Delhi High Court
Directorate Of Education vs Ramjas School on 20 January, 2025
Author: Rekha Palli
Bench: Rekha Palli
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 20.01.2025
+ LPA 488/2022 and CM APPL. 36930/2022-Stay, CM
APPL.36929/2022-Delay
DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Udit Malik, ASC (Civil) for
GNCTD with Ms. Rima Rao and Ms.
Palak Sharma, Advocates.
Versus
RAMJAS SCHOOL .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Kamal Gupta, Mr. Sparsh
Aggarwal, Ms. Yosha Dutt, Ms. Rashi
Agarwal and Mr. Aaditya Dhull,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA PALLI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAURABH BANERJEE
SAURABH BANERJEE, J (ORAL)
1. The present appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent Appeal seeks
to assail the order dated 20.05.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in
W.P.(C) No.9688/2019, whereby, the learned Single Judge has allowed the
writ petition of the respondent by upholding its decision to increase the
School fees for the Academic Session 2016-2017.
2. Succinctly put and prior to proceeding to deal with the merits
involved, we may note that the present appeal has been filed after more than
two years and three months from the passing of the impugned order.
However, taking into account the orders passed by the Apex Court in suo
moto W.P. (C) No.3/2020, since the period till 28.02.2022, was required to
be excluded for the purposes of computing limitation, the appellant before
us has filed the present appeal alongwith an application under Section 5 of
LPA 488/2022 Page 1 of 10
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the Limitation Act, 1963 (said application), albeit seeking condonation of
delay of the remaining 175 days only after 28.02.2022.
3. Interestingly, in the said application seeking condonation of delay in
filing the present appeal, the appellant has in paras 3 and 5 primarily pleaded
that the delay was inadvertent and occurred on account of the following
reasons. The said relevant paragraphs are being reproduced as under:
“3. That it is submitted that taking the approval of various
officials of the Applicant Department, vetting and perusing the
grounds of appeal preparation of the appeal memorandum,
collection of information / documents / armexures, vetting of
facts in the prepared affidavit from the Office of Deputy
Director of Education, District South West-A of at C-4, Vasant
Vihar, New Delhi and Head Quarter level of Direetorate of
Education , GNCT of Delhi at Old Secretariat, Delhi took tim.e
Moreover, it is respeetfully submitted that the eoneemed eourt
ease files dealing with the preparation of EPA and seeking the
requisite approval(s) from the department, post-preparation of
the appeal, went through various branehes at Zonal Level
/Distriet level and at Head Quarter Level of the Directorate of
Education, GNCT of Delhi.
XXXXX
5. That in briefing Standing Counsel (Civil) GNCTD and
getting prepared LPA, it took some time. Further, Directorate
of Education being a Govt. department, decision to file LPA in
the present matter is routed through various channels & it took
time, by the Deponent before filing the present LPA.”
4. Sans the above averments, there is nothing else stated which is/ or, for
that matter, can be said to be material or of any importance in the said
application for the purposes of our adjudication thereof. In fact, learned
counsel for the appellant in support of the above, reiterates that the reason(s)
for delay in preferring the present appeal was that the appellant had to obtain
signatures of the officials from the various concerned departments which
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took some time as also for briefing the concerned Standing Counsel (Civil),
GNCTD.
5. The application is vehemently opposed by learned counsel for the
respondent, Mr. Kamal Gupta, who submits that the aforesaid reasons
furnished by the appellant in the said application are absolutely cryptic and
cannot be, in any manner, said to be sufficient reasons for condoning the
delay in filing the present appeal.
6. Mr. Kamal Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent further submits
that the issue decided by the learned Single Judge pertains to the fees
recovered by the School for the Academic Session 2016-2017, which
amount, as per him, has already been spent by the School in providing
amenities. In effect, he wishes to submit that much water has flown since
then as long time has elapsed thence. He, therefore, prays that the
application seeking condonation of 175 days delay in filing the appeal be
dismissed.
7. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties
and upon perusal of the record, we may note that the aforenoted paras 3 and
5 of the application, wherein, the appellant has sought to furnish reasons for
seeking condonation of delay in filing of the present appeal thereby,
disclosing that the justification(s) sought to be provided by the appellant for
the delay of 175 days in filing of the present appeal are only that the said
time period was spent in obtaining approval from various officials of the
department of the appellant as also for preparing and perusing the appeal
paper book and securing the signatures of the Deputy Director on the
affidavit in support of the present appeal and lastly that it required time to
brief the learned Standing Counsel (Civil) for GNCTD, who was to appear
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in Court on its behalf.
