Gujarat High Court
Dipakkumar Laxmanbhai Parmar vs Gujarat Polybutenes Private Limited on 30 July, 2025
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C/SCA/1199/2020 JUDGMENT DATED: 30/07/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1199 of 2020
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3466 of 2020
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3469 of 2020
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3475 of 2020
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3476 of 2020
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4893 of 2020
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4894 of 2020
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6801 of 2020
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6800 of 2020
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
==========================================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
YES
==========================================================
DIPAKKUMAR LAXMANBHAI PARMAR
Versus
GUJARAT POLYBUTENES PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR UT MISHRA(3605) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR NISARG DESAI WITH MS PRAVALIKHA BATTHINI FOR GANDHI LAW
ASSOCIATES(12275) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 2
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
Date : 30/07/2025
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ORAL JUDGMENT
1 Since the issue raised in these petitions is similar,
they are being decided by a common judgment. The
facts of Special Civil Application No.1199 of 2020 are
taken for the purpose of adjudication.
2 This petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, challenging the award dated
01.04.2019 passed by the learned Labour Court,
Vadodara in Reference (LCB) No.349 of 2013,
whereby the Reference filed by the present petitioner
came to be dismissed.
3 It was the case of the present petitioner before the
learned Reference Court, as stated in the statement
of claim, that he had been serving as a Helper with
the respondent establishment for the past 23 years,
and that his services were terminated on 29.12.2012
in violation of Sections 25F, 25G, and 25H of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to
as ‘the I.D. Act‘). It was contended by the workman
that juniors were retained in service, and that the
retrenchment was effected without considering the
seniority list. Accordingly, the petitioner filed the
Reference seeking reinstatement from the date of
termination.
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3.1 The respondent establishment appeared before
the learned Reference Court and filed its written
statement, stating that the petitioner’s services
were terminated on 29.12.2012 with the payment
of one month’s notice pay as well as retrenchment
compensation, in compliance with Section 25F of
the I.D. Act. It was contended that the termination
was effected due to the poor financial condition of
the establishment, and that due procedure under
the I.D. Act was followed. It was further submitted
that no juniors were retained in service after the
petitioner’s retrenchment, nor were any new
employees appointed thereafter. Hence, it was
prayed that the Reference be rejected.
3.2 On considering the submissions and the
evidence adduced by both sides, the learned
Reference Court dismissed the Reference on the
ground that the petitioner failed to establish a
case of illegal retrenchment under Section 25F,
and also failed to prove violations of Sections 25G
and 25H of the I.D. Act, which is the subject matter
of challenge before this Court.
4 Heard the learned advocate Mr.U.T.Mishra for the
petitioner and learned advocate Mr. Nisarg Desai
with Ms.Pravalikha Batthini for the respondent.
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5 Learned advocate Mr. U.T. Mishra submits that the
services of the petitioner were terminated on
29.12.2012, and he was paid one month’s notice pay
of Rs.7,970/- and retrenchment compensation of
Rs.91,655/-, totaling Rs.99,625/-. It is submitted by
the learned advocate Mr.Mishra that, as per the
termination order, the petitioner had completed 23
years of service, and under the provisions of Section
25F of the I.D.Act, 1947, he was entitled to
retrenchment compensation equivalent to 15 days’
wages for each completed year of service. As per the
petitioner’s calculation, the amount of retrenchment
compensation whould have come to approximately
Rs.1,12,000/-. However, only Rs.91,655/- was paid,
which is lesser than the statutory requirement.
Therefore, it is submitted that there has been non-
compliance with Section 25F of the I.D. Act, rendering
the termination illegal in the eyes of law.
5.1 It is further submitted by the learned advocate
Mr. Mishra that more than 100 employees were
working in the respondent establishment, and
therefore, in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
prior permission under Section 25N was
mandatorily required before effecting
retrenchment. In the absence of such permission,
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the order of retrenchment is vitiated and liable to
be set aside. Learned advocate Mr. Mishra submits
that though the petitioner had clearly established
the violation of Sections 25N and 25O of the I.D.
Act, the learned Labour Court failed to consider
these aspects and erroneously dismissed the
Reference.
