directions of the GOK.
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19. When CIAL was being established, it had borrowed huge
financial loans and guarantees from various financial institutions/
banks, the guarantor and surety of which was provided by none
else but the GOK. For illustration, for bringing financial support
from HUDCO to the tarmac of CIAL, with a loan exposure of around
Rs.140 crores, sovereign guarantee was extended by the GOK itself.
This fact also finds mention in the official brochure/booklet of
CIAL- ‘Insignia of a dream’, specifically mentioning that sovereign
guarantees were extended for various loan facilities raised from
nationalized banks by CIAL to the extent of more than Rs.250
crores from different entities.
20. The GOK has only invested its money as share capital of
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CIAL, and not any direct financing. There is no direct free funding
provided by the Government to CIAL otherwise, and like other
shareholders, the GOK also earns handsome dividend from the
investment in share capital of CIAL by the GOK.
21. As such other than capital shareholding and dominance
and 1/3rd membership in the BOD of CIAL, there is no other mode of
direct or indirect control by the Government on CIAL. Thus, the
role and control of CIAL is restricted only to the extent as provided
under the MoA and AoA of CIAL. Other than GOK, there is a capital
shareholding of the private sector to an extent more than 50% of
the total standing share capital.
22. On applications moved by certain private entities for
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disclosure of certain information, the Public Information Officer of
CIAL (for short, ‘PIO, CIAL’) took a view that CIAL being not a
‘public authority’ under Sec. 2(h) of the RTI Act, there is no bound
obligation to adhere to RTI Act. This took the dispute to the SIC,
Kerala, which through its first order dated 26.07.2010 held that
CIAL is a ‘public authority’ under Sec. 2(h) of the RTI Act and
resultantly obligated to disclose information sought for by the
private applicants. CIAL contested this judgment of the SIC before
the High Court, which eventually through its final judgment and
order passed in 19.02.2019 in W.P.(C) No. 12151 of 2015 (Cochin
International Airport Ltd v. State Information Commissioner) and
other connected writ petitions remanded the matter back to the
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SIC for fresh consideration on the question of jurisdiction and
applicability of the RTI Act to CIAL.
23. Thereafter, SIC again took up all the matters afresh and
through its final order dated 20.06.2019 reiterated the very same
view which it took earlier viz., that CIAL is a ‘public authority’
under Sec. 2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act and therefore bound to provide
information sought for by the private applicants. It is this order
that was passed in the second round dated 20.06.2019, which had
now reached the corridors of this Court, wherein the Single Bench
through its final judgment dated 02.12.2022 passed commonly for
the whole batch of petitions (which is under challenge before us)
took a view that CIAL being a ‘public authority’ cannot repel
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requests for being provided the necessary information under RTI
Act.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT/ WRIT PETITIONER
24. Assailing the judgment of the learned Single Bench, the
appellant/ writ petitioner contends as follows:
a. The SIC as well as the Single Bench have misdirected
themselves whilst holding the CIAL to be amenable to RTI
Act. The principal contention revolves around the fact that
after all GOK is at best a shareholder (albeit having the
highest aggregate of shares), receiving dividends at par with
any other category of shareholders and therefore mere
shareholding would not constitute control or ownership of
the affairs of CIAL;
b. Drawing this Court’s attention to the various AoAs and
MoAs of CIAL, the learned senior counsel led by other
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for holding that it is the BODs which takes a decision as per
the majority and merely because certain representatives are
on Board of CIAL would not make it a company ‘controlled’
by the GOK or its instrumentalities;
c. In extension of this argument, it is further argued that
eventually it is not the individual members or a lot of
members who decide the fate of the company’s course of
action, but the majority in the BOD, which has the actual
decision-making powers;
d. It is further contended that random documents uploaded on
the website cannot be relied upon, which are individualized
studies of Harvard University, Kennedy School and National
University of Singapore, which are at the highest subjective
assessments of the course of development of CIAL;
e. It is contended that initial take-off of CIAL was without any
funding by the Government, whose grant was merely a
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1996 and the GOK had absolutely no say in the affairs of the
company which was actually at the relevant point of time
taking key decisions pertaining to the development of CIAL.
Therefore, it cannot be held that CIAL was ‘substantially
financed’ by GOK, as being ‘substantially financed’ would
imply a financial support which constitutes a spine in the
vertical growth of any commercial entity and not a mere
financial support, when the concerned entity is already
standing on its leg and making good profits;
f. Referring to the provisions of Secs. 255, 268, 269, 198, 309,
310, 311, and other applicable provisions of the Companies
Act, 1956, it was arduously contended that the decision of
BOD of CIAL is subject to the Annual General Meeting of BOD
of the company, which is a conglomerate of all the
shareholders and that it cannot be held that 1/3 directors
appointed/ nominated by GOK would exercise absolute or
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g. Referring further to the judgment of D.A.V. College Trust
and Management Society and Ors. v. Director of Public
Instructions and Ors. [(2019) 9 SCC 185], the appellants
contend that ‘substantial financing’ under Sec. 2(h)(d)(i) of
the RTI Act attributes an objective color to the funding, but
for such funding it would be extremely onerous and difficult
to sustain. The moot question to be addressed according to
the appellants for determining whether any entity is
‘substantially financed’ is to raise and answer the question –
whether the concerned entity can carry on its activities
effectively, without getting any finance from the
government. If its functioning is independent of the
finances of the government, there can be no manner of
doubt that it is not ‘substantially financed’;
h. In support of the contention that CIAL is not ‘substantially
financed’ by GOK or its subsidiary or its instrumentalities,
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total asset value and investment of CIAL, vis-a-vis the
investments made by GOK or share capital held by GOK,
which comes to a pittance when compared to the former. In
this respect our attention was drawn to figures quoted vide
Paras 25, 28 and 29 of the memorandum of writ appeal.
25. All in all it’s been argued that GOK, even if has invested
any amount in CIAL, at the highest it is an investment of equity and
shareholding which cannot be treated as an investment for giving a
fillip to the establishment, sustenance and maintenance of CIAL.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
26. The vehemence of the appellants was countered with
equivalent force by the opposite parties, which argued as follows:
a. CIAL can be treated as an authority/ body established vide
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GOK in the present case. The predecessor entity of CIAL, viz.
