Disney Broadcasting (India) Private … vs Competition Commission Of India on 28 May, 2025

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Kerala High Court

Disney Broadcasting (India) Private … vs Competition Commission Of India on 28 May, 2025

Author: D. K. Singh

Bench: D. K. Singh

WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022                       1




                                                             2025:KER:36755

                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                   PRESENT

                   THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE D. K. SINGH

         WEDNESDAY, THE 28TH DAY OF MAY 2025 / 7TH JYAISHTA, 1947

                           WP(C) NO. 29766 OF 2022


PETITIONER:

              ASIANET STAR COMMUNICATIONS PRIVATE LIMITED
              STAR HOUSE, URMI ESTATE 95 GANPATRAO KADAM MARG LOWER
              PAREL (W), MUMBAI- 400013, REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED
              SIGNATORY K.S. BIJU


              BY ADVS.
              V.V.NANDAGOPAL NAMBIAR
              ADV.MR.MANINDER SINGH (SR.)
              ADV.MR.JAIJU BABU(SR.)
              ADV.MR.SANTHOSH MATHEW(SR)
              SMITHA (EZHUPUNNA)
              CHITRA JOHNSON
              VICTOR GEORGE V.M.
              ADV.MR.PRABHAS BAJAJ
              K.GOPALAKRISHNA KURUP (SR.)(G-169)
              RANJEET SINGH SIDHU(D/2599/2015)
              SIDHARTH CHOPRA(D/673/2005)
              SWIKRITI SINGHANIA(D/2229-C/2011)
              KUBER MAHAJAN(D/2760/2020)
              AKSHAY AGARWAL(D/2269/2017)
              SNEHA JAIN(D/3024/2010)
              SAIKRISHNA RAJAGOPAL(D/1147/1995)



RESPONDENTS:

     1        COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA
              REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, 9TH FLOOR, OFFICE BLOCK -
              1, KIDWAI NAGAR (EAST) , NEW DELHI - 110023, INDIA.

     2        ASIANET DIGITAL NETWORK PRIVATE LIMITED 2A,
              II FLOOR, CARNIVAL TECHNOPARK, LEELA INFOPARK,
              TECHNOPARK, KAZHAKKOOTTAM, KARYAVATTOM, TRIVANDRUM -695
 WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022                     2




                                                          2025:KER:36755

            581 REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY

     3      STAR INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
            STAR HOUSE, URMI ESTATE, 95, GANPATRAO KADAM MARG, LOWER
            PAREL (WEST), MUMBAI -400013 REPRESENTED BY ITS
            AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY

     4      DISNEY BROADCASTING (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED
            STAR HOUSE, URMI ESTATE, 95, GANPATRAO KADAM MARG, LOWER
            PAREL (WEST), MUMBAI -400013, REPRESENTED BY ITS
            AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY

     5      THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
            COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 'B' WING, HUDCO VISHALA,
            14, BHIKAJI CAMA PLACE, NEW DELHI - 110 066.


         BY ADVS.
         MARIAM MATHAI
         Santhosh Mathew
         ADV.SRI.N.VENKATARAMAN, ASGI asst.by
         SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, CGC
         ADV.MR.RITIN RAI(SR.)
         ADV.MR.AVINASH AMARNATH
         ADV.MR.TARUN DONADI
         ADV.MR.UDAY BALI
         ADV.MR.NAMAN GOLECHHA
         ADV.DAYAAR SINGLA
         SAJI VARGHESE T.G
         ARUN THOMAS(K/844/2007)
         ANIL SEBASTIAN PULICKEL(K/000278/2018)
         MATHEW NEVIN THOMAS(K/000936/2019)
         KURIAN ANTONY MATHEW(K/1812/2020)


     THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 19.02.2025
ALONG WITH WP(C).29767/2022, 29768/2022, THE COURT ON 28.05.2025 DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING:
 WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022                       3




                                                             2025:KER:36755


                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                   PRESENT

                   THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE D. K. SINGH

         WEDNESDAY, THE 28TH DAY OF MAY 2025 / 7TH JYAISHTA, 1947

                           WP(C) NO. 29767 OF 2022


PETITIONER:

              STAR INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED,
              STAR HOUSE, URMI ESTATE, 95, GANPATRAO KADAM MARG, LOWER
              PAREL, MUMBAI 400 013 REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED
              SIGNATORY SHRI. BIJU K.S.


              BY ADVS.
              V.V.NANDAGOPAL NAMBIAR
              ADV.MR.MANINDER SINGH (SR.)
              ADV.MR.JAIJU BABU(SR.)
              ADV.MR.SANTHOSH MATHEW(SR)
              SMITHA (EZHUPUNNA)
              CHITRA JOHNSON
              VICTOR GEORGE V.M.
              ADV.MR.PRABHAS BAJAJ
              K.GOPALAKRISHNA KURUP (SR.)(G-169)
              RANJEET SINGH SIDHU(D/2599/2015)
              SIDHARTH CHOPRA(D/673/2005)
              SWIKRITI SINGHANIA(D/2229-C/2011)
              KUBER MAHAJAN(D/2760/2020)
              AKSHAY AGARWAL(D/2269/2017)
              SNEHA JAIN(D/3024/2010)
              SAIKRISHNA RAJAGOPAL(D/1147/1995)




RESPONDENTS:

     1        COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA,
              REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, 9TH FLOOR, OFFICE BLOCK - 1
              KIDWAI NAGAR (EAST) NEW DELHI - 110023, INDIA.
 WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022                     4




                                                         2025:KER:36755

     2      ASIANET DIGITAL NETWORK PRIVATE LIMITED,
            2A, II FLOOR, CARNIVAL TECHNOPARK, LEELA INFOPARK,
            TECHNOPARK, KAZHAKKOOTTAM, KARYAVATTOM, TRIVANDRUM 695 581
            REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY.

     3      DISNEY BROADCASTING (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED,
            STAR HOUSE, URMI ESTATE, 95, GANPATRAO KADAM MARG, LOWER
            PAREL (WEST), MUMBAI -400013 REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED
            SIGNATORY.

     4      ASIANET STAR COMMUNICATIONS PRIVATE LIMITED,
            STAR HOUSE, URMI ESTATE, 95, GANPATRAO KADAM MARG, LOWER
            PAREL (WEST), MUMBAI -400013, REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED
            SIGNATORY.

     5      THE DIRECTOR GENERAL,
            COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA. 'B' WING, HUDCO VISHALA,
            14, BHIKAJI CAMA PLACE, NEW DELHI - 110 066.


            BY ADVS.
            MARIAM MATHAI
            Santhosh Mathew
            ADV.SRI.N.VENKATARAMAN, ASGI asst.by
            SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, CGC
            ADV.MR.RITIN RAI(SR.)
            ADV.MR.AVINASH AMARNATH
            ADV.MR.TARUN DONADI
            ADV.MR.UDAY BALI
            ADV.MR.NAMAN GOLECHHA
            ADV.DAYAAR SINGLA
            SAJI VARGHESE T.G
            ARUN THOMAS(K/844/2007)
            ANIL SEBASTIAN PULICKEL(K/000278/2018)
            MATHEW NEVIN THOMAS(K/000936/2019)
            KURIAN ANTONY MATHEW(K/1812/2020)




     THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 19.02.2025
ALONG WITH WP(C).29766/2022, 29768/2022, THE COURT ON 28.05.2025 DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING:
 WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022                       5




                                                             2025:KER:36755


                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                   PRESENT

                   THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE D. K. SINGH

         WEDNESDAY, THE 28TH DAY OF MAY 2025 / 7TH JYAISHTA, 1947

                           WP(C) NO. 29768 OF 2022


PETITIONER:

              DISNEY BROADCASTING (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED
              STAR HOUSE, URMI ESTATE, 95, GANPATRAO KADAM MARG, LOWER
              PAREL (WEST), MUMBAI -400013 REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED
              SIGNATORY


              BY ADVS.
              V.V.NANDAGOPAL NAMBIAR
              ADV.MR.MANINDER SINGH (SR.)
              ADV.MR.JAIJU BABU(SR.)
              ADV.MR.SANTHOSH MATHEW(SR)
              SMITHA (EZHUPUNNA)
              CHITRA JOHNSON
              VICTOR GEORGE V.M.
              ADV.MR.PRABHAS BAJAJ
              K.GOPALAKRISHNA KURUP (SR.)(G-169)
              RANJEET SINGH SIDHU(D/2599/2015)
              SIDHARTH CHOPRA(D/673/2005)
              SWIKRITI SINGHANIA(D/2229-C/2011)
              KUBER MAHAJAN(D/2760/2020)
              AKSHAY AGARWAL(D/2269/2017)
              SNEHA JAIN(D/3024/2010)
              SAIKRISHNA RAJAGOPAL(D/1147/1995)




RESPONDENTS:

     1        COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA
              REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, 9TH FLOOR, OFFICE BLOCK - 1
              KIDWAI NAGAR (EAST) NEW DELHI - 110023, INDIA.
 WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022                     6




                                                         2025:KER:36755

     2      ASIANET DIGITAL NETWORK PRIVATE LIMITED
            2A, II FLOOR, CARNIVAL TECHNOPARK, LEELA INFOPARK,
            TECHNOPARK, KAZHAKKOOTTAM, KARYAVATTOM, TRIVANDRUM 695 581
            REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY

     3      STAR INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
            STAR HOUSE, URMI ESTATE, 95, GANPATRAO KADAM MARG, LOWER
            PAREL, MUMBAI 400 013 REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED
            SIGNATORY SHRI. BIJU K.S.

     4      ASIANET STAR COMMUNICATIONS PRIVATE LIMITED
            STAR HOUSE, URMI ESTATE, 95, GANPATRAO KADAM MARG, LOWER
            PAREL (WEST), MUMBAI -400013 REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED
            SIGNATORY

     5      THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
            COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA 'B' WING, HUDCO VISHALA, 14,
            BHIKAJI CAMA PLACE, NEW DELHI 110 066.


            BY ADVS.
            MARIAM MATHAI
            Santhosh Mathew
            ADV.SRI.N.VENKATARAMAN, ASGI asst.by
            SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, CGC
            ADV.MR.RITIN RAI(SR.)
            ADV.MR.AVINASH AMARNATH
            ADV.MR.TARUN DONADI
            ADV.MR.UDAY BALI
            ADV.MR.NAMAN GOLECHHA
            ADV.DAYAAR SINGLA
            SAJI VARGHESE T.G
            ARUN THOMAS(K/844/2007)
            ANIL SEBASTIAN PULICKEL(K/000278/2018)
            MATHEW NEVIN THOMAS(K/000936/2019)
            KURIAN ANTONY MATHEW(K/1812/2020)




     THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 19.02.2025
ALONG WITH WP(C).29766/2022, 29767/2022, THE COURT ON 28.05.2025 DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING:
 WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022                     7




                                                       2025:KER:36755




                             JUDGMENT

[WP(C) Nos.29766/2022, 29767/2022, 29768/2022]

“TRAI sets the field, CCI calls the fouls”

2. Heard Mr Maninder Singh (Sr), Mr Jaiju Babu (Sr), Mr

Santhosh Mathew (Sr), Ms Sneha Jain, Mr Ranjeet Singh Sidhu, Mr

Prabhas Bajaj, learned Counsel for the petitioners; Mr N

Venkataraman, learned Additional Solicitor General of India

assisted by Mr Jaishankar V Nair, learned Central Government

Counsel of Competition Commission of India and Mr Ritin Rai (Sr),

Mr Avinash Amarnath, Mr Tarun Donadi, Mr Uday Bali, Mr Naman

Golechha, Mr.Dayaar Singla, Mr Saji Varghese T G learned Counsel

for the respondents.

