Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dhanendra Chaudhary vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 21 July, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
ON THE 21st OF JULY, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 26404 of 2022
DHANENDRA CHAUDHARY
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Prakhar Naveriya - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Yagesh Dhande - Government Advocate for the respondent-State.
ORDER
By way of present petition, challenge is made to the order of
termination of the petitioner Annexure P/4 dated 05.09.2020 whereby
services of the petitioner have been terminated upon finding of the petitioner
having siphoned funds to the tune of Rs. 1.50 lacs which is a major
misconduct.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner while pressing the case of the
petitioner has vehemently argued that an ex-parte enquiry report was
prepared by Panchayat Coordination Officer dated 17.07.2020 in which the
petitioner did not get any opportunity to put forth his case and put forth his
defence. It is further argued that the show-cause notice were issued to the
petitioner but he could not reply to the show-cause notices because he was
on leave and therefore, the show-cause notices Annexure P/2 and P/3 dated
31.07.2020 and 20.08.2020 were never served upon the petitioner prior to
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issuing the termination order Annexure P/4 on 05.09.2020 and therefore, the
case is one of failure of observance of principle of natural justice and leave
alone any regular enquiry, the petitioner was not even given any chance to
reply to the show-cause notice and termination order has been passed. On
these assertions the termination order so also the appellate orders Annexure
P/7 and P/9 have been put to challenge.
3. Upon hearing learned counsel for petitioner and on perusal of the
record, it is seen that the petitioner did not submit reply to the show-cause
notice. The allegation against the petitioner was that his brother namely
Preetam Choudhary was registered vendor of the Gram Panchayat and his
name Rs. 1.50 lac, has been withdrawn and misappropriated. The fact of
transfer of funds to the tune of Rs. 1.50 lacs to the brother of the petitioner
has been established from the Bank statement which has not been denied.
During course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner was asked
pin-pointed question that whether he has taken any defence even in the
appeal or before this Court that whether the amount of Rs. 1.50 lacs
transferred to brother of petitioner by him was utilized in any work of Gram
Panchayat for which it was transferred. Learned counsel for the petitioner
was not in a position to throw light on this aspect but only stressed that the
principle of natural justice was violated.
4. The memorandum of appeal filed before the Jila Panchayat is on
record as Annexure P/6. In the said memorandum of appeal the allegations
against the petitioner have been duly admitted by the petitioner saying that
he was asked by Sarpanch and Secretary to withdraw money in name of
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some other works by the Vendor ID of his brother and he handed over the
said money to the to the Sarpanch and Secretary which was utilized by
Sarpanch and Secretary for some other works and has not been personally
utilized by the petitioner. The petitioner has made the following averments in
the memorandum of appeal.
“महोदय जी उ संबंध म स व तार लेख यह है क मेरे ारा अपने सगे संबंधी के नाम से रािश
आहरण कर अपने िनजी वाथ म उपयोग कर शासक य रािश का दु पयोग नह ं कया गया है
ब क उ रािश का उपयोग शासक य काय म ह कया गया है । जसका संपूण ववरण इस कार
है क ाम पंचायत भ जयापार म वष 2015-16 म सव िश ा अिभयान अंतगत दो नवीन
मा यिमक शाला भवन क वीकृ ित दान क गई थी। जसक रािश 32,00,000/- पए का व ीय
संचालन सिचव ी चैनलाल नवरे ती व सरपंच महोदय ी यामसुदं र पटले ारा इं डयन ओवरसीस
बक बालाघाट के खाते से कया जा रहा था। यह क शाला भवन का िनमाण काय पूण होने से
पहले से ह सिचव व सरपंच महोदय ारा पूर रािश आहरण कर ली गई जसक जानकार मुझे
नह थी शाला भवन िनमाण काय पूरा नह ं होने के कारण सिचव, सरपंच के नाम से 5.94 लाख
पय क आर.आर.सी. जार होने क जानकार मुझे सरपंच महोदय ारा कह गई थी व समाचार
प म भी पढ़ा था जस पर सरपंच महोदय ारा मौ खक प से मुझे कहा गया क सव िश ा
अिभयान क रािश आना शेष है , अभी पंचायत दपण खाते से रािश आहरण कर काय पूरा कर लेते
है । सव िश ा अिभयान क रािश िमलते ह उ रािश का समायोजन कर दे ग। जस पर मेरे
सहमत नह होने पर सिचव व सरपंच महोदय ारा मुझे िल खत प से भी आ ासन दया गया
था जसक छाया ित संल न है एवं उ च अिधका रय के ारा भी आपसी सामंज य के साथ उ
काय को पूरा करने हे तु मौ खक प से कहा गया था तभी मेरे एवं सरपंच महोदय के जंयु
ह ता र से 1,50,000/- पए क रािश आहरण क गई है तथा उ रािश का उपयोग नवीन
मा यिमक शाला भवन िनमाण काय म कया गया है ना क मेरे ारा अपने िनजी उपयोग म
खच कया गया है । ”
5. From the aforesaid admission of the petitioner made in the appeal
memo, there remains nothing to be enquired about because the petitioner has
duly admitted allegations against him while submitting appeal.
