Gauhati High Court
CRP/104/2024 on 27 May, 2025
GAHC010218942024
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Principal Seat at Guwahati
CRP/104/2024
1. The State of Nagaland, represented by the
Secretary to the Government of Nagaland,
Department of Land and Revenue, Nagaland,
Kohima.
2. The Commissioner to the Government of Nagaland,
Kohima, Nagaland.
3. The Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur,
Nagaland.
4. The Revenue Officer, Dimapur,
Nagaland.
5. The Land Record Survey Officer, Dimapur,
Nagaland.
........Petitioners/Defendants
-Versus-
1. Shri Vinoka Chishi,
S/O Shri Vitokhu Chishi,
R/O -Village K-Khel Diphuphar Village,
Page 1 of 80
District - Dimapur, Nagaland.
2. Shri Tokihe Chishi,
S/O Shri Vitokhu Chishi,
R/O Village K-Khel Diphuphar Village,
District - Dimapur, Nagaland.
3. Shri Kughalu Yeptho,
S/O Shri Kughato Yeptho,
R/O Village K-Khel Diphuphar Village,
District- Dimapur, Nagaland.
4. Shri M. Sensotemjen,
S/O Shri Manjem,
R/O Thilixu Village Block-2, H/No. 423,
District- Dimapur, Nagaland.
5. Shri Heito Sema,
S/O Shri Luzhevi Sumi,
R/O Chekiye Village Block 1, H/No. 16,
District- Dimapur, Nagaland.
6. Shri H. Inoto Murru,
S/O Shri Hosheto Murru,
R/O Village K-Khel, Diphuphar Village,
District- Dimapur, Nagaland.
7. Shri Tito Yeptho,
S/O Shri Hokugha Yeptho,
R/O Village K-Khel, Diphuphar Village,
District- Dimapur, Nagaland.
8. Shri Phushito,
S/O Shri Kheniho,
R/O Village K-Khel, Diphuphar Village,
District- Dimapur, Nagaland.
Page 2 of 80
9. Shri Hokashe,
S/O Shri Zenhoto,
R/O Village K-Khel, Diphuphar Village,
District- Dimapur, Nagaland.
10. Smti. Toshili Sumi,
S/O- Shri Tokiho Sumi,
R/O- Village K-Khel, Diphuphar Village,
District- Dimapur, Nagaland.
11. Shri Akaho Zhimo,
S/O Shri Saiche Zhimo,
R/O Thilixu Village Block-III, H/No. 88,
District- Dimapur, Nagaland.
12. Shri Shikai Tuccu,
S/O Shri Toshivi Tuccu,
R/O Satakha Town,
District- Zunheboto, Nagaland.
13. Shri Sheloka Yepth,
S/O Shri Hokato Yeptho,
R/O Ekranipathar Village,
District- Dimapur, Nagaland.
.......Respondents/Plaintiffs
14. Smti. Tohuli,
W/O Late V. Atoshe Sumi,
Hovukhu Village,
Niuland, Nagaland.
15. Airport Authority of India, represented by
the Deputy General Manager, Dimapur, Nagaland.
…….Proforma Respondents
Page 3 of 80
– B E F O R E-
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
Advocate for the petitioners : Mr. K.N. Balgopal, Advocate General;
Ms. T. Khro, Addl. Advocate General;
Ms. M. Kechi, Addl. Advocate General.
Advocate for the respondents : Mr. S. Dutta, Senior Advocate;
Mr. A. Biswas;
Mr. A. Das;
Ms. P. Chetri.
Date of hearing : 27.02.2025
Date of judgment : 27.05.2025
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Heard Mr. K.N. Balgopal, learned Advocate General, Nagaland,
assisted by Ms. T. Khro, learned Additional Advocate General and
Ms. M. Kechi, learned Additional Advocate General for the
petitioners. Also heard Mr. S. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel assisted
by Mr. A. Biswas for the respondent Nos. 1 to 13; Mr. A. Das,
learned counsel for the proforma respondent No. 14 and Ms. P.
Chetri, learned counsel for the proforma respondent No. 15.
Page 4 of 80
2. This revision petition, under Section 115 of the CPC, read with
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is preferred against the
order dated 29.09.2023, passed by the Principal District Judge,
Dimapur, in Civil Appeal No. 24/2023.
3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned order dated
29.09.2023, the learned Principal District Judge, Dimapur („Appellate
Court‟, for short) had dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 24/2023,
preferred by the petitioners herein and hereby upheld the order,
dated 22.11.2021, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Dimapur („Trial Court‟, for short) in I.A. (Civil) No.
224/2020, arising out of Civil Suit No. 14/2020, wherein the learned
Trial Court had granted temporary injunction in favour of the
respondents/plaintiffs, in respect of the land under Dag Nos. 38 and
40 of Diphupar area and restraining the petitioner/defendant No. 3
herein, from executing the eviction order dated 11.12.2020.
4. The background facts, leading to filing of the present petition,
are briefly stated as under:
“The respondent Nos. 1 to 13 herein, as plaintiffs, had
instituted a civil suit, being Civil Suit No. 14/2020, praying for
a decree declaring the orders dated 30.11.2019 and
05.12.2019, as null and void; a decree declaring the eviction
order dated 11.12.2020, as null and void and a decree
declaring and directing the defendants/petitioners herein to
properly and befittingly compensate the plaintiffs/respondent
Nos. 1 to 13 herein, if the land of the plaintiffs is required for
Page 5 of 80
public interest. Along with the said suit, the respondent Nos. 1
to 13 had also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2 of
the CPC, read with Part-VI, Section 94 of the CPC, upon which
I.A.(Civil) No. 224/2020, praying for grant of injunction
against the petitioners herein, not to disturb the peaceful
possession of the land by the respondent Nos. 1 to 13.
The deceased husband of the proforma respondent No.
14, namely, Late V. Atoshe Sumi @ Hutoshe Sema is the
original owner of the land belonging to the respondent Nos. 1
to 13 and they are the rightful owners and possessors of their
respective plots of land which they had received by way of
gifts and/or sale from proforma respondent No. 14 and are in
possession of the same which is claimed by the petitioners
herein. The respondent Nos. 1 to 13 have been enjoying the
possession of their respective plots of land by way of
transferring and mutating their names in the land records
maintained by the Office of the Deputy Commissioner,
Dimapur, by issuing land pattas in connection with their
respective plots of land.
It is the case of the respondent Nos. 1 to 13 that the
husband of proforma respondent No. 14 had purchased a plot
of land on the banks of the Diphupar river on 10.10.1991,
from one Mr. Vizheto Sema, covered by Dag No. 38, Diphupar,
measuring an area of 9½ bighas for a sum of Rs. 1,25,000/-.
Further, the husband of proforma respondent No. 14 on
09.09.1996, had purchased from Mr. Vizheto Sema, the
Page 6 of 80
adjoining plot of land under Dag No. 38, measuring an area of
9 bighas 4 kathas 3 lechas for an amount of Rs. 2,85,000/-
and the aforementioned sale was done in presence of the then
SDO (Civil), Dhansripar. It is also the case of respondent Nos.
1 to 13 that the husband of proforma respondent No. 14, on
05.03.1995, had purchased a plot of land from one Smti. S.
Khehoni, wife of Late Sahoto Yeptho, measuring an area of
5½ bighas, located at Diphupar village for an amount of Rs.
2,85,000/- and as per the sale agreement, the land has never
been compensated by the Airport Authority of India
(AAI)/proforma respondent No. 15 herein, and is free from all
encumbrances. Thereafter, on 05.03.2000, the husband of
proforma respondent No. 14 had purchased the remaining
adjacent plot of land from Smti. S. Khehoni, measuring an
area of 9½ bighas, for an amount of Rs. 2,85,000/- and
thereafter, the husband of proforma respondent No. 14 on
07.04.1995, purchased the private plot of land with teak tree
plantation, from one Nitovi Yeptho, measuring an area of 1½
bighas located at Diphupar village for an amount of Rs.
57,000/-. Thereafter, on 07.07.1995, the proforma respondent
No. 14 had purchased remaining adjacent plot of land from
Mr. Nitovi Yeptho, measuring an area of 1½ bighas.
It is also the pleaded case of the respondent Nos. 1 to
13 herein that the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur, vide order
dated 27.10.1993, issued temporary allotment of land
measuring an area of 9 bighas 4 kathas 3 lechas, under Dag
Page 7 of 80
No. A/40, located at Diphupar, to the husband of proforma
respondent No. 14, and as directed by the Additional Deputy
Commissioner, Dimapur, a spot verification was conducted by
the Office of the Land Record Survey Officer, Dimapur against
the allotment of land to the husband of proforma respondent
No. 14, under Dag No. 40. The report of Land Record Survey
Officer, Dimapur dated 09.07.1996, categorically stated that
the land of the husband of proforma respondent No. 14,
under Dag No. 40 of Diphupar village, falls outside the fencing
of the acquired land for AAI. On receipt of the spot verification
report, the Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur, vide
order No. VLS-25/90-D/6444-47, dated 02.09.1996,
regularized in the name of the husband of proforma
respondent No. 14, the allotment of the plot of land
measuring an area of 9 bighas 4 kathas 3 lechas, under part
of Dag No. A/40 of Diphupar village, which was earlier
temporarily allotted to him. Thereafter, the Deputy
Commissioner, Dimapur, vide order No.VLS-31/76-D/Pt/2840-
44, dated 23.05.2007, had issued in the name of the husband
of proforma respondent No. 14, a jamabandi and/or patta in
respect of the plot of land measuring 9 bighas 4 kathas 3
lechas, under part of Dag No. A/40 at Diphupar village.
Thereafter, the land jamabandi/Patta No. 45 for surveyed
village, under Diphupar was issued to the husband of
proforma respondent No. 14. Thereafter, the Deputy
Commissioner, Dimapur, vide order No. VLS/91-D/Pt.
file/1502-05, dated 10.08.2009 rectified the Patta No.45,
Page 8 of 80
under Dag No. 40/100, a plot of land measuring an area of 23
bighas 3 kathas 10 lechas located at Diphupar village, in
respect of the husband of proforma respondent No.14. The
said plot of land, located at Diphupar village, which was
directed to be rectified, includes the land bought by the
husband of proforma respondent No. 14 from erstwhile land
owners as described herein above.
Thereafter, the AAI/ proforma respondent No. 15
herein, in the year 2002, encroached upon the private land of
the husband of proforma respondent No. 14, and undertaken
developmental activities. Then, the husband of proforma
respondent No. 14 had filed representations dated
06.08.2002, 11.07.2003 and 12.05.2007 to the Deputy
Commissioner, Dimapur against the illegal encroachment of
his land by the AAI and against developmental works being
carried out without any compensation or negotiation with the
land owner.
It is also the pleaded case of the respondent Nos. 1 to
13 that the husband of proforma respondent No. 14, by way
of gift and sale transferred to the respondents Nos.1 to 13
their respective plots of land from his registered land located
at Diphupar village. Thereafter, the respondent Nos. 1 to 13
had applied before the Office of the Deputy Commissioner,
Dimapur for transferring and mutating their respective plots of
land in their names. It is stated that the Office of the Deputy
Commissioner, Dimapur, had conducted spot verification and
Page 9 of 80
advised that for mutation of their respective plots of land from
the registered land of the husband of proforma respondent
No. 14, the Surveyor from the Office of the Deputy
Commissioner, Dimapur asked the respondents to prepare
their respective sale deed/gift deed showing their lands
situated at Ekranipathar and accordingly, as advised by the
Surveyor, the respondent Nos. 1 to 13 had prepared their
respective sale/gift deeds showing their lands located at
Ekranipathar and the Office of the Deputy Commissioner,
Dimapur mutated their lands and issued their respective land
jamabandi at Ekranipathar, though their actual possession of
land is situated at Diphupar village.