KIAS was established through a government order issued in
this behalf, whose public project report was forwarded by
no one else, but the District Collector, Ernakulam. KIAS was
a registered society comprising the majority of government
nominees, including the Chief Minister, State Transport
Minister, the Chief Secretary, the District Collector and
many other government nominees who actually drove the
idea from dream to fruition of CIAL. It is this KIAS, which
was later converted into CIAL as a company, with entire
assets and land base under the ownership and control of
KIAS transferred to it. Therefore, clearly attributing a
purposive interpretation to Sec. 2(h), it can be treated as an
authority or a body established vide an order made by the
appropriate government and thus the first limb of
applicability of Sec. 2(h) is clearly attracted;
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that the shareholding in CIAL to the extent of 45% of the
share capital by the GOK, Central Government or their
undertakings, PSUs etc. The word ‘owned’ under Sec.
2(h)(d)(i) reflects the dominance in decision making,
shareholding and financial affairs of the concerned entity or
body. Therefore, even the second limb of Sec. 2(h)(d)(i)
stands satisfying with CIAL being a body owned by the GOK;
c. Referring to the MoA and AoA, specifically Articles 95, 125,
185 and others, the respondents contend that 1/3rd of the
BODs of CIAL are government representatives, including the
Chief Minister, the Cabinet Ministers, the Chief Secretary,
District Collector and other such government officers. The
Managing Director of CIAL is also a government nominee,
which by the virtue of his designation has the first say in
the holding of meetings, drawing of agenda and passing of
final resolutions of CIAL;
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d. Apart from financial funding, all these directors on Board of
CIAL are its incumbents by virtue of their government post
and designation and not individually. They draw their
salaries for discharging the functions of CIAL from the
public exchequer and consolidated fund of the State, which
is yet another attribute of indirect government funding of
CIAL. Therefore, it can be treated as a body or an authority
‘controlled’ by the appropriate government;
e. Referring to the judgment of Thalapalam Service
Cooperative Bank Limited v. Union of India [2009 (2) KLT
507], the respondents contend that the expression
‘substantially financed’ occurring under Sec. 2(h)(d)(i)
would imply any financial help which is substantial and
visible in nature to the financial standing of the authority or
body. The word ‘substantial’ by its very usage would imply
any and every help which is not a pittance or insignificant.
Therefore, once it is established that shareholding to the
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extent of 45% was from the public funds or monies drawn
from the State exchequer, then it can clearly be
compartmentalized as a financing which is ‘substantial’ in
nature and, enough to clothe the concerned authority or
body as a ‘substantially financed’ authority under
Sec.2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act;
f. Referring to various facts, figures mentioned in the writ
petition as also both the judgments of SIC, it is contended
vehemently by respondent No.2 that financial aid was
provided to CIAL at the stage when it needed the most and
therefore at a later stage, after having successfully taken off,
the management of CIAL cannot turn its back and after 2
decades label the said financial aid as a pittance,
insignificant or insubstantial in nature;
g. The Court must always lean in favour of disclosure and
transparency by purposefully interpreting the RTI Act,
instead of giving it restricted and narrow interpretation
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viewed in the backdrop of the objective for which RTI Act
has been enacted. The Court must lean in favour of bringing
CIAL under the larger umbrella of RTI Act, for it would be in
the benefit of one and all concerned.
RTI ACT: SCHEME,OBJECT & RECOGNITION OF A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
27. Before we embark on consideration of various issues, a
peep into the background of RTI Act, 2005 must be adverted to.
Two landmark judgments paved the way for RTI Act, which were
Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of
India v. Cricket Association of Bengal [(1995) 2 SCC 161], and
PUCL & another v. Union of India & Ors. [(2004) 2 SCC 476]. In
the judgment of Secretary, Ministry of Information &
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Broadcasting, GOI v. Cricket Association of Bengal (supra), the
Supreme Court held that right to impart and receive information is
a specie of the right of freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India (for
short, ‘COI’). It is a necessary adjunct to the exercise of one’s
expression, voice, views and opinion in any vibrant democracy
without which the individual cannot express himself to the fullest.
Likewise, in the judgment of PUCL v. Union of India (supra), the
Supreme Court reiterated that the people of the country have the
right to know every public act, whatever is done in a public way by
their public functionaries and representatives. Transparency,
accountability, removal of corruption, and citizen-participation
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are some of the ideals which a developing country must achieve.
Efficient implementation of social welfare and economically
beneficial legislations in any country is dependent on the
accountability and integrity of those obligated to implement the
same. Openness in the decision making process goes a long way in
building accountability, credibility and integrity of all those who
are part of the decision making process as well as the ultimate
decision.
28. The two judgments as aforementioned led to the
enactment of RTI Act after a lot of deliberations and participatory
discussions. The Preamble of the RTI Act itself envisions the
objective for which it is enacted, viz. an enactment for introducing
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a formalised regime enabling citizens to secure access to
information under the control of ‘public authorities’, in order to
promote transparency and accountability in the working of every
‘public authority’. The recitals accompanying the Preamble state
that democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency
of information, which are vital to its functioning and also to
contain corruption by holding governments and their
instrumentalities accountable to the governed; it is expedient and
necessary to provide a formalised structure for furnishing certain
information to citizens who desire to have it.
29. The RTI Act is therefore aimed at providing free access
to information with the objective of making governance more
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transparent and accountable. Akin to other fundamental rights,
right to information is not uncontrolled or untrammeled, but
subject to inbuilt restrictions in the statute itself and
constitutional limitations of right to privacy enshrined under
Article 21 of the COI. Therefore to that extent, wherever the right
to information doesn’t collide or conflict directly with rights
under Article 21 of any individual or third party, it must have its
way through by expansive and purposive interpretation of the
provisions of the RTI Act especially the definition clause.
30. Proceeding ahead, Sec.2 of the RTI Act titled as
‘definitions’ vide Sec. 2(a), (h) and (j), defines ‘appropriate
government’, ‘public authority’ and ‘right to information’,
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respectively as follows:
“2. Definitions.–In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,–
(a) “appropriate Government” means in relation to a
‘public authority’ which is established, constituted, owned,
controlled or substantially financed by funds provided directly or
indirectly–
(i) by the Central Government or the Union territory
administration, the Central Government;
(ii) by the State Government, the State Government;
***
(h) ‘public authority’ means any authority or body or
institution of self- government established or constituted–
(a) by or under the Constitution;
(b) by any other law made by Parliament;
(c) by any other law made by State Legislature;
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(d) by notification issued or order made by the
appropriate Government, and includes any–
(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;
(ii) non-Government organisation substantially financed,
directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate
Government
***
(j) “right to information” means the right to information
accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of
any ‘public authority’ and includes the right to–
(i) inspection of work, documents, records;
(ii) taking notes, extracts or certified copies of documents
or records;
(iii) taking certified samples of material;
(iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes,
floppies, tapes, video cassettes or in any other electronic mode or
through printouts where such information is stored in a
computer or in any other device.”