Introduction:

3. The alleged conflict between the scope and jurisdiction

of the authorities under the Telecom Regulatory Authority of
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and 29768 OF 2022 8

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India (TRAI) Act 1997 and the Competition Commission of India

(CCI), a statutory authority constituted under the Competition Act

2002, is involved in the present writ petitions. The issue is which

authority, i.e., TRAI (Telecom Regulatory Authority of

India)/ TDSAT (Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate

Tribunal) or the Competition Commission of India (CCI), would

have the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint filed

by the respondent, i.e., Asianet Digital Network Private Limited

(ADNPL) (a wholly owned subsidiary of Asianet Satellite

Communications Limited)/ Informant.

4. There are mainly three parties which are relevant to the

present writ petitions:

(a) Star India Private Limited (SIPL) – Broadcaster of Satellite-

Based TV Channels

(b) Asianet Digital Network Private Limited (ADNPL/Informant)

– A Multi-System Operator (MSO) engaged in the business of
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 9

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providing TV services. It receives broadcasting signals from SIPL

for monetary consideration and distributes the channels of SIPL

to its customers in pursuance of the agreements entered into

between the parties.

(c) Kerala Communicators Cable Limited (KCCL) – Another MSO

and a competitor of ADNPL, having similar arrangements with the

SIPL.

Facts:

5. ADNPL submitted Information to the CCI alleging SIPL’s

abuse of dominant position and denial of market access to the

ADNPL in violation of Section 4(2)(a)(ii) and Section 4(2)(c) of the

Competition Act 2002 by entering into sham marketing

agreements with KCCL. TRAI formulated and introduced the

Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services

Interconnection (Addressable Systems) Regulations 2017 (for

short, ‘Interconnection Regulations 2017’) and
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 10

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Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Eighth)

(Addressable Systems) Tariff Order 2017 (Collectively, New

Regulatory Framework), under which the Maximum Retail Price

(MRP) for each pay channel was fixed. The TRAI had a total

discount of 35% of the MRP payable to distributors (split as 15%

towards discount and 20% towards distribution fee). Under the

TRAI regulatory framework, broadcasters are to treat distributors

non-discriminatorily and offer discounts on fair and transparent

terms to ensure a level playing field.

5.1 The Information alleges that SIPL offered KCCL

discounts up to 50% (instead of 15% as prescribed by the

Interconnection Regulation 2017). SIPL achieved this by entering

into marketing and advertising agreements with KCCL, offering

benefits in the form of discounts. Marketing agreements were

entered into between the SIPL and the KCCL purporting to

advertise the petitioner’s channel ‘Asianet’, which already enjoys
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 11

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huge popularity in Kerala, having four times more viewership

than its nearest competing channel. The agreement is only a

sham, as these advertisements are being featured by the KCCL on

a ‘Test’ channel at the end of its channel list, which merely shows

these advertisements on a 24*7 basis without any real viewership.

The SIPL, therefore, has violated Section 4(2)(a)(ii) and Section

4(2)(c) of the Competition Act for offering discriminatory

discounts, denying market access to ADNPL, and providing unfair

advantage to KCCL.

5.2 ADNPL, which is an MSO, predominantly provides

digital TV services in Kerala. It also operates in Karnataka,

Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Odisha. As per the complaint

filed before the CCI, the ADNPL had a customer base of 10.02 lakh

in Kerala and a minimum of 1.19 lakh customers in all other States

combined (as of December 2021). The SIPL and its subsidiaries and

group companies, including Disney and Asianet Star, are
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 12

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broadcasters of satellite-based TV channels in India, having

multiple channels of different languages and various genres,

including general entertainment, movies, kids’ entertainment,

sports and infotainment.

Order of the Competition Commission of India:

6. The ADNPL has made the following prayers before the

Competition Commission of India:

“(i) Pass an order under Section 26 (1) of the Act to cause an
investigation into the discriminatory conduct of SIPL;

(ii) Pass an order under Section 27 of the Act finding that SIPL has
abused its dominant position in contravention of Section 4 of the Act
by indulging in discriminatory pricing and conduct resulting in the
denial of market access;

(iii) Impose the highest penalty on SIPL given its habitual and
repeated contraventions of the Act;

(iv) Pass an order directing SIPL to cease and desist from indulging
in discrimination between DPOs;

(v) Pass an order to refund the excess amount along with interest @
12% p.a to ADNPL, w.e.f. 01.02.2019 in accordance with parity with
KCCL in Kerala and parity with other MSOs. receiving the highest
benefits above 35% of MRP and also pay compensation of Rs 200
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
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crores demanded by ADNPL on SIPL; and

(vi) Pass any other order as it may deem fit.”

6.1 The CCI, after considering the Information and

materials available on record, noted the thrust of the allegations

that SIPL offered additional discounts to select MSOs and KCCL,

ADNPL’s main competitor in Kerala. SIPL had placed MSOs like

ADNPL at a huge disadvantage, which is detrimental to the

competition and competitors in the market. Such conduct of the

SIPL, which is the dominant player, would be violative of the

provisions of Section 4 of the Competition Act, which also

amounts to imposition of unfair and discriminatory prices and

denial of market access to the Informant, besides distorting the

level playing field in the marketplace and hindering the ability of

the players to compete in an effective manner.

6.2 The CCI also observed that apparently KCCL was getting

the channels at about 30% of the MRP, with about 70% discount
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 14

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(special discounts of up to 50% added with a distribution fee of

20%), whereas the maximum permissible discount under the New

Regulatory Framework was capped at 35%. This indirect way of

providing discounts to circumvent the New Regulatory

Framework is by way of promotion and advertising payments to

KCCL through high-value advertising deals.

6.3 The result of SIPL providing channels to KCCL at a

discounted price was that Informant was constrained to price its

channels higher than those of KCCL, ultimately losing its

consumers, with a corresponding gain to KCCL. The Informant

had to offer services at a loss-making price to retain the subscriber

base, but in vain. ADNPL’s subscriber base fell from 14.5 lakhs in

April 2019 to 11.76 lakhs in September 2021, while the subscriber

base of KCCL went up from 21.3 lakhs in April 2019 to 29.35 lakhs

in September 2021.

6.4 The CCI, therefore, directed the Director General (DG) to
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and 29768 OF 2022 15

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cause an investigation to be made into the matter and submit a

report within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the

Order.

Writ Petitions before the Bombay High Court:

7. Asianet Star Communications Private Limited, Disney

Broadcasting (I) Private Limited, and Star India Private Limited

filed W.P.(C) Nos. 3755, 3845 and 3860 of 2022, respectively, before

the Bombay High Court, challenging the Order dated 28.02.2022

passed by the Competition Commission of India.

7.1 The Bombay High Court vide Interim Order dated

06.04.2022 directed all three petitioners to furnish to the Director

General such documentary material and information as he had

called for or in response to his queries on a without-prejudice and

no-equities basis. However, an interim direction was issued to the

CCI not to pass any further orders or to adjudicate further on the

complaint filed by the ADNPL until further orders of the Court.
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and 29768 OF 2022 16

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The CCI was also directed not to permit or direct any coercive

actions against the petitioners until the next date. The

information collected by the Director General was to be kept

confidential as specifically required by law. The information and

documents supplied to the Director General by the petitioners

were not to be shared or used by the ADNPL in any manner.

7.2 These writ petitions were finally disposed of by the

Bombay High Court vide judgment dated 16.09.2022, having found

that no part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial

jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. The petitioners therein

were granted liberty to file appropriate proceedings against the

impugned order passed by the CCI before the appropriate Forum

having territorial jurisdiction.

Present writ petitions:

8. Thus, after the Bombay High Court disposed of the writ

petitions, the present writ petitions came to be filed before this
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and 29768 OF 2022 17

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Court. This Court vide Interim Order dated 06.10.2022 passed an

identical order as that of the Bombay High Court dated 06.04.2022.

Submissions:

On behalf of the Petitioners:

9. Mr Maninder Singh (Sr) and Mr Santhosh Mathew (Sr),

learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms Sneha Jain, learned

Counsel, have broadly made the following submissions. The sum

and substance of the allegations in the Information filed by the

ADNPL before the CCI is violation/non-compliance of the TRAI

Regulations by the SIPL, which is evident from paragraphs 8.11(b),

9.4, and 10.1 of the Information.

9.1 The Parliament has provided a specific Sectoral

Regulator, i.e., TRAI, under the TRAI Act, regulating broadcasting

activities/services. This Sectoral/Special Regulator has been

assigned the duties and responsibilities to regulate ‘broadcasting

services’ and ‘cable services’ as ‘telecommunication services’ since
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2004 in terms of the provisions of the TRAI Act with the

Notification No.39 (S.O. No.44(E)) dated 09.01.2004. As the

allegations of the ADNPL pertain to the violation of the regulatory

framework conceived by the TRAI, any breach of this regulatory

framework can be examined only by the TRAI, as the TRAI is the

sectoral regulator and would have the exclusive jurisdiction over

the subject matter.

9.2 The TRAI Act is a complete Code in itself. The TRAI Act

and Regulations framed thereunder regulate broadcasting

activities/services in all respects, including competition. The

scheme of the TRAI Act includes all measures to be adopted by the

TRAI as the Regulator to deal with any anti-competitive activity

and maintain and encourage healthy competition in the

broadcasting sector. Only one regulator should regulate any

particular activity/industry to avoid any confusion, fight for

supremacy or dispute over jurisdiction. As broadcasting services
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are governed by a special law, i.e., TRAI Act, TRAI, being the

sectoral regulator, should examine the allegations, and no other

Regulator, such as CCI, should entertain the complaint in respect

of the alleged noncompliance/violation of the TRAI Act and the

Regulations framed thereunder.

9.3 It is further submitted that as the TRAI Act covers all

aspects, including competition, and the Competition Act, being

the general law dealing with competition, should not entertain

complaints/Information in respect of the alleged anti-competitive

activities of a market player in broadcasting activity/services.

The special law will prevail over the general competition law

under the Competition Act. Therefore, the CCI ought not to have

entertained the Information and passed the impugned order.

10. The ADNPL itself understood this aspect that any such

allegation/dispute can only be raised before the TRAI/TDSAT and

not before the CCI. In the past, ADNPL had filed petitions raising
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similar issues for redressal before the TDSAT. One such petition

was Broadcasting Petition No.150/2018, in which the TDSAT held

that Asianet was not similarly placed as KCCL. This order was not

disclosed by the ADNPL in its Information filed before the CCI.

This Order passed by the TDSAT would have rendered the ADNPL’s

Information to the CCI unsustainable at the threshold. The

learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the past conduct of

the ADNPL would act as an estoppel against it for approaching the

CCI with the present complaint. The ADNPL had obtained

forbearance from TRAI and had obtained orders for

confidentiality of commercial agreements from this Court.