Thereafter, on receipt of complaint by the Office of the
Commissioner of Nagaland that the husband of the proforma
respondent No. 14 was in illegal occupation of land which was
acquired by the State Government for extension of Dimapur
Airport, under Dag Nos. 38 and 40 of Diphupar village, had
issued summons to the land holders to appear before the
Commissioner of Nagaland. Thereafter, the Commissioner,
after hearing the parties, vide order No. CNR-5/6/99(Pt-
II)/116, dated 30.11.2019, held the deceased husband of the
proforma respondent No. 14, Late V. Atoshe Sumi and 22
other transferees to be in illegal possession of public land at
Dag Nos. 38 and 40 and were declared as encroachers. The
Commissioner, then cancelled the allotment order No. VLS-
5/86-D/1500-02 issued to V. Atoshe for an area of 27 bighas
Page 10 of 80
2 kathas 8 lechas, in respect of land covered by Dag No.79
Ekaranipathar, but recorded as Dag No.97 Ekaranipathar for
an area of 47 bighas 2 kathas 8 lechas in the chitha and
jamabandi records, and by the same order, the Commissioner
had directed the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur to
immediately proceed for eviction as per law. Thereafter, the
Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur, vide order No. REV-31/2016-
D/I/5953-80, dated 05.12.2019, cancelled the mutation order
and the pattas issued to the 22 transferees flowing from
Atoshe’s patta, wherein the allotment order issued to the
husband of proforma respondent No. 14 was cancelled.
Thereafter, against the aforesaid order of the
Commissioner, Nagaland, dated 30.11.2019 and the order of
the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur, dated 05.12.2019, the
respondents Nos. 1 to 13 herein, whose pattas and mutation
orders were cancelled, approached this Court by filing WP(C)
No. 151/2020, in the Principal Seat, wherein vide order dated
08.01.2020, an order of status quo was passed in respect of
possession of the transferees over the land covered by the
impugned orders and thereafter, the writ petition was
transferred to Kohima Bench and renumbered as WP(C) No.
7(K) of 2020 and vide order dated 09.12.2020, the petitioners
were allowed to withdraw the said writ petition with liberty to
file afresh one. On the basis of the wrong pleadings in the
petition, this Court, while dealing with I.A.(Civil) No. 83 of
2020, filed by the State to modify the interim order dated
Page 11 of 80
08.01.2020, had passed the judgment and order dated
04.12.2020, modifying the status quo in respect of the land at
Ekranipathar, whereas the respondent Nos. 1 to 13, all are
residing and in physical occupation of the land covered by Dag
No. 40, Patta No. 45 at Diphupar. Thereafter, the petitioners
again instituted WP(C) No. 216(K) of 2020 and vide order
dated 11.12.2020, the writ petition was disposed of with a
direction that the petitioners may approach the Civil Court.
It is the pleaded case of the petitioners that the Deputy
Commissioner, Dimapur not being aware of the order dated
11.12.2020, passed by this Court, had issued order No. REV-
31/2016-D/I/10365, dated 11.12.2020, wherein eviction order
was issued and directed the respondents to vacate the land on
or before 18.12.2020, and it was the aforesaid eviction order
dated 11.12.2020 of the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur,
wherein temporary injunction was granted by the learned Civil
Judge (Senior Division), Dimapur, vide the order dated
22.11.2021, restraining the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur
from executing the eviction order and from recovering the suit
land pending disposal of the suit.
Being aggrieved, the petitioners herein preferred a civil
appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 24/2023, challenging, the
jurisdiction of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Dimapur for entertaining the Civil Suit No. 14/2020, which is
expressly barred by Section 9 of the CPC, and that the learned
Page 12 of 80
Civil Judge has usurped the jurisdiction not vested in it by law
and passed the order dated 22.11.2021.
The stand taken in the aforementioned appeal is that
the subject matter of suit is with regard to eviction of persons
in unauthorized occupation of public land where the Nagaland
Eviction of Persons in Unauthorized Occupation of Public Land
Act, 1971 („The Act of 1971‟, for short) bars the Civil Courts to
entertain such nature of suit and as such, the order dated
22.11.2021, was passed by the learned Civil Judge without
jurisdiction and therefore, the temporary injunction in favour
of the respondent Nos. 1 to 13 herein is null and void and
non-est in the eye of law.
Thereafter, hearing both the parties, the learned
Appellate Court, vide impugned order, dated 29.09.2023,
dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioners and thereby,
upheld the order dated 22.11.2021, passed by the learned
Trial Court in I.A. (Civil) No. 224/2020, arising out of Civil Suit
No. 14/2020.
5. Being aggrieved, the petitioners herein preferred this revision
petition on the following grounds:
(i) That, the learned Appellate Court without giving his
independent observation/finding, had arbitrarily and
deliberately reiterated all the findings of the learned Trial
Court and dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 24/2023.
Page 13 of 80
(ii) That, the learned Appellate Court, though totally agreed to
the submission of the petitioners herein that under Section 14
of the Act of 1971, that there is a bar to suits or legal
proceedings and that the learned Trial Court acted contrary to
the law and usurped the jurisdiction not vested in it by law by
granting temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiffs in
violation of the provisions of the statutes, however, in the
most arbitrary, the learned Appellate Court had came to a
perverse conclusion that the civil suit involves issues with
regard to right, title and interest and the same must be
adjudicated and decided only by the civil courts and the civil
suit and the application for temporary injunction were
instituted on the basis of the direction of the order of this
Court, dated 11.12.2020, and this finding is blatantly false as
this Court did not direct the petitioners to approach the Civil
Court, but passed an order that the petitioners may approach
the Civil Court and this Court did not quash and set aside the
Commissioner’s orders dated 30.11.2019 and Deputy
Commissioner’s order dated 01.12.2019 and the eviction order
dated 11.12.2020, and therefore, the Civil Court is barred
from entertaining any suits pertaining to the matters relating
to the Act of 1971, and therefore, the finding of the learned
Appellate Court is perverse.
(iii) That, Section 41 (ha) of the Specific Relief Act prohibits the
grant of injunction with regard to infrastructure projects like
Airport and the grant of temporary injunction in favour of thePage 14 of 80
plaintiffs/respondents is against the statute and the aforesaid
proposition of law is laid down in the case of N.G. Projects
Limited vs. Vinod Kumar Jain, reported in (2022) 6
SCC 127, and thereby totally ignored the said proposition of
law and held that the statutory bar as projected in N.G
Projects Ltd. (supra) will not operate in the present case
for the reason that the suit preferred by the
plaintiffs/respondents is with regard to a decree for declaring
the order of eviction against the plaintiffs/respondents as null
and void and not for any infrastructure project and this finding
is completely perverse as the whole purpose of acquiring the
land is for infrastructure project, namely, the development
and expansion of the Dimapur Airport.
(iv) That, the learned Appellate Court had recorded a finding that
the “The learned Civil Judge while discussing the
point for determination No. 4 with regard to
fourth dimension and public interest/policy, has
observed that the question of acquisition of the
suit land by the state appellants is yet to be
adjudicated and went on to hold that the plea of
the State appellant that it is for public interest
that the suit land is required to be vacated
cannot be accepted”, and this finding is erroneous
inasmuch as that the petitioners herein have placed on record
sufficient documents to establish the acquisition of the
property in Dag Nos. 38 and 40 and also established thePage 15 of 80
vesting of the property in the Government, vide notification
dated 23.09.1992 published in the Nagaland Gazette, and
therefore, as per Section 6(2) of the Nagaland Land
(Requisition and Acquisition) Act 1965, once notice for
requisition of land and premises is published in the Official
Gazette, the land and premises vest absolutely with the State
Government, and the respondents have not established their
right and title over the suit land, rather they have filed
documents pertaining to sale/gift of property at another
locality in Ekranipathar, basing on which they are claiming Dag
Nos. 38 and 40. Further, that the respondents/plaintiffs had
neither sought the relief of title to the property nor have filed
any documents purported to have been executed by Late V.
Atoshe in their favour with regard to the area of
encroachment and the burden of proving the title to the
property is on the person claiming the title and not on the
petitioners herein, and the learned Appellate Court had
ignored the same.
(v) That, the learned Appellate Court had totally ignored all the
material documents available on record while upholding the
order of the learned Trial Court and the respondents had
failed to disclose any cause of action in Civil Suit No. 14/2020,
and when the very foundation of the suit is not in existence,
the suit cannot survive. Further, that the respondents could
not show any documents of their rights and titles, over Dag
Nos. 38 and 40, which they claimed to have purchased fromPage 16 of 80
V. Atoshe Sema in the year 2015 on the basis of various sale
deed, gift deed, whereas the fact that the allotment of land to
Atoshe Sema under Dag No. A/40 was already cancelled on
31.05.2005, by the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur and the
said order attained finality, and that perusal of the sale deeds
on record clearly show that V. Atoshe Sumi did not sell any
property to the respondents and the sale deeds confirm that
the transaction was with Shiloka, pertaining to land at
Ekranipathar and not at Diphupar, the Airport land in Dag Nos.
38 & 40.
(vi) That, the respondents pleaded in their plaint that though the
land was at Diphuphar, on the instructions of the Survey
Officer it was written as Ekranipathar and such pleading is hit
by Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, and the exclusion of
evidence of oral agreements for the purpose of contradicting a
written document, and, therefore, it is evident that the
respondents are rank trespasser on Airport land, thereby
acting in violation of Section 41 (ha) of the Specific Relief Act.
(vii) That, the learned Appellate Court without giving his
independent observations/findings had arbitrarily and
deliberately reiterated the findings of the learned Trial Court
to the effect that a prima facie case is made out in favour of
the respondents, and they are in physical occupation of the
suit land on the basis of valid pattas issued by the competent
authority, which is not only erroneous, but, also contrary to
the judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Court in the
Page 17 of 80
case of State of Nagaland & Anr vs. Avio Naleo &
Ors., reported in (2023) 1 GLT 634, wherein it has been
held that the Deputy Commissioner has to take the approval
of the Government before issuing land patta and there is no
statement in the pleading to the effect that such permission
has been granted for the simple reason that the Government
did not approve of this transaction which is completely against
the law, and despite the same, the learned Appellate Court
concluded that there is no infirmity and/or illegality in the
order and held that a prima facie case is made out.
(viii) That, the learned Appellate Court without giving his
independent observations/findings had arbitrarily and
deliberately reiterated the findings of the learned Trial Court
that the balance of convenience is in favour of the
respondents herein, by holding that- “the respondent Nos. 1
to 13 and the proforma respondent No. 14 are presently
housed at the suit premises with their families, wherein there
are structures/buildings standing vis-a-vis the urgency of the
appellants in ensuring that the land is vacated for carrying out
developmental work for expansion of the Airport which is for
public interest. Since no development has taken place in the
suit land from the end of the petitioners herein as per
materials placed on record, less inconvenience will be caused
to the petitioners vis-a-vis the respondents if the injunction, as
prayed for, is allowed in favour of the plaintiffs and decided in
favour of the plaintiffs.”
Page 18 of 80
(ix) That, on the question of irreparable injury, the learned
Appellate Court, without giving his independent observations/
findings, had arbitrarily and deliberately, reiterated the
findings of the learned Trial Court to the effect that- “the
learned Trial Court held that the present suit has been filed for
injunction against an eviction order issued by the Deputy
Commissioner, Dimapur. The respondents herein are in actual
physical possession of the suit land. The respondents and
their families are occupying the suit land and needs to be
protected from being dispossessed. If injunction is not
allowed, the respondents herein will suffer irreparable loss or
injury, which cannot be compensated in terms of money.
There is every likelihood that if the petitioners herein are not
restrained, the present standing structures will be demolished
which ultimately will change the nature of the property and
result in multiplicity of proceedings which will prejudiced, the
respondents which cannot be compensated in terms of
money.” Such findings/conclusions without independent
observation, is absurd and perverse.
(x) That, regarding the question of the fourth dimension i.e.
public interest/policy, the learned Appellate Court, without
giving his independent observations/findings, had arbitrarily
and deliberately reiterated the findings of the learned Civil
Judge that there is no infirmity in the conclusion, so arrived at
by the learned Civil Judge on the issue of fourth dimension
and on the question of public interest/policy.
Page 19 of 80
(xi) That, the learned Appellate Court without giving his
independent observations/findings decided for himself on the
cases in which temporary injunction can be granted has gone
to the extent of stating that the learned Trial Court had
correctly applied the golden principles.
(xii) That, there is no prima facie case, balance of convenience and
irreparable loss in favour of the respondents herein and the
learned Appellate Court had ignored the same and he also
failed to consider the fact that the suit land was acquired for
extension of existing Dimapur Airport and the same was
leased by the State Government to the AAI, and that the
respondents herein are trespassers/encroachers, basing their
claims to the land pattas at Ekranipathar, and occupying land
under Dag Nos. 38 and 40 at Diphupar. But the learned
Appellate Court had ignored the same.