6. It is settled in law that opportunity of hearing is not an unruly horse
and this Court would not mechanically set aside every order on the question
of denial of opportunity of hearing. In Natwar Singh Vs. Director of
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Enforcement, reported in 2010 (13) SCC 255 , it has been held as under :-
26 [Ed.: Para 26 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No.
F.3/Ed.B.J./3/2011 dated 10-1-2011.] . Even in the application of the
doctrine of fair play there must be real flexibility. There must also
have been caused some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no
such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The
requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of
the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal
is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with and so forth. Can the
courts supplement the statutory procedures with requirements over
and above those specified? In order to ensure a fair hearing, courts
can insist and require additional steps as long as such steps would not
frustrate the apparent purpose of the legislation.
27. In Lloyd v. McMahon [1987 AC 625 : (1987) 2 WLR 821 :
(1987) 1 All ER 1118 (HL)] , Lord Bridge observed: (AC pp. 702 H-
703 B)
“My Lords, the so-called rules of natural justice are not
engraved on tablets of stone. To use the phrase which better
expresses the underlying concept, what the requirements of
fairness demand when any body, domestic, administrative or
judicial, has to make a decision which will affect the rights of
individuals depends on the character of the decision-making
body, the kind of decision it has to make and the statutory or
other framework in which it operates. In particular, it is well
established that when a statute has conferred on any body the
power to make decisions affecting individuals, the courts will
not only require the procedure prescribed by the statute to be
followed, but will readily imply so much and no more to be
introduced by way of additional procedural safeguards as will
ensure the attainment of fairness.”
28. As Lord Reid said in Wiseman v. Borneman [1971 AC 297 :
(1969) 3 WLR 706 : (1969) 3 All ER 275 (HL)] : (AC p. 308 C)
“… For a long time the courts have, without objection from
Parliament, supplemented procedure laid down in legislation
where they have found that to be necessary for this purpose.”
29. It is thus clear that the extent of applicability of the principles of
natural justice depends upon the nature of inquiry, the consequences
that may visit a person after such inquiry from out of the decision
pursuant to such inquiry.
7. In Mohd. Sartaj Vs. State of U.P. , reported in 2006 (2) SCC 315 , it
was held as under :-
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14. However, in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379] this
Court has also observed as under: (SCC p. 395, para 24)“In our view the principles of natural justice know of no
exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made
any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-
observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and
proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural
justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has
denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is
not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or
indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under
the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not
issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not
because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but
because courts do not issue futile writs.”
18. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan [(2000) 7 SCC
529 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 965 : AIR 2000 SC 2783] this Court considered
the question whether on the facts of the case the employee can invoke
the principle of natural justice and whether it is a case where, even if
notice has been given, result would not have been different and whether
it could be said that no prejudice was caused to him, if on the admitted
or proved facts grant of an opportunity would not have made any
difference. The Court referred to the decisions rendered in M.C. Mehta
v. Union of India [(1999) 6 SCC 237] , the exceptions laid down in S.L.
Kapoor case [(1980) 4 SCC 379] and K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of
India [(1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62 : AIR 1984 SC 273]
where it has been laid down that not mere violation of natural justice
but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) has to be proved.
The Court has also placed reliance in the matter of State Bank of Patiala
v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717] and
Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460] where the principle
has been laid down that there must have been some real prejudice to the
complainant. There is no such thing as merely technical infringement of
natural justice. The Court has approved this principle and examined the
case of the employee in that light. In Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman,
J&K Bank Ltd. [(2005) 5 SCC 337 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 689] this Court
has held that the principles of natural justice are required to be
complied with having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. It
cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It cannot be applied in a vacuum
without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case.
