Delhi High Court
Dilshad Khan vs Govt Of Nct Of Delhi on 20 August, 2025
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 07.08.2025
Judgment delivered on: 20.08.2025
+ FAO (COMM) 206/2025 & CM APPL. 47787/2025 (Delay of
87 days in filing the appeal)
DILSHAD KHAN .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Sanjay Bansal, Advocate.
versus
GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Tushar Sannu, Counsel for
GNCTD with Ms. Shaoni Das,
Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGEMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR J.
1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 37 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961 read with Section 13(1A) of
the Commercial Courts Act, 20152, inter alia, assailing the Order
dated 04.02.20253 passed by the learned District Judge
(Commercial Court), North-East District, Karkardooma Courts,
1
A&C Act.
2
3
Impugned Order.
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Delhi4, in OMP (COMM) 2/2023. By the Impugned Order, the
Petition under section 34 of the A&C Act filed by the Respondent
herein was allowed and the Arbitral Award dated 02.03.2023, passed
in case No. ARB/RM/15 by the learned sole Arbitrator was set aside.
2. At the very outset, the learned counsel for the Appellant was
posed with the question as to whether the present appeal is
maintainable, considering that it appears to have been filed beyond the
prescribed period of limitation.
3. The aforesaid query arose on the basis of the averments
contained in the application, accompanied with the appeal, seeking
condonation of delay, which reads as follows:
“3. The appellant submit that the Impugned order was passed
on 04.02.2025 and 60 days expired on 05.04.2025. Thereafter
the appellant had applied for certified copy of order on
06.05.2025 in which the date of delivery was given as
14.05.2025 when again new date of delivery was given as
24.05.2025. However, the applicant had received the copy on
23.05.2025, hence date from 06.05.2025 to 23.05.2025 i.e., 18
days was taken by registry to provide certified copy and
thereafter the vacation starts from 01.06.2025 to 30 June 2025
i.e. for 30 days. The total time taken for filing the present appeal
was 147 days, out of which 60 days granted by Act 1996 for
filing appeal, 18 days taken by Registry to supply certified copy
and 30 days summer vacations period is to be deducted from the
total time of 147 days i.e. 147-(60+18+30) = 39 days, i.e. there
is delay in filing the present appeal after three months was only
9 days beyond three months in terms of period provided under
Section 34 of Act and the same can be condoned under law.
4. It is further submitted that three months expires on
04.05.2025 and thereafter the appeal also can be filed within
extended period of 30 days and the same shall expire on
03.06.2025, however, the summer vacation starts from
01.06.2025. the Period of 18 days also to be deducted from the
period of 27 days i.e. after 04.05.2025 till 31.05.2025 and hence
the total delay beyond three months was only 9 days and the
same can be condoned in terms of Law.
4
District Judge.
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5. It is further submitted that the delay was caused due to
marriage of son of appellant on 15.04.2025 and therefore the
appellant could not be able to file the present appeal in time.
6. It is only after the marriage of son of appellant, the appellant
son had applied for copy of order dated 04.02.2025 from the
Registry at Karkardooma courts and the same was received by
him on 23.05.2025, though the copy was ready on 19.05.2025 as
per date given on certified copy. However, the date of delivery
on the receipt was extended from 14.05.2025 to 24.05.2025 and
it is therefore only the certified copy was received on
23.05.2025
7. The delay is due to marriage of son of appellant and the
same is within the extended period of 30 days beyond three
months as per total time 120 days as provided by Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India.
8. That delay of total 87 days, however after deducting the
period of 18 days towards registry and 30 days of summer
vacation, there was a delay of 09 days beyond the period of 90
days but well within period of 120 days in filing the present
accompanying appeal, which was neither intentional nor
deliberate but due to sufficient reasons of marriage of son of
appellant as stated above. No prejudice shall be caused to the
respondent if the delay in filing the appeal is condoned,
however, the appellant would be prejudiced if the delay is not
condoned.”
4. On a conjoint reading of the provisions of the CC Act and the
Limitation Act, 19635, as interpreted by a three-Judge Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra (Water
Resources Department) v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors
Pvt. Ltd.6, and contrasted with the earlier two-Judge decision in N.V.