10.1 The ADNPL had challenged the requirement of

disclosure of commercial agreements before this Court in W.P.(C)

No.428/2020, wherein the Telecommunication (Broadcasting and

Cable) Services Register of Interconnection Agreements

Regulations 2019 were challenged, so far as they required the
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distributors of signals of television channels to disclose the

information regarding agreements with regard to

placement/marketing and any other technical or commercial

activities.

10.2 This Court vide judgment dated 12.07.2021 in the

aforesaid writ petition quashed the Regulation so far as they

required a disclosure of the placement and marketing agreements

bilaterally entered into between the broadcasters and the

distributors. The submission is that the Information filed by the

ADNPL before the CCI has sought disclosure of SIPL’s marketing

agreements. Once the ADNPL itself obtained the order from the

Court against the disclosure of marketing /placement

agreements, the ADNPL is estopped from seeking the same

disclosure from the petitioner before the CCI.

11. It is further submitted that the commercial/ marketing

agreements after interconnection had been covered by the TRAI
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in its Regulations (registration of agreements). The ADNPL had

themselves requested the TRAI for forbearance on placement

agreements and other marketing agreements. In fact, they had

challenged the stipulation for registration of placement

agreements and commercial agreements by the TRAI in its

Regulations by filing W.P.(C) No.428/2020 before this Court.

11.1 Therefore, it would not be proper to say that the TRAI

would not have jurisdiction to regulate commercial agreements

post-interconnection, and only forbearance is being observed by

the TRAI, at present. Forbearance would mean that the

Regulatory Authority would have jurisdiction, but the issue is

being continuously monitored. Section 11(1)(b)(iv) provides for

regulating and forbearing the arrangements among service

providers, which is an overriding power of the TRAI. The TRAI

generally gives freedom to the parties to enter into commercial

agreements on their own, and it is in the event of failure that the
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TRAI exercises its regulatory powers. In the event of

interconnections, the TRAI need not extend the commercial

freedom to the parties at the threshold and can regulate

interconnection from the very beginning. The submission is that,

after seeking forbearance from the TRAI over placement

arrangements and commercial agreements, it would not be

permissible for the ADNPL to contend that the TRAI would not

have jurisdiction after interconnection.

11.2 Grant of forbearance is an integral part of the regulatory

regime exercised by the TRAI, and it constitutes the continuing

pendency of that issue before the TRAI. Whenever the Regulatory

Authority deems it appropriate to intervene, the state of

forbearance would be withdrawn with the insistence on

compliance with the regulatory stipulations imposed by the TRAI.

As the TRAI is observing forbearance, the issue is pending for

monitoring, and the TRAI may intervene in future to remove the
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state of forbearance.

11.3 The TRAI, in paragraph 18 of its Explanatory

Memorandum to the 2017 Regulations, stipulated that TRAI, being

a Sectoral Regulator of broadcasting services and cable services,

had been entrusted with the task of ensuring a level playing field

and fair competition in the sector and also ensuring that the

interest of consumers and service providers are protected.

Therefore, the TRAI had the power to look at all issues affecting

competition in the market and to craft remedies for the same on

an ex-ante basis.

11.4 The submission is that the TRAI Act, being a Self-

Contained Code in the subject of telecom/broadcasting, and it

being a subject of broadcasting, it covers every aspect of

competition as well. The Competition Act in respect of the

broadcasting service has become the general law on competition.

The TRAI, being a Sectoral Regulator of broadcasting services and
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cable services, is entrusted with the task of ensuring a level

playing field and fair competition in the sector to ensure that the

interests of the consumers and the service providers are

protected.

11.5 The learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that

in view of the judgment in Competition Commission of India v.

Bharti Airtel Limited1, CCI would have sequential jurisdiction

where there was a cartelisation. If there is no allegation of

cartelisation, the CCI would not possess any jurisdiction at all. It

is further submitted that the jurisdiction issue has to be decided

at the threshold. The CCI ought to have decided whether it had

the jurisdiction to proceed with the complaint or not, as per the

provisions of Section 21A of the Competition Act. To decide the

existence or absence of jurisdiction of any authority at the

threshold, issuance of notice by the CCI to the parties against

1
(2019) 2 SCC 521
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whom the Information has been filed is required. In the present

case, no notice has been issued, and the CCI ex parte has directed

the Director General to conduct the investigation and submit the

report and, without issuing notice, decide the issue of jurisdiction.

As jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter, without issuing

notice and giving a hearing to the petitioner, passing an order for

investigation is an exercise in nullity and in violation of the

principles of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned order is

unsustainable and is liable to be set aside.

Asianet Digital Network Private Limited’s:

12. Mr Ritin Rai, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr

Tarun Donadi, learned Counsel, appearing for the ADNPL, in

response to the submissions advanced by Mr Maninder Singh,

learned Senior Counsel, has submitted that the ADNPL has

submitted information to the CCI about the SIPL’s abuse of

dominant position and denial of market access to the ADNPL in
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violation of Sections 4(2)(a)(ii) and 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act

by entering into sham marketing agreements with KCCL. These

agreements/arrangements are entered into after interconnection

and are not regulated by the TRAI. The commercial

agreements/arrangements made after interconnection are

outside the jurisdiction of the TRAI. Pursuant to the order of the

CCI, the Director General has completed its investigation and

submitted the report to the CCI, and the CCI will afford a hearing

to the petitioner before it passes any order under Sections 26/27

of the Competition Act. The petitioner may raise the issue of

jurisdiction before the CCI, and the CCI would decide the matter.

12.1 It is further submitted that even otherwise, the subject

matter of Information, i.e., the marketing agreements, would

squarely fall within the jurisdiction of the CCI. The question

which needs to be decided by the CCI is whether the petitioner,

SIPL, has abused its dominant position and indulged in unfair and
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discriminatory conduct by entering into the marketing

arrangements/agreements with the KCCL. The TRAI’s regulatory

scope is limited to ‘interconnection’. A Sectoral Regulator cannot

exercise forbearance over an issue which falls outside its

regulatory regime.

12.2 The present dispute does not involve any question of

sequential jurisdiction. The petitioner had not approached the

TRAI/TDSAT, and even otherwise, it could not have approached

these authorities for the reliefs sought in the Information, which

is predominantly an abuse of the dominant position by the SIPL

and a denial of market access to the ADNPL. The marketing

agreements and placement arrangements are outside the purview

of the TRAI’s regulatory regime. The issue squarely falls within

the jurisdiction of the CCI, and there is no jurisdictional fact

involved for decision by the CCI.

12.3 The submission is that the CCI has the jurisdiction to
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proceed with the investigation regarding the petitioner’s abuse of

the dominant position and denial of market access to ANDPL.

These issues are outside the TRAI’s jurisdiction, and TRAI does not

have the jurisdiction to investigate the allegations in the

Information merely because the matter pertains to the

broadcasting entities. There is no obligation for the CCI to provide

a right of hearing at the stage of Section 26(1), which is a purely

administrative stage. The Order Section 26(1) does not entail any

civil consequences. At the investigation stage, this Court may not

interfere with the matter. Before passing the order under Section

26(1), there is no requirement for notice and hearing. In the

present case, even otherwise, the Director General’s investigation

stands concluded.

12.4 The learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the

judgment in the case of CCI v. SAIL2. In AIDCF v. TRAI3, the

2
(2010) 10 SCC 744
3
(2021) SCC Online Ker 7162
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contention of the AIDCF, another MSO, was that the TRAI would

not have jurisdiction vis-à-vis marketing agreements. However,

that would not mean that the CCI would not have the jurisdiction

to investigate sham marketing agreements entered by the SIPL

with the KCCL in abuse of the dominant market position, which

has the consequence of denial of market access to the ADNPL. The

decision in the AIDCF’s case is that TRAI does not exercise

forbearance over marketing agreements, as marketing

agreements would not fall within TRAI’s regulatory regime, and

the regulatory regime of TRAI is limited to interconnection. The

issue before the CCI is whether the petitioner/SIPL is indulging in

unfair/discriminatory conduct by entering into sham marketing

agreements with KCCL in abuse of its dominant position in

violation of Section 4 of the Competition Act.

12.5 The learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the

judgment of the Supreme Court in Bharti Airtel (supra) is not
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applicable to the facts of the present case. TRAI may have primary

jurisdiction when the dispute relates to a jurisdictional domain of

the TRAI’s regulatory regime. However, in the present case, the

matter relates to the marketing agreements/arrangements which

are outside the jurisdictional regime of the TRAI. Therefore, the

TRAI cannot decide the issue involved in the present case,

inasmuch as there is no jurisdictional issue pertaining to the

interconnection involved in the present case. There is no question

of sequential jurisdiction or overlap of jurisdiction between the

CCI and the TRAI. Further, it would be open to the petitioner to

raise the question of the jurisdiction of the CCI and whether the

CCI is competent to hear and decide on its own jurisdiction.

Reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Aamir Khan

Productions India Private Limited v. Union of India4.

Competition Commission of India’s:

4

2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1226
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13. Mr N Venkataraman, learned Additional Solicitor

General of India, assisted by Mr Jaishankar V Nair, learned Central

Government Counsel, has submitted that this Court had not

interfered with the investigation and the investigation has been

completed by the Director General and the report has been

submitted before the CCI for further adjudication. When the

investigation is complete, the CCI should be allowed to pass an

order as envisaged under Section 26 or Section 27 of the

Competition Act. At this stage, it would not be proper to interfere

with the matter when the investigation is complete.

13.1 From the scheme of the Act, it is evident that the CCI is

empowered and entitled to inquire into any matter which may

contravene the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. The CCI is the

only Regulator constituted by the Parliament, which has the

power to direct investigations to be carried out into matters

violating Section 4 of the CCI Act. The TRAI does not have the
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power to examine a transaction in the context of abuse of

dominant position, which is the power exclusively vested with the

CCI. There is no such power vested with the TRAI under the

provisions of the TRAI Act as provided in Section 19(4) of the Act,

in respect of the transactions pertaining to the abuse of the

dominant position. Therefore, when the allegations are in respect

of the abuse of the dominant position by a market player in the

relevant field, it is the CCI which will have jurisdiction and not the

TRAI, even in respect of the broadcasting and cable services.

13.2 The TRAI, in its regulatory regime and part of its

licensing conditions, may impose certain obligations and

restrictions on parties to ensure a level playing field and fairness

in the market. Any breach of these may certainly invite an action

from the TRAI, being a Sectoral Regulator. However, the TRAI

would have the jurisdiction for initiating an action on a breach of

a licensing condition alone. It could not have jurisdiction in
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respect of the abuse of the dominant position by a market player

in the relevant field. If the petitioner’s contentions are accepted,

then every transaction involving a Sectoral Regulator would be

outside the ambit of inquiry under the Competition Act, even

though such a Sectoral Regulator is not vested with the powers to

examine the transactions from a Competition Law perspective.

The TRAI’s action is limited to the license holder. However, any

investigation by the CCI in a matter involving the abuse of

dominance would be from the perspective of the end consumer

and the wide market impact that such dominance has.

13.3 Further, it is submitted that the CCI in its impugned

order passed under Section 26(1) had, prima facie, found violations

of Sections 4(2)(a)(ii) and 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act.

Therefore, it ordered the investigation by the Director General.