8. A perusal of the said application reveals that the appellant has merely
made general, rather, basic averments without giving any proper details and/
or particulars qua the approvals taken by the department and/ or time period
involved for it to seek recourse under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
(the Act). This, unfortunately, can prove to be damaging since one of the
most essential requirement(s) for a party (like the appellant herein to seek
benefit under Section 5 of the Act) is that the appellant is required to make
out, show and also establish any “sufficient cause” on account of which the
appellant was prevented from and was unable to file the present appeal
within the prescribed period of limitation under the statute. In case there is
nothing in support thereof, we are afraid that the appellant cannot be allowed
to take benefit of its own negligence and inaction. In this case, admittedly,
the appellant has indeed approached us with a very basic application under
Section 5 of the Act which contains no sufficient reason(s) for seeking
condonation of such a huge delay of 175 days in filing the present appeal.
9. In this regard, we may refer to a very recent decision in Civil Appeal
No.317/2025 titled H. Guruswamy & Ors. vs. A. Krishnaiah Since
Deceased By LRS, wherein the Apex Court has held as under:
“15. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights
of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort
to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.
16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter
which the court must take into consideration while considering
whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor
of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they
want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of
instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed aLPA 488/2022 Page 4 of 10
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period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his
right to have the matter considered on merits because of his
own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-
deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he
cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves
to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must
not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a
duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the
sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of
the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into
aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
(Emphasis supplied)
17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not
merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public policy and principles
of equity. No court should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’
hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of
time.”
10. As per the aforestated settled position of law and the facts borne out
before us, it is clear that at the end of the day stating reasons for establishing
a “sufficient cause” for a party like the appellant is in fact a pre-requisite to
seek benefit of the provisions as contained under Section 5 of the Act qua
condoning the delay in filing the present appeal. We, once again reiterate
that, admittedly, the said application of the appellant is indeed bereft of any
such reasons disclosing any “sufficient cause”. We feel there is hardly any
scope for us to accord any benefit thereof to the appellant herein.
11. This is more so, since when we are considering an application for
condonation of delay in filing an appeal like the present one, wherein, the
appellant herein is trying to seek recourse under Section 5 of the Act, there
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are two noteworthy considerations that we have to bear in mind. Firstly, we
are to see as to what is the length of the delay involved by the appellant in
approaching this Court to file the present appeal. Secondly, we are also to
take note of the fact as to whether the appellant has been able to make out
and/ or show a “sufficient cause” supplemented with explicit reason(s) on
account of which the said delay occurred, which prompted the appellant to
file the present appeal after the lapse of the prescribed period for limitation
under the statute.
12. Unfortunately, we do not see any reason to condone the huge delay of
175 days in the appellant preferring the present appeal before us. Alas, and
moreover, the appellant has not been able to demonstrate any plausible
reason enabling us to condone the prolonged delay of 175 days. This is, as
neither there is/ are any such explanation for the length of the delay involved
in approaching this Court to file the present appeal nor the appellant has
been able to show and/ or make out a case showing “sufficient cause” with
any explicit reason(s) on account of which the said delay occurred and
which prompted the appellant to file the present appeal after the lapse of the
prescribed statutory period for limitation. Therefore, the appellant is unable
to fulfil either of the twin pre-requisites as discussed above.
13. In any event, in our considered view the aforesaid plea taken by the
appellant in the said application qua obtaining approvals from various
officials of its departments, briefing the learned Standing Counsel (Civil) for
GNCTD as also preparing and perusing the appeal paper book cannot be
said to be justifiable and treated as “sufficient cause” for the said application
under Section 5 of the Act to be allowed. Thus, the same inspire no
confidence in us.
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14. Interestingly, in FAO(OS) (COMM) 22/2024 titled Union of India vs.