International v. State of Assam7, the settled legal position is that the
prescribed limitation for filing an appeal under Section 37 of the A&C
Act in respect of commercial disputes of “Specified Value” is sixty
days, in terms of Section 13(1A) of the CC Act. In the present case, it
is an undisputed fact that the “Specified Value” exceeded the
6
(2021) 6 SCC 460.
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prescribed threshold. Section 2(1)(i) of the CC Act defines “Specified
Value” as follows:
“(i) “Specified Value”, in relation to a commercial dispute, shall
mean the value of the subject matter in respect of a suit as
determined in accordance with section 12 which shall not be less
than three lakh rupees or such higher value, as may be notified by
the Central Government.”
5. In N.V. International (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had
proceeded on the premise that, in the absence of a specific provision
prescribing limitation for appeals under Section 37, the limitation
applicable to Section 34(3) proceedings would also govern such
appeals. On that reasoning, it was held that delay in filing an appeal
under Section 37 could not be condoned beyond thirty days. However,
in Borse Brothers Engineers (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
undertook a detailed examination of the statutory framework under the
A&C Act, the CC Act and the Limitation Act, and concluded that the
reasoning in N.V. International (supra) was rendered per incuriam as
it failed to consider the interplay of these enactments. The relevant
paragraphs of Borse Brothers Engineers (supra) are produced herein
below:
“23. Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, when read with Section
43 thereof, makes it clear that the provisions of the Limitation
Act will apply to appeals that are filed under Section 37. This
takes us to Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act, which
provide for a limitation period of 90 days and 30 days,
depending upon whether the appeal is from any other court to a
High Court or an intra-High Court appeal. There can be no
doubt whatsoever that Section 5 of the Limitation Act will apply
to the aforesaid appeals, both by virtue of Section 43 of the
Arbitration Act and by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act.
*****
7
(2020) 2 SCC 109.
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25. When the Commercial Courts Act is applied to the aforesaid
appeals, given the definition of “specified value” and the
provisions contained in Sections 10 and 13 thereof, it is clear
that it is only when the specified value is for a sum less than
three lakh rupees that the appellate provision contained in
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act will be governed, for the
purposes of limitation, by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation
Act. Shri Deshmukh’s argument that depending upon which
court decides a matter, a limitation period of either 30 or 90
days is provided, which leads to arbitrary results, and that,
therefore, the uniform period provided by Article 137 of the
Limitation Act should govern appeals as well, is
rejected…………
*****
27. Even in the rare situation in which an appeal under Section
37 of the Arbitration Act would be of a specified value less than
three lakh rupees, resulting in Article 116 or 117 of the
Limitation Act applying, the main object of the Arbitration Act
requiring speedy resolution of disputes would be the most
important principle to be applied when applications under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act are filed to condone delay
beyond 90 days and/or 30 days depending upon whether Article
116(a) or 116(b) or 117 applies. As a matter of fact, given the
timelines contained in Sections 8, 9(2), 11(4), 11(13), 13(2)-(5),
29-A, 29-B, 33(3)-(5) and 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, and the
observations made in some of this Court’s judgments, the object
of speedy resolution of disputes would govern appeals covered
by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act.
*****
32. Thus, from the scheme of the Arbitration Act as well as the
aforesaid judgments, condonation of delay under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act has to be seen in the context of the object of
speedy resolution of disputes.
33. The bulk of appeals, however, to the appellate court under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, are governed by Section 13 of
the Commercial Courts Act. Sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 of
the Commercial Courts Act provides the forum for appeals as
well as the limitation period to be followed, Section 13 of the
Commercial Courts Act being a special law as compared with
the Limitation Act which is a general law, which follows from a
reading of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Section 13(1-A)
of the Commercial Courts Act lays down a period of limitation
of 60 days uniformly for all appeals that are preferred under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. [As held in BGS SGS SOMA
JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234, whereas Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act provides the substantive right to appeal, Section
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13 of the Commercial Courts Act provides the forum and
procedure governing the appeal (see para 13).]