(xiii) That, the learned Appellate Court had acknowledged that
under the Act of 1971, the Commissioner is the Appellate
Authority and despite the Commissioner’s order No. CNR-
5/6/99(Pt-II)/116, dated 30.11.2019 and order No. CNR-
5/6/99(Pt-II)/117, dated 30.11.2019, declaring the
respondents herein, to be in illegal occupation of public land,
the learned Appellate Court had came to a whimsical finding
that the respondents cannot take the order of the Deputy
Commissioner, Dimapur, dated 05.12.2019, and the eviction
order dated 11.12.2020, on appeal to the Commissioner would
not be maintainable. Further, that learned Appellate Court
Page 20 of 80
held that the two orders dated 30.11.2019, passed by the
Commissioner were in his capacity as the appellate authority,
but, allegedly on the basis of his original jurisdiction, which he
does not possess under the Act of 1971, and such finding is
perverse as the learned Appellate Court is neither the
appropriate authority nor posses the jurisdiction to give such
finding against the Commissioner under the Act of 1971.
(xiv) That, the learned Appellate Court had totally ignored the fact
that in WP(C) No. 151/2020 filed before the Principal Seat of
this Court which was transferred to Kohima Bench and
renumbered as WP(C) No. 7/2020, wherein the respondents
conceding to the fact that their land is at Ekaranipathar and
not in Dag Nos. 38 and 40, which is evident from para Nos. 3,
5, 7, 8 and 11 of the writ petition, and even at para No. 26 in
the prayer clause the respondents had asked for protection of
their land at Ekaranipathar, and though WP(C) No. 7/2020
was withdrawn, the law is settled that the admission made in
one case can be used in another case between the same
parties, and despite the settled law, the learned Appellate
Court had ignored the same.
(xv) That, the learned Appellate Court had totally ignored the
principle of law, laid down by Bombay High Court in the case
of Jai Bholenath Construction vs. The Chief
Executive Officer & Ors., in WP No. 14156 of 2021,
wherein it has been reiterated that a word of caution ought to
be mentioned herein that any contract of public service should
Page 21 of 80
not be interfered with lightly and in any case, there should not
be any interim order derailing the entire process of the
services meant for larger public good.
(xvi) That, the learned Appellate Court had also ignored various
decisions passed by this Court in the cases of Avio Naleo
(supra); Naga United/Inavi Village & Ors. vs.
State of Nagaland & Ors., reported in 2011 SCC
Online Gau 121 and State of Nagaland vs. Thilixu
‘B’, reported in 2014 (2) GLT 829.
(xvii) That, the learned Appellate Court had ignored the fact that
Dimapur is the only Airport in Nagaland and Runway-12 was
closed up due to NH-29 and heavily inhabited area and
therefore, Runway-30 (Chathe/Diphu River side) is the only
possible area for further extension of runway, and the learned
Appellate Court had ignored the same and upheld the order of
the learned Trial Court and took a completely opposite view in
flagrant violation of the decisions of Hon‟ble Supreme Court
and this Court, and therefore, it is contended to allow this
petition.
6. Mr. Balgopal, learned Advocate General, Nagaland, appearing
for the petitioners has reiterated the grounds mentioned in this
revision petition. He submits that though the husband of the
proforma respondent No. 14 claimed to have allotted the land, yet
he has not been allotted any land with permission of the
Government and the Commissioner of the department has denied
Page 22 of 80
the same. Mr. Balgopal also submits that Section 41 (ha) of the
Specific Relief Act prohibits granting of injunction against any
infrastructure project being undertaken in relation to airport as
provided in schedule Clause 1(e). Mr. Balgopal further submits that
the land belongs to the State Government and that public interest
will always prevail over the individual interest,
6.1. Mr. Balgopal also submits that the respondents herein have
also challenged the administrative order passed by the Hon‟ble Chief
Justice of this Court transferring the present Civil Revision Petition
to the Principal Seat from the Kohima Bench, by filing Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 851 of 2024, before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and the
same was dismissed, vide order dated 02.01.2025, and during the
hearing of the said petition before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, the
engaged counsel for the respondents had submitted that they had a
video of furnishing a copy of the administrative order of Hon‟ble
Chief Justice to him (Mr. Balgopal), but said administrative order of
Hon‟ble Chief Justice was not furnished to them despite a request
being made and such submission is totally false and the
respondents herein, can go to such an extent to overreach the
order of the Court, and that they had not approached the Court with
clean hands. And as such, the case of the plaintiffs/respondents
herein ought to have thrown out at the very threshold by the
learned courts below. Mr. Balgopal also submits that the suit is not
maintainable under Section 9 of the CPC and that the observation
made by the learned Appellate Court in respect of maintainability of
the suit against the order of eviction passed under the Nagaland
Page 23 of 80
Eviction of Persons in Unauthorized Occupation of Public Land Act,
1971, erroneous and the suit land is already acquired for the
purpose of extension of Dimapur Airport, and the finding of the
learned Trial Court and also the learned Appellate Court in respect
of the three golden principles and also about fourth dimension in
favour of the respondents are arbitrary and illegal and liable to be
interfered with.
7. Per contra, Mr. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent Nos. 1 to 13 in his argument highlighted following
points: –
(i) The impugned order dated 29.09.2023, passed by the learned
first appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 24/2023 is not
maintainable in as much as, the value of the suit was shown
as Rs. 10,00,00,000/- and ad valorem court fee amounting to
Rs. 11,000/- was paid by the respondent Nos. 1 to 14 and
that the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, shows
that the learned Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain a suit of Rs. 10,00,00,000/-, as in view Sections 96
and 106 of the CPC, an appeal from an order can only be
heard by a Court which is authorised to hear the same.
(ii) The right to appeal of the petitioners against the order passed
by the learned Trial Court is not at all inherited right conferred
upon the petitioners, but a right which is conferred by the
statute, which is in the instant case is the provisions contained
in Section 96 and 106 of the CPC, and as such, the learnedPage 24 of 80
Appellate Court is not the Court to entertain the
aforementioned appeal and the impugned order is nullity for
being passed by a Court which is not authorized under the
statute to hear the same.
7.1. In support of his submission, Mr. Dutta has referred to the
following decisions:
(i) Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar and Ors., reported in
(1974) 2 SCC 393.
(ii) Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. vs. Municipal
Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors.,
reported in (1999) 4 SCC 468.
(iii) State of Haryana vs. Maruti Udyog Ltd. and Ors.,
reported in (2000) 7 SCC 348.
(iv) Anant Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat and
Ors., reported in (1975) 2 SCC 175.
(v) Deonath Missir and Ors. vs. Chandraman Missir and
Ors., reported in 1957 SCC OnLine Pat 182.
7.2. Mr. Dutta, further submits that the impugned order passed by
the learned first appellate Court is nullity and non-est in law and as
such, this revision petition against a non-est order is not
maintainable, and therefore, it is contended to dismiss the same.
8. On the other hand, Mr. Das, learned counsel for the proforma
respondent No. 14 has also subscribed to the submission of Mr.
Page 25 of 80
Dutta, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 13. But,
he has also pointed out that as required under Chapter 5A Rule-1 of
the Gauhati High Court Rules, the petition is not supported by any
affidavit.
9. However, Ms. Chetri, learned counsel for the proforma
respondent No. 15 submits that Dimapur Airport at present is
having runway length of 2290 meters. The runway has two end
which is called Runway-12 end and Runway-30 end and additional
land measuring 17.9 acres has been acquired extension of Runway-
30 end which shall be utilized for extension of Runway to
(2290+310-211) = 2,389 meters which is essential for safe
operation of Airbus & Boeing flights. She also submits that although
the State Government has already acquired the additional land, but
the same could not be handed over to AAl because of the
encroachment over the said land, and since there is encroachment
on the additional land, the Runway-30 end could not be extended
and the land involved in the present proceedings that is land
measuring 17.9 acres situated at Dag Nos. 38 and 40 of Diphupar
village are part of acquired land by State Government for extension
of Runway-30 end. She further submits at present the Runway End
Safety Area (RESA) at RWY30 side measured 90×90 meters. On
getting additional land, the low-lying area at the Chathe/Diphu river
side shall be earth filled and Runway End Safety Area (RESA) will be
shifted further towards the river stream and maintained with
dimension 90x 240 meters as per DGCA standards, and at the
Ayomti & Hollohon Village side i.e. North of existing Runway, land
Page 26 of 80
plot of 52.4 Acres under Dag Nos. 10, 11, 16, 19 & 20 is required to
meet the DGCA standards to maintain Basic Strip of 140 mtr. from
centrelines of runway on both sides. She also submits that to
accommodate operation of larger size of aircraft and to ensure
operational safety, the critical length and width of the runway &
basic strip as per DGCA standards are essential, and that Dimapur
Airport has witnessed a spurt in passenger growth post Covid. The
present annual passenger throughput is projected at 3.26 lakhs for
FY 2025-26 (extrapolated basis Q3 Dec 2024 figures). For FY 2018-
19 the passenger throughput was 1.96 lakhs at Dimapur Airport.
She further submits that as per airport expansion/development
plan, the said land is required for extension of runway length by 310
meters to compensate the displacement of 211 meters of Runway-
12 from its threshold. The displacement is due to the presence of
vehicular movement on NH-29 and due to above displacement of
runway of 211 meters at Runway-12 side, total length of the
runway from 2290 is reduced to only 2079 meters for take-off of
flights at present, and that the existing runway at Dimapur airport is
used as unidirectional due to presence of hilly terrain on Runway-30
side. All landings of the aircraft are from Runway-12 end, and as
such, the acquired land is very much required for expansion of the
Airport.
10. Having heard the submissions of learned Advocates of both
sides, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents
placed on record, and also perused the impugned order dated
29.09.2023, passed by the learned first appellate Court, in Civil
Page 27 of 80
Appeal No. 24/2023 and the order dated 22.11.2021, passed by the
learned trial Court, in I.A. (Civil) No. 224/2020, arising out of Civil
Suit No. 14/2020.
The Issue of Jurisdiction:-
11. In the case in hand Mr. S. Dutta, learned Senior counsel for
the respondent No. 1 to 13, and Mr. A. Das learned counsel for the
respondent No. 14 has taken a categorical stand that the suit value
being Rs.10 crore, the learned Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal and on this count, the order of the learned
Appellate Court is liable to be set aside.
11.1. Per contra, Mr. Balgopal, the learned Advocate General,
Nagaland submits that the learned counsel for the respondent, for
the first time objected to the maintainability of the order passed in
appeal by the learned Appellate Court, Dimapur, though the same
was in their favour, coupled with the fact that throughout the
proceedings in appeal, they did not challenge the proceedings
before the learned Appellate Court, either on grounds of
jurisdiction including pecuniary jurisdiction. Mr. Balgopal further
submits that the law is settled that in such cases, objection on the
question of jurisdiction etc. should be taken at the count of first
instance and having kept quiet throughout the entire proceedings,
they cannot later turn around and challenge the order passed by
the Appellate Court on the ground of want of pecuniary jurisdiction
more so, in view of the fact that these persons have not sufferedPage 28 of 80
any prejudice whatsoever. Mr. Balgopal also submits that the law in
this context has been well settled in the case of Kiran Singh &
Others Vs. Chaman Paswan & Others, reported in (1954) 1
Supreme Court Cases 710 and the said proposition of law was,
later on, followed in the case of Om Prakash Agarwal Vs. Vishal
Dayal Rajpoot and Another, reported in (2019) 14 SCC 526.
11.2. It is to be noted here that Section 21(2) CPC deals with
objections to pecuniary jurisdiction. It provides that no objection as
to the competence of a Court, with reference to the pecuniary limits
of its jurisdiction, shall be allowed by an appellate or revisional
Court, unless such objection was taken:
1. In the Court of first instance at earliest possible
opportunity, and
2. In all cases, where issues are settled, at or before such
settlement, and
3. Unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.
11.3. The use of word „and‟ signifies that all three conditions must
be fulfilled simultaneously. In the case in hand, and as submitted by
Mr. Balgopal, the learned counsel for the respondents, for the first
time objected to the maintainability of the order passed in appeal by
the learned Appellate Court, in spite of remaining silent throughout
the proceedings in appeal. At earliest possible opportunity, they
kept quiet and now they cannot turn around and challenge the
order passed by the learned Appellate Court on the ground of want
of pecuniary jurisdiction. Besides, they could not show that theyPage 29 of 80
suffered any prejudice whatsoever, or that there was failure of
justice.