The final order under Section 26(1) would be passed after hearing

the parties and considering the report submitted by the Director
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General to the CCI. The issue raised in the Information is wholly

outside the purview of the regulatory regime of the TRAI.

13.4 Furthermore, it is further submitted that the judgment

of Bharti Airtel (supra) was delivered on the three underlying

facts:

i) Under TRAI’s licensing conditions, each telecom

operator is required to provide a point of interconnection

with other telecom operators.

ii) Reliance Jio’s grievance was that the point of

interconnection was not provided to it by other telecom

operators. It also sought specific performance that TRAI

direct the operators to provide such points of

interconnection.

iii) TRAI/TDSAT was already seized of the matter and held

the jurisdiction to settle the dispute raised by Reliance Jio.

13.5 The Supreme Court did not oust the CCI’s jurisdiction to
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examine transactions from a Competition Law perspective.

However, on the basis of the above three factual aspects, it was

held that the matter may need to be examined by the TRAI first

since it involved interpreting certain areas that would lie within

the TRAI’s exclusive domain, making them jurisdictional issues

and for which the TRAI alone is competent to examine.

13.6 In the present case, the TRAI would not have to resolve

any question first. Even if it is held by the TRAI that the pricing

mechanism adopted by the SIPL would not be violative of any

licensing condition prescribed by the TRAI, it would not render

the proceedings initiated by the CCI invalid. The CCI would retain

its jurisdiction to examine the matter under Section 4, read with

Section 19(4) of the Act, to determine whether there was an abuse

of dominance by the SIPL in the relevant market. The CCI is not

required to examine the regulatory framework of the TRAI or

interpret any licensing conditions. There are no jurisdictional
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requirements that need to be ironed out by the TRAI first.

13.7 The learned Additional Solicitor General of India has

relied on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in WhatsApp Llc v.

Competition Commission of India5, which held that the CCI has the

exclusive jurisdiction to examine the matter through the prism of

Competition Law.

Salient Provisions of the Statutes:

The Competition Act 2002:

14. The object of the Competition Act is to establish a

Commission to prevent practices having an adverse effect on

competition, to promote and sustain competition in markets, to

protect the interest of consumers and ensure freedom of trade

carried on by the participants in markets in India. The relevant

statutory provisions of the Competition Act 2002 are taken note of

hereunder:

5

2021 SCC OnLine Del 2308
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14.1 Section 2(c) defines “cartel” as an association of

producers, sellers, distributors, traders or service providers who,

by agreement amongst themselves, limit, control or attempt to

control the production, distribution, sale or price of, or trade in

goods or provision of services.

14.2 Section 2(h) defines “enterprise” to mean a person or a

department of the Government, including units, divisions,

subsidiaries, who or which is, or has been, engaged in any

economic activity, relating to the production, storage, supply,

distribution, acquisition or control of articles or goods, or the

provision of services, of any kind, or in investment, or in the

business of acquiring, holding, underwriting or dealing with

shares, debentures or other securities of any other body

corporate, either directly or through one or more of its units or

divisions or subsidiaries, but does not include any activity of the

Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the
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Government including all activities carried on by the departments

of the Central Government dealing with atomic energy, currency,

defence and space;

Explanation: For the purposes of this clause,

(a) “activity” includes profession or occupation.

(b) “article” includes a new article, and “service” includes a

new service.

(c) “unit” or “division”, in relation to an enterprise,

includes–

(i) a plant or factory established for the production,

storage, supply, distribution, acquisition or control of any

article or goods.

(ii) any branch or office established for the provision of

any service.

Enterprise means a Government department engaged in

any activity related to the various Government activities.
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The only exception is the government activities relating to

sovereign functions, including atomic energy, currency,

defence, and space.

14.3 Section 2(r) defines “relevant market” to mean the

market which may be determined by the Commission with

reference to the relevant product market or the relevant

geographic market, or with reference to both the markets.

15. Chapter II of the Competition Act deals with the

prohibition of anti-competitive agreements regarding

production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of

goods or provision of services, which may have an appreciable

adverse effect on competition within India. This provision is also

against the formation of a cartel engaged in identical or similar

trade of goods or provision of services, which directly or

indirectly determines the purchase or sale price.

15.1 Sub-section (5) of Section 3 provides an exemption for
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protection from infringement of intellectual property holders in

the context of anti-competitive agreements under Section 3. It is

designed to restrain any infringement of reasonable conditions

for protecting any rights under the Copyright Act, Patents Act,

Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, etc, may be prescribed in

agreement, and such an agreement shall be outside the purview

of the anti-competitive agreements as defined in Section 3.

15.2 The anti-competitive agreements entered into in

contravention of the provisions shall be void. Section 3 also

specifies certain activities which shall be presumed to have an

appreciable effect on competition. It specifies certain agreements

which shall be in contravention of sub-section (1) of Section 3 if

such an agreement causes an appreciable adverse effect on

competition.

16. Section 4 prohibits abuse of dominant position by an

enterprise or group. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 casts an
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obligation on every enterprise or group not to abuse its dominant

position. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 lists certain

activities/circumstances that would constitute abuse of dominant

position by an enterprise or group. If an enterprise or group

directly or indirectly imposes an unfair or discriminatory price on

the purchase or sale (including a predatory price) of goods or

services, then it amounts to an abuse of the dominant position

under Section 4(2)(a)(ii) of the Competition Act.

16.1 If an enterprise or group indulges in practice or

practices resulting in the denial of market access in any manner,

then it would amount to an abuse of dominant position under

Section 4(2)(c). Explanation to Section 4 defines “dominant position”

to mean a position of strength, enjoyed by an enterprise, in the

relevant market, in India, which enables it to —

(i) operate independently of competitive forces

prevailing in the relevant market; or
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(ii) affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant

market in its favour;

17. The Duties, Powers and Functions of the Competition

Commission are defined under Chapter IV of the Competition Act.

The Act casts a duty on the Commission to eliminate practices

having an adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain

competition, to protect the interests of consumers and ensure

freedom of trade carried on by other participants in markets in

India.

18. Under Section 19 of the Competition Act, the

Competition Commission is entitled to inquire into any

contravention of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of

Section 3 or sub-section (1) of Section 4 either on its own motion

or on receipt of a complaint from any person, consumer or their

association or trade association or on a reference made to it by the

Central Government or a State Government or a statutory
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authority raising violation of both provisions.

18.1 Section 19(4) lists thirteen criteria and parameters to

which the Competition Commission of India is mandated to give

due regard when determining whether an enterprise enjoys a

dominant position or whether a market constitutes a relevant

market.

19. Section 20 empowers the Commission, on its own

knowledge or information relating to acquisition as referred to in

Section 5(a) and (b) or merger or amalgamation referred to in

clause (c) to determine whether such combination has caused or

is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in

India. It lays down the limitation of time for initiation of inquiry

under Section 20 as one year from the date on which the

combination has taken effect as a result of acquisition, merger or

amalgamation, etc, when such inquiry is conducted by the

Commission upon its own knowledge or information.
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19.1 Sub-section (4) of Section 20 lays down the factors which

the Commission should take into consideration to determine

whether the combination has an appreciable adverse effect on the

competition in the relevant market or not.

20. Section 21 and 21A provide for reference to be made by

the Statutory Authority and reference by the Competition

Commission, respectively. Under Section 21, if a Statutory

Authority is entrusted with the responsibility of regulating any

goods or service or market and concludes that the decision taken

by such Statutory Authority would be contrary to the provisions

of the Competition Act, then the Statutory Authority shall be

bound to refer to the Commission. The Commission, after hearing

the parties to the proceedings, shall give the Statutory Authority

its opinion, and thereafter the Statutory Authority shall pass its

order.

20.1 Under Section 21A if the Competition Commission
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during the course of the proceedings forms an opinion on a issue

raised by any party that a decision taken by the Commission

during such proceedings or the decision which is proposed to be

taken would be contrary to any provision of the Act whose

implementation is entrusted to a Statutory Authority, then the

Commission may make a reference in respect of such issue to the

Statutory Authority. The Commission may also make a suo motu

reference to the Statutory Authority. On receipt of the reference

by the Competition Commission, the Statutory Authority shall

give its opinion within sixty days of receipt of such a reference,

and the Commission shall consider the opinion of the Statutory

Authority and thereafter give its findings recording reasons

thereof on the issues referred to in the said opinion.

21. Section 26 lays down the procedure to be followed for

conducting the inquiry by the Commission under Section 19. The

CCI is empowered to direct the Director General to cause an
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investigation to be made into the matter if it is of the opinion that

there exists a prima facie case. The Director General is required to

submit a report under sub-section (3) of Section 26, based on

which the Competition Commission can either close the matter

forthwith or order further investigation and pass orders under

Section 27.

21.1 Sections 26(5) to 26(8) provide opportunities to parties

to file objections and be heard before any order is passed that may

prejudice a right of a party.

22. Section 27 lays down the orders which may be passed by

the Commission after inquiry if it finds that any agreement

referred to in Section 3 or action of an enterprise in a dominant

position is in contravention of Section 3 or Section 4, which would

include a direction to the enterprise to discontinue such abuse of

dominant position and inter alia impose penalty.

23. Section 28 empowers the CCI to order the division of an
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enterprise enjoying a dominant position.

24. Section 60 provides that the provisions of the

Competition Act will have an effect, notwithstanding anything

inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time

being in force.

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) Act 1997:

25. The object of the TRAI Act is to provide for the

establishment of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and

the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal to

regulate the telecommunication services, adjudicate disputes,

dispose of appeals and to protect the interests of service providers

and consumers of the telecom sector as well as to promote and

ensure orderly growth of the telecom sector.

25.1 The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the TRAI Act of

1997 would disclose that the Act has been amended to bring the

quality of telecom services to world standards, to provide a wide
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range of services to meet the customers’ demand at reasonable

price, and participation of the companies registered in India in the

area of basic as well as value added telecom services and making

arrangements/provisions for protection and promotion of

consumer interest and ensuring fair competition, for which a

Regulator (TRAI) has been established to regulate the telecom

services and infrastructure for orderly and healthy growth apart

from protection of the consumer interest.

26. Section 2 is the definition clause. Clause (k) of sub-

section (1) of Section 2 defines “telecommunication service” to mean

service of any description (including electronic mail, voice mail,

data services, audio tax services, video tax services, radio paging

and cellular mobile telephone services) which is made available to

users by means of any transmission or reception of signs, signals,

writing, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature, by wire,

radio, visual or other electro-magnetic means but shall not
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include broadcasting services. Provided that the Central

Government may notify other services to be telecommunication

services, including broadcasting services.

27. Section 3 of the TRAI Act is in respect of the

establishment and incorporation of the Authority, i.e., the

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India. The powers and functions

of the Authority are prescribed in Chapter III of the TRAI Act in

Sections 11 to 13. Section 11 defines the functions of the

Authority, which would include making recommendations either

suo motu or on a request from a licensor on various aspects as

provided in sub-clauses (i) to (viii) of Clause (a) of Section 11.