34. The vexed question which faces us is whether, first and
foremost, the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is
excluded by the scheme of the Commercial Courts Act, as has
been argued by Dr George. The first important thing to note is
that Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act does not
contain any provision akin to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration
Act. Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act only
provides for a limitation period of 60 days from the date of the
judgment or order appealed against, without further going into
whether delay beyond this period can or cannot be condoned.
35. It may also be pointed out that though the object of
expeditious disposal of appeals is laid down in Section 14 of the
Commercial Courts Act, the language of Section 14 makes it
clear that the period of six months spoken of is directory and not
mandatory. By way of contrast, Section 16 of the Commercial
Courts Act read with the Schedule thereof and the amendment
made to Order 8 Rule 1 CPC, would make it clear that the
defendant in a suit is given 30 days to file a written statement,
which period cannot be extended beyond 120 days from the date
of service of the summons; and on expiry of the said period, the
defendant forfeits the right to file the written statement and the
court cannot allow the written statement to be taken on record.
This provision was enacted as a result of the judgment of this
Court in Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (2) v. Union of India, (2005)
6 SCC 344.
*****
39. Unlike the scheme of the Central Excise Act relied upon in
CCE v. Hongo (India) (P) Ltd., (2009) 5 SCC 791, there are no
other provisions in the Commercial Courts Act which provide
for a period of limitation coupled with a condonation of delay
provision which is either open-ended or capped. Also, the period
of 180 days provided was one indicia which led the Court to
exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as it
was double and triple the period provided for appeals under the
other provisions of the same Act. Section 13(1-A) of the
Commercial Courts Act, by way of contrast, applies an
intermediate period of 60 days for filing an appeal, that is, a
period that is halfway between 30 days and 90 days provided by
Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act.
*****
43. The next important argument that needs to be addressed is
as to whether the hard-and-fast rule applied by this Court in
N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 is
correct in law. Firstly, as has correctly been argued by Shri
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Shroti, N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109,
does not notice the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act at
all and can be said to be per incuriam on this count. Secondly, it
is also correct to note that the period of 90 days plus 30 days
and not thereafter mentioned in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration
Act cannot now apply, the limitation period for filing of appeals
under the Commercial Courts Act being 60 days and not 90
days. Thirdly, the argument that absent a provision curtailing
the condonation of delay beyond the period provided in Section
13 of the Commercial Courts Act would also make it clear that
any such bodily lifting of the last part of Section 34(3) into
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act would also be unwarranted.
We cannot accept Shri Navare’s argument that this is a mere
casus omissus which can be filled in by the Court.
*****
52. For all these reasons, given the illuminating arguments
made in these appeals, we are of the view that N.V.
International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 has been
wrongly decided and is therefore overruled.
53. However, the matter does not end here. The question still
arises as to the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to
appeals which are governed by a uniform 60-day period of
limitation. At one extreme, we have the judgment in N.V.
International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 which does
not allow condonation of delay beyond 30 days, and at the other
extreme, we have an open-ended provision in which any amount
of delay can be condoned, provided sufficient cause is shown. It
is between these two extremes that we have to steer a middle
course.
*****
55. Reading the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act
as a whole, it is clear that when Section 37 of the Arbitration
Act is read with either Article 116 or 117 of the Limitation Act
or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, the object and
context provided by the aforesaid statutes, read as a whole, is
the speedy disposal of appeals filed under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act. To read Section 5 of the Limitation Act
consistently with the aforesaid object, it is necessary to discover
as to what the expression “sufficient cause” means in the
context of condoning delay in filing appeals under Section 37 of
the Arbitration Act.
*****
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought
to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the
Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of
the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of
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the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts
Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is
to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a
fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not
in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in
the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind
that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may
have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost
by the first party’s inaction, negligence or laches.”
(emphasis supplied)
6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Borse Brothers Engineers
(supra) categorically held that the limitation period prescribed under
Section 34(3) of the A&C Act does not apply to appeals under Section
37. The Court explained that the “hard stop” applicable to Section 34
proceedings cannot be mechanically extended to Section 37 appeals.