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31. Sec. 3 occurring under Chapter II titled as ‘Right to
Information and Obligations of Public Authorities’ is a formal
recognition and embodiment of the fundamental right under
Article 19(1)(a) of the COI stating that all citizens have the right to
information. Thus, the right to information is not merely a
statutory right, but a fundamental right enjoined to every citizen
of India by virtue of being a participant in Indian polity and
democracy. Sec. 3 therefore, merely formalises and acknowledges
the fundamental right and does not introduce any new right. Sec. 4
titled as ‘Obligation of public authorities’ mandates every ‘public
authority’ (as defined under Sec. 2(h) to introduce paraphernalia
in a time bound period, including appointment of PIOs so that
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information sought to be procured by any citizen is provided
within statutory timelines. Secs.6 and 7 titled as ‘Request for
obtaining information’ and ‘Disposal of request’, respectively
are the machinery provisions wherein application is being made
for procurement of any information by any citizen to any ‘public
authority’ and consideration and disposal of the said request. Sec.8
titled as ‘Exemption from disclosure of the information’,
provides various heads under which the ‘public authority’ is
absolved of its responsibility to provide information in relation to
the heads mentioned thereunder, which includes ‘third party
information’ relating to personal facts and details of any
individuals. Sec. 11 titled as ‘Third party information’ provides
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for safeguards against disclosure of information of any nature
which may affect third party personally or individually.
32. The conspectus of statutory provisions of the RTI Act
would ably demonstrate its beneficial nature, having been
formalised to effectuate and effectively realise the fundamental
rights under Article 19(1)(a) of the COI. The curtailment of the said
right can take place only vide exemptions and exceptions provided
under Secs. 8 to 11. Otherwise the right to obtain information is
otherwise absolute and unrestricted. Therefore, the Court must be
loathe to interpret beneficial provisions of the RTI Act in any
manner, that would dismantle any edge or corner of the
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). The
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endeavour is always towards expansion and elaboration of the
right to information as it ushers in transparency, non-secrecy,
openness, resulting in turn accountability and credibility in the
democratic governance. The Court’s effort must be to ensure that
the sunlight enters every room and corner of any building from
where the governance and decisions of government take place,
instead of bringing down the curtains and keeping things in dark
under the veil of secrecy. The Delhi High Court in the matter of
Indian Railway Welfare organisation v. D.M. Gautam & another
[2010 SCC OnLine Del 1795] whilst dealing with the definition of
‘public authority’ held that the term ‘public authority’ under
Sec.2(1)(h) must be interpreted widely, without importing any
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restrictions or conditions, which are not expressly mentioned in the
defining provision.
33. In the above background, it is now appropriate to deal
with the issues individually and answer them head wise.
RE ISSUE NO. 1: CIAL BEING A BODY/ AUTHORITY ESTABLISHED
UNDER AN ORDER ISSUED BY THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT
34. CIAL has vehemently contested that CIAL is not an
authority/ body established through a notification or an order
issued by the appropriate government. Learned Senior Counsel for
CIAL argued in extent that it has been incorporated as a company
under the provisions of erstwhile Companies Act, 1956, being
therefore not an ordain of any statutory authority. Mere
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registration as a company would not confer it the attribute of a
‘public authority’ under Sec. 2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act. Referring to
the certificate of incorporation dated March 1994, it is further
contended that registration of a company along with its
independent MoA and AoA can not be presumed to be clothed as a
‘public authority’.
35. The aforementioned contention is quoted to be rejected
for the fundamental reason that CIAL as a company was not
incorporated for the first time, nor can it be said that it had no
predecessors. As explicated above, it’s an admitted fact that CIAL
was preceded by KIAS, which was a society predominantly
constitutive of senior functionaries of the GOK like the Chief
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Minister, the Cabinet Minister, as also of senior bureaucrats,
deputed and officiating in the State of Kerala, who had steered the
dream of an international airport into fruition. One of them was
erstwhile Collector of Ernakulam, Shri. V.J. Kurian, who had
personally taken up the whole fight for arranging resources for
commissioning and establishment of an international airport. KIAS
was clearly established through G.O. (Ms) No. 42/93/PW&T dated
19.05.1993 issued by the GOK to handle all the issues relating to
land acquisition and the insurmountable financial and
administrative difficulties being faced regarding the same. Had
KIAS not been constituted, perhaps the necessity for constitution
of CIAL after the land base of KIAS had become substantial would
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have never arisen. The constitution of CIAL led to transfer of the
entire asset structure and land base being passed over under the
name, title and ownership of CIAL overnight, which could have
never been possible without the government of the day agreeing
and consenting for the same. KIAS can clearly be treated as a
predecessor of CIAL, from whom CIAL borrowed all the assets, land
base and other capital and funds.
36. Therefore in view of our foregoing analysis, it can
clearly be held that CIAL’s predecessor came into existence by
virtue of an order issued by the GOK (through the erstwhile
Collector, Ernakulam District). Had KIAS not been there, clearly
the question of constitution of CIAL would have never arisen and
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therefore it can safely be recorded that KIAS and resultantly CIAL
both came into existence by virtue of a specific order, bearing G.O.
(Ms) No. 42/93/PW&T dated 19.05.1993 issued by the Collector in
this regard. It is this G.O. (Ms) No. 42/93/PW&T dated 19.05.1993
that had set the stage formally for establishment and
commissioning of the airport at Cochin. Clearly, therefore the first
limb of Sec. 2(h)(d)(i) stands satisfied in the present case of CIAL
being established by an order made by the appropriate
government. We accordingly answer issue No. 1 against the
appellant.
RE ISSUE NO. II: CIAL IS A BODY OWNED & CONTROLLED BY GOK
37. It has been contended rigorously by the learned senior
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counsel appearing on behalf of CIAL that it cannot be treated as a
body owned and controlled by the GOK or any of its
instrumentalities. It is further contended that neither the SIC nor
the Single Bench have considered or properly interpreted the
meaning of ‘owned’ and ‘controlled’ as occurring under Sec.