5.2 It is further submitted by the learned advocate
Mr.Mishra that after retrenching the petitioner, the
employer engaged several daily wagers and
allotted work to them. In such circumstances, it
cannot be said that there was no work available
with the employer. Despite availability of work and
engagement of other employees, the petitioner
was not offered reemployment, which amounts to
a violation of Sections 25G and 25H of the I.D. Act.
However, the learned Labour Court overlooked
these statutory violations and dismissed the
Reference.
5.3 Learned advocate Mr. Mishra also submits that
no cogent evidence was brought on record to
establish the alleged unsound financial condition
of the employer. Mere pleading without proof
cannot be accepted in law. It is further pointed out
that even after the order of retrenchment dated
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29.12.2012, the respondent establishment
continued to operate till 2016 and work was
carried out by engaging other employees. In this
background as well, the impugned award is
required to be interfered with.
5.4 Learned advocate Mr. Mishra has placed
reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in
Rajendra Shankar Shukla v. State of
Chhattisgarh, reported in (2015) 10 SCC 400,
and submitted that the learned Labour Court has
committed an error in not adjudicating upon the
contention raised by the petitioner regarding the
applicability of Chapter V(B) of the I.D. Act, 1947.
It is submitted that the issue pertains to a pure
question of law, and therefore, it was open for the
petitioner to raise such a contention at any stage
of the proceedings.
5.5 Learned advocate Mr. Mishra further submits
that even in the absence of specific pleadings in
the statement of claim, once the evidence with
respect to the applicability and violation of Chapter
V(B) was brought on record, the learned Labour
Court ought to have considered the same and
adjudicated the dispute in that context. However,
the learned Labour Court has erroneously ignored
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the material evidence relating to the violation of
Chapter V(B), and such omission amounts to a
serious error in law. On this ground also, the
impugned award is liable to be quashed and set
aside.
5.6 Learned advocate Mr. Mishra has also relied on
the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the
case of Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State
Warehousing Corporation, reported in (2010) 3
SCC 192, and submitted that, even for
establishing a breach of Sections 25G and 25H, it
is not necessary to examine the violation of
Section 25F, as all these provisions operate
independently and are required to be examined
separately by the learned Court. In view of the
above submissions, learned advocate Mr. Mishra
submits that the learned Labour Court has
committed an error in dismissing the Reference.
Therefore, the impugned award deserves to be set
aside, and the present petition is required to be
allowed.
6 Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Nisarg Desai,
appearing for the respondent, has submitted that,
with regard to the contention of short payment of
retrenchment compensation, no such averments
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were made either in the statement of claim or during
the course of evidence. Learned advocate Mr. Desai
submits that during the cross-examination, the
petitioner categorically admitted that the
retrenchment compensation paid to him was
received, and at no point of time was any dispute
raised regarding the alleged shortfall in the
compensation amount. Hence, the ground of non-
compliance with Section 25F of the I.D. Act cannot be
sustained.
6.1 It is further submitted by Mr. Desai that since
the petitioner has admitted receipt of both notice
pay and retrenchment compensation, there is no
ground to set aside the termination on the basis of
Section 25F.
6.2 With regard to the contentions under Sections
25G and 25H of the I.D. Act, it is submitted by the
learned advocate Mr.Desai that though the
petitioner has claimed in his chief examination
that some persons were continued in service after
his termination, his own evidence indicates that
the alleged employees were appointed prior to his
termination. In such circumstances, it cannot be
said that any juniors were retained or appointed
after his termination, and thus no violation of
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Sections 25G or 25H is made out.
6.3 Learned advocate Mr. Desai further submits
that during cross-examination, the petitioner
himself admitted that he had no knowledge about
any fresh appointments or continuation of juniors
after his termination. In that background as well,
the Labour Court rightly concluded that no
violation of Sections 25G or 25H was established.
6.4 In support of his submissions, learned advocate
Mr. Desai has relied on the following decisions:
(1) Brahm Pal Singh vs. P.O., Industrial
Tribunal No.II & Ors. (High Court of Delhi),(2) Ranjit Natvarlal Chauhan vs. Morbi Nagar
Palika, 2011 SCC OnLine Guj 976 (Division
Bench of this Court), and(3) Regional Manager, State Bank of Bikaner
and Jaipur vs. Bhanwar Lal Saini, (High Court of
Rajasthan).