Instead, such appeals are governed either by Articles 116 and 117 of
the Limitation Act or by Section 13(1A) of the CC Act, depending on
whether the dispute qualifies as a commercial dispute of “Specified
Value”. Accordingly, from Borse Brothers Engineers (supra), the
following legal position emerges:
(i) For commercial disputes of “Specified Value” under the CC
Act, the limitation period for filing an appeal under Section 37
is sixty days, as provided in Section 13(1A) of the CC Act; and
(ii) In all other cases, for filing an appeal under Section 37, the
limitation periods prescribed under Articles 116 and 117 of the
Limitation Act, will apply.
7. In the said Judgement, the Hon’ble Court further emphasised
that while Section 5 of the Limitation Act permits condonation of
delay, such discretion must be exercised with caution. It is confined to
“short delays” and is to be invoked only where the appellant
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demonstrates bona fide conduct, absence of negligence, and lack of
prejudice to the respondent.
8. Having regard to the object of both the CC Act and the A&C
Act, namely, ensuring speedy resolution of commercial disputes,
condonation of delay is permissible only upon establishing “sufficient
cause”, i.e., circumstances genuinely beyond the party’s control, and
not arising from negligence, inaction, or wilful indifference. This
principle has also been succinctly reiterated by a Coordinate Bench of
this Court in Union of India vs. Rajiv Agarwal8. The relevant
paragraphs of the said Judgement are as follows:
“9. Under Section 37(1)(c) of the Act, an appeal would be
maintainable against an order setting aside or refusing to set
aside an arbitral award. However, the time period for filing
such an appeal is governed by Section 13 of the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015. The period provided for filing of an appeal as
per Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is 60 days
from the date of judgment/order, however, by way of judicial
decisions, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have also
been held to be applicable to such appeals.
10. The time period within which an appeal under Section 37 of
the Act can be filed has been discussed and laid down in detail
by the decision of the Supreme Court in Government of
Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Represented By
Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers &
Contractors Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 460. In the said judgment
the Supreme Court has considered the decisions in N.V.
International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 and Union
of India v. Varindera Constructions Ltd., (2020) 2 SCC 111.
11. In Varindera Constructions (Supra), the Court had held that
a total of 120 days would be available for filing of such an
appeal.
12. In Borse Brothers (Supra), the Supreme Court was dealing
with three cases arising from judgments of the Bombay High
Court, the Delhi High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High
Court. The former two High Courts had taken a view that delay
in filing of an appeal under Section 37 of the Act beyond 120
days would not be condonable, however, the Madhya Pradesh
8
2025 SCC Online Del 3810.
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High Court had taken a view that a delay of 57 days would be
liable to be condoned. While dealing with these cases, the
Supreme Court observed as under:
“58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both
the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that
is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression
“sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long
delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision
itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not
itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and
stale claims.
xxxx
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal
sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and
the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by
Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-
A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days,
30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way
of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which
a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a
negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can,
in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing
in mind that the other side of the picture is that the
opposite party may have acquired both in equity and
justice, what may now be lost by the first party’s inaction,
negligence or laches.”
13. A conjoint reading of the above two extracts of the judgment
in Borse Brothers (Supra) would show that the object of speedy
disposal under the Act would only be achieved by making such
appeals also bound by the limitation period which is prescribed
for filing of petitions under Section 34 of the Act. The delay
beyond the prescribed period has been held to be not
condonable. Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court
refused to condone delay of 131 days in State of Maharashtra v.
Borse Bros. Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd., 2020 SCC
OnLine Bom 427 days in Union of India v. Associated
Constructions Co., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10797 as also 75
days in Borse Brothers (Supra).
14. Coming to the facts of the present case, the present petition
has been filed by the Union of India with an application for
condonation of delay of 613 days. The reasons given in the
application are that the matter was initially marked to different
panel Counsel of the Railways and the file movement constitutes
sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The relevant portion of
the application is set out below:
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“3. It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant received
the Impugned Order passed by the Ld. District Judge,
Commercial Court, Delhi, on 05.06.2023. After, receipt of
the said order, necessary steps were promptly initiated in
relation to the present matter. The case file was thereafter
forwarded to the Sr. Law Officer/DLI, Railway, along, and
the contesting advocate was requested to furnish a legal
opinion on the Impugned order. The legal opinion from
the learned counsel was received on 07.08.2023.