11.4. It is true, the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any
stage of the proceedings and even in collateral proceedings also as
held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Singh &
Others (supra). Same proposition of law is laid in the case of
Dr. Jagmittar Sain Bhagat vs. Dir., Health Services,
Haryana & Others, reported in AIR 2013 SC 3060, wherein it
has been held that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any
stage and doctrine of waiver does not apply. In the case of Kamala
& Others vs. K.T.Eshwara SA & Others, reported in AIR
2008 SC 3174, same principle is reiterated.
11.5. But the question remains whether a party, who had
appeared before the learned Appellate Court on receipt of notice of
the appeal, being filed the respondents herein, and contested the
appeal and also got an order in their favour can raise the issue of
jurisdiction before this Court in a revision petition. The answer is
obvious that a person, who entered appearance upon receipt of a
notice from the court he exposes himself to acceptance of
jurisdiction of that court, and later on, he cannot make a
somersault. The case rests on the simple and universally admitted
principle that a litigant, who has voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of a court by appearing before it, cannot afterwards,
dispute its jurisdiction. Where such a litigant, though a defendant
rather than a claimant, appears and pleads to the merits withoutPage 30 of 80
contesting the jurisdiction, there is clearly a voluntary submission.
The same is the case, where he does indeed contest the
jurisdiction, but, nevertheless, proceeds further to plead to the
merits, or agrees to a consent order dismissing the claims and
cross-claims, or where he fails to appear in proceedings at first
instance, but appeals on the merits.
11.6. Reference in this context can be made to some overseas
decisions also. In the case of Golden Endurance Shipping SA v
RMA Watanya SA [2016] EWHC 2110 at para. 28, Phillips
J3 (MANU/UKCM/0064/2016), it has been held by England and
Wales High Court (Commercial Court) that: ‚a party, who
voluntarily appears or participates in proceedings is
considered by the common law, to have accepted an offer
from the opposing party, who commenced the proceedings
to accept the jurisdiction and be bound by its
judgment. The touchstone of submission on this basis is
therefore consent, although the question of whether
consent has been given is to be judged objectively.‛
11.7. In the case of Williams & Glyn’s Bank Plc. v. Astro
Dinamico Compania Naviera S.A., [1984] 1 W.L.R. 438
(MANU/UKHL/0018/1984), the House of Lords described the test
for implying such consent as being: “in order to establish a
waiver, you must show that the party alleged to have
waived his objection, has taken some step which is only
necessary or only useful if the objection has been
Page 31 of 80
actually waived, or if the objection has never been
entertained at all.”
11.8. In the instant case, the conduct of the parties, in fact,
demonstrated a submission to the jurisdiction. However, there
remains the question of whether or not there has been a voluntary
submission and the same requires wider investigation into the
conduct of the parties.
11.9. In the case of Om Prakash Agarwal (supra), while
dealing with the issue, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
‚57. The policy underlying Section 21 of Code of
Civil Procedure is that when the case has been
tried by a court on merits and the judgment
rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed
purely on technical grounds, unless it has
resulted in failure of justice. The provisions
akin to Section 21 are also contained in Section
11 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 and Section 99
of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court had the
occasion to consider the principle behind Section
21, Code of Civil Procedure and Section 11 of the
Suit Valuation Act, 1887 in Kiran Singh v. Chaman
Paswan [Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC
340]. In para 7 of the judgment following was laid
down: (AIR p. 342)‚7. … The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99
of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 11 of
the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely,
that when a case had been tried by a court on
the merits and judgment rendered, it should notPage 32 of 80
be liable to be reversed purely on technical
grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of
justice, and the policy of the legislature has
been to treat objections to jurisdiction both
territorial and pecuniary as technical and not
open to consideration by an appellate court,
unless there has been a prejudice on the merits.
The contention of the appellants, therefore,
that the decree and judgment of the District
Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity
cannot be sustained under Section 11 of the
Suits Valuation Act.‛
Thereafter, summing up the discussion, Hon‟ble Supreme
Court has held as under:-
‚69. We thus hold that even when the Court of
Additional District Judge was not competent to
decide the small causes suit in question on the
ground that the pecuniary jurisdiction is vested
in the Court of Small Causes i.e. Civil Judge,
Senior Division w.e.f. 7-12-2015, no interference
was called in the judgment of the Additional
District Judge in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction by the High Court in view of the
provisions of Section 21 of the Civil Procedure
Code.‛11.10. In the case in hand, the respondents could not show that
any prejudice has been caused to them. It is well settled that unless
there has been a prejudice on the merits, purely on technical
grounds, the impugned judgment of the learned Appellate CourtPage 33 of 80
cannot be treated as nullity. Thus, drawing premises from the
illuminating discourse, it can safely be concluded that the impugned
judgment of the learned Appellate Court in deciding the appeal in
question cannot be treated as nullity. Therefore, the
objection/contentions, so raised by the respondents, in respect of
jurisdiction of the learned Appellate Court, and the submissions of
their counsel cannot be acceded to and the same failed to command
an acceptance of this Court and accordingly, the same stands
repudiated.
11.11. I have also gone through the decisions referred by Mr.
Dutta, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1-13. There is no
quarrel at the Bar regarding the proposition of law laid down in the
said case. But, the same proceeds their own fact and not applicable
in all force to the given facts and circumstances of this case and in
that view of the matter, the same would not come into his
assistance.
The Three Golden Principles of Granting Injunction:
12. It is no more res-integra that in order to grant temporary
injunction, the party applying for the same has to satisfy three
golden principles. This aspect has elaborately been dealt with by
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions. In the case of
Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh, reported in (1992) 1 SCC
719, while dealing with Order 39 Rule 1(C) CPC, Hon‟ble Supreme
Court has held as under:
Page 34 of 80
4. It is settled law that the grant of
injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise
thereof is subject to the court satisfying that(1) there is a serious disputed question to be
tried in the suit and that an act, on the
facts before the court, there is probability
of his being entitled to the relief asked
for by the plaintiff/defendant;
(2) the court’s interference is necessary to
protect the party from the species of
injury. In other words, irreparable injury
or damage would ensue before the legal right
would be established at trial; and
(3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or
inconvenience which is likely to occur from
withholding the injunction will be greater
than that would be likely to arise from
granting it.
5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by
evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that
there is ‚a prima facie case‛ in his favour
which needs adjudication at the trial. The
existence of the prima facie right and
infraction of the enjoyment of his property or
the right is a condition for the grant of
temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not
to be confused with prima facie title which has
to be established, on evidence at the trial.
Only prima facie case is a substantial question
raised, bona fide, which needs investigation
and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that
there is a prima facie case by itself is not
sufficient to grant injunction. The Court
Page 35 of 80
further has to satisfy that non-interference by
the Court would result in ‚irreparable injury‛
to the party seeking relief and that there is
no other remedy available to the party except
one to grant injunction and he needs protection
from the consequences of apprehended injury or
dispossession. Irreparable injury, however,
does not mean that there must be no physical
possibility of repairing the injury, but means
only that the injury must be a material one,
namely one that cannot be adequately
compensated by way of damages. The third
condition also is that ‚the balance of
convenience‛ must be in favour of granting
injunction. The Court while granting or
refusing to grant injunction should exercise
sound judicial discretion to find the amount of
substantial mischief or injury which is likely
to be caused to the parties, if the injunction
is refused and compare it with that which is
likely to be caused to the other side if the
injunction is granted. If on weighing competing
possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of
injury and if the Court considers that pending
the suit, the subject matter should be
maintained in status quo, an injunction would
be issued. Thus, the Court has to exercise its
sound judicial discretion in granting or
refusing the relief of ad interim injunction
pending the suit.
12.1. Again, in the case of Seema Arshad Zaheer vs.
Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai, reported in (2006) 5
SCC 282, same principles are reiterated as under: –
Page 36 of 80
‚30. The discretion of the court is exercised
to grant a temporary injunction only when the
following requirements are made out by the
plaintiff:
(i) existence of a prima facie case as
pleaded, necessitating protection of the
plaintiff’s rights by issue of a
temporary injunction;
(ii) when the need for protection of the
plaintiff’s rights is compared with or
weighed against the need for protection
of the defendant’s rights or likely
infringement of the defendant’s rights,
the balance of convenience tilting in
favour of the plaintiff; and
(iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury
being caused to the plaintiff if the
temporary injunction is not granted. In
addition, temporary injunction being an
equitable relief, the discretion to
grant such relief will be exercised only
when the plaintiff’s conduct is free
from blame and he approaches the court
with clean hands.‛Public Interest, the Fourth Dimension: –
12.2. It is also to be mentioned here that in the case of Mahadeo
Savlaram Shelke and Ors. vs. Pune Municipal Corporation
and Ors., reported in (1995) 3 SCC 33, Hon‟ble Supreme
Court has held additionally that public interest is one of thePage 37 of 80
material and relevant considerations in either exercising or refusing
to grant ad interim injunction.
Finding of the Trial Court: –
13. It is to be noted here that while deciding the injunction
application being I.A. 224/2020, in the Civil Suit No. 14 of 2020, the
learned Trial Court had framed following points for determination: –
1. Whether or not prima facie case has been made out
by the plaintiffs/petitioners in their favour?
2. Whether or not Balance of Convenience favours the
case of plaintiffs/petitioners?
3. Whether or not plaintiffs/ petitioners are going
to suffer irreparable injury?
4. The fourth dimension will also be determined since
the suit involves question on public interest
/policy.
13.1. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court solely relying on the
pleadings, the documents relied upon by the parties and the
observations made in the said order, without going into the merits
of the case, opined that the respondents herein have succeeded in
establishing a prima facie case in their favour and decided the point
No.1 in favour of the respondents herein.
13.2. The learned Trial Court had held that – ‚from the
pleadings as projected in the plaint by the respondents
herein, it appears that, the respondents herein who are
fourteen in numbers, are at present housed at the suitPage 38 of 80
premises, with their families which implies that, there
are structures/buildings standing thereon on the suit
land. Keeping in mind the present status of the
respondents herein and also considering the urgency of
the petitioners herein in ensuring that the land is
vacated for carrying out developmental work for
expansion of the airport, which is for public interest
if, we are to balance these two aspects of the
situations in hand, it appears that, scale of
inconvenience leans more towards the side of the
respondents herein, as the injunction, as prayed for,
if not granted in favour of the respondents herein is
going to be felt more by them. It is seen that less
inconvenience will be caused to the petitioners herein
as the development work has not been initiated, and
thereafter, decided point No.2 in affirmative in favour
of the respondents.‛13.3. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court had decided point No.3 in
favour of the respondents observing that – ‚the case in hand
pertains to a prayer for injunction against an eviction
order issued by the respondents herein. From the
pleadings, as projected in the plaint, it appears that,
the respondents herein are in actual physical
possession of the suit land. It appears that the
respondents herein and their families are occupying the
suit land. From the discussions made above, it appears
that the respondents need to be protected from beingPage 39 of 80
dispossessed. It is seen that if injunction, as prayed
for is not granted, the respondents will suffer
irreparable loss and injury which cannot be compensated
in terms of money.‛13.4. The learned Trial Court, thereafter, decided the fourth point
by holding that – ‚since the suit involves question on
public interest/policy, and even presuming the question
of acquisition is not under dispute, it is seen that
the land in question is required for expansion of the
existing Dimapur Airport only. It is seen that the
present existing Airport is fully functional and
operating on daily basis even now. It is not a case,
where the structures had been built on the suit land
and the construction work had been kept on hold/ left
unfinished because of litigation and the public, as a
result of which, are affected and unable to access the
service. It is seen that developmental work is yet to
be initiated.‛ It had also observed that- ‚once permanent
structures are set up on the suit land, it will cause
irreparable loss and injury to the respondents herein.‛
Thereafter, it had hold that – ‚the respondents herein had
satisfied the three golden principles for granting
temporary injunction in their favour.‛ Thereafter, it had
allowed the Civil Misc Case No.224/20, arising out of Civil Suit
No.14/20, granting temporary injunction in favour of the
respondents restraining the petitioner No. 3 herein from executingPage 40 of 80
the aforementioned Eviction order dated 11-12-20, and obtaining
possession of the suit land there under, pending disposal of the suit.