6.5 Learned advocate Mr.Desai submits that it is for
the petitioner to establish his claim by leading
cogent and reliable evidence, and in the absence
of the same, the plea of violation of Sections 25G
and 25H cannot be sustained.
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6.6 With regard to the contention of illegal closure,
it is submitted by the learned advocate Mr.Desai
that the same was not part of the terms of
reference referred for adjudication before the
Labour Court. Learned advocate Mr. Desai submits
that the petitioner had neither raised any plea
regarding violation of Sections 25O and 25N of the
I.D. Act in the original statement of claim nor
sought any amendment to that effect. In this
background, the Labour Court rightly did not
consider the said contentions. He submits that
such a question cannot be considered incidental to
the main reference, and therefore, no error has
been committed by the learned Court in dismissing
the Reference.
7 Having considered the arguments advanced by the
learned advocates for the respective parties and on
perusal of the reasons assigned by the learned
Reference Court, it emerges that the petitioner, who
was serving as a Helper with the respondent
establishment at its Hajira plant, was terminated on
29.12.2012 upon payment of retrenchment
compensation of ₹91,655/- for 23 years of service,
along with one month’s notice pay of ₹7,970/-. In the
statement of claim filed before the learned Reference
Court, the petitioner did not raise any grievance
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regarding the alleged shortfall in payment of
retrenchment compensation.
8 In addition to the above, during the cross-
examination, the petitioner admitted that he had
received the retrenchment compensation amount as
reflected in Exhibit 9/1. The petitioner ought to have
specifically pleaded, either in the statement of claim
or through evidence, that there was a shortfall in the
payment of retrenchment compensation, thereby
resulting in a violation of Section 25F of the I.D. Act.
In the absence of any such pleadings or supporting
evidence, and considering the petitioner’s own
admission that he received the amount as recorded
in Exhibit 9/1, it can be concluded that the petitioner
either admitted or did not controvert the facts
pertaining to the payment of retrenchment
compensation. Though it is true that legal issues can
be raised at any stage, the present issue involves
disputed questions of fact which ought to have been
raised and established by leading cogent evidence
before the learned Labour Court. In absence of such
evidence, this Court is of the view that no error has
been committed by the learned Labour Court in
disbelieving the petitioner’s case regarding the
alleged violation of Section 25F of the I.D. Act.
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8.1 With regard to the alleged violation of Section
25G of the I.D. Act, it is the case of the petitioner
that junior employees were retained in service
while he alone was chosen for retrenchment.
However, the termination order itself indicates that
the petitioner was the junior-most employee, and
therefore, his services were retrenched.
Furthermore, the seniority list produced on record
at Exhibit 27/1 has not been disputed by the
petitioner, nor has he established that any Helpers
junior to him were continued in service. In that
background, the learned Labour Court has rightly
disbelieved the petitioner’s case with regard to the
alleged breach of Section 25G of the I.D. Act.
9 As far as Section 25H of the I.D. Act is concerned,
though the petitioner, during his chief examination,
has stated the names of various employees, the
dates of their engagement as stated by the petitioner
himself indicate that those employees were already
in service on the date of the petitioner’s termination.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was
denied an opportunity of re-employment while others
were employed after his termination. In the absence
of any concrete evidence showing that the
respondent establishment employed any person after
the termination of the petitioner in violation of
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Section 25H, the learned Labour Court has rightly not
accepted the petitioner’s claim under the said
provision.
10 It is also admitted by the petitioner during cross-
examination that he does not have any knowledge as
to whether any other persons were engaged after his
retrenchment, nor does he have any information
regarding the engagement of trainees post his
termination. In these circumstances, this Court is of
the opinion that the workman has failed to discharge
the burden of proof by not producing satisfactory
evidence to establish that other persons were
engaged and that he was not offered re-employment.