Subsequently, the Sr. Law Officer/DLI, Railway, also
opined in favour of preferring an appeal against the said
order. Accordingly, the file was processed for obtaining
the requisite approval from the competent authority for
filing the appeal. After, grant of the necessary approval,
the Appellant approached the Litigation Cell, Delhi High
Court, for the nomination of counsel to represent the
Union of India in the matter. The Litigation Cell, further
sought the opinion of the Deputy DGM/Law, Northern
Railway Headquarters, through proper official channels.
The said Opinion was duly obtained and forwarded to the
Litigation Cell, Delhi High Court. Thereafter, the counsel
was nominated by the Litigation Cell for drafting and
filing the appeal. Thereafter, the complete set of relevant
documents was provided to the nominated counsel on
18.03.2024. However, due to certain administrative issues,
the previously nominated counsel was changed, and a new
counsel was detailed for filing the appeal. The draft
appeal was then prepared, processed, checked, and legally
vetted. The same was duly signed and handed over to the
present counsel for filing before this Hon’ble Court.
4. That in view of above mentioned obligatory and
unavoidable circumstances, there is some delay in filling
of the aforesaid appeal which is neither intentional, nor
deliberate either on the part of department or any
authorities rather due to movement of file and also due to
compliance of official procedure by the authorities which
was beyond the control of the appellant.”
15. The Court has considered the matter. The law in this regard
is quite well settled and clear. Recently, in a similar case
involving an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, a Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in Delco Infrastructure Projects Pvt. Ltd. v.
Intec Capital Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2158 has also
refused to condone the delay under Section 13(1)(a) of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 in the following terms:
“10. In N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2
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delay in filing an appeal under Section 37 of the Act
cannot be condoned beyond a period of thirty days.
However, this decision was overruled by the Supreme
Court in a subsequent decision in Government of
Maharashtra (Water Resources Department)
Represented By Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers
Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 460.
The Supreme Court held that the power of the court to
condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 37 (1)
of the Act was not restricted to a period of thirty days as
specified under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A&C
Act. However, the Supreme Court also observed as under:
58. Given the object sought to be achieved
under both the Arbitration Act and the
Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy
resolution of disputes, the expression
“sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to
cover long delays beyond the period provided
by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the
expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a
loose panacea for the ill pressing negligent
and stale claims…
***
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of
speedy disposal sought to be achieved both
under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act, for appeals under section 37 of the
Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles
116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section
13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay
beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days,
respectively, is to be condoned by way of
exception and not by way of rule….”
11. It is essential to adhere to time lines in matters
involving commercial disputes. Any delay in filing appeals
under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015
cannot be condoned unless the court is satisfied that the
appellants were prevented from sufficient cause from
filing the appeal within the stipulated time. The court must
be satisfied that such cause is genuine and not an illusion
to disguise lack of diligence.
12. In the facts of the present case, we are unable to
accept that the appellants have shown any sufficient cause
for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal.”
9. It would also be apposite to refer herein to the Judgment of the
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Coordinate Bench in Delco Infrastructure vs. Intech Capital9; the
relevant paras whereof read as follows:
“9. The application filed by the appellants for seeking condonation
of delay in filing the application for setting aside the impugned
order dated 14.02.2023 was rejected by the learned Commercial
Court by an order dated 27.04.2024. However, the appellants did
not take any immediate steps to file the present appeal. The present
appeal was filed on 25.07.2024, that is, almost ninety days after
the order dated 27.04.2024. There is no explanation whatsoever as
to the cause that prevented the appellants from preferring the
appeal immediately after 27.04.2024.