Finding of the Appellate Court: –
14. The order dated 22.11.2021, in I.A. No. 224/2020, in Civil Suit
No. 14 of 2020, being challenged by the petitioners herein before
the learned Appellate Court, in Civil Appeal No. 24 of 2023, and the
learned Appellate Court had recorded its finding as under: –
15. Prima facie case: – In respect of prima-facie case, the
learned Appellate Court held that- ‚the learned Trial Court
first discussed the meaning of ‘prima facie’ as held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Marin Burn Ltd v. R.N.
Banerjee, reported in 1958-I LLJ 247; and in Gujurat
Electricity Board, Gandhinagar vs. Maheshkumar & Co.
Ahmedabad, reported in (1995) 5 SCC 545.‛
15.1. Thereafter, the learned Appellate Court went on to observe
that – ‚the learned Trial Court by holding that
injunction being an equitable relief, it is vital that
one who seeks relief come before the Court with clean
hands and while determining the first golden principle,
it is imperative that the same be taken into
consideration. The learned Trial Court relied on S.J.S.
Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors,
reported in (2004) 7 SCC 166; which held that “As a
general rule, suppression of material fact by a
Page 41 of 80
litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any
relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of
the Courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process
of Court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must
be a material one in the sense that had it not been
suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of
the case.”
15.2. The learned Appellate Court also proceeded to observe that
– ‚the learned Trial Court held that upon perusal of
the records, all the stages, leading to filing of the
present suit, had been sequenced and pleaded in the
plaint and annexed with all the relevant orders. It was
also observed by the learned Trial Court that this
Court while passing the interim modification, vide
Judgment and Order dated 04.12.2020, had after hearing
the actual facts of the case in WP (C) No.216 of 2020,
had disposed of the writ petition, vide order dated
11.12.2020, by observing that the party may approach
the civil court.‛
15.3. Thereafter, the learned Appellate Court had observed that
‚with regard to the contention of forgery, false
revenue records and fraud being committed by the
respondents herein, these are disputed question of
facts and law, which are required to be determined at
the time of trial and requires mature considerations.
Thus, the learned Trial Court did not accept the
contention that the respondents herein had not come
Page 42 of 80
with clean hands and the case of suppression of
material facts is not made out in the instant case. The
Court at this stage is not to conduct a mini trial, but
to confine to the materials placed before it and decide
on the face of it.‛
15.4. The learned Appellate Court also went on to observe that –
‚as far as the Eviction Order No.REV-31/2016-D/I/10365
dated 11.12.2020 is concerned, it was held by the
learned Civil Judge that the same was issued without
complying to the procedure laid down under Section 5 of
the Act. Considering the aforesaid and further
considering the fact that the respondents are in
physical occupation of the suit land on the basis of
valid pattas issued by the competent authority, the
learned Trial Court had held that a prima-facie case
has been made out by the respondents herein in their
favour and that it is a fit case to go for trial.
Accordingly, the learned Trial Court had decided the
point for determination No.1 in favour of the
respondents.‛
15.5. Thereafter, the learned Appellate Court had held that- –
‚in view of what had been held and discussed aforesaid,
it is in total agreement to the conclusion arrived at
by the learned Trial Court, there is neither any
infirmity and/or illegality in the impugned order and
the point for determination No.1 is accordingly
answered in favour of the respondents herein.‛
Page 43 of 80
16. Balance of Convenience: – In respect of balance of
convenience the learned Appellate Court went on to observe that –
‚the learned Trial Court first discussed and observed
the meaning of balance of convenience as held in Orissa
State Commercial Transport Corporation Ltd. vs.
Satyanarayan Singh, (1974) 40 Cut LT 336; wherein it
was held that:
“Balance of Convenience” means the comparative
mischief or inconvenience to the parties. The
inconvenience to the plaintiff, if temporary
injunction is refused, would be balanced and
compared with that to the defendant if it is
granted. If the scale of inconvenience leans to
the side of the plaintiff, then interlocutory
injunction alone should be granted.”
16.1. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court had discussed another
case law in Bikash Chandra Deb v. Vijaya Minerals Pvt
Ltd, 2005 (1) CHN 582; wherein the Calcutta High Court
observed as under:-
“Issue of balance of convenience, it is to be
noted that the Court shall lean in favour of
introduction of the concept of balance of
convenience, but does not mean and imply that
the balance would be on one side and not in
favour of the other. There must be proper
balance between the parties and the balance
cannot be a one-sided affair.”
Page 44 of 80
16.2. The learned Appellate Court then observed that – ‚keeping
the aforesaid principles in mind, the learned Trial
Court went on to observe that from a perusal of the
pleadings as projected in the plaint by the respondents
in their suit, the respondents, who are fourteen in
numbers, are presently housed at the suit premises with
their families, which implies that there are
structures/buildings standing on the suit land. Keeping
in mind the present status of the respondents vis-à-vis
the urgency of the appellants in ensuring that the land
is vacated for carrying out developmental work for
expansion of the Airport which is for public interest,
if we are to balance these two aspects of the situation
in hand, the scale of inconvenience leans more towards
the side of the respondents as, the impact of
injunction, as prayed for, if not granted in favour of
the respondents is going to be felt more by them.
Further, less inconvenience will be caused to the
petitioners herein as the development work has not been
initiated.‛
16.3. Further the learned Appellate Court had observed that –
‚thus, the learned Trial Court went on to hold that
since no development has taken place in the suit land
from the end of the petitioners, as per the materials
placed on record, less inconvenience will be caused to
the petitioners vis-à-vis the respondents, if the
injunction as prayed for is allowed in favour of the
Page 45 of 80
respondents and decided the point for determination
No.2 in favour of the respondents.‛
16.4. From the aforesaid, the learned Appellate Court had held
that – ‚the learned Trial Court had correctly applied
the golden principles with regard to balance of
convenience to the facts of the instant case and
decided the point for determination No.2 in favour of
the respondents and that no infirmity and/or illegality
to the conclusion arrived at by the learned Trial Court
in deciding the point No.2, so as to take a view
contrary to that of the learned Trial Court.
Accordingly, it had recorded concurrence with the
finding of the Trial Court.‛
17. Irreparable injury: In respect of „irreparable injury‟, the
learned Appellate Court had discussed following decisions: –
(i) Orissa State Commercial Transport Corporation
Ltd. v. Satyanarayan Singh, (1974) 40 Cut LT 336;
wherein it was held that:
“Irreparable injury means such injury which cannot
be adequately remedied by damages. The remedy by
damages would be inadequate if the compensation
ultimately payable to the plaintiff in case of
success in the suit would not place him in the
position in which he was before injunction was
refused.”
Page 46 of 80
17.1. The learned Appellate Court had observed that – ‚basing
on the above observation, the learned Trial Court
observed that the present suit pertains to a prayer for
injunction against an eviction order issued by the
petitioner No. 3 herein. From the pleadings as
projected in the plaint by the respondents in the suit,
the respondents are in actual physical possession of
the suit land. The respondents and their families are
occupying the suit land. From the aforesaid
observation, the respondents need to be protected from
being dispossessed. In the instant case, if the
injunction as prayed for is not allowed, the
respondents will suffer irreparable loss and injury,
which cannot be compensated in terms of money and
decided the point for determination No.3 in affirmative
in favour of the respondents.‛
17.2. Then, the learned Appellate Court had observed that- ‚it
is in total agreement to the above view arrived at by
the learned Trial Court and thereby deciding the point
for determination No.3 in favour of the respondents
herein.‛
17.3. Further, the learned Appellate Court observed that – ‚there
is every likelihood that if the appellants are not
restrained by way of injunction, the present standing
structures on the suit land will be demolished which
ultimately will change the nature of the property and
Page 47 of 80
also result in multiplicity of proceedings which will
prejudiced the respondents, which cannot be compensated
in terms of money.‛
The Fourth Dimension i.e. the Public Interest/Policy:
18. In respect of fourth dimension, the learned Appellate Court
went on to observe that – ‚it was observed by the learned
Trial Court that the question of acquisition of the
suit land by the petitioners herein is yet to be
adjudicated. Thus, the plea of the petitioners that it
is for public interest that the suit land is required
to be vacated cannot be accepted. The acquisition of
the suit land by the petitioners is denied by the
respondents. The petitioners relied upon Acquisition
Memo No.REV-29/88-D/ dated 23.09.1992, to show that the
suit land has been acquired by the Government and that
it is public land. It was observed that a piece of land
measuring 253B-02K-12Ls covered by part of Dag No.7,
46, 47, 37, 38, 46, 55, 309 and 16 contiguous to the
existing Airport of Dimapur at Ekranipathar, Diphupar
and Ekranigoan villages of Dimapur Mouza had been
acquired from the land owners under the Nagaland
Regulation and Acquisition Act, 1965. However, the
learned Trial Court held that the memo relied upon by
the petitioners herein finds no mention of Dag No.40.‛
18.1. The learned Appellate Court also held that – ‚the
petitioners also relied upon the Notification No.REV-
Page 48 of 80
29/88-D/11162-68 dated 20.12.1990 wherein a piece of
land measuring 13B-03K-17Ls covered by Dag No.40
contiguous to the existing Airport of Dimapur, at
Diphupar village of Dimapur Mouza has been acquired
from Shri K.N. Sekhose. However, the land under Dag
No.40 alleged to have been acquired from one Shri K.N.
Sekhose finds no mention in the list of landowners
compensated. Rather, the name of two persons namely
Shri Peleo Angami and Shri Imti Ao appears in the list
of compensated landowners under Dag No.40. Both the
lease deeds, dated 18.09.1989 and 25.11.1992, relied
upon by the petitioners finds no mention of land under
Dag No.40. The learned Trial Court then went on to
hold that even presuming the question of acquisition is
not under dispute, the land in question is required for
expansion of the existing Dimapur Airport which at
present is fully functional and operating on daily
basis. It is not a case where structures has been built
on the suit land and the construction work has been
kept on hold and/or left unfinished because of
litigation as a result of which the public are affected
and unable to access the service. It is seen that
developmental works are yet to be initiated. From the
aforesaid observation arrived at by the learned Trial
Court, on the issue of fourth dimension, and on the
questions of public interest/policy, the learned
Page 49 of 80
Appellate Court had held that there is no infirmity in
the conclusion arrived by the learned Trial Court.‛
18.2. The learned Appellate Court further observed that –
‚besides the above, lengthy submission was advanced by
Shri K.N. Balgopal, the learned Advocate General for
the state of Nagaland and also relied upon the
Judgments of various High Courts and the Supreme Court.
It is submitted by the learned Advocate General that
the land situated at Diphupar Village, Ekranipathar
Village and Ekaranigaon Village were acquired by the
state government from various landowners’ in a phased
manner and compensation for the land was paid between
the years 1988 and 2008. The said lands were acquired
for extension of the existing Dimapur Airport and the
same were leased by the State Government in 1989 to the
National Airport Authority, New Delhi. It was further
submitted that proforma respondent No. 14 and the
transferees were trespassers and encroachers and are
basing their claims on the basis of forged and
fabricated documents. The proforma respondent No. 14
was temporarily allotted a plot of land subject to
approval of the Government. It is also submitted that
there is a ban on allotment of Government land to
private individuals, since the year 1992, without prior
and specific approval of the Government.‛
18.3. Thereafter, learned Appellate Court observed that – ‚from
the aforesaid, it is noticed that the proforma
Page 50 of 80
respondent No. 14 and the other respondents are in
physical possession of the suit land alleged to have
been acquired by the Government for expansion of the
Airport. However, it may be noted that the alleged
encroachers were in physical possession of the suit
land, on the basis of land pattas issued by the
competent authority, where structures have been erected
and buildings have come up. As such, the very fact that
the proforma respondent No. 14 and the other
respondents are in possession of the suit land and have
erected structures on the basis of land pattas issued
by the competent authority, which were later cancelled
by the petitioner No. 3 herein, vide order dated
05.12.2019, the instant matter is a fit case for grant
of temporary injunction. Further, as pointed out by
Shri Akito Zhimomi, the learned counsel for the
respondents, that the 8 respondents’ were in
possession of the land by virtue of sale and gift by
proforma respondent No. 14, it may be noted that not
all the land of proforma respondent No. 14 was
allegedly by way of allotment from the Government but
proforma respondent No. 14 had also purchased
considerable area of land from the land owners. As
such, this aspect of the matter should also be taken
into consideration.‛
18.4. The learned Appellate Court also observed that – ‚one
pertinent aspect of the matter is that whether the two
Page 51 of 80
orders of the Commissioner of Nagaland dated
30.11.2019, vide Order No.CNR-5/6/99(Pt-II)/1116 and
Order No.CNR-5/6/99(Pt-II)/1117 can be sustained in the
eyes of law. No doubt, under Section 12 of the Act, the
Commissioner of Nagaland is the appellate authority.