The principle of natural justice, it is trite, is no unruly horse. When
facts are admitted, an enquiry would be an empty formality. Even the
principle of estoppel will apply. In another recent judgment in State of
U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi [(2006) 1 SCC 667 : JT (2006) 1 SC 19] while
considering the argument that the principle of natural justice had been
ignored before terminating the service of the employees and, therefore,
the order terminating the service of the employees was bad in law, this
Court has considered the principles of natural justice and the extent and
the circumstances in which they are attracted. This Court has found in
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Neeraj Awasthi case [(2006) 1 SCC 667 : JT (2006) 1 SC 19] that if the
services of the workmen are governed by the U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act, they are protected under that law. Rules 42 and 43 of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Rules lay down that before effecting any
retrenchment the employees concerned would be entitled to notice of
one month or in lieu thereof pay for one month and 15 days’ wages for
each completed year of service by way of compensation. If
retrenchment is to be effected under the Industrial Disputes Act, the
question of complying with the principles of natural justice would not
arise. The principles of natural justice would be attracted only when the
services of some persons are terminated by way of a punitive measure
or thereby a stigma is attached. Applying this principle, it could very
well be seen that discontinuation of the service of the appellants in the
present case was not as a punitive measure but they were discontinued
for the reason that they were not qualified and did not possess the
requisite qualifications for appointment.
8 . In SBI Vs. M.J. James, reported in 2022 (2) SCC 301 , it was held as under
:-
28. Traditional English law recognised and valued the rule against
bias that no man shall be a judge in his own cause i.e. nemo debet
esse judex in propria causa; and the obligation to hear the other or
both sides as no person should be condemned unheard i.e. audi
alteram partem. To these, new facets sometimes described as
subsidiary rules have developed, including a duty to give reasons in
support of the decision. Nevertheless, time and again the courts have
emphasised that the rules of natural justice are flexible and their
application depends on facts of each case as well as the statutory
provision, if applicable, nature of right affected and the
consequences. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [A.K. Kraipak v.
Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262] the Constitution Bench, dwelling
on the role of the principles of natural justice under our Constitution,
observed that as every organ of the State is controlled and regulated
by the rule of law, there is a requirement to act justly and fairly and
not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered
inherent in the exercise of a quasi-judicial or administrative power are
those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. What
particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must
depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case,
the framework of law under which the enquiry is held and the
constitution of the body of persons or tribunal appointed for that
purpose. When a complaint is made that a principle of natural justice
has been contravened, the court must decide whether the observance
of that rule was necessary for a just decision in the facts of the case.
29. Legal position on the importance to show prejudice to get relief is
also required to be stated. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma
[State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364] a Division
Bench of this Court distinguished between “adequate opportunity”
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and “no opportunity at all” and held that the prejudice exception
operates more specifically in the latter case. This judgment also
speaks of procedural and substantive provisions of law embodying
the principles of natural justice which, when infracted, must lead to
prejudice being caused to the litigant in order to afford him relief.
The principle was expressed in the following words : (SCC p. 389,
para 32)“32. Now, coming back to the illustration given by us in the
preceding paragraph, would setting aside the punishment and
the entire enquiry on the ground of aforesaid violation of sub-
clause (iii) be in the interests of justice or would it be its
negation? In our respectful opinion, it would be the latter.
Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests
of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished
and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion
failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice.
Principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve the
ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very
opposite end. That would be a counterproductive exercise.”
30. Earlier decision in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [M.C. Mehta v.
Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237] examined the expression
“admitted and undisputable facts”, as also divergence of legal opinion
on whether it is necessary to show “slight proof” or “real likelihood
of prejudice”; or legal effect of “an open and shut case”, with
reference to the observations in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [S.L.
Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] and elucidates in the
following words : (M.C. Mehta case [M.C. Mehta v. Union of India,
(1999) 6 SCC 237] , SCC pp. 245-47, paras 22-23) “
22. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we
would like to state that cases relating to breach of natural
justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are
not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a
considerable case law and literature as to whether relief can
be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the
applicant is not one of “real substance” or that there is no
substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not
be different, even if natural justice is followed. See Malloch v.