11 With regard to the last contention concerning
the applicability of Chapter V(B) of the I.D. Act, upon
perusal of the statement of claim, it is evident that
the petitioner has not raised any contention with
respect to the breach of either Section 25O or
Section 25N of the I.D. Act. At this stage, reliance is
placed on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court
in the case of Hochtief Gammon v. Industrial
Tribunal, Bhubaneshwar, reported in AIR (1964)
SC 1746, wherein it has been held that Section
10(4), which was inserted by way of an amendment,
restricts the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to the
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specific points of dispute referred to it by the order of
reference. The said jurisdiction, however, may extend
to matters that are incidental to the said points. The
Apex Court further observed as under:
“(15) In Anil Kumar Updhaya v. P. K. Sarkar , AIR
1961 Cal 60 a learned single Judge of the Calcutta
High Court has accepted the same view. In that case,
the Trustees of the Provident Fund in question who
had not been impleaded originally to the reference
were summoned by the Tribunal and the Court held
that in the absence of the Trustees, the award would
have become nugatory. It would be noticed that in
all these decisions, the implied power of the Tribunal
to summon additional parties in the reference
proceedings is confined only to cases where such
addition appeared to be necessary for making the
reference complete and the award effective and
enforceable. Such a power cannot be exercised to
extend the scope of the reference and to bring in
matters which are not the subject-matter of the
reference and which are not incidental to the dispute
which has been referred.
***
(17). The next contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee is
that M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party
because it is the, said concern which is the employer ofPage 14 of 25
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the respondents and not the appellant. In either words,
this contention is that though in form the appellant
engaged the workmen whom the respondent union
represents, the appellant was actingas the agent of its
principal and for adjudicating upon the industrial
dispute referred to the Tribunal by the State of Orissa,
it is necessary that the principal, viz., M/s Hindustan
Steel Ltd. ought to be added as a party. In dealing with
this argument, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact
that the appellant does not dispute the respondent
Union’s case that the workmen were employed by the
appellant. It would have been open to the State
Government to ask the Tribunal to consider who was
the employer of these workmen and in that case, the
terms of reference might have been suitably framed.
Where the appropriate Government desires that the
question as to who the employer is should be
determined, it generally makes a reference in wide
enough terms and includes as parties to the reference
different persons who are alleged to be the employers.
Such a course has not been adopted in the present
proceedings, and so, it would not be possible to hold
that the question as to who is the employer as between
the appellant and M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a,
question incidental to the industrial dispute which has
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been referred under s. 10(1)(d) This dispute is a
substantial dispute between the appellant and M/s
Hindustan Steel Ltd. and cannot be regarded as
incidental in any sense, and so, we think that even this
ground is not sufficient to justify the contention that
M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a, necessary party which
can be added and summoned under the implied powers
of the Tribunal under s. 18(3)(b).
12 In the opinion of this Court the Court cannot
examine the case beyond the points which are
specified in the order of reference or incidental
thereto. To examine that Whether the alleged breach
of section 25N and 25O can be said to be incidental
to the main question which was referred to the
learend Court with regard to the illegal termination, if
one would examine the said question then it emerges
that while claiming the illegal termination in the
statement of claim, no averments were made with
regard to violation of chapter V(B). At this stage, the
reference of the judgment rendered by the Apex
Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of
India and others vs. Retired L.I.C. Officers
Association and others, reported in 2008 4 SCC
321 is required to be be made wherein in paragraph
20 to 23 it is held as under:
“20. Method of fixation, eligibility for the benefit of
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revision and the date from which the revisions shall
apply are thus, the only areas within which the
Chairman can exercise jurisdiction. The effect of revision
of pay scales on other spheres and which are otherwise
governed by another statute or other provisions of the
said Regulations would not come within the purview
thereof. 21. The terminology used “and other matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto” must,
therefore, be held to have a direct nexus with any one
of the aforementioned three elements. The same has
nothing to do with the construction of any other
provision of the Regulations. The words “incidental to”
cannot be interpreted too broadly. It cannot be read
independently of the main provision. It cannot serve
some other purpose which is not covered by Regulation
51 of the Regulations. It cannot be permitted to
encroach upon an area which is not within the
jurisdiction of the Chairman of the Corporation.
22. It is one thing to say that the court while exercising
its jurisdiction would be entitled to exercise such
incidental power for determination of the principal issue
but it is another thing to say that a statutory authority
in such matters would be held to have such power
which is beyond the scope and purport of the principal
provisions.