BESCO Limited (Wagon Divison), albeit, while dealing with any appeal
under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 involving a
similar application seeking condonation of 112 days in filing the appeal, we,
after relying upon a decision of the Apex Court in Basawaraj v. Land
Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 as also observing the dicta of the
Apex Court in Government of Maharastra vs. M/s Borse Brothers
Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 460, had dismissed the
said application, holding as under:-
“12. In the light of the aforesaid, we find that the reasons set
out by the appellant for seeking condonation of delay cannot be
said to be falling within the category of either ‘sufficient cause’
or ‘exceptional circumstances’. Though learned counsel for the
appellant has, by placing reliance on the decision in Jaitely
Construction Ltd. (supra), vehemently urged that once the
Apex Court had condoned the delay of 244 days in filing the
appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, the delay in the present case being 112 days, this Court
ought to take a liberal view and condone the said delay. Having
perused the said decision, we find that in Jaitely Constructions
(supra) the Apex Court had condoned the delay of 244 days in
filing the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 only upon finding that as per the
documents produced by the appellants therein, alongwith the
application, an exceptional case was made out. On the other
hand, in the present case, we find that the appellant has acted
in a most callous and negligent manner and even the bald
explanation given in the application is not supported by any
documents. Once no sufficient cause for seeking condonation
of delay has been shown, the decision in Jaitely Constructions
(supra) will not be applicable to the present case.
13. Further, we are of the view that it is not merely the
number of days of delay, which would be material for
considering the application seeking condonation of delay but itLPA 488/2022 Page 7 of 10
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is the sufficiency of reasons for the delay which would be
material to determine whether the delay should be condoned.
For this purpose, we may refer to pargraph 65 of the decision
of the Apex Court in Borse Brothers Engineers (supra),
wherein the Court had, while dealing with Civil Appeal arising
out of SLP (C) NO.665/2021, declined to condone the delay of
131 days beyond the 60 days period provided for filing of an
appeal under the Commercial Courts Act. The relevant extract
of the said decision reads as under:-
“65. Apart from this, there is a long delay of 131 days
beyond the 60- day period provided for filing an appeal
under section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act. There
is no explanation worth the name contained in the
condonation of delay application, beyond the usual file-
pushing and administrative exigency. This appeal is
therefore dismissed.”
14. In fact, it also emerges that in the same decision, the
Apex Court while dealing with SLP (C) No.15278/2020 had
declined to condone even the delay of 75 days in filing an
appeal which was otherwise required to be filed within 60 days
under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. It would, therefore, be
apposite to refer hereinbelow to the paragraph nos. 67 and 68
of the said decision as well.
“67. That apart, on the facts of this appeal, there is a long
delay of 75 days beyond the period of 60 days provided by
the Commercial Courts Act. Despite the fact that a
certified copy of the District Court’s judgment was
obtained by the respondent on 27.04.2019, the appeal was
filed only on 09.09.2019, the explanation for delay being:
“2. That, the certified copy of the order dated 01/04/2013
was received by the appellant on 27/04/2019. Thereafter
the matter was placed before the CGM purchase
MPPKVVCL for the compliance of the order. The same
was then sent to the law officer, MPPKVVCL for opinion.
3. That after taking opinion for appeal, and approval of
the concerned authorities, the officer-in-charge was
appointed vide order dated 23/07/2019.
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4. That, thereafter due to bulky records of the case and for
procurement of the necessary documents some delay has
been caused however, the appeal has been prepared and
filed to pursuant to the same and further delay.
5. That due to the aforesaid procedural approval and
since the appellant is a public entity formed under the
Energy department of the State Government, the delay
caused in filing the appeal is bonafide and which
deserve[s] to be condoned.
68. This explanation falls woefully short of making out any
sufficient cause. This appeal is therefore allowed and the
condonation of delay is set aside on this score also.”
15. In the light of the aforesaid, we are of the considered
view that the explanation furnished by the appellant does not
show any sufficient cause whatsoever for condonation of delay
of 112 days in filing of the appeal, which was otherwise
required to be filed within 60 days as prescribed under Section
37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.”
15. On account of all the above observations and findings, we find no
occasion for venturing into the merits involved in the present appeal, more
so, since the averments made in the said application under Section 5 of the
Act is/ are insufficient for the appellant to seek condonation of 175 days
delay in filing the present appeal.
16. However, it is clarified that since the appellant has raised questions
about the charging of the fees by the School authorities without any
interference from the Directorate, we make it clear that since we have not
expressed any opinion on the merits of the issues raised in the present
appeal. It is made clear that the said issue is not being adjudicated on merits
and is kept open.
17. In light of the above observations, we have no option but to dismiss
the present application seeking condonation of 175 days delay in filing the
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present appeal. Needless to say, as necessary corollary the appeal also stands
dismissed.
18. The pending application is, accordingly, disposed of.
(SAURABH BANERJEE)
JUDGE
(REKHA PALLI)
JUDGE
JANUARY 20, 2025/uk/Ab
LPA 488/2022 Page 10 of 10
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Signing Date:22.01.2025
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