27.1 Clause (b) mandates the Authority to discharge the

enumerated functions, which inter alia are (i) ensure compliance

of the terms and conditions of the licence; (ii) notwithstanding

anything contained in the terms and conditions of the licence

granted before the commencement of the Telecom Regulatory
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Authority of India (Amendment) Act, 2000 (2 of 2000), fix the

terms and conditions of inter-connectivity between the service

providers; (iii) ensure technical compatibility and effective inter-

connection between different service providers; (iv) regulate

arrangement amongst service providers of sharing their revenue

derived from providing telecommunication services; (v) lay-down

the standards of quality of service to be provided by the service

providers and ensure the quality of service and conduct the

periodical survey of such service provided by the service

providers so as to protect interest of the consumers of

telecommunication service; (vi) lay-down and ensure the time

period for providing local and long distance circuits of

telecommunication between different service providers; (vii)

maintain register of inter-connect agreements and of all such

other matters as may be provided in the regulations; (viii) keep

register maintained under clause (vii) open for inspection to any
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member of public on payment of such fee and compliance of such

other requirement as may be provided in the regulations; (ix)

ensure effective compliance of universal service obligations;

27.2 The Authority is also mandated to perform such other

functions, including such administrative and financial functions

as may be entrusted to it by the Central Government or as may be

necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act.

28. Section 12 defines the powers of the Authority to call for

information and conduct investigations, etc. The Authority is

empowered to direct a service provider to furnish in writing such

information or explanation relating to its affairs as the Authority

may require or appoint one or more persons to make an inquiry

in relation to the affairs of any service provider and inspect the

books of accounts or other documents of any such service

provider. Sub-section (4) of Section 12 empowers the Authority to

issue such directions to service providers as may be considered
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necessary for proper functioning by the service providers.

29. Section 13 empowers the Telecom Authority to issue

such directions to the service provider from time to time for the

discharge of its functions as described under sub-section (1) of

Section 11, as may be considered necessary.

30. Chapter IV is in respect of the establishment of the

Appellate Tribunal. Section 14 of the said Chapter provides for the

establishment of the Appellate Tribunal for the adjudication of the

dispute between a licensor and a licensee, between two or more

service providers, or between a service provider and a group of

consumers. However, the Appellate Tribunal does not have the

power to inquire into the monopolistic trade practices, restrictive

trade practices and unfair trade practices which were the subject

matter of the erstwhile Monopolies and Restrictive Trade

Practices Commission established under the provisions of the

MRTP Act 1969. The procedure and powers of the Appellate
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Tribunal are defined in Section 16 of the TRAI Act. Against an

order or decision of the Appellate Tribunal, an appeal lies to the

Supreme Court under Section 18 of the TRAI Act.

31. Section 19 provides that the orders passed by the

Appellate Tribunal are executable as a decree. Section 20 is the

penal provision for willful failure to comply with the orders of the

Appellate Tribunal, which provides that in case of willful failure

to comply with the orders of the Appellate Tribunal, the person

will be punishable with a fine which may extend to one lakh

rupees and in case of a second or subsequent offence with fine

which may extend to two lakh rupees and in the case of continuing

contravention with additional fine which may extend to two lakh

rupees for every day during which such default continues.

32. Section 25 empowers the Central Government to issue

directions to the Authority as it may think necessary in the

interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the
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State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency

or morality. Section 29 prescribes the penalty for contravention

of the directions issued by the Authority. Section 30 is in respect

of the offences by Companies. Section 35 is the rule-making power

of the Central Government for carrying out the purposes of the

Act. Section 36 is the regulation-making power of the Authority.

Section 38 provides that the provisions of the TRAI Act shall be in

addition to the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 and

the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act 1933.

Key Legal Developments:

MTNL v. Telecom Regulatory Authority Of Delhi6

33. The Delhi High Court, in this judgment, held that the

power under Section 11(1)(d)(iv) of the TRAI Act to regulate and

forbear the arrangement(s) amongst service providers is an

overriding power. The TRAI generally gives freedom to the

6
AIR 2000 Delhi 208
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parties to enter into commercial agreements on their own, and in

the event of interconnection, the TRAI need not extend the

commercial freedom to the parties at the threshold and can

regulate interconnection from the very beginning. Paragraphs 47

and 48 are extracted hereunder:

46. Thus, it is clear that the Authority itself understood that its own
function under Section 11(1)(d) was only to intervene in the event
of the service providers not being able to arrive at an arrangement.

It is clear that an arrangement does not necessarily imply an
agreement. However, these are matters in which the service
provider must be first given an opportunity to arrive at an
arrangement amongst themselves. The question of regulation would
only arise if the service providers are not able to arrive at an
arrangement. The Authority may lay down guidelines regarding
those arrangement, provided the guidelines are not contrary to the
terms of a license or a policy decision taken by the Government.

47. Section 14 is also relevant. One of the matters on which a dispute
could be adjudicated upon by the Authority is revenue sharing
arrangement between service providers. If the Authority had
powers to issue regulations which were binding on service providers
and/or upon the Central Government then everybody would be
bound to follow those regulations. If such a regulation could be
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issued in the absence of any arrangement, then there may be no
arrangement. In that case, there would be no question of
adjudicating dispute on a matter relating to “revenue sharing
arrangement”. To be noted that the adjudication is not in respect of
revenue sharing between service provider. The adjudication is in
respect of “revenue sharing arrangements” between the service
providers.”

Aamir Khan Productions Private Limited vs Union Of India7

34. The Bombay High Court in this case held that the

question whether the Competition Commission has jurisdiction to

initiate the proceedings is a mixed question of law and fact which

the Competition Commission is competent to decide, especially

when the matter is at the stage of further inquiry. The

Commission has not taken a decision in the matter, and there is

no reason to believe that the Competition Commission will not

consider the contentions sought to be raised by the petitioners.

Paragraphs 14 to 19 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder:

“14. It is vehemently contended on behalf of the petitioners that

7
2010 SCC Online Bombay 1226
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issuance of notices by the Competition Commission proceeds on
the basis of incorrect assumption of certain facts and issues. It is,
therefore, necessary to discuss the power of the Commission to
determine jurisdictional facts. It is true that the jurisdictional fact
is a fact which must exist before a Court, Tribunal or an Authority
assumes jurisdiction to decide a particular matter.
In Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi, AIR 1959 SC
492 (para 17), the Apex Court quoted with approval the following
observations of Lord Esher M.R., in the Queen v Commissioner for
Special Purposes of the Income-tax, (1888) 21 QBD 313, 319 :

“When an inferior Court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power
of deciding facts is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to
consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that,
if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it
proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but
not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state
of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what
they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without
jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The
legislature may intrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes
the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as
well as the jurisdiction on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do
something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body
with limited jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal
from their decision, or there will UPA 20 wp358-10 be none. In the second of
two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say
that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding
certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to
determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on
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which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given
jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal
from such exercise of their jurisdiction.”

The Apex Court then stated as under :

“These observations which relate to inferior Courts or tribunals with limited
jurisdiction show that there are two classes of cases dealing with the power of
such a tribunal (1) where the legislature entrusts a tribunal with the
jurisdiction including the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary
state of facts on which the exercise of its jurisdiction depends exists and (2)
where the legislature confers jurisdiction on such tribunals to proceed in a case
where a certain state of facts exists or is shown to exist. The difference is that
in the former case the tribunal has power to determine the facts giving it
jurisdiction and in the latter case it has only to see that a certain state of facts
exists.”

Whatever may be the debate about the scope of review by the Writ Court
of the decision of a Tribunal on a jurisdictional fact, every Tribunal has
the jurisdiction to determine the existence or otherwise of the
jurisdictional fact, unless the statute establishing the Tribunal provides
otherwise.

On a bare reading of the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002, it is
clear that the Competition Commission has the jurisdiction to determine
whether the preliminary state of facts (on which the further exercise of
its jurisdiction depends) exists. There is nothing in the UPA 21 wp358-10
Competition Act, 2002 to indicate that the Competition Commission is
not invested with the jurisdiction to determine such jurisdictional fact.

15. The question whether the Competition Commission has jurisdiction
to initiate the proceedings in the fact situation of these cases is a mixed
question of law and fact which the Competition Commission is
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competent to decide. The matter is still at the stage of further inquiry.
The Commission is yet to take a decision in the matter. There is no
reason to believe that the Competition Commission will not consider all
the contentions sought to be raised by the petitioners in these petitions
including the contention based on sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the
Competition Act.

16. The submission of the respondents that the Writ Court would not
entertain a petition challenging a show cause notice, is sought to be
countered on behalf of the petitioners by relying on the decision in
Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd, (supra).

The contention which appealed to the Apex Court in the above case was
the following:-

“26. Mr. Sastri next pointed out that at the stage when the Income Tax Officer issued
the notices he was not acting judicially or quasi-judicially and so a writ of certiorari or
prohibition cannot issue. It is well settled however that though the writ of prohibition
or certiorari will not issue against an executive authority, the High Courts have power
to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without
jurisdiction. Where UPA 22 wp358-10 such action of an executive authority acting
without jurisdiction subjects or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and
unnecessary harassment, the High Courts, it is well settled, will issue appropriate
orders or directions to prevent such consequences.”

(emphasis supplied)

17. In the facts of the instant case, it cannot be said that requiring the
petitioners to appear before the Competition Commission will subject
the petitioners to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment.
Sections 8 and 9 of the Competition Act provides that the Commission
shall consist of a Chairperson and two to six Members having special
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knowledge of, and professional experience of at least fifteen years in
international trade, economics, business, commerce, law, finance,
accountancy, management, industry, public affairs or competition
matters, including competition law and policy. The Chairperson and
Members of the Commission are to be appointed by the Central
Government from a panel of persons recommended by a Selection
Committee headed by the Chief Justice of India or his nominee.
In case the final decision of the Competition Commission is adverse
to the petitioners, the petitioners will have right to challenge the
same in an appeal before the Competition Appellate Tribunal
established under Section 53A of the Competition Act and the said
Appellate Tribunal is headed by a former Judge of the Supreme Court
of India. It, therefore, appears to us that the decision of the Apex
Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. (supra), in which the challenge
was to the show cause notice issued by an Income Tax Officer for re-
assessment, cannot be UPA 23 wp358-10 applied to a case where a
show cause notice has been issued by the Competition Commissioner
under the Competition Act. Against the decision of the Commission
an appeal would lie before the Appellate Tribunal headed by a sitting
or a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India or a Chief Justice of
a High Court as provided in Section 53D of the Competition Act. Sub-
section (2) of Section 53D of the Competition Act also provides that
Members of the Appellate Tribunal shall be persons of ability,
integrity and standing having special knowledge of and professional
experience of at least twenty-five years in competition matters,
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including competition law and policy, international trade,
economics, business, commerce, law, finance, accountancy,
management, industry, public affairs, administration. As provided in
Section 53E of the Competition Act, the Chairperson and Members of
the Appellate Tribunal are appointed by the Central Government
from a panel of names recommended by a Selection Committee
consisting of the Chief Justice of India or his nominee as the
Chairperson, and the Secretary in the Ministry of Corporate Affairs
and the Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice as the Members
of the selection committee.