However, a perusal of the Act obviously shows that the
Commissioner, Nagaland do not possess any original
jurisdiction. These two orders dated 30.11.2019 were
not passed by the Commissioner in his capacity as the
appellate authority, but allegedly on the basis of his
original jurisdiction which he do not possess under the
Act.‛
18.5. Thereafter, the learned Appellate Court had discussed the
following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and of the High
Courts, which were relied upon by the appellants to buttress their
arguments:
(i) In Jai Bholenath Construction vs. The Chief
Executive Officer & Ors, 923 WP No.14156 of 2021; by
Judgment dated 30.03.2022, the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay
High Court, at Para 9, reiterated the view as expressed in N.G.
Projects Ltd (supra) that –
“26. A word of caution ought to be mentioned
herein that any contract of public service should
not be interfered with lightly and in any case,
there should not be any interim order derailing
the entire process of the services meant for
larger public good.”
Page 52 of 80
Thereafter, the learned Appellate Court had observed that –
‚the instant case is not with regard to contract, but
for a decree to declare the eviction order dated
11.12.2020, as null and void. The respondents had also
in their suit prayed for a decree declaring the orders,
dated 30.11.2019 and the order dated 05.12.2019, as
null and void.‛
(ii) Thereafter, the learned Appellate Court had discussed the
decision of this Court in State of Nagaland & Anr. vs. Avio
Naleo & Ors, (2023) 1 GLT 634; wherein it was held at Para 43
that –
“(iv) The directions passed in the order dated
06.12.2005 by the Deputy Commissioner thereby
allowing the respondent No.3 to enjoy his rights
over the disputed land on the basis of long
standing and continued occupation over the
disputed land, would merely be a permission being
granted by the Deputy Commissioner to remain in
occupation of the land pending
allotment/settlement made in favour of the
respondent No.3. In that view of the matter, the
respondent No.3 would have no rights as a
proprietor, land holder, settlement holder over
the land measuring 40 Bighas, 0 Katha, 0 Lecha
which was covered by Dag No.36 of Patta No.19. The
rights of the respondent No.3 over the said land
to continue in possession would be subject to
revocation of such permission by the Deputy
Commissioner or by the State Government in
accordance with law.”
Page 53 of 80
Then, the learned Appellate Court had went on to observe
that – ‚with regard to the above, there are also various
Notifications and Office Memorandums banning the
allotment of Government lands to private individuals
without prior and specific approval of the Government.
Further, the temporary allotment is also subject to
approval of the Government.‛
(iii) Thereafter, the learned Appellate Court had discussed the
decisions of this Court in Naga United/Inavi Village & Ors v.
State of Nagaland & Ors, 2011 SCC OnLine Gau 121;
wherein it was held that –
“26. Whichever way we look at the problem, there
is no doubt that the Villagers are rank
encroachers in Intangki Wild Life Sanctuary and
Intangki National Park and the State of Nagaland
is fully entitled to evict them therefrom and to
ensure that they do not continue with their
encroachment in the Intangki Wild Life Sanctuary
or the Intangki National Park.
33. …….However, if they continue to remain in
occupation, then they will have to pay Rs. 5 lakhs
per hectare per month to the State of Nagaland.”
Then, the learned Appellate Court went on to observe that –
‚there is no dispute to the above proposition of law.
Once a person is shown and declared to be an encroacher, the state can initiate the process of
eviction against him. However, in the instant case it
is the Commissioner, Nagaland who declared the proforma
Page 54 of 80
respondent No. 14 and other respondents as encroachers
on the basis of his alleged original jurisdiction which
he do not possess under the Act.‛
(iv) Thereafter, the learned Appellate Court had discussed
another decision of this Court in State of Nagaland v. Thilixu
‘B’, 2014 (2) GLT 829; wherein it was held that-
“11. Subsequently, the fourth dimension of public
interest has been found to be a relevant
consideration while deciding claim of injunction
in appropriate cases. Obviously, the claimants of
injunction here are opposing public Interest. The
Government purportedly has been protecting
Rangapahar Wildlife Sanctuary from encroachers.
Whether the plaintiffs are encroachers or not
would be decided in course of trial but
undoubtedly the question of public interest
appears relevant in the present case. The learned
trial court has not considered even the said
aspect of the matter. The one-page judgment
granting injunction against the Government and
that too against purported protection of Wild Life
Sanctuary without there being necessary
ingredients referred to above cannot be in any way
be upheld. The impugned order dated 24.04.2012
lacks necessary ingredients for being a judgment
at all. The learned trial court not having framed
the point for determination in such an important
issue involving public interest and thereafter not
having objectively decided the same, the impugned
order has been vitiated. On totality of
circumstances, the impugned order dated 24.04.2012
is liable to be rejected.”
Page 55 of 80
18.6. The, the learned Appellate Court went on to hold that- ‚A
perusal of the impugned order dated 22.11.2021 shows
that the learned Civil Judge had framed the point for
determination No.4 to consider the fourth dimension as
the suit involves question on public interest/policy
and went on to hold that the question of acquisition of
the suit land by the state appellants is yet to be
adjudicated and as such, the plea of the state
appellants that it is for public interest that the suit
land is required to be vacated was not accepted.‛
18.7. Thereafter, the learned first appellate court had arrived at a
finding that – ‚In view of the above discussion and the
findings arrived at and also considering the matter in
its entirety, the instant appeal fails and the impugned
order dated 22.11.2021 passed by the learned Civil
Judge Senior Division, Dimapur in I.A. (Civil)
No.224/2020 arising from Civil Suit No.14/2020 is
hereby upheld.‛
Consideration of Submissions of the Parties:-
19. In view of the facts and circumstances discussed herein above,
there appears to be force in the submission of Mr. Balgopal, learned
Advocate General, Nagaland that the finding, so recorded by the
learned Appellate Court, in respect of the three golden principles, in
granting injunction is based on erroneous interpretation of law as
well as erroneous application of the same to the facts herein this
Page 56 of 80
case. It is not in dispute that there is a statutory bar, under Section
41(ha) of the Specific Relief Act, for which no injunction can be
granted in infrastructure projects as in view of the inclusion of
infrastructure project such as Airports in the Schedule of the said
Act.
19.1. The submission of Mr. Balgopal, stands fortified from the
various decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, including in the case of
N.J. Projects Ltd. vs. Vinod Kumar Jain and Ors.,
reported in (2022) 6 SCC 127 also. Further, as contended by Mr.
Balgopal, despite the settled legal position, injunction was granted
by the learned Trial Court giving the public interest a complete go-
bye. Even it appears that the learned Courts below had gone to the
extent of giving a finding that the petitioner State, in the suit,
should first establish that they have acquired the land for expansion
of Airport and further, it had recorded a finding that these
trespassers have valid title. Further, it appears that as contended by
Mr. Balgopal, the trespassers relied upon a bunch of documents to
establish their title and there is doubt about the genuineness of
those documents, which clearly show that the documents do not
pertain to the Airport land and these are the documents based on
which they had obtained injunction orders restraining the petitioners
herein from evicting them and said order being confirmed by the
Appellate Court.
19.2. It is worth noting in this context that Section 41 (ha) of the
Specific Relief Act prohibits the grant of injunction with regard to
infrastructure projects like Airport, being enumerated in the
Page 57 of 80
Schedule of Section 41 (ha). This Section 41 (ha) of the Specific
Relief Act was introduced by an amendment in 2018 and this
amendment was considered by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case
of N.G Projects Ltd. (supra). In Para 19 to para 21 and para
26 of the said judgment it has been held as under:
“19. The Specific Relief Act, 1963 was amended
by Central Act 18 of 2018 when clause (ha) was
inserted in Section 41 of the said Act to say:
Injunction cannot be granted in terms of
section:
“41 (ha) if it would impede or delay the
progress or completion of any infrastructure
project or interfere with the continued
provision of relevant facilities related thereto
or services being the subject matter of such
project.”
20. Such amendment was in pursuance of
the report submitted on 20th June 2016 of the
Expert Committee. The report is as under:-
“The Expert Committee set on examining
Specific Relief Act, 1963 submits its Report to
Union Law & Justice Minister Recommends
modifications for ensuring ease of doing
business The Expert Committee set on examining
the Specific Relief Act, 1963 today Submitted
its Report to Union Law & Justice Minister Shri
D.V.Sadananda Gowda here in New Delhi. In its
report the committee has recommended
modifications in the Specific Relief Act, 1963
for ensuring the ease of doing business.
Page 58 of 80
In the context of tremendous developments
which have taken place since 1963 and the
present changed scenario involving contract-
based infrastructure developments, public
private partnerships and other public projects,
involving huge investments; and changes required
in the present scheme of the Act so that
Specific performance is granted as a general
rule and grant of compensation or damages for
non-performance remains as an exception, the
committee decidedi. To change the approach, from damages
being the rule and Specific performance
being the exception, to Specific
performance being the rule, and damages
being the alternate remedy.
ii. To provide guidelines for reducing the
discretion granted to Courts and
tribunals while granting performance and
injunctive Reliefs.
iii. To introduce provisions for rights of
third parties (other than for Government
contracts).
iv. To consider addressing unconscionable
contracts, unfair contracts, reciprocity
in contracts etc., and implied terms.
The committee observed that there is a
need to classify diverse public utility
Contracts as a distinct class recognising the
inherent public interest/importance to be
addressed in the Act. Any public work must
progress without interruption. This requires
consideration whether a court’s intervention inPage 59 of 80
public works should be minimal. Smooth
functioning of public works projects can be
effectively managed through a monitoring system
and regulatory mechanism. The role of courts in
this exercise is to interfere to the minimum
extent so that public works projects will not be
impeded or stalled.”
21. Since the construction of the road is
an infrastructure project and keeping in view
the intent of the legislature that
infrastructure projects should not be stayed,
the High Court would have been well advised to
hold its hand to stay the construction of the
infrastructure project. Such provision should be
kept in view even by the Writ Court while
exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.”
19.3. Thereafter, in paragraph No. 26, it has been held as under:-
“26. A word of caution ought to be mentioned
herein that any contract of public service
should not be interfered with lightly and in any
case, there should not be any interim order
derailing the entire process of the services
meant for larger public good. The grant of
interim injunction by the learned Single Bench
of the High Court has helped no-one except a
contractor who lost a contract bid and has only
caused loss to the State with no corresponding
gain to anyone.”
19.4. In the instant case, a cursory perusal of the order of the
learned Trial Court dated 22.11.2021, in I.A. (Civil) No. 224/2020,
arising out of Civil Suit No. 14/2020, indicates that this amendment
Page 60 of 80
was totally ignored by the learned Trial Court and though a
discussion was directed to that effect, but no finding was recorded
in this regard. Instead, it had granted injunction despite statutory
prohibition. Further, from a perusal of the impugned judgment of
the learned Appellate Court indicates that it had held that the
statutory bar as projected by the appellant, will not operate in the
instant case, as the suit was preferred by the respondents for a
decree for declaring the order of eviction against the respondents as
null and void and not for any infrastructure project. It also appears
that the learned Appellate Court had further held that the learned
Trial Court, while discussing the point for determination No. 4 with
regard to fourth dimension i.e. public interest/policy, has observed
that the question of acquisition of the suit land by the petitioners is
yet to be adjudicated and went on to hold that the plea of the
petitioners that it is for „public interest‟ that the suit land is required
to be vacated cannot be accepted.
19.5. The finding, so recorded by the learned Trial Court as well as
the learned Appellate Court appears to be fallacious in as much as,
it is the categorical contention of the petitioners herein, from the
very inception, that the suit land belongs to the Government of
Nagaland, vide Notification dated 23.09.1992, published in the
Nagaland Gazette, the land and premises, vested absolutely to the
Government.