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23. The word “Incidental” has been defined in Advanced
Law Lexicon 3rd (2005) Edition, Book 2 at 2275 to
mean :- “According to Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, a
thing is said to be incidental to another when it
appertains to the principal thing. According to the
ordinary Dictionary meaning, it signifies a subordinate
action. Hukumchand Jute Mills Ltd. vs. Labour
Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1958 Cal. 68, 70. (Industrial
Disputes Act (14 of 1917), S. 10(4)]. The word
“incidental” does not imply any casual or fortuitous
connection. In a legal sense as applied to powers, it
means a power which is subsidiary to that which has
been expressed, and of an instrumental nature in
relation thereto, which is both necessary and proper for
the carrying into execution of the main power which
has been expressly conferred. (Dunichand and Co. vs.
Narain Das and Co. (1947) 17 Comp. Cas. 195 (FB).”
13 This Court has also referred the decision
rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Airlines
Hotel (Private) Ltd. Bombay vs. Workmen,
reported in AIR (1962) SC 676 wherein it is held as
under:
“1. This appeal by special leave arises out of an industrial dispute
between the appellant company, the Airlines Hotel Private
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and its workmen. The workmen had raised demands in regard to
a number of matters including, wages, service charges and
provident fund. The demand in the matter of service charges was
divided into five heads, one of which was inspection of the
company’s accounts books, bills and receipt books etc., “to
ascertain the correct amount collected by the management and
due to the workers.” The Government made a reference for
adjudication by an industrial tribunal under Section 10 of the Act
as regards all the demands, excepting one, viz., the demand for
inspection of accounts in connection with the amount of service
charges. The Tribunal made as award in favour of the workers as
regards the demand on the question of wages and the demand for
provident fund. The demand as regards service charges was
rejected except that the Tribunal directed all outstanding arrears
in respect of what the company admitted to be payable to
workers to be paid within one month and that a direction was
given for giving access to the workers to the books of account for
the purpose of ascertaining the amount collected. The special
leave granted by this Court was limited to three points, viz., (1)
the matter of inspection of accounts ; (2) the wages ; and (3) the
provident fund. With the other portions of the award we are not
concerned in this appeal.
2. The appellant’s main contention on the first question is that the
Tribunal had no jurisdiction to give any direction to the appellant
to give access to the workers to the account books in view of the
fact that the Government had in terms refused to refer the dispute
as regards the inspection of accounts. In our opinion, this
contention should prevail.
3. On behalf of the workmen it was urged that the only result of
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the refusal of the Government to refer for adjudication the
demand for inspection of accounts was that the Tribunal would
have no jurisdiction to deal with this matter directly ; but that
would not stand in the way of giving such directions as the
Tribunal might think necessary as ancillary to its award on any
other point in dispute. It is urged that the Tribunal has given this
direction not as a decision on a matter which was not referred to
it but only as incidental to the dispute as regards service charges
that was in fact referred. If the question of inspection of accounts
had not at all been raised so that there was no question of refusal
to refer the question, there might perhaps be some scope for an
argument that the question might have been considered as
involved in and incidental to the question of service charges that
was referred. That however is not the position here. As has
already been pointed out, the workmen had mentioned five
different heads of the demand for service charges, one of the
heads being for inspection of accounts, in these words: –
“The management should place all the account books, bills
and receipt books etc., from 1-1-57 onwards and relevant
documents of the Airlines Hotel Private Ltd., before the
representatives of Bombay Hotels Kamgar Union for
inspection to ascertain the correct amount collected by the
management and due to the workers.”
It was this demand which the government refused to refer because
“the government was satisfied that there was no case for reference
thereof to a tribunal for the reason that this demand was not
reasonable.” In these circumstances, there can be no justification
for the view that what could not be done directly because of this
refusal could be done indirectly on the plea that it was incidental.
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In our opinion, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to give the
direction as regards inspection of accounts. That direction must
accordingly be set aside.
9. While we think it undesirable to lay it down as an
inviolable rule that if the dispute referred is on the
question of wage scale ad hoc increases could never be
given, there can be no doubt that ordinarily that should be
so. On the facts of the present case there are no
circumstances which would justify a departure from this
ordinary rule. Demands which raised the dispute being for
a wage scale and that being the dispute referred in terms
the Tribunal could either grant the wage scale demanded in
part or in whole or refuse the demand altogether. It was
not justified in giving ad hoc increases in the manner as
has been done here.”