18. The contention that the Competition Commission has already pre-
judged the issue also cannot be accepted. Under sub- section (1) of
Section 26, the Commission directed an investigation by Director
General into the complaint of FICCI-Multiplex Owners’ Association.
Under sub-section (3) thereof, the Director General submitted a
report of his findings that there is contravention of Section 3(3) of the
Act and under sub-section (4), the Commission forwarded a copy of
the report to the petitioners. After consideration of the petitioners’
objections, the Commission has formed an opinion under UPA 24
wp358-10 sub-section (8) that further inquiry is called for. Hence all
that the Commission is doing is to hold an inquiry into such
contravention as reported by the Director General. All the authorities
including disciplinary authority in service matters initiate
departmental inquiries upon receiving preliminary inquiry report of
subordinate officer indicating misconduct having been committed,
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but once the inquiry is held by observing the applicable statutory
provisions and the principles of natural justice, the concerned
disciplinary authority takes a final decision in the matter in
accordance with law. Hence, mere issuance of a show cause notice
under Section 26(8)/ Section 27, like issuance of a charge-sheet in a
departmental inquiry, cannot be treated as pre-judging the issue,
merely because the petitioners had raised some of the legal
contentions in the replies to the notice issued by the Director General
of Investigation and thereafter also the Commission has issued show
cause notices. That can never mean that the Competition Commission
will not consider the petitioners’ objections against maintainability
of the proceedings.

19. Since we are inclined to dismiss the petitions only on the ground
that the petitions challenge show cause notices and that it is open to
the petitioners to raise all available contentions, including
preliminary objection against legality or otherwise of initiation of the
proceedings against the petitioners, we do not express any opinion
on merits of controversy between the parties and, therefore, we do
not think it fit to deal with those contentions on merits, as we do not
wish to express any opinion either way even on the merits of the
preliminary objections raised by the petitioners about jurisdiction of
the Tribunal to initiate the proceedings against the petitioners. All
contentions are kept open.”

Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India
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Limited8.

35. The judgment deals extensively with the nature and

scope of the orders passed under Section 26 of the Competition

Act. The Supreme Court held that when information is received,

the Commission is expected to satisfy itself and express its opinion

that a prima facie case exists, from the record produced before it

and then pass a direction to the Director General to cause an

investigation to be made into the matter. Section 19 does not

suggest that any notice is required to be given to the informant,

affected party or any other person at that stage. Such parties

cannot claim the right to notice or hearing, but it will always be

open to the Commission to call any “such person” for rendering

assistance or to produce such records as the Commission may

consider appropriate.

35.1 In terms of Section 26(3) when the Director General

8
(2010) 10 SCC 744
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submits the report to the Commission, the Commission is duty

bound to issue notice to the affected parties to reply with regard

to the details of the information and the report submitted by the

Director General and thereafter permit the parties to submit

objections and suggestions to such documents.

35.2 Paragraphs 21 to 23 of the said judgment reads thus:

“21. The informant i.e. the person who wishes to complain to the
Commission constituted under Section 7 of the Act, would make
such information available in writing to the Commission. Of
course, such information could also be received from the Central
Government, the State Government, statutory authority or on its
own knowledge as provided under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act.
When such information is received, the Commission is expected
to satisfy itself and express its opinion that a prima facie case
exists, from the record produced before it and then to pass a
direction to the Director General to cause an investigation to be
made into the matter. This direction, normally, could be issued by
the Commission with or without assistance from other quarters
including experts of eminence. The provisions of Section 19 do
not suggest that any notice is required to be given to the
informant, affected party or any other person at that stage. Such
parties cannot claim the right to notice or hearing but it is always
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open to the Commission to call any “such person”, for rendering
assistance or produce such records, as the Commission may
consider appropriate.

22. The Commission, wherever, is of the opinion that no prima
facie case exists justifying issuance of a direction under Section
26(1)
of the Act, can close the case and send a copy of that order
to the Central Government, the State Government, statutory
authority or the parties concerned in terms of Section 26(2) of the
Act. It may be noticed that this course of action can be adopted by
the Commission in cases of receipt of reference from sources
other than of its own knowledge and without calling for the
report from the Director General.

23. In terms of Section 26(3), the Director General is supposed to
take up the investigation and submit the report in accordance
with law and within the time stated by the Commission in the
directive issued under Section 26(1). After the report is submitted,
there is a requirement and in fact specific duty on the Commission
to issue notice to the affected parties to reply with regard to the
details of the information and the report submitted by the
Director General and thereafter permit the parties to submit
objections and suggestions to such documents.”

35.3 It is further held that the direction under Section 26(1)

of the Competition Act, after formation of a prima facie opinion,
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is an administrative direction to one of its own wings and is

without entering upon any adjudicatory process. Paragraphs 37

to 39 of the said judgment, which are relevant, are extracted

hereunder:

“37. As already noticed, in exercise of its powers, the
Commission is expected to form its opinion as to the existence
of a prima facie case for contravention of certain provisions of
the Act and then pass a direction to the Director General to cause
an investigation into the matter. These proceedings are initiated
by the intimation or reference received by the Commission in
any of the manners specified under Section 19 of the Act. At the
very threshold, the Commission is to exercise its powers in
passing the direction for investigation; or where it finds that
there exists no prima facie case justifying passing of such a
direction to the Director General, it can close the matter and/or
pass such orders as it may deem fit and proper. In other words,
the order passed by the Commission under Section 26(2) is a final
order as it puts an end to the proceedings initiated upon
receiving the information in one of the specified modes. This
order has been specifically made appealable under Section 53-A
of the Act.

38. In contradistinction, the direction under Section 26(1) after
formation of a prima facie opinion is a direction simpliciter to
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cause an investigation into the matter. Issuance of such a
direction, at the face of it, is an administrative direction to one
of its own wings departmentally and is without entering upon
any adjudicatory process. It does not effectively determine any
right or obligation of the parties to the lis. Closure of the case
causes determination of rights and affects a party i.e. the
informant; resultantly, the said party has a right to appeal
against such closure of case under Section 26(2) of the Act. On
the other hand, mere direction for investigation to one of the
wings of the Commission is akin to a departmental proceeding
which does not entail civil consequences for any person,
particularly, in light of the strict confidentiality that is
expected to be maintained by the Commission in terms of
Section 57 of the Act and Regulation 35 of the Regulations.

39. Wherever, in the course of the proceedings before the
Commission, the Commission passes a direction or interim
order which is at the preliminary stage and of preparatory
nature without recording findings which will bind the parties
and where such order will only pave the way for final decision,
it would not make that direction as an order or decision which
affects the rights of the parties and therefore, is not
appealable.”

Amazon Seller Services Private Limited v. Competition Commission
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of India9

36. The Karnataka High Court held that the Order under

Section 26 of the Competition Act is an administrative direction,

and it does not provide issuance of any notice to any party before

or at the time of formation of an opinion by the Commission on

the basis of the information received by the Commission.

36.1 Paragraph 36 of the said judgment is extracted

hereunder:

” 36. Thus, from the above authorities, it is clear that:

An order under Section 26(1) of the Act passed by the
Commission is an ‘administrative direction’ to one of its wings
departmentally and without entering upon any adjudicatory
process; and Section 26(1) of the Act does not mention about
issuance of any notice to any party before or at the time of
formation of an opinion by the Commission on the basis of
information received by it.

WhatsApp LLC v. Competition Commission of India10

9
Judgment
dated 23.07.2021 in W.A. No.562, 563/2021
10
2022 SCC OnLine Del 2582
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37. Paragraph 28 of the Delhi High Court, the Division Bench

outlined the issue, which is the overlapping jurisdiction of the CCI

and the Constitutional Courts and whether CCI should abstain

from exercising its jurisdiction to maintain comity between

decisions of different authorities on the same issue. It was held

that even if the issues considered by the CCI and TRAI are the

same, the approach of the authorities was vastly dissimilar, and

there exists no inviolable rule that the CCI would completely lack

jurisdiction in such a case. Parallel enquiries by two different

authorities in their respective spheres of adjudication are not

uncommon, and a slight overlap between the enquiries does not

mean that one must lead to ouster of the other.

37.1 Paragraphs 30 to 32 of the said judgment are extracted

hereunder:

“30. A reading of the aforesaid paragraphs of the Judgment indicates
that the sole issue therein was a conflict between the jurisdiction of
a sectoral regulator and the market regulator. The Supreme Court
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came to a finding that the matter pertained to the telecom sector,
which was specifically regulated by the TRAI Act. However, it noted
that the jurisdiction of TRAI would not oust that of CCI to deal with
violations of Competition Act and violations thereunder. Moreover,
Paragraph 100 of the Judgment states that in the case therein, the
dispute pertained to how Incumbent Dominant Operators (IDOs) had
not given Points of Interconnect (POIs) as per the license conditions,
and Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd. (RJIL) had specifically approached
TRAI for the settlement of this dispute. TRAI, being the authority
that would mandate the adherence to licensing conditions, was,
therefore, deemed fit to be seized of the matter before the charge of
investigation could be given to the CCI.

31. It is the contention of the Appellants that since the underlying
issues arising before the Apex Court and this Court, and the
investigation that is sought to be conducted by the CCI are common,
this can potentially lead to conflicting opinions. This contention of
the Appellants is not acceptable. It is the case of the Appellants that
while the Apex Court is looking into whether the 2021 Policy is
violative of the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India or not, the investigation by CCI is confined to whether the
2021 Policy is in furtherance of the dominant position occupied by
WhatsApp and institutes anti-competitive practices. The sphere of
operation of both are vastly different. Neither this Court nor the
Supreme Court are analysing the 2021 Policy through the prism of
competition law. The Order dated 24.03.2021 rendered by the CCI
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also notes the same:

“13. In relation to the above mentioned contentions of WhatsApp, the
Commission is of the view that the judgments relied by WhatsApp have no
relevance to the issues arising in the present proceedings and its plea is
misplaced and erroneous. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Bharti Airtel Case has no application to the facts of the present case as the
thrust of the said decision was to maintain ‘comity’ between the sectoral
regulator (i.e. TRAI, in the said case) and the market regulator (i.e. the CCI).
WhatsApp has failed to point out any proceedings on the subject matter which
a sectoral regulator is seized of. Needless to add, the Commission is examining
the policy update from the perspective of competition lens in ascertaining as
to whether such policy updates have any competition concerns which are in
violation of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Further, the Commission is
of the considered view that in a data driven ecosystem, the competition law
needs to examine whether the excessive data collection and the extent to which
such collected data is subsequently put to use or otherwise shared, have anti-
competitive implications, which require anti-trust scrutiny. The reliance of
WhatsApp on Vinod Kumar Gupta and other cases is also misplaced as the
Commission has only observed that breach of the Information Technology Act
does not fall within its purview. However, in digital markets, unreasonable data
collection and sharing thereof, may grant competitive advantage to the
dominant players and may result in exploitative as well as exclusionary effects,
which is a subject matter of examination under competition law. It is trite to
mention that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and not in derogation
of the provisions of any other law, as declared under Section 62 of the Act.”

32. The observation of the learned Single Judge that certain issues that
the CCI is seized of “may substantially be in issue before the Supreme
Court and this Court” does not lead to a conclusion that the Supreme
Court or this Court are adjudicating upon the same issue. Contrary to
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what has been submitted by the Appellants, this observation cannot be
interpreted as a holding that the issues being considered by both the
authorities are the same. Even if the issues are the same, the approach
of the authorities is vastly dissimilar, and there exists no inviolable
rule that the CCI would completely lack jurisdiction in the instant
matter. Parallel inquiries by two different authorities in their
respective spheres of adjudication is not uncommon and a slight
overlap between the inquiries does not mean that one must lead to the
ouster of the other. Therefore, in the absence of any irreconcilable
repugnancy between the jurisdiction of both the authorities, i.e. CCI
and the Constitutional Courts, the CCI has the liberty to proceed ahead
with its investigation under Section 26(1) of the Act.”

Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Limited11

38. The Supreme Court again reiterated that the order

under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act is administrative in

nature. The Commission forms a prima facie opinion while

directing the Director General to carry out the investigation, and

the High Court would not be competent to adjudge the validity of

11
(2019) 2 SCC 521
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such an order on merit. Paragraph 121 of the judgment is

extracted hereunder:

“121. Once we hold that the order under Section 26(1) of the
Competition Act is administrative in nature and further that it
was merely a prima facie opinion directing the Director General
to carry the investigation, the High Court would not be competent
to adjudge the validity of such an order on merits. The
observations of the High Court giving findings on merits,
therefore, may not be appropriate.”

38.1 The Supreme Court further held that the TRAI has been

constituted for the orderly and healthy growth of the

telecommunication infrastructure, apart from the protection of

consumer interest. It is the duty of the TRAI to see the

achievement of the universal service, which should be of world-

standard quality and to ensure that the telecom services are

provided to the customers at a reasonable price. The TRAI is

required to ensure arrangements for the protection and

promotion of consumer interests and ensure fair competition.
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Specific functions which are assigned to TRAI, amongst others,

include ensuring technical compatibility and effective inter-

relationship between different service providers, ensuring

compliance of licence conditions by all service providers, and

settlement of disputes between service providers.

38.2 In the aforesaid case, Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited (for

short, ‘RJIL’), a new entrant in the telecom sector, had raised a

grievance regarding whether the Incumbent Dominant Operators

(for short, ‘IDOs’) had not given Point of Interconnection (POIs) to

RJIL as per the licence conditions, resulting in non-compliance

and failure to ensure inter-se technical compatibility. The RJIL had

approached TRAI for the settlement of the aforesaid dispute,

which had arisen between service providers, i.e., RJIL and IDOs.

The TRAI was seized of the said dispute at that time, and the RJIL

also approached the CCI, alleging an anti-competitive

agreement/cartel having been formed by the IDOs (three major
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telecom operators – Airtel, Vodafone and Idea. The allegation was

that the IDOs had, through anti-competitive agreements/cartels,

limited the provision of services by delaying or denying POIs to

RJIL to block its entry into the market. The CCI took cognisance

of the said complaint (Information) and came to a prima facie

conclusion that a case for investigation was made out and directed

the Director General to cause an investigation in the case.

38.3 The Supreme Court held that the TRAI is an expert

regulatory body governing the telecom sector and the following

issues:

(a) Whether IDOs were under any obligation to provide POIs

during the test period?

(b) As per the letter dated June 21, 2016, from RJIL, when were IDOs

to commence provisioning of POIs to RJIL?

(c) Whether the demand for POIs made by RJIL was reasonable or

not?

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(d) Whether there was any delay/denial at the end of Vodafone in

the provisioning of POIs?

(e) Whether the POIs were to be provided ‘immediately’ and

during ‘test phase’?

(f) Whether IDOs have provided a sufficient number of POIs to RJIL

in conformity with the licence conditions?

These are to be decided by the TRAI in the first instance. These issues

involve jurisdictional aspects. Unless the TRAI finds fault with the IDOs on

the aforesaid aspects, the matter cannot be taken further, even if it is

assumed that the CCI would have the jurisdiction to deal with the

complaint/Information filed before it.

38.4 Paragraphs 103 to 105 of the said judgment are

extracted hereunder:

“103. We are of the opinion that as TRAI is constituted as an
expert regulatory body which specifically governs the telecom
sector, the aforesaid aspects of the disputes are to be decided by
TRAI in the first instance. These are jurisdictional aspects.
Unless TRAI finds fault with the IDOs on the aforesaid aspects,
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the matter cannot be taken further even if we proceed on the
assumption that CCI has the jurisdiction to deal with the
complaints/information filed before it. It needs to be reiterated
that RJIL has approached the DoT in relation to its alleged
grievance of augmentation of POIs which in turn had informed
RJIL vide letter dated 6-9-2016 that the matter related to
interconnectivity between service providers is within the
purview of TRAI. RJIL thereafter approached TRAI; TRAI
intervened and issued show- cause notice dated 27-9-2016; and
post issuance of show-cause notice and directions, TRAI issued
recommendations dated 21-10-2016 on the issue of
interconnection and provisioning of POIs to RJIL. The sectoral
authorities are, therefore, seized of the matter. TRAI, being a
specialised sectoral regulator and also armed with sufficient
power to ensure fair, non-discriminatory and competitive
market in the telecom sector, is better suited to decide the
aforesaid issues. After all, RJIL’s grievance is that
interconnectivity is not provided by the IDOs in terms of the
licences granted to them. The TRAI Act and Regulations framed
thereunder make detailed provisions dealing with intense
obligations of the service providers for providing POIs. These
provisions also deal as to when, how and in what manner POIs
are to be provisioned. They also stipulate the charges to be
realised for POIs that are to be provided to another service
provider. Even the consequences for breach of such obligations
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are mentioned.

104. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court is right
in concluding that till the jurisdictional issues are straightened
and answered by TRAI which would bring on record findings on
the aforesaid aspects, CCI is ill-equipped to proceed in the
matter. Having regard to the aforesaid nature of jurisdiction
conferred upon an expert regulator pertaining to this specific
sector, the High Court is right in concluding that the concepts of
“subscriber”, “test period”, “reasonable demand”, “test phase
and commercial phase rights and obligations”, “reciprocal
obligations of service providers” or “breaches of any contract
and/or practice”, arising out of the TRAI Act and the policy so
declared, are the matters within the jurisdiction of the
Authority/TDSAT under the TRAI Act only. Only when the
jurisdictional facts in the present matter as mentioned in this
judgment particularly in paras 72 and 102 above are determined
by TRAI against the IDOs, the next question would arise as to
whether it was a result of any concerted agreement between the
IDOs and COAI supported the IDOs in that endeavour. It would be
at that stage CCI can go into the question as to whether violation
of the provisions of the TRAI Act amounts to “abuse of
dominance” or “anti-competitive agreements”. That also follows
from the reading of Sections 21 and 21-A of the Competition Act,
as argued by the respondents.

105. The issue can be examined from another angle as well. If CCI
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is allowed to intervene at this juncture, it will have to necessarily
undertake an exercise of returning the findings on the aforesaid
issues/aspects which are mentioned in para 102 above. Not only
TRAI is better equipped as a sectoral regulator to deal with these
jurisdictional aspects, there may be a possibility that the two
authorities, namely, TRAI on the one hand and CCI on the other,
arrive at conflicting views. Such a situation needs to be avoided.
This analysis also leads to the same conclusion, namely, in the
first instance it is TRAI which should decide these jurisdictional
issues, which come within the domain of the TRAI Act as they
not only arise out of the telecom licences granted to the service
providers, the service providers are governed by the TRAI Act
and are supposed to follow various regulations and directions
issued by TRAI itself.”

38.5 The Supreme Court thus held that only when the TRAI

determined the jurisdictional facts against IDOs would the

question arise as to whether it was a result of any concerted

agreement with them. It would be at that stage that the CCI can

go into the question as to whether violation of the provisions of

the TRAI Act amounts to ‘abuse of dominance’ or ‘anti-

competitive agreements’. The Supreme Court also held that the
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TRAI is a sectoral regulator that is better equipped to deal with

the aforesaid jurisdictional aspects.

38.6 The Supreme Court also held that the CCI is empowered

to deal with and decide the following three issues:

(a) where agreements are entered into by certain persons with a

view to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition;

(b) where any enterprise or group of enterprises, which enjoys a

dominant position, abuses the said dominant position; and

(c) regulating the combination of enterprises through mergers or

amalgamations to ensure that such mergers or amalgamations do

not become anti-competitive or abuse the dominant position that

they can attain.

The jurisdiction of the CCI is to eliminate such practices which

have an adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain

competition and to protect the interests of the consumers and

ensure freedom of trade, carried on by other participants in India.
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To this extent, the functions of the CCI are distinct from the

functions of TRAI under the TRAI Act.

38.7 The Supreme Court specifically held that it would be

within the jurisdiction of the CCI to find out whether IDOs were

acting in concert and colluding, thereby forming a cartel to block

or hinder entry of RJIL in the market in violation of Section 3(3)(b)

of the Competition Act. Whether there was an anti-competitive

agreement between the IDOs using the platform of COAI. The CCI

would be required to determine whether the conduct of the

parties was unilateral or collective action based on an

agreement. And such an exercise has to be undertaken by the CCI.

The Supreme Court further held that when the two statutes

operate in different fields and have different purposes, it cannot

be said that there is implied repeal of one by another. The

Competition Act is a special statute which deals with anti-

competition practices/agreements. It is further held that the
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TRAI is not at all equipped to deal with these issues. The TRAI

returns a finding that a particular activity was anti-competitive;

its powers would be limited to the action that can be taken under

the TRAI Act alone. It is only the CCI which is empowered to deal

with the same anti-competitive act from the lens of the

Competition Act.

38.8 Paragraphs 109 to 113 are extracted hereunder:

“109. CCI is specifically entrusted with duties and functions, and
in the process empower as well, to deal with the aforesaid three
kinds of anti-competitive practices. The purpose is to eliminate
such practices which are an adverse effect on the competition, to
promote and sustain competition and to protect the interests of
consumers and ensure freedom of trade carried on by other
participants in India. To this extent, the function that is assigned
to CCI is distinct from the function of TRAI under the TRAI Act.
The learned counsel for the appellants are right in their
submission that CCI is supposed to find out as to whether the IDOs
were acting in concert and colluding, thereby forming a cartel,
with the intention to block or hinder entry of RJIL in the market
in violation of Section 3(3)(b) of the Competition Act. Also,
whether there was an anti-competitive agreement between the
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IDOs, using the platform of COAI. CCI, therefore, is to determine
whether the conduct of the parties was unilateral or it was a
collective action based on an agreement. Agreement between the
parties, if it was there, is pivotal to the issue. Such an exercise has
to be necessarily undertaken by CCI. In Haridas Exports³, this
Court held that where statutes operate in different fields and have
different purposes, it cannot be said that there is an implied
repeal of one by the other. The Competition Act is also a special
statute which deals with anti-competition. It is also to be borne in
mind that if the activity undertaken by some persons is anti-
competitive and offends Section 3 of the Competition Act, the
consequences thereof are provided in the Competition Act.

110. Section 27 empowers CCI to pass certain kinds of orders,
stipulated in the said provision, after inquiry into the agreements
for abuse of dominant position. The following kinds of orders can
be passed by CCI under this provision:

“27. Orders by Commission after inquiry into agreements or abuse of
dominant position. Where after inquiry the Commission finds that any
agreement referred to in Section 3 or action of an enterprise in a dominant
position, is in contravention of Section 3 or Section 4, as the case may be, it
may pass all or any of the following orders, namely-

(a) direct any enterprise or association of enterprises or person or
association of persons, as the case may be, involved in such agreement, or
abuse of dominant position, to discontinue and not to re-enter such
agreement or discontinue such abuse of dominant position, as the case
may be;

(b) impose such penalty, as it may deem fit which shall be not more than
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ten per cent of the average of the turnover for the last three preceding
financial years, upon each of such person or enterprises which are parties
to such agreements or abuse:

Provided that in case any agreement referred to in Section 3 has been
entered into by a cartel, the Commission may impose upon each producer,
seller, distributor, trader or service provider included in that cartel, a
penalty of up to three times of its profit for each year of the continuance
of such agreement or ten per cent of its turnover for each year of the
continuance of such agreement, whichever is higher.