10. In N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109, the
Supreme Court had taken a view that the delay in filing an appeal
under Section 37 of the Act cannot be condoned beyond a period of
thirty days. However, this decision was overruled by the Supreme
Court in a subsequent decision in Government of Maharashtra
(Water Resources Department) Represented By Executive
Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.,
(2021) 6 SCC 460. The Supreme Court held that the power of the
court to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 37(1)
of the Act was not restricted to a period of thirty days as specified
under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. However, the
Supreme Court also observed as under:
“58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both
the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that
is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression
“sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long
delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision
itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not
itself a loose panacea for the ill pressing negligent and
stale claims…
***
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal
sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and
the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals under section 37
of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116
and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the
Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days
or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of
exception and not by way of rule….”
11. It is essential to adhere to time lines in matters involving
commercial disputes. Any delay in filing appeals under Section
13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 cannot be condoned
9
2025 SCC OnLine Del 2158.
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unless the court is satisfied that the appellants were prevented from
sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the stipulated time.
The court must be satisfied that such cause is genuine and not an
illusion to disguise lack of diligence.
12. In the facts of the present case, we are unable to accept that the
appellants have shown any sufficient cause for condoning the delay
in filing the present appeal.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. As is evident from the Appellant’s own averments, and in light
of the settled legal position, it is clear that the present appeal, arising
from a commercial dispute of a “Specified Value” under the CC Act,
was required to be filed within sixty days from the date of the
impugned order, i.e., on or before 05.04.2025.
11. However, the Appellant failed to do so. The appeal was
instituted only on 01.07.2025, much beyond the statutory limit.
Accordingly, there exists a delay of 87 days from the expiry of the 60-
day limitation period. The computation is set out herein below for
ready reference:
Event Date Remarks
Impugned Order Starting point for limitation under
passed by the 04.02.2025 Section 13(1A) of the CC Act.
learned District
Judge
Expiry of the 60- 05.04.2025 Last date for filing appeal, without
day limitation seeking condonation of delay.
Actual date of 01.07.2025 87 days beyond expiry of limitation
filing (i.e., from 05.04.2025).
12. The sole issue that arises for determination is whether the
Appellant has shown “sufficient cause” to justify condonation of the
87-day delay beyond the prescribed limitation period. It is settled law
that such discretion is to be exercised sparingly and only in
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exceptional circumstances. The burden rests squarely on the Appellant
to furnish a clear, cogent, and convincing explanation for the delay.
Condonation is neither a matter of right nor to be granted as a matter
of routine.
13. The averments in the application for condonation of delay,
already extracted hereinabove, reveal that the Appellant is proceeding
on a manifest misconception with respect to the computation of
limitation.
14. The first ground urged, that the period of court vacation should
be excluded under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, is wholly
untenable. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Gupta v.
Raju @ Rajendra Singh Yadav10, the benefit of Section 4 cannot be
extended where the Registry remains functional during the court
vacation. The relevant portion of Ajay Gupta (supra) states as under: –
“3. Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to
as “the Act”), dealing with “Expiry of prescribed period when
court is closed”, no doubt, applies to suits as well, and in case
the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires
on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application
may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court
reopens.
4. The Explanation under Section 4 of the Act also makes it
clear that:
“Explanation. –A court shall be deemed to be
closed on any day within the meaning of this section
if during any part of its normal working hours it
remains closed on that day.”
5. There is no case for anybody that even for part of the day, the
Registry was closed. But Section 5 of the Act which deals with
“Extension of prescribed period in certain cases”, applies only
to appeals or applications and not to suits. Therefore, no court
or tribunal can extend the period of limitation for filing a suit.
Even if any cause, beyond the control of the plaintiff is shown
10
(2016) 14 SCC 314.
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also, the only extension is what is permitted under Section 4 of
the Act, the period coming under court holiday.
6. Thus, both the trial court and the High Court have gravely
gone wrong on the first principles on the law of limitation.
Therefore, the impugned order is set aside. The application filed
by the appellant under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 is allowed. Recovery Suit No. 1 of 2011 on the
file of the ADJ, Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh is dismissed.”
15. Since it is an undisputed fact that the Registry of this Court
remained functional during the summer vacation, the Appellant’s
reliance on Section 4 of the Limitation Act is misconceived and
cannot be accepted.