2(h)(d)(i), which would imply a substantial extent of ownership and
control over the management, administration and decision making
powers of CIAL. It is further contended that the ultimate decision
of CIAL vests with the BODs, and the AGM of CIAL, which is the final
body taking any decision relating to the management and affairs of
the airport.
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38. To the contrary, the respondents have argued on the
lines of observations made in the twin orders of SIC, dated
26.07.2010 and 20.06.2019 passed in the first round and in the
second round, respectively.
39. Sec. 2(h)(d) employs 3 different terms separated by
comma and the word ‘or’ the body may be either ‘owned,
controlled or substantially financed by the appropriate
government’. The ownership conceived under Sec. 2(h) may be not
be a complete or an absolute ownership, but a partial ownership as
well, we would readily import the said reasoning and rationale in
interpreting the word ‘owned’ so employed under Sec. 2(h)(d)(i).
Ergo, even though complete or absolute ownership may not be
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shown to be existing with any entity of the GOK or any of its
instrumentalities. Likewise, the word ‘controlled’ shall also
envisage a limited control over the affairs, management and
decisions of a company, in a way that the controlling entity is able
to influence or affect the final decisions taken by the controlled
entity. The test therefore to be applied in such cases to examine
whether the controlling authority (GOK or its instrumentalities in
the present case) is able to influence and affect the course and
direction of the decisions of the controlled entity by referring to
the MoA and AoA of CIAL (the controlled entity).
40. It is admitted between the parties that through the G.O.
(Ms) No. 22/2000/Tran dated 17.09.2001, CIAL was directed by GOK
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to amend its Bye-laws as a precondition for shareholding to the
extent of 26% in the management of CIAL. In pursuance of the
aforesaid G.O. dated 17.09.2001, the MoA and AoA were extensively
amended, specifically Articles 95, 118, 125, 195, wherein in
compliance with the G.O., the newly amended Articles provided
1/3rd reservation for senior government functionaries and officers
of the State of Kerala. These included the Chief Minister, the
Cabinet Ministers of the State, Chief Secretary as the Managing
Director and other such government functionaries. The Managing
Director is the person first amongst equals who heads all the
meetings, decides the agenda, and sets the tone and tenor of
decisions to be taken in the meeting by the BOD as a collective
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entity. The presence of the Chief Minister, the Cabinet Minister in
the ex-officio capacity further ladens the CIAL with the
governmental character. All these 1/3rd members are members of
CIAL by virtue of their post, i.e., as ex-officio directors. They are
drawing their salary, perks, and remuneration from the State
exchequer, whilst participating and discharging their functions as
part of the BOD of CIAL. The question therefore arises is if CIAL was
never controlled by GOK, then why were the MoA and AoA
amended on the directives of the State Government; why 1/3rd
reservation for nominees of the State Government was specifically
provided by amendment of the said Articles. Clearly, all this was
designed towards ensuring that the management of CIAL does not
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go against the interests or planning of the State Government. This
was provided because the State Government has a continuous and
constant say in the decisions to be taken by the BOD in its GBMs.
41. This can be gleaned from a bare reading of some of the
AoA, which are as follows:
“Appointment of Directors
95(1) Subject to the compliance of Section 255, 268 and other
applicable provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and Articles
108 (1,2 & 3) of the AoA of the company, so long as the
Government of Kerala and/ or its Public Sector Undertakings
jointly or severally hold not less than 26% of the paid up equity
capital of the company, Government of Kerala shall have the
right to nominate from time to time at its discretion 1/3rd of
the total number of Directors of the company. Government of
Kerala shall also be entitled from time to time to remove any
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other person in his or their place and that the Directors so
appointed by Government of Kerala shall not be liable to retire
by rotation.
***
Chairman
118(1) So long as the Government of Kerala and’ or its Public Sector
Undertakings Jointly or severally hold not less than 26% of the
paid up equity capital of the company, the Chief Minister,
Kerala shall bo tho Chairman of the Company who shall be one
of the nominee Directors: of the State Government under
***
Appointment and Powers of Managing Directors/ Whole time
Directors/ Technical Directors.
125(1) Subject to the provision of sections 268, 269, 198, 309, 310,
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Companies Act, 1956 as amended and applicable from time
to time, so long as the Government of Kerala and/ or its
Public Sector Undertakings jointly or severally hold not
less than 26% of the paid up equity capital of the company,
the Government of Kerala shall have the right to appoint
one among the Directors as Managing Director of the
company for such term not exceeding five years at a time
and to fix his remuneration. Government of Kerala will also
have the right to withdraw/ cancel the appointment so
made and to re-appoint any other Director as Managing
Director at their discretion. However, the Government of
Kerala shall exercise their rights contained in this Article
(Article 125(1)) only in consultation with the Board of the
company. Board may appoint one or more of its members
as wholetime Director or Wholetime Directors or Technical
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upon such conditions as they think fit.”
42. There are 6 members out of the total strength of 11
directors on the BOD of CIAL. Out of these 6 members are ex-officio
government nominees. Therefore the government holds a clear
mandate of majority thereby controlling the affairs and
management of CIAL. A similar view had been taken by the
Supreme Court in the judgment of Air India Ltd. v. Cochin
International Airport Ltd. & others [(2000) 2 SCC 617], wherein
whilst dealing with the issue of interference in contractual
decisions being taken by the CIAL, the Court observed that CIAL is a
government undertaking, which has a substantial shareholding
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was discussed at length. This judgment related to the allotment of
ground handling facilities by the management of CIAL to certain
private parties, which was challenged on the ground that decision
is to award tender to one company, Air India Limited. This Court
had then cancelled the contract in favor of Air India so awarded by
CIAL, whilst directing it to reconsider the valid tenders once again
and call all the tenderers who had applied for the same. Whilst
dealing with the challenge to the aforesaid judgment of this Court,
the Supreme Court impliedly proceeded on the assumption that
CIAL is a State instrumentality, being owned, controlled and
‘substantially financed’ by the GOK. It was also mentioned that
CIAL was expected to act fairly being under a public duty towards
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all the bidders and tenderers. The decision of CIAL was scrutinized
by the Supreme Court as to whether it withstood the test of
objectivity and fairness and whether it deserved interference by
the writ Court. The aforesaid judgment is clearly an indicator of
the stand taken by CIAL itself in the past that it is an entity
substantially owned and controlled by the State Government and
therefore amenable to judicial review of its decisions taken with
the involvement of the State Government and its functionaries.
43. Likewise, the expression ‘controlled’ fell for
interpretation earlier on many occasions in different contexts.