13.1 This Court has referred the decision of the Apex
Court in the case of Oshiar Prasad and Others
Versus Employers In Relation to Management
of Sudamdih Coal, Washery of M/s Bharat
Coking Coal Limited, Dhanbad, Jharkhand
reported in (2015) 4 SCC 71 wherein, the Apex
Court has held as under:-
“17. Before we examine the factual matrix of the case in hand,
we consider it apposite to take note of law laid down by this
Court regarding the powers of the appropriate Government in
making reference under Section 10 of the Act and the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal while answering the reference. Indeed it is wellPage 21 of 25
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settled and remains no more res integra.
18. One of the questions which fell for consideration by this
Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen
and Others (AIR 1967 SC 469) was that what are the powers of
the appropriate Government while making a reference and the
scope and jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of
the Act.
19. Justice Mitter, speaking for the Bench, held as under:
“(8) ……Under S. 10(1)(d) of the Act, it is open to the
appropriate Government when it is of opinion that any
industrial dispute exists to make an order in writing
referring “the dispute or any matter appearing to be
connected with, or relevant to the dispute,…..to a Tribunal
for adjudication” under s. 10(4) “where in an order
referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal
or National Tribunal under this section or in a subsequent
order, the appropriate Government has specified the points
of dispute for adjudication, the Labour Court or the
Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be,
shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters
incidental thereto.”
(9) From the above it therefore appears that while it is
open to the appropriate Government to refer the dispute or
any matter appearing to be connected therewith for
adjudication, the Tribunal must confine its adjudication to
the points of dispute referred and matters incidental
thereto. In other words, the Tribunal is not free to enlarge
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the scope of the dispute referred to it but must confine its
attention to the points specifically mentioned and anything
which is incidental thereto. The word ‘incidental’ means
according to Webster’s New World Dictionary :
“happening or likely to happen as a result of or in
connection with something more important; being an
incident; casual; hence, secondary or minor, but usually
associated :”
“Something incidental to a dispute” must therefore
mean something happening as a result of or in
connection with the dispute or associated with the
dispute. The dispute is the fundamental thing while
something incidental thereto is an adjunct to it.
Something incidental, therefore, cannot cut at the root
of the main thing to which it is an adjunct to it…..”
13.2 This Court has also referred the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Firestone Tyre And
Rubber Company of India (P0 Ltd. Versus
Workmen Employed, Represented by Firestone
Tyre Employees’ Union reported in (1981) 3 SCC
451, wherein, the Apex Court has held as under:-
“9. In this case the points of dispute were specified in the
schedule to the order of reference, and the Tribunal was therefore
required to confine its adjudication to those points and matters
that were incidental to them. From a reading of demands 1(A)
and 1(B) as a whole it is clear that the demand for reinstatement
in respect of both groups of workmen as made arises on thePage 23 of 25
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alleged invalidity of the action taken by the management in
dismissing these workmen. The issue of unfair labour practice or
discrimination by reason of subsequent reinstatement on a
permanent basis of some and not all the 25 workmen was not a
matter referred to the Tribunal for adjudication, nor it can be said
to be in any way connected with or incidental to the right of
reinstatement claimed by the 101 workmen from the date of their
dismissal. The fairness of subsequent absorption of some workmen
is a matter quite irrelevant for judging the validity of the earlier
dismissal of these workmen along with others; it is an entirely
separate and independent question. The Tribunal also did not
frame an issue on the alleged discrimination. That being so, we
think the Tribunal travelled outside its jurisdiction in recording a
finding of unfair labour practice and discrimination.”
14 In the opinion of this Court, on referring to the
above decisions, it is clear that an incidental matter
cannot override or cut at the root of the principal
issue to which it is ancillary. Whether a matter is
incidental or not would depend on how and under
what circumstances the question arises in the
context of the dispute referred for adjudication. A
matter which is independent in one context may
become subsidiary in another, depending on the
factual and legal framework. A different result and
procedure would follow if a party were to allege a
breach of the provisions under Chapter V(B) of the
I.D. Act. In this background, the issue regarding the
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applicability of Chapter V(B), when the dispute
referred was limited to the alleged breaches of
Sections 25F, 25G, and 25H of the I.D. Act, cannot be
said to be incidental to the reference.
15 Considering the overall circumstances of the
case, this Court does not find any merit in the
petitions, nor any illegality or infirmity in the findings
recorded by the learned Labour Court. Accordingly,
these petitions are dismissed. Rule is discharged.
(M. K. THAKKER,J)
M.M.MIRZA
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