20. It appears that the respondents/plaintiff had claimed that they
are the rightful owners and possessors of their respective plots of
land, which they have received by way of gifts and/or sale from late
Page 61 of 80
V. Atoshe Sumi @ Hutoshe Sema, who was the original owner of
their land under Dag No. 38 and 40, situated at Diphupar area. The
respondents had also claimed that they had been enjoying the
possession of their respective plots of land by way of transferring
and mutating their names in the land records maintained by the
Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur, by issuing respective
land pattas in respect of their respective plots of land.
20.1. It is their pleaded case that V. Atoshe Sumi on 10.10.1991
had purchased a plot of land on the banks of Diphupar river from
one Mr. Vizheto Sema covered by Dag No.38, Diphupar, measuring
an area of 9½ Bighas for a sum of Rs. 1,25,000/-. Thereafter, V.
Atoshe Sumi on 09.09.1996 had purchased adjoining plot from Mr.
Vizheto Sema under Dag No.38 measuring an area of 9B-4K-3L for
an amount of Rs.2,85,000/-. The sale was witnesses by the then
SDO (Civil), Dhansripar.
20.2. It is their further pleaded case that V. Atoshe Sumi on
05.03.1995, had purchased another plot of land from one Smti S.
Khehoni, wife of late Sahoto Yeptho, measuring an area of 5 1/2
Bighas located at Diphupar Village for an amount of Rs.2,85,000/-.
The land was free from all encumbrances.
20.3. Thereafter, on 05.03.2000, V. Atoshe Sumi purchased the
remaining adjacent plot of land from Smti S. Khehoni measuring an
area of 9 1/2 Bighas for an amount of Rs.2,85,000/-. Also V. Atoshe
Sumi on 07.04.1995, had purchased the private plot of land with
Teak Tree plantation from one Nitovi Yeptho, measuring an area of
Page 62 of 80
1 1/2 Bigha located at Diphupar Village for an amount of
Rs.57,000/-. Thereafter, on 07.07.1995, V. Atoshe Sumi purchased
the remaining adjacent plot of land from Mr. Nitovi Yeptho
measuring an area of 1 1/2 Bigha.
20.4. It is also their pleaded case that the Deputy Commissioner,
Dimapur vide order dated 27.10.1993, issued temporary allotment
of land measuring an area of 09B-04K-03Ls under Dag No. A/40
located at Diphupar to V. Atoshe Sumi. Thereafter, as directed by
the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur, a spot verification
was conducted by the office of Land Record Survey Officer (LRSO),
Dimapur against the allotment of land to V. Atoshe Sumi under Dag
No.40. The report of LRSO dated 09.07.1996 categorically stated
that the land of V. Atoshe Sumi, under Dag No.40 of Diphupar
village, falls outside the fencing of the acquired land for Airport
Authority of India (AAI). On receipt of the spot verification report,
the Office of Deputy Commissioner, vide Order No.VLS-25/90-
D/6444-47, dated 02.09.1996, regularized in the name of V. Atoshe
Sumi the allotment of the plot of land measuring an area of 09B-
04K-03Ls under part of Dag No.A/40 of Diphupar village which was
earlier temporarily allotted to him. Then, the Deputy Commissioner,
Dimapur vide Order No.VLS-31/76-D/Pt/2840-44 dated 23.05.2007,
issued in the name of V. Atoshe Sumi a Jamabandi and/or Patta in
respect of the plot of land measuring 09B-04K-03Ls under part of
Dag No.A/40 at Diphupar village. Accordingly, the land
Jamabandi/Patta No.45 for surveyed village under Diphupar was
issued to V. Atoshe Sumi.
Page 63 of 80
20.5. And the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur vide Order
No.VLS/91-D/Pt.file/1502-05 dated 10.08.2009 rectified Patta
No.45, under Dag No.40/100 a plot of land measuring an area of
23B-03K-10Ls located at Diphupar village in the name of V. Atoshe
Sumi. The said plot of land located at Diphupar village which was
directed to be rectified includes the land bought by V. Atoshe Sumi
from erstwhile land owners as described above.
20.6. It is also their pleaded case that the AAI, in the year 2002
encroached upon the private land of V. Atoshe Sumi while
undertaking developmental activities. Then V. Atoshe Sumi had filed
representations dated 06.08.2002, 11.07.2003 and 12.05.2007 to
the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur against the illegal
encroachment of his land by the AAI and against developmental
works being carried out without any compensation or negotiation
with the land owner.
20.7. Thereafter, V. Atoshe Sumi, by way of gift and sale
transferred to the respondents No.1-13 their respective plot of land
from his registered land located at Diphupar Village. Thereafter, the
respondents applied before the Office of the Deputy Commissioner,
Dimapur for transferring and mutating their respective plots of land
in their names. Then the Office of the Deputy Commissioner,
Dimapur had conducted spot verification and advised that for
mutation of their respective plots of land from the registered land of
V. Atoshe Sumi, the Surveyor from the Office of the Deputy
Commissioner had asked the respondents to prepare their
respective sale deed/gift deed showing their land situated at
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Ekranipathar. Accordingly, as advised by the Surveyor, the
respondents prepared their respective sale/gift deeds showing their
lands located at Ekranipathar and the Office of the Deputy
Commissioner had mutated their lands and issued their respective
land Jamabandi at Ekranipathar though their actual possession of
land is situated at Diphupar Village.
21. However, it appears from the documents placed on record and
further appears from the pleading of the petitioners and from the
submission of Mr. Balgopal, learned Advocate General, Nagaland
that on receipt of complaint by the Office of the Commissioner of
Nagaland that V. Atoshe Sumi/proforma respondent No. 14, was in
illegal occupation of land which was acquired by the State
Government for extension of Dimapur Airport, under Dag No.38 and
40 of Diphupar Village, summons were issued to the land
holders/respondents to appear before the Commissioner of
Nagaland, the petitioners No. 2 herein.
21.1. The Commissioner of Nagaland after hearing the parties,
vide Order No.CNR-5/6/99(Pt-II)/116, dated 30.11.2019, held Shri
V. Atoshe Sumi and 22 other transferees, to be in illegal possession
of public land at Dag No.38 and 40 and were declared as
encroachers. The Commissioner, Nagaland then cancelled the
Allotment Order No.VLS-5/86-D/1500-02, issued to V. Atoshe Sumi
for an area of 27B-02K-08Ls in respect of land covered by Dag
No.79 Ekaranipathar, but, recorded as Dag No.97 Ekaranipathar for
an area of 47B-02K-08Ls in the Chitha and Jamabandi records.
Page 65 of 80
21.2. Further, it appears that by the same order, the Deputy
Commissioner, Dimapur was directed to immediately proceed for
eviction as per law. The Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur vide Order
No.REV-31/2016-D/1/5953-80, dated 05.12.2019, had cancelled the
mutation order and the pattas issued to the 22 transferees, flowing
from V. Atoshe Sumi‟s patta wherein the allotment order issued to
V. Atoshe Sumi was cancelled.
21.3. Against the aforesaid order of the Commissioner, Nagaland
dated 30.11.2019 and the order of the Deputy Commissioner,
Dimapur dated 05.12.2019, the respondents/plaintiffs, whose pattas
and mutation orders were cancelled, approached this Court by filing
WP(C) No.151/2020, in the Principal Seat, wherein vide dated
08.01.2020, an order of status quo was passed in respect of
possession of the transferees over the land covered by the
impugned orders. Thereafter, the writ petition was transferred to
Kohima Bench and renumbered as W.P.(C) No.7(K) of 2020 and
vide order dated 09.12.2020, the petitioners were allowed to
withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file a fresh one on the
ground that due to miscommunication between the plaintiffs and
their counsel at Guwahati, several relevant documents were not
annexed and the pleadings were also misplaced.
21.4. The record also indicates that this Court while dealing with
I.A. (Civil) No. 83 of 2020 filed by the petitioners to modify the
interim order, dated 08.01.2020, passed the judgment and order
dated 04.12.2020, modifying the status quo in respect of the land at
Ekranipathar where the plaintiffs/respondents herein are all residing
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and in physical occupation of the land covered by Dag No. 40 Patta
No.45 at Diphupar.
21.5. Thereafter, the respondents herein had again instituted
W.P.(C) No.216(K) of 2020 and vide order dated 11.12.2020 the
writ petition was disposed of with a direction that the petitioner may
approach the Civil Court.
21.6. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur had issued
eviction order No. REV-31/2016-D/I/10365, dated 11.12.2020,
wherein, the respondents were directed to vacate the land on or
before 18.12.2020.
22. The record also indicates that the petitioners herein had
contended that there is a statutory bar i.e. Section 9 of the Code of
Civil Procedure in entertaining civil suit and that the learned Trial
Court had exercised the jurisdiction not vested upon it. It is also
their contention that the subject of the suit is with regards to
eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public land, where
the Nagaland Eviction of Persons in Unauthorized Occupation of
Public Land Act, 1971 (“The Act“, for short) expressly bars the Civil
Court to entertain such nature of suit.
22.1. But, the learned Appellate Court had held that there is no
dispute that under the Act, the Commissioner is the appellate
authority, however, in the instant case, the respondents cannot take
the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur, dated 05.12.2019,
cancelling the order of mutation and their pattas and the eviction
order dated 11.12.2020, on appeal to the Commissioner would not
Page 67 of 80
be maintainable as the same would be against the principles of
natural justice since the Commissioner would be sitting over his own
cause, and that though it is strenuously argued by the counsel for
the appellants that there is an express statutory bar to suits or legal
proceedings vide Section 14 of the Act, and there is force in the
submission advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents,
but it had observed that the instant case involve issues with regard
to rights, title and interest and that the same must be adjudicated
and decided only by the ordinary Civil Courts, and the instant suit
and the accompanying application for temporary injunction were
instituted on the basis of the direction of this Court in the order
dated 11.12.2021, in WP(C) No.216(K) of 2020, where it was
observed by this Court that – “from the submission of the learned
counsel of the petitioner it appears prima facie that this is a fit case
for approaching the civil court, and therefore, the petitioner may
approach the civil court,” and this finding also appears to be
erroneous in as much as, in fact this Court had never issued any
direction to institute a civil suit. Rather, an observation was made,
which is being misinterpreted by the learned Appellate Court to
assume the jurisdiction.
22.2. Further, the record reveals that the Civil Suit No. 14 of 2020,
was not filed for right, title and interest over a suit property. It was
instituted by the respondents, inter alia, praying for the below noted
reliefs: –
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(a) A decree declaring the even dated Orders dated
30.11.2019 and the Order dated 05.12.2019 as null and
void.
(b) A decree declaring the eviction Order dated 11.12.2020
as null and void.
(c) A decree declaring and directing the defendants
(appellants herein) to properly and befittingly
compensate the plaintiffs (Respondents No.1-13 herein)
if the land of the plaintiffs be required for public
development.
(d) The full costs of the suit;
(e) Any other reliefs which the court may deemed it fit and
proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
22.3. That being so, the learned Appellate Court had committed a
grave mistake by making/recording such a finding. Even for the
sake of argument, if it is accepted that the relief for right, title and
interest is covered in the prayer (e), then also the suit for
declaration of right, title and interest, where possession is not
sought for, is hit by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and is thus
not maintainable. [See- Ram Saran vs. Ganga Devi reported in
(1973) 2 SCC 73 and Vinay Krishna vs. Keshab Chandra,
reported in 1993 Supp (3) SC 129]
22.4. The learned Appellate Court had also placed reliance upon a
decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in D.R. Chawla & Ors v.
MCD, reported in (1993) 3 SCC 162; wherein it was held that
where a statute bars the Civil Court’s jurisdiction, a suit questioning
the appellate order would be maintainable on ground of
Page 69 of 80
jurisdictional error. But, reliance upon this decision also by the
learned Appellate Court to assume jurisdiction not vested in it,
appears to be misplaced.