Aberdeen Corpn. [Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn., (1971) 1
WLR 1578 (HL)] . (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce),
Glynn v. Keele University [Glynn v. Keele University, (1971)
1 WLR 487] , Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority
[Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority, (1980) 1 WLR 582
(CA)] where such a view has been held. The latest addition to
this view is R. v. Ealing Magistrates’ Court, ex p Fannaran [R.
v. Ealing Magistrates’ court, ex p Fannaran, (1996) 8 Admn
LR 351] (Admn LR at p. 358) (see de Smith, Suppl. p. 89)
(1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be
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different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMahon [Lloyd v.
McMahon, 1987 AC 625 : (1987) 2 WLR 821 (HL)] (WLR at
p. 862) has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain
cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in
McCarthy v. Grant [McCarthy v. Grant, 1959 NZLR 1014]
however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of
bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is
“real likelihood — not certainty — of prejudice”. On the
other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn., 1996, pp.
271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been
different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we
have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin [Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964
AC 40 : (1963) 2 WLR 935 (HL)] , Megarry, J. in John v.
Rees [John v. Rees, 1970 Ch 345 : (1969) 2 WLR 1294]
stating that there are always “open and shut cases” and no
absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits
are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner,
J. has said that the “useless formality theory” is a dangerous
one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be
followed. His Lordship observed that “convenience and
justice are often not on speaking terms”. More recently Lord
Bingham has deprecated the “useless formality” theory in R.
v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p
Cotton [R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police
Forces, ex p Cotton, 1990 IRLR 344] by giving six reasons.
(See also his article “Should Public Law Remedies be
Discretionary?” 1991 PL, p. 64.) A detailed and emphatic
criticism of the “useless formality theory” has been made
much earlier in “Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow” by
Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63)
contending that Malloch [Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn., (1971)
1 WLR 1578 (HL)] and Glynn [Glynn v. Keele University,
(1971) 1 WLR 487] were wrongly decided. Foulkes
(Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996, p. 323), Craig
(Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596) and others say that the
court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the
decisionmaking authority. de Smith (5th Edn., 1994, Paras
10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed
themselves to any one view though discretion is always with
the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp.
526-30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a
distinction has to be made according to the nature of the
decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to
admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable
divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled
to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to
prove a case of substance or if he can prove a “real likelihood”
of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some
remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that
even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond
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in exercise of their “discretion”, refuse certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not
followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of
cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [State Bank
of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364] , Rajendra
Singh v. State of M.P. [Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P.,
(1996) 5 SCC 460] that even in relation to statutory provisions
requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases
where the provision is intended for individual benefit and
where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the
former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it
cannot be waived.
23. We do not propose to express any opinion on the
correctness or otherwise of the “useless formality” theory and
leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch
as, in the case before us, “admitted and indisputable” facts
show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed [S.L.
Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] out by Chinnappa
Reddy, J.”
31. In State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh [State of U.P. v. Sudhir
Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 847]
referring to the aforesaid cases and several other decisions of this
Court, the law was crystallised as under : (SCC para 42) “42. An
analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals:
42.1. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the
judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The
breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself,
without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby
caused.
42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law
embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se
does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again,
prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a
mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in
individual interest, but also in public interest.
42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the
breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute
the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of
estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge
or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the
Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be
said to have been caused to the person complaining of the
breach of natural justice.
42.4. In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or
indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court
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there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be
drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and
not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person.
42.5. The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere
apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It
should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite
inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the
nonobservance of natural justice.”
9. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, no prejudice has
been caused by not conducting regular enquiry when the charges were duly
admitted by the petitioner in his appeal memo and he admitted to have
siphoned of funds to Vendor ID of his brother to the tune of Rs. 1.50 lacs
and alleged complicacy of the Sarpanch and Secretary along with himself.
10. It is clearly a case of fraud committed with the Gram Panchayat. The
petitioner has admitted to committing such fraud but has only stated that he
did not himself had utilized the money. Fraud and diversion of funds having
been admitted, the punishment of dismissal is fully commensurate with the
misconduct.
11. Therefore, finding no reason to interfere with the penalty order
Annexure P/4 and appellate orders Annexure P/7 and P/8, the petition stands
dismissed.
(VIVEK JAIN)
JUDGE
MISHRA
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