Currently, we are concerned about it being used in the context of
RTI Act and not in the context of expression ‘State’ employed
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under Article 12 of the COI. Article 12 of the COI becomes relevant
in the context of maintainability of a writ against a body or
authority under Article 226 and therefore it would be
inappropriate to import the aforesaid interpretation of ‘controlled’
as employed vide Article 12 for interpreting the similar expression
employed under Article 12 to the RTI Act. In State of West Bengal
& Anr. v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi [AIR 1966 SC 447], the
expression ‘controlled’ was interpreted in the context of Article
235 of the COI (control of High Court over District Courts). The
Supreme Court held that control doesn’t imply merely the power of
arranging day to day working of the Court, but higher degree of
power of holding inquiries, imposing punishments and the like.
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Likewise in the case of Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v.
L.V.A. Dixitulu & Ors. [(1979) 2 SCC 34) it was held that the term
‘control’ is of a very wide connotation, amplitude and includes a
large variety of powers which are incidental or consequential to
achieve the powers vested in the authorities concerned. It is
employed synonymously with superintendence, management or
authority to direct, restrict or regulate the subordinate authority
in exercise of its supervisory powers. Merely because an authority/
body exercises supervisory or regulatory powers over some other
authority, the relationship of control by the former over the latter
is clearly not established. It must therefore be held that the control
of any entity must be of such a nature and degree, which amounts
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to substantial control over the management and affairs of the body.
44. Applying the above yardstick and scrutinizing the
amended MoA and AoA, specifically the Articles referred to above,
it is clear as noon day that GOK exercises an authoritative
dominance with the presence of none else but the Chief Minister of
the State in the BOD of CIAL. The presence of Chief Minister and
other Cabinet Ministers in the BOD practically has the
consequential psychological effect of all other private Directors
yielding to the opinion, view and expression of authority to the
head of the government. It cannot be gainsaid that opinion or
proposal of the Chief Minister and other Cabinet Ministers
presiding over the meeting of BOD of CIAL can be overridden by
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other private Directors on board of CIAL in a routine or cavalier
manner, neither individually nor collectively. The group of private
Directors is bound as a norm (barring certain exceptional
contingencies) to tow the line of the Chief Minister, who vide
Article 118(1) of the AoA holds the apex position of being the
chairman of the whole company. The control therefore of GOK is
not nominal, supervisory or merely regulatory in nature over CIAL,
but complete and total in its effect and impact, in the day to day
functioning and decision making of CIAL. This Court cannot break
away from the reality that when senior government functionaries,
bureaucrats and officers preside over the meeting, then
non-government members are left with little choices, but to follow
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the opinion and suggestions of their government counterparts in
Board meetings. Board meetings may be reflective of participatory
and collective consciousness of the entire Board, but in effect the
balance gets heavily tilted towards the government nominees
appointed by virtue of Articles 95(1), 118(1) & 125(1) of the CIAL.
The practical working and functioning of BOD cannot be
overlooked by the Court whilst interpreting the textual clauses and
statutory provisions. Therefore, the contentions of the appellant/
writ petitioner merit rejection, of the company being governed by
the provisions of the Companies Act and not controlled by the GOK
or its instrumentalities.
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IN RE: ISSUE NO. III CIAL BEING A ‘SUBSTANTIALLY
FINANCED’ ENTITY UNDER SEC. 2(h)(d)(i) OF GOK
45. The next and last limb of submission of the appellant is
that CIAL is not a ‘substantially financed’ body of GOK, nor can the
latter be treated as ‘appropriate government’ to be labelled as
‘public authority’ on the said score. Here it would be worthwhile to
point out that the learned senior counsel for CIAL did not dispute
certain facts which were argued and mentioned by the
respondents, as also the 2 orders dated 26.07.2010 and 20.06.2019
passed by the SIC on the issue of substantial financing of CIAL by
GOK:
a. In the year 1994, when KIAS was established, the entire
exercise of land acquisition was facilitated both
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around 1254 acres of land under the management and
control of CIAL by adopting land acquisition proceedings.
The necessary funds and expenses were borne by the GOK
itself on a keen interest shown by the erstwhile Chief
Minister, District Collector and other senior government
functionaries;
b. When financial instability was being faced by CIAL in the
1990s and various banks, financial institutions were
reluctant to extend the requisite monetary support, it was
GOK which stood as a guarantor extending sovereign
guarantees to the lender institutions. Ready reference can
be made to the loan arrangements of around 140 crores
extended by HUDCO in the year 1995, for protecting which
GOK stood as a guarantor for the entire loan agreement.
Clearly, without extension of sovereign guarantee the loans
or borrowings would not have come into existence for the
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c. The GOK had initially promised shareholding support to the
extent of 51% in the year 1997, which was however settled
finally at 26% with the GOK extending equity support to the
extent of Rs. 27.85 crores. The issuance of G.O. (Ms) No.
22/2000/Tran dated 17.09.2001, through which GOK
required CIAL to mandatorily amend their Bye-laws as a
precondition for extending 26% of financial support (in the
form of equity share capital), and CIAL eventually amending
them itself demonstrates visibly the pressing necessity of
funds from the GOK for CIAL, lest there was never any
occasion to concede for amendment to the AoA/ MoA of the
company. The fact that a government order came to be
issued formally with the concession of CIAL and AoA/MoA
were substantially altered, speaks volumes about the
scarcity of existing equity and corpus to make the airport
successfully operational and functional. Therefore, the
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by the State Government was never a necessity, but was
offered to an already taken-off successfully executed project
doesn’t appeal to this Court in the face of above
circumstances.
d. Apart from the above, admittedly in the year 2010 as
mentioned supra, around 45% equity shareholding was in
the hands of GOK or its instrumentalities (PSUs), Central
Government or its PSUs. The financial exposure of CIAL to
the extent of 45% of public funds of the State exchequer is a
clear indicia of ‘substantial financing’ of its activities by the
GOK and the GOI. A faint attempt was made that the phrase
‘appropriate government’ is not a relative term but an
absolute term so employed under Sec. 2(h)(d)(i) and the
investments of GOK shall be different from that of GOI, both
standing in separate compartments. While we prefer not
engaging ourselves with which shall be the ‘appropriate
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our prima facie interpretation of the provision implies that
GOK and its instrumentalities having the highest
shareholding, the ‘appropriate government’ shall be GOK
itself. However we restrain ourselves from going deeper into
this question as it doesn’t arise before us. What arises before
us is being answered about the meaning of ‘substantial
financing’, which in this Court’s opinion would be referable
to the aggregate financing from the State exchequer of the
project in question of any body/ authority. Seen from this
perspective, the figure to be considered for determining
whether CIAL is substantially funded is the figure of 45%
(aggregate shareholding of both GOK as well as GOI) which
clearly accords the character of ‘public authority’ to CIAL,
meeting even the third requisite of the statutory provision.