23. It is the categorical contention of the petitioners‟ that V.
Atoshe Sumi was allotted a plot of land in June, 1993, wherein it
was mentioned that the land has been acquired for Airport
expansion for which compensation has already been paid and the
allotment was subject to vacating the land and not claiming
compensation in terms of the said letter, followed by a temporary
allotment of Dag No. A/40, and the said land was given to him
because he was landless. The said land i.e. Dag No. A/40 is
supposed to have been regularized in 1996. However, on 31st May
2005, on the ground that the site allotted to Atoshe falls within the
Airport land, the same was cancelled on 31st May, 2005, by the
Deputy Commissioner in the year 2005, after issuing several show
cause notices, under the Nagaland Eviction of Person in
Unauthorized Occupation of Public Land Act, 1971 were served
upon Atoshe.
23.1. Admittedly, the order dated 31st May, 2005, has not been
challenged by V. Atoshe Sumi, and therefore, it has become final.
Further, V. Atoshe Sumi had relied upon a purported jamabandi of
the same Dag No. A/40, two years after the cancellation. The
factum of cancellation of the jamabandi, in the year 2005 was
suppressed by the respondents. After such cancellation, the Deputy
Commissioner has no power of review the same without permission
of the Government. It is also stated that V. Atoshe Sumi had claims
Page 70 of 80
that he had obtained Dag No. 117 by ratification of Dag No. 40/100,
but such a procedure is not known in law.
23.2. It is not in dispute that by issuing various notifications, the
Government has prohibited issuance of patta by the Deputy
Commissioner without the approval of the Government. And these
Notifications were upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in Avio
Naleo (supra). It also appears that a report regarding the
genuineness of the jamabandi with patta No. 45, Dag No. 40/100 of
Block Diphupar was called for from the officer concerned, who had,
vide his letter dated 10.01.2020, clarified that the jamabandi,
purportedly signed by him, is not his signature and that he never
issued such jamabandi. Further, report of the Surveyor, after spot
verification, dated 09.12.2019 indicates that total area of land
occupied under Dag No. 38, an area of 48B 00K-09L and under Dag
No. 40, an area of 06B-00K 11L all total 15.9 Acres were
encroached.
23.3. The learned Trial Court, however, solely relying on the
pleadings of the parties, the documents relied upon by the parties
and without going into the merits of the case, had held that the
respondents herein had succeeded in establishing a prima-facie
case in their favour. In arriving at such a finding, the learned Trial
Court had relief upon the following facts and circumstances: –
(i) The respondents/plaintiffs are in actual physical
possession of the suit land;
Page 71 of 80
(ii) The finding of the defendant/O.P. No. 2 (petitioner No.
2 herein), is based on a report of one-man enquiry
committee, wherein the plaintiffs/respondents had not
participated;
(iii) It is an admitted fact that through V. Atoshe Sumi, the
others i.e. respondents/plaintiffs had entered into
possession of the suit land;
(iv) The parties were not given opportunity to defend their
case, even if the land of the plaintiffs situated at
Ekranipathar, not at Diphupar.
(v) The eviction order, dated 11.12.2020, indicates that
notices issued on 05.12.2019 and deemed served in
respect of the compliance is not acceptable.
(vi) The procedure laid down in Section 5 of the Act of
1971 has not been complied with before eviction order
dated 11.12.2020, had been issued.
23.4. But, it appears that the basis of the claim of the respondent
V. Atoshe Sumi is that the land was allotted in June, 1993 as
because he was land less and there was some condition that the
land has been acquired for airport expansion for which
compensation has already been paid the allotment was subject to
vacating the land and not claiming any compensation in terms of
the said letter followed by temporary allotment of Dag No. A/40.
The said land i.e. Dag No. A/40 is supposed to have been
Page 72 of 80
regularized in 1996. However, on 31st May 2005, on the ground
that the site allotted to V. Atoshe Sumi falls within the Airport land,
the same was cancelled on 31st May, 2005, by the Deputy
Commissioner in the year 2005, after issuing several show cause
notices under the Nagaland Eviction of Person in Unauthorized
Occupation of Public Land Act, 1971 were served upon V. Atoshe
Sumi. This fact is not disputed. The cancelled order dated 31st May,
2005, having not been challenged, had already attained finality.
That being so, the possession of the suit land by the respondent V.
Atoshe Sumi, is held to be illegal on the date of filing the suit and
the respondents had no valid title. It is well settled that in favour of
a trespasser, injunction, being an equitable relief, cannot be
granted.
23.5. For the reason aforesaid, the finding of „prima-facie‟ case in
favour of the respondents, by the learned Trial Court as well as
upholding the same by the learned Appellate Court, fails to
withstand the legal scrutiny. When a trespasser, being in illegal
possession of a government land, acquired for the purpose of
extension of Dimapur Airport, the balance of convenience, being
found in favour of the trespasser by the learned Trial Court and also
by Appellate Court appears to be illegal and arbitrary. The third
golden principle, i.e. irreparable loss also cannot be found in favour
of a trespasser. Since the land in question has been acquired for
extension of the Dimapur Airport, considerable public interest is
involved therein, as it is the categorical contention of the petitioners
that existing short runway fails to meet the requirement of a long
Page 73 of 80
runway for landing of bigger aircraft as there is risk of accident.
Thus, the fourth requirement also appears to be not in favour of the
respondents herein.
24. Further, it appears that the learned Trial Court as well as the
learned Appellate Court are not an authority, either appellate or
revisional, under the Nagaland Eviction of Persons in Unauthorised
Occupation of Public Land Act, 1971, to examine and decide the
legality of the order of eviction being passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, Dimapur. Therefore, the finding of the learned Trial
Court that – from a bare reading of the Eviction Notice dated
11.12.2020, if it is to be presumed that show cause Notice dated
05.12.2019, is to be made applicable to the instant Eviction Order,
dated 11.12.2020, and deemed served in compliance to the
provision of law the same cannot be accepted and that the
defendant/OP No.3, cannot rely upon the show cause Notice issued
more than a year ago and issue a fresh eviction order after a year
on the strength of the said show cause Notice issued more than a
year ago, and as far as the Eviction order No.REV-31/2016-
D/I/10365, dated 11.12.2020, is concerned the same had been
issued without complying to the procedure laid down under Section
5 of the of The Nagaland Eviction of Persons in Unauthorized
Occupation of Public Land Act, 1971, fails to withstand legal
scrutiny. And further, the observation made by the learned
Appellate Court that the suit was filed for right, title and interest,
which has to be adjudicated upon, and assuming jurisdiction to
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adjudicate the matter is perverse, being based on improper factual
appreciation of the matter.
24.1. That, a perusal of Section 12 of The Nagaland Eviction of
Persons in Authorized Occupation of Public Land Act, 1971 reveals
that it provides for an appeal. Sub-section (1) read as under:-
(1) An appeal shall lie from every order made by the Deputy
Commissioner under sub-section (1) of Section 5 or
under Section 7 in respect of any public land to an
Appellate Officer who shall be the Commissioner of the
State of Nagaland.
(2) Every appeal referred to in sub-section (1) shall be
referred within fifteen days from the date of service of
the order on the person concerned:
Provided that where the Appellate Officer is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from preferring the appeal within the said period
of fifteen days, he may allow the appeal to be preferred
within a further period of thirty days.
25. Further, Section 14 of the said Act provides for a Bar to suits
or other legal proceedings. It read as under: –
“No suit or other legal proceedings shall lie in any Court
in respect of the eviction of any person who is in
unauthorised occupation of any public land or thePage 75 of 80
recovery of any damages or costs awarded under this
Act or any portion of such damages or costs”.
26. This being the legal and factual position, the suit to challenge
the legality, propriety and correctness of the eviction order dated
30.11.2019 and 11.12.2020, is not at all maintainable in view of
Section 9 CPC, and the learned Advocate General, Nagaland has
rightly pointed this out and this court is inclined to put judicial
imprimatur to the same.
27. It is also to be noted here that in WP(C) No. 151/2020, filed
by the respondent/plaintiffs, before the Principal Seat of this Court
which was transferred to Kohima Bench and renumbered as WP(C)
No. 7/2020, they had conceded in para No. 3, 5, 7, 8 and 11 that
their land is at Ekaranipathar and not in Dag Nos. 38 and 40, and
even at para No. 26 in the prayer clause the respondents had asked
for protection of their land at Ekaranipathar. However, said WP(C)
No. 7/2020 was withdrawn by them, but it is well settled that the
admission made in one case can be used in another case between
the same parties. But this aspect also eschewed consideration of
both the courts below.
28. Thus, to recapitulate, on the following grounds, the impugned
order of the learned Appellate Court and the impugned order of the
learned Trial Court have failed to withstand legal scrutiny: –
(i) Section 14 of the Nagaland Eviction of Persons in
Unauthorised Occupation of Public Land Act, 1971,
imposed a bar to suits or other legal proceedings and asPage 76 of 80
such in view of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the suit itself is not maintainable;
(ii) Merely because the Commissioner, being an appellate
authority, and being involved in the process of issuance
of eviction notice to the respondents, the learned Trial
Court or the learned Appellate Court cannot assume
jurisdiction on such count, as such jurisdiction is not
vested upon it by the statute.
(iii) The land in question, being acquired for extension of
Dimapur Airport and in view of Section 41 (ha) and
Schedule of the Specific Relief Act, extension of Airport
being an infrastructure project, injunction cannot be
granted.
(iv) The Dag number of the land being claimed by the
respondents, and the land in respect of which eviction
notice was issued for being illegally occupied by them, is
different, while the land of the respondents admittedly
situated at Ekranipathar, the land in illegal occupation is
situated at Diphupar.
(v) Having not been any authority, either appellate or
revisional, under the Act of 1971, and having not been
vested with any power under the said Act, the learned
Appellate Court had no authority to comment/examinePage 77 of 80
the legality of the eviction order, being passed by the
Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur.
(vi) The land under Dag No. 38 and 40 at Diphupar were
acquired by the Government and vide Notification dated
23.09.1992, the same were vested with the Government
as per Section 6(2) of the Nagaland (Requisition and
Acquisition) Act, 1965, and it was published in the
Official Gazette and by virtue of it the Government is the
absolute owner of the same. That being so, the finding
of the learned Appellate Court in respect of fourth
dimension is perverse.
(vii) Besides, the three golden principles, including the fourth
one, were arbitrarily decided in favour of the
respondents ignoring the settled principles of law.
(viii) The land under Dag No. A/40, was cancelled on 31st May,
2005, by the Deputy Commissioner in the year 2005,
after show cause notice, under the Nagaland Eviction of
Person in Unauthorized Occupation of Public Land Act,
1971 and the said order had already attained finality and
on such count possession of the suit land by the
respondents on the date of filing of the suit was illegal
and their status becomes trespasser, as the respondents
had no valid title on that day, an equitable relief, like
injunction, cannot be granted to a trespasser.
Page 78 of 80
(ix) In WP(C) No. 7/2020, they had conceded in para-No. 3,
5, 7, 8 and 11 that their land is at Ekaranipathar and not
in Dag Nos. 38 and 40, and even at para-No. 26 in the
prayer clause the respondents had asked for protection
of their land at Ekaranipathar. But the Courts below had
not taken note of the same.
29. In the result, and for the reason aforesaid, this Court finds
sufficient merit in this petition and accordingly, the same stands
allowed. The impugned order dated 29.09.2023, passed by the
Principal District Judge, Dimapur, in Civil Appeal No. 24/2023, vide
which the learned Principal District Judge, Dimapur had upheld the
order dated 22.11.2021, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Dimapur in I.A. (Civil) No. 224/2020, arising out of Civil
Suit No. 14/2020, in granting temporary injunction in favour of the
respondents/plaintiffs in respect of the land under Dag Nos. 38 and
40 of Diphupar area and restraining the petitioner No. 3 from
executing the eviction order dated 11.12.2020, stands set aside and
quashed.
30. It is, however, true that this civil revision petition is not
supported by any affidavit as required under Chapter 5A Rule-1 of
the Gauhati High Court Rules. Mr. Das, the learned counsel for the
respondent No.14 has rightly pointed this out. But the petition is
supported by a certificate. Moreover, this is a ground, too technical,
to deny the relief being sought for to the petitioners.
Page 79 of 80
31. Before parting with the record, this court is inclined to make it
clear that the observations, made herein above, are only for the
purpose of disposing of the present petition.
32. In terms of above, this writ petition stands disposed of. Send
down the records of the learned Trial Court as well as the learned
Appellate Court, along with a copy of this judgment and order. The
parties have to bear their own costs.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
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