16. The second justification advanced by the Appellant is that the
certified copy of the impugned order was applied for only after 31
days beyond the statutory 60-day period, and that the additional 18
days consumed in preparation of the copy should also be excluded.
This contention too is misplaced. In this regard, observations of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. &
Anr. v. M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited11 are relevant, which
state as under: –
“10. We are afraid it is difficult for us to take the view that the
provision referred to above is mandatory. It comes to this that
till the Registry does not provide the copy of the judgment,
though not demanded, the period of limitation would not
commence from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment.
*****
13. Although in Housing Board, Haryana (supra) this Court
had held that where the provisions enjoin a duty of
communicating any order or judgment that has been
pronounced, the limitation for challenging the same would begin
from the date of such communication, yet the aforesaid
observations cannot be construed devoid of the context in which
they were made. A close reading of the decision would indicate
that in the said case, after the pronouncement of the order, the11
2025 INSC 533
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appellants therein had made active efforts for procuring the said
order, and this is evident from the fact that few days after the
pronouncement, the counsel of the appellants therein had made
inquires as regards the unavailability of the order in response to
which he was informed that the order was yet to be signed.
14. Thus, when this Court in Housing Board, Haryana (supra)
held that the limitation for challenging the same would begin
from the date of such communication, the same would be
applicable only where despite best of efforts at the end of the
parties in procuring the order the same could not be obtained
and thereby resulting in unavoidable delay in the filing of
appeals. One of the core tenets of the law of limitation is to
enthuse diligence amongst parties as to their rights. The law of
limitation cannot be read in such a manner whereby parties stop
showing any modicum of regard for their own rights and on the
pre-text of untimely communication continue to litigate without
being vigilante themselves.
15. Similarly, we find that the reliance by the appellants on the
decision of Sagufa Ahmed (supra) is also misplaced. In the said
case, this Court while considering Section 421 sub-section (3) of
the Companies Act, 2013 held that the period of limitation
prescribed therein would start running only from the date on
which a copy of the order is made available to the person
aggrieved. However, yet again in the said case, the appellants
therein had made some efforts to procure a certified copy of the
order to be assailed during the period of limitation.
16. In the present case we find that after the order in question
came to be pronounced by the Commercial Court, Ranchi, the
appellants herein during the limitation period did not bother to
even inquire as to why the said order was not available. It was
only eight-months after the pronouncement of the said order and
almost 150-days after the expiry of the limitation period, that the
realization suddenly dawned upon the appellants herein to apply
for the certified copy.
17. One of the avowed objects of the provisions of the
Commercial Courts Act read with amended provisions of CPC
applicable to the Commercial Courts is to ensure that there is
no unnecessary delay in disposal of the commercial suit. Once
specific time lines are fixed and there is a strict procedure
provided in terms of the Commercial Courts Act, parties are by
the statute put to notice that they have to very carefully contest
the suits filed as commercial suits and that failing to comply
with statutory timelines and a strict procedure, certain adverse
consequences may flow on account of lack of application by a
contesting party.
18. Thus, merely because Order XX Rule I enjoins a duty upon
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the commercial courts to provide the copies of the judgment that
does not mean that the parties can shirk away all responsibility
of endeavoring to procure the certified copies thereof in their
own capacity. Any such interpretation would result in
frustrating the very fundamental cannons of law of limitation
and the salutary purpose of the Act, 2015 of ensuring timely
disposals.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. Thus, the belated application for a certified copy, filed 31 days
after the expiry of the statutory period, coupled with the untenable
reliance on court vacation, leaves significant portions of the 87-day
delay wholly unexplained. In the context of a commercial matter
governed by strict timelines under the CC Act, such explanation is
neither credible nor sufficient to overcome the bar of limitation.
18. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the application
for condonation of delay filed with the present Appeal is bereft of any
cogent or persuasive grounds. The explanation tendered is specious
and does not constitute “sufficient cause” in law.
19. Accordingly, without entering into the merits of the case, the
appeal stands dismissed on the ground of delay and limitation alone.
20. The present Appeal, along with pending application(s), if any, is
disposed of in the above terms.
21. No order as to costs.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
AUGUST 20, 2025/v/sm/kr
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