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46. The learned senior counsel representing CIAL has
persuaded us ably to accept that GOK was not an investor but was
receiving dividends and profits out of its shareholding at par with
other shareholders, and detailed facts, statistics were produced in
support thereof. Though at first blush this contention seems to be
attractive, but on a deeper scrutiny, it is also liable to be turned
down. This is because the applicability of the expression ‘substantial
financing’ is not about the returns being earned or the flavour of
financing or investment, but the factum of extent of financing. It’s a
plain vanilla test, which has to be applied to dehors the flavour or
nature of investment or funding by the appropriate government
from the public funds of the State exchequer. Not to forget that
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even a one-time grant of Rs. 10 crores was made by AAI in July 2010
towards development of various infrastructural facilities. The fact
that various government agencies and undertakings were willingly
coming forward to financially support CIAL itself is indicative of
the fact that management of CIAL was desperately looking for
investment through public funds in its corpus. Every investment
has its own return in tangible or intangible form, by way of interest
or fixed returns or dividends. However, the factum of ‘substantial
financing’ under Sec.2(h)(d)(i) cannot be adjudged on the basis of
returns being earned out of the investment, but from the
investment and financial support (in whatever form) extended to
the borrowing entity as a support system.
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47. It has not been disputed on behalf of CIAL that as on
date 01.10.2018, 32.42% of equity shareholding is held by GOK and
its PSUs in its company. As on today the face value of shareholding
of GOK stands at an aggregate of Rs. 125 crores. It is also not
disputed that the infrastructural assets and land base which came
in possession of KIAS was transferred whole hog under the title,
possession and ownership of CIAL on its incorporation as a
company from KIAS. This conversion and resultant transfer of
entire asset base from KIAS to CIAL was itself facilitated by the GOK
with the active involvement of the erstwhile Chief Minister and the
entire State machinery. The official brochure/ booklet titled as
‘Insignia of a Dream’ issued by CIAL under its sign and seal itself
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records all the aforementioned facts of the active role of State
Government, the incumbent Chief Ministers from time to time and
the entire State machinery (through its bureaucrats, senior
officials and not to forget the Collector, Ernakulam District) in the
swift and smooth transfer of assets from KIAS to CIAL. The
aforementioned facts about the sovereign guarantees in lieu of
loan facilities were given by GOK, facilitated by the active
involvement of the erstwhile Chief Minister, the Cabinet Ministers
and the Collector, Ernakulam District also assume much
pertinence. When the learned senior counsel was confronted with
the contents and acknowledgments made in their own official
brochure/booklet titled ‘Insignia of a Dream’, they found
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themselves frail to deny the same. A vertical glance and glimpse of
this elegantly designed brochure ‘Insignia of a Dream’, provides a
profound insight into the cardinal role played by various organs of
GOK in the eventual establishment, commissioning and successful
operation of CIAL. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of CIAL attempted to take an escape route by arguing that the
acknowledgments and recognitions extended in the brochure are a
bit exaggerated and in many corners even blown out of proportion,
but the fact remains it is a document of CIAL itself, issued, drafted,
designed and released by its own officials. Therefore, the escape
route contrived by the learned senior counsel for CIAL couldn’t
provide much of a rescue.
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48. We must at this juncture also refer to certain judgments
relied upon by both parties on the aspect of the tests laid down in
various judgments on the aspect of ‘substantially financed’ as has
been used under Sec. 2(h)(d)(i). The Supreme Court in the matter of
Thalappalam Service Coop. Bank Ltd. and others v. State of
Kerala and others [(2013) 16 SCC 82], held that the expression
‘substantially financed’ though has nowhere been defined under the
RTI Act, but it literally means solid, massive, etc., indicating that
the degree of financing must be actual, existing, positive and real
to a substantial extent, not moderate, ordinary, tolerable etc. It
would be condign to quote certain observations made vide Paras
46, 47 and 48 of the corresponding judgement of Thalappalam
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Service Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (supra), which reads
thus:
“46. The words “substantially financed” have been used in
Sections 2(h)(d)(1) and (ii), while defining the expression ‘public
authority’ as well as in Section 2(a) of the Act, while defining the
expression “appropriate Government”. A body can be substantially
financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate
Government. The expression “substantially financed”, as such, has not
been defined under the Act. “Substantial” means “in a substantial
manner so as to be substantial”. In Palser v. Grinlings, while
interpreting the provisions of Section 10(1) of the Rent and Mortgage
Interest Restrictions Act, 1923, the House of Lords held that
“substantial” is not the same as “not unsubstantial” i.e. just enough to
avoid the de minimis principle. The word “substantial” literally means
solid, massive, etc. The legislature has used the expression
“substantially financed” in Sections 2(h)(d)(1) and (ii) indicating that
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substantial extent, not moderate, ordinary, tolerable, etc.
47. We often use the expressions “questions of law” and
“substantial questions of law and explain that any question of law
affecting the right of parties would not by itself be a substantial
question of law. In Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) the word
“substantial” is defined as
“Substantial.- of real worth and importance; of considerable
value; valuable. Belonging to substance; actually existing; real; not
seeming or imaginary; not illusive; solid; true; veritable. Something
worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely
nominal. Synonymous with material.”
The word “substantially” has been defined to mean “essentially,
without material qualification; in the main; in substance; materially”. In
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th Edn.), the word “substantial”
means “of ample or considerable amount of size; sizeable, fairly large;
having solid worth or value, of real significance; solid; weighty;
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important, worthwhile; of an act, measure, etc. having force or effect,
effective, thorough”. The word “substantially” has been defined to mean
“in substance; as a substantial thing or being; essentially, intrinsically”.
Therefore the word “substantial” is not synonymous with “dominant” or
“majority”. It is closer to “material” or “important” or “of considerable
value”. “Substantially” is closer to “essentially”. Both words can signify
varying degrees depending on the context.
48. Merely providing subsidies, grants, exemptions, privileges,
etc. as such, cannot be said to be providing funding to a substantial
extent, unless the record shows that the funding was so substantial to
the body which practically runs by such funding and but for such
funding, it would struggle to exist. The State may also float many
schemes generally for the betterment and welfare of the cooperative
sector like deposit guarantee scheme, scheme of assistance from
NABARD, etc. but those facilities or assistance cannot be termed as
“substantially financed” by the State Government to bring the body
within the fold of ‘public authority’ under Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the Act.
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But, there are instances, where private educational institutions getting
ninety-five per cent grant-in-aid from the appropriate Government, may
answer the definition of ‘public authority’ under Section 2(h)(d)(i).”
49. The very same expression fell for consideration in yet
another judgment, of D.A.V. College Trust & Management
Society & Ors. v. Director of Public Instructions & Ors., (supra),
where the Supreme Court had an occasion to scrutinize whether
NGOs are ‘public authority’, within the meaning of RTI Act or not.
The Supreme Court held that even a society, which may not be
owned or controlled by the government, akin to an NGO, but if
‘substantially financed’ directly or indirectly by the government,
would be a ‘public authority’. The word ‘substantial’ was
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interpreted to mean a large and sizable portion, which may not
necessarily be a major portion or more than 50% of the
stakeholding. Substantial financing can be both direct or indirect.
Vide Paras 26 to 29, the Court explained how the expression
‘substantially financed’ be interpreted, which reads as follows:
“26. In our view, “substantial” means a large portion. It does not
necessarily have to mean a major portion or more than 50%. No
hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in this regard. Substantial financing
can be both direct or indirect. To give an example, if a land in a city is
given free of cost or on heavy discount to hospitals, educational
institutions or such other body, this in itself could also be substantial
financing. The very establishment of such an institution, if it is
dependent on the largesse of the State in getting the land at a cheap
price,would mean that it is substantially financed. Merely because
financial contribution of the State comes down during the actual
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be taken into consideration. The value of the land will have to be
evaluated not only on the date of allotment but even on the date when
the question arises as to whether the said body or NGO is substantially
financed.
27. Whether an NGO or body is substantially financed by the
Government is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts
of each case. There may be cases where the finance is more than 50% but
still may not be called substantially financed. Supposing a small NGO
which has a total capital of Rs 10,000 gets a grant of Rs 5000 from the
Government, though this grant may be 50%, it cannot be termed to be
substantial contribution. On the other hand, if a body or an NGO gets
hundreds of crores of rupees as grant but that amount is less than 50%,
the same can still be termed to be substantially financed.
28. Another aspect for determining substantial finance is
whether the body, authority or NGO can carry on its activities effectively
without getting finance from the Government. If its functioning is
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manner of doubt that it has to be termed as substantially financed.
29. While interpreting the provisions of the Act and while
deciding what is substantial finance one has to keep in mind the
provisions of the Act. This Act was enacted with the purpose of bringing
transparency in public dealings and probity in public life. If NGOs or
other bodies get substantial finance from the Government, we find no
reason why any citizen cannot ask for information to find out whether
his/her money which has been given to an NGO or any other body is
being used for the requisite purpose or not.”
50. In view of the aforementioned test, the Court held the
society and the colleges run by DAV Trust as a ‘public authority’
under Sec. 2(h)(d) of the RTI Act. Whilst holding so, the Court had
underscored that salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff of the
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college were borne by the State Government, even though
infrastructural and instructional costs of buildings, auditoriums,
hostels, etc, were borne by the Trust itself (not by the
government). The Supreme Court extensively skimmed through
the audit reports of the DAV Trust to return a finding that Rs. 10 to
15 crores annually were being donated to the society/ trust in
various forms by the government, which took care of almost half of
the expenditure of the colleges/ schools run by it. Therefore, the
colleges/ schools were treated to be ‘substantially financed’ and
resultantly ‘public authority’ under the RTI Act.
51. We must not forget referring to a similar controversy
which arose before the Karnataka High Court in the matter of
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Bangalore International Airport Limited v. Karnataka
Information Commission and Ors. [(2010) SCC OnLine Kar 108].
The question before the Karnataka High Court was whether
Bangalore International Airport Limited (for short, ‘BIAL’) is a
‘public authority’. Somewhat similar contentions were raised of
BIAL not being ‘public authority’ under the RTI Act. The Karnataka
High Court, after examining long line of precedents and views
taken by other High Courts, arrived at a finding that number of tax
exemptions and benefits were being provided to BIAL; various PSUs
of State of Karnataka had extended direct and indirect financial
support to BIAL; indirect financial support pertained to exemption
from payment of entry tax on movable and immovable plant and
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machinery of BIAL, property tax, stamp duty and registration
charges, etc. The Government of Karnataka had also extended
substantial monetary support in various forms to BIAL to ensure it
became successfully operational.
52. The indirect as well as direct financial benefits clearly
translated into a substantial largesse, considered in aggregate.
Eventually, it was held that BIAL was a ‘public authority’ ‘being
controlled and ‘substantially financed’ by the Government of
Karnataka. It would be apposite quoting certain paras from the
aforesaid judgment, which would squarely apply in the case at
hand as well. Vide Paras 20 to 23, the Karnataka High Court held
thus:
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phase, the Government’s finance is at 30.8% and the private
promoters financing amounts to 17.1 % as indicated in the
statement of objections. The security to the lenders for the project
is also to be found in Clause 14.1.2 of the Concession Agreement.
The State Government has also ensured that uninterrupted supply
of power and water has to be given to the petitioners. If one were to
take these substantial concession in terms of indirect finance
which is given indirectly, it leads to the conclusion that the
petitioner is a non-Government body which is substantially
financed directly or indirectly by the funds provided by the
appropriate Government. The finance could be either as
investment or towards the expenses, or both. The way in which the
words have been placed, indicates that perhaps (i) relates to the
investments and (ii) relates to the running expenses. Thus every
institution which is owned by the Government or not is clearly
covered. By any norms, whenever over 50% of the investment in a
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body belongs to any entity, it is said to be owned by that entity.
Since bodies owned by Government have been mentioned
separately, the words “Controlled” and “Substantially financed”
will have to be assigned same meaning not covered by ownership.
Thus, it is evident that the intention of the parliament is to extent
the scope of the right to other organisations which are not owned
by it. No words in an Act can be considered to be superfluous,
unless the contradiction is so much as to render a significant part
meaningless or they violate the preamble. Therefore, it becomes
necessary to consider a situation where an entity may be
controlled by Government without ownership or substantial
finance. The interpretation given by some that ‘control’ means any
kind of control like that exercised by the Registrar of Societies over
Co-operative Societies, or by RBI on all private Banks is too wide
and certainly are not supported by the law. If we take this very
wide interpretation, all companies are controlled by the Registrar
of Companies, all sales tax dealers by the sales tax authorities and
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will have to give information under the RTI Act. Such a wide
interpretation is not clearly intended in the law.
21. Let us now consider what are the implications of the
words ‘substantially financed. It is obvious that as per Section
2(h)(i) “body…….substantially financed” would be a body where
the ownership may not lie with the Government, nor the control.
Hence, clearly the wording ‘substantially financed’ would have to
be given meaning at less than 50% holding. The company law gives
significant rights to those who own 26% of the shares in a
company. Perhaps this could be taken to define the criterion of
‘substantial finance’. The finance could be as equity or subsidies in
land or concession in taxation.
22. Thus, I am of the view that the twin conditions of the
RTI Act are attracted, inasmuch as, the petitioner — BIAL is
required to be construed as a ‘public authority’ which is
substantially financed either directly or indirectly by the funds
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23. Indeed, another contention was raised by Learned
Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the State Commission
was not justified in importing the definition of “substantially
financed” from another enactment. He would contend that both
the CCAG as well as RTI Act would operate in different fields.
Hence, they cannot be construed as pari materia. But however,
what is significant to note that the word “substantially financed”
is not defined under the RTI Act. In this regard, one will have to
fall back upon either the dictionary meaning of “Substantially
Financed” or for that matter, if the said phraseology is defined in
some other enactment, the same can be imported in this context.
In this regard, one can refer to the Division Bench ruling of this
Court in the case of Bhavani Housing Co-Operative Society Limited
(R) v. Bangalore Development Authority. This Court while
considering whether the definition of a particular phrase can be
imported in a particular enactment has held that if the Acts are
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pari materia to each other, then the definition of one Act can be
imported to the other Act. As observed, “substantially financed” is
not defined in the RTI Act. What would the phrase “substantial”
mean has to be understood in contradiction to the word trivial and
where the funding is not trivial, to be ignored as pittance, the same
would be substantial funding because it comes from public funds.
It need not necessarily be by a cash flow but also by any other
kind. Hence, I am of the view that the petitioner BIAL can be
classified as a ‘public authority’ and a non-Government
organisation which is substantially financed directly and
indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government.”
53. The coalescence of above discussion and judgments is
that ‘substantial financing’ cannot be treated as financing which
must exceed, in the form of direct financial benefit/ aid, to the
extent of being more than 50%, as has been contended on behalf of
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CIAL. The very expression ‘substantial’ implies an aid which is
diametrically opposed to ‘pittance’; an aid which is not intangible,
inconsiderable or insignificant. This Court has thus no hesitation
in holding that from much before its incorporation KIAS and then
CIAL had been ‘substantially financed’ by GOK and its
instrumentalities and the Central Government. Therefore, all the
limbs of being a ‘public authority’ are duly satisfied and we must
hold that CIAL is a ‘public authority’ amenable to disseminate
information under the provisions and rigours of RTI Act.
CONCLUSION
54. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is therefore held
that CIAL is a ‘public authority’ under Sec. 2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act.
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The view taken by SIC in the impugned order dated 20.06.2019 is
affirmed, holding that CIAL is bound to divulge necessary
information and meet the statutory obligations placed upon its
shoulders vide the various provisions of the RTI Act, including the
appointment of PIO and divulging of necessary information in the
said regard. We fix a timeline of 15 days for CIAL to take all
necessary steps for being completely RTI compliant under various
provisions of the RTI Act, especially so specified under Chapter II
(Right to Information and Obligations of Public Authorities) of the
RTI Act and file a compliance report before this Court. It is made
clear that no request for the extension of the aforesaid timeline
shall be entertained, which are just procedural formalities to be
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sufficiently implemented in a time span of 15 days.
55. On the setting up of the entire RTI paraphernalia, the
applications made by various applicants including the respondents
under RTI Act, specifically under provisions of Secs. 6, 7 and 11
shall be dealt with and disposed of within the statutory timeline
framed under the enactment. The authority shall be at liberty to
examine and apply the exemption clauses pertaining to disclosure
of information as stipulated under Secs. 8 to 11 of the RTI Act on
their own merits, against which the aggrieved applicant shall be at
liberty to take appropriate recourse available under law.
56. From perusal of the history of these cases, it appears that
the Managing Director of CIAL has filed the writ petitions and writ
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appeals without approval of the Board of Directors of CIAL for the
purpose of hiding several important actions/decisions from the
general public shareholders of CIAL. Even the Chief Minister being
the Chairman has not been consulted prior to filing of these cases.
Therefore, the Managing Director had no authority to file these
cases without prior approval. We deprecate such kind of practice
and direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Kerala, who is one of
the members of the Board of Directors of CIAL, to take appropriate
action in this regard and also ensure that such instances are not
repeated in future. The Chief Secretary is also directed to ensure
proper compliance and file action taken report in a sealed cover
before the Registry of this Court within a period of 15 days of
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receipt of a copy of this judgment. The Registry of this Court is
directed to communicate a copy of this judgment to the Chief
Secretary forthwith.
57. This Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits
of the individual applications, but decided the singular issue as to
whether CIAL is a ‘public authority’ under RTI Act or not. Though
other issues of exemption from disclosure of third party
information and applicability of exempting provisions of Secs. 8
and 9 were argued by the learned counsel for the appellant,
however we refrain ourselves from expressing any opinion thereto
and leave it on the competent authority/ PIO to decide and dispose
of the same through a reasoned speaking order.
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58. Since no approval of the Board of Directors was taken by
the Managing Director of CIAL, we are of the considered opinion
that the writ petitions and the writ appeals have been filed without
proper authority. Therefore, we deem it appropriate to impose
cost of Rs.1 lakh (Rupees One lakh only) on CIAL to be paid in the
Bank Account of Kerala High Court Advocates’ Association (A/c
No.6271201000065, IFSC Code: CNRB0006271, Canara Bank, High
Court Branch) within a period of ten days from today and produce
receipt before the Registry of this Court.
59. The batch of writ appeals are therefore dismissed in view
of what has been held in the present judgment with the aforesaid
directions and observations to the limited extent.
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Registry of this Court is directed to list the writ appeals for
reporting compliance immediately after expiry of 15 days from the
date of delivery of the present judgment.
Sd/-
SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
JUDGE
Sd/-
SYAM KUMAR V.M
JUDGE
smp