(c) repealed;

(d) direct that the agreements shall stand modified to the extent and in
the manner as may be specified in the order by the Commission;

(e) direct the enterprises concerned to abide by such other orders as the
Commission may pass and comply with the directions, including payment
of costs, if any; repealed;

(g) pass such other order or issue such directions as it may deem fit.

Provided that while passing orders under this section, if the Commission
comes to a finding, that an enterprise in contravention to Section 3 or
Section 4 of the Act is a member of a group as defined in clause (b) of the
Explanation to Section 5 of the Act, and other members of such a group are
also responsible for, or have contributed to, such a contravention, then it
may pass orders, under this section, against such members of the group.”

111. Moreover, it is within the exclusive domain of CCI to find out as
to whether a particular agreement ment will have appreciable
adverse effect on competition within the relevant market in India.
For this purpose, CCI is to take into consideration the provisions
contained in the Competition Act, including Section 29 thereof.
Sections 45 and 46 also authorise CCI to impose penalties in certain
situations.

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112. Obviously, all the aforesaid functions not only come within the
domain of CCI, TRAI is not at all equipped to deal with the same. Even
if TRAI also returns a finding that a particular activity was anti-
competitive, its powers would be limited to the action that can be
taken under the TRAI Act alone. It is only CCI which is empowered
to deal with the same anti-competitive act from the lens of the
Competition Act. If such activities offend the provisions of the
Competition Act as well, the consequences under that Act would also
follow. Therefore, the contention of the IDOs that the jurisdiction of
CCI stands totally ousted cannot be accepted. Insofar as the nuanced
exercise from the standpoint of the Competition Act is concerned,
CCI is the experienced body in conducting competition analysis.
Further, CCI is more likely to opt for structural remedies which
would lead the sector to evolve a point where sufficient new entry
is induced thereby promoting genuine competition. This specific
and important role assigned to CCI cannot be completely wished
away and the “comity” between the sectoral regulator (i.e. TRAI) and
the market regulator (i.e. CCI) is to be maintained.

113. The conclusion of the aforesaid discussion is to give primacy
to the respective objections (sic objectives) of the two regulators
under the two Acts. At the same time, since the matter pertains to
the telecom sector which is specifically regulated by the TRAI Act,
balance is maintained by permitting TRAI in the first instance to
deal with and decide the jurisdictional aspects which can be more
competently handled by it. Once that exercise is done and there are
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findings returned by TRAI which lead to the prima facie conclusion
that the IDOs have indulged in anti-competitive practices, CCI can
be activated to investigate the matter going by the criteria laid
down in
the relevant provisions of the Competition Act and take it
to its logical conclusion. This balanced approach is construing the
two Acts would take care of Section 60 of the Competition Act as
well.”

MRF Limited rep. by its Company Secretary Mr Ravi Mannath v.
Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) rep by Secretary to
Government of India12

39. The Madras High Court held that the power of the CCI to

go into the merits of the Information is within its exclusive

domain as the original adjudicating authority, and the writ Court

is not expected to interfere at the preliminary stage. The CCI,

being a fact-finding authority, shall be left free to find out the

truth of the allegations after conducting a proper inquiry. The

order directing an investigation would not cause any prejudice to

the parties, inasmuch as at this stage, the rights of the parties are

12
2022 SCC OnLine Mad 50
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not affected till the dispute is finally determined. The CCI owes a

public duty to protect the interests of consumers when parties

have formed a cartel to increase the price.

39.1 Paragraphs 19 to 21 are extracted hereunder:

“19. Firstly, the power of the Competition Commission of India (CCI)
to go into the merits of the allegations in the reference as well as the
information is within its domain as the original adjudicating
authority, with which the writ Court is not expected to interfere at
the preliminary stage, because the CCI being the fact finding
authority shall be left free to find out the truth of the allegations
after conducting a proper inquiry. Therefore, the interference at the
stage of investigation would certainly amount to usurping the
original jurisdiction of such authority, unless the interference is so
warranted for want of jurisdiction.

20. Secondly, the impugned order directing a mere investigation will
not cause any prejudice to the parties, as their rights are not affected
or finally determined in the said order.

21. Thirdly, the Competition Commission of India owes a public duty
to protect the interest of the consumers, more particularly, when
there was a serious allegation that the writ petitioner and the
supporting parties forming a cartel, increase the prices of tyres
whenever the price of natural rubber goes up, but when there is a
corresponding reduction in the price of rubber, they did not reduce
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the prices of tyres.”

39.2 It is further held that the order of investigation does not

attract any civil consequences, inasmuch as it does not finally

determine the issue raised against the parties. Paragraph 50 is

extracted hereunder:

50. A close and careful reading of the proviso to Section 27 supports
the arguments of the respondents 2 & 3 that in case any agreement
referred to in section 3 has been entered into by a cartel, the
Commission may impose upon each producer, seller, distributor,
trader or service provider included in that cartel, a penalty of up
to three times of its profit for each year of the continuance of such
agreement or ten percent. of its turnover for each year of the
continuance of such agreement, whichever is higher. Therefore,
the principles of res judicata may not apply, inasmuch as the
expression ‘for each year of the continuance of such agreement’,
the CCI is empowered to investigate the complaint of cartelization,
as it concerns with each year. Moreover, if the CCI taking up the
complaint for the year 2008, finding want of acceptable evidence,
dismissed the complaint for the year 2008, it does not mean that
the same CCI is precluded from entertaining a fresh complaint for
the next year against the same producer or distributor, trader, etc.,
by virtue of Section 27. When the Act permits the CCI to initiate
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action on the complaint of cartelization independently for each
year, the argument of the appellant on the principles of res judicata
cannot be accepted. This issue is also answered against the
appellant, accordingly.”

Samir Agrawal v. Competition Commission of India (CAB
Aggregators case)13

40. The Supreme Court held that under the provisions of the

Competition Act and the 2009 Regulations, “any person” may

provide information to the CCI, which may then act upon it in

accordance with the provisions of the Act. In this regard, the

definition of “person” in Section 2(l) of the Competition Act is an

inclusive definition and is extremely wide, which would include

individuals of all kinds and every artificial juridical person. The

proceedings under the Competition Act are proceedings in rem

which affect the public interest. The CCI may inquire into any

alleged contravention of the provisions of the Act on its own

13
(2021) 3 SCC 136
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motion, as provided under Section 19(1) of the Competition

Act. Section 45 of the Act provides deterrence by providing

information to the CCI mala fide or recklessly false statements and

omissions of material facts are punishable with a penalty.

40.1 Paragraphs 14 to 18 of the said judgment is extracted

hereunder:

“14. A reading of the provisions of the Act and the 2009
Regulations would show that “any person” may provide
information to CCI, which may then act upon it in accordance
with the provisions of the Act. In this regard, the definition of
“person” in Section 2(1) of the Act, set out hereinabove, is an
inclusive one and is extremely wide, including individuals of all
kinds and every artificial juridical person. This may be contrasted
with the definition of “consumer” in Section 2(f) of the Act, which
makes it clear that only persons who buy goods for consideration,
or hire or avail of services for a consideration. are recognised as
consumers.

15. A look at Section 19(1) of the Act would show that the Act
originally provided for the “receipt of a complaint from any
person, consumer or their association, or trade association. This
expression was then substituted with the expression “receipt of
any information in such manner and” by the 2007 Amendment.
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This substitution is not without significance. Whereas, a
complaint could be filed only from a person who was aggrieved by
a particular action, information may be received from any person,
obviously whether such person is or is not personally affected.
This is for the reason that the proceedings under the Act are
proceedings in rem which affect the public interest. That CCI may
inquire into any alleged contravention of the provisions of the Act
on its own motion, is also laid down in Section 19(1) of the Act.
Further, even while exercising suo motu powers, CCI may receive
information from any person and not merely from a person who
is aggrieved by the conduct that is alleged to have occurred. This
also follows from a reading of Section 35 of the Act, in which the
earlier expression “complainant or defendant has been
substituted by the expression, “person or an enterprise”, setting
out that the informant may appear either in person, or through
one or more agents, before CCI to present the information that he
has gathered.

16. Section 45 of the Act is a deterrent against persons who
provide information to CCI, mala fide or recklessly, inasmuch as
false statements and omissions of material facts are punishable
with a penalty which may extend to the hefty amount of rupees
one crore, with CCI being empowered to pass other such orders as
it deems fit. This, and the judicious use of heavy costs being
imposed when the information supplied is either frivolous or
mala fide, can keep in check what is described as the growing
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tendency of persons being “set up” by rivals in the trade.

17. The 2009 Regulations also point in the same direction
inasmuch as Regulation 10, which has been set out hereinabove,
does not require the informant to state how he is personally
aggrieved by the contravention of the Act, but only requires a
statement of facts and details of the alleged contravention to be
set out in the information filed. Also, Regulation 25 shows that
public interest must be foremost in the consideration of CCI
when an application is made to it in writing that a person or
enterprise has substantial interest in the outcome of the
proceedings, and such person may therefore be allowed to take
part in the proceedings. What is also extremely important is
Regulation 35, by which CCI must maintain confidentiality of the
identity of an informant on a request made to it in writing, so
that such informant be free from harassment by persons
involved in contravening the Act.

18. This being the case, it is difficult to agree with the impugned
judgment of NCLAT in its narrow construction of Section 19 of
the Act, which therefore stands set aside.”

All India Digital Cable Federation, represented by its Secretary
General v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India
, represented by
its Secretary14

14
2021 SCC OnLine Ker 7162
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41. The Single Judge of this Court considered the validity of

the Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services

Register of Interconnection Agreements and all such Other

Matters Regulations, 2019 issued by the Telecom Regulatory

Authority of India. Under Section 11(1)(b)(vii) of the TRAI Act, the

TRAI is required to maintain a register of interconnection

agreements and of all such other matters as may be provided in

the Regulations. The TRAI’s access to information and regulation

2005 have been framed by the TRAI, which provides that a service

provider furnishing any Information to the authority under the

TRAI may make or request in writing to keep that information

confidential and in which case, it shall furnish a non-confidential

summary of the portions sought to be kept confidential. However,

the TRAI, if it is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient to

disclose that information in public interest, may reject the request

of the service provider after informing him in writing of the
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reasons for doing so and giving him an opportunity to make a

representation against the same.

41.1 It is further provided in Regulation 6 that the

information covered regarding any of the following categories

shall be exempt from disclosure:

(i) trade and commercial secrets and information protected by

law;

(ii) Commercially and financially sensitive information, the

disclosure of which is likely to cause unfair gain or unfair loss to

the service provider, or to compromise,

in the placement of the channel in the Electronic Program Guide.

41.2 The learned Single Judge held that the requirement in

the Regulation that all placement and marketing agreements have

to be reported to the regulator is not a decision which could have

been taken without considering and addressing the objections of

the MSOs on this point. The power of the TRAI to form an opinion
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that it is necessary or expedient to disclose the information of

public interest, even in respect of commercially and financially

sensitive information, is clearly a total discretion of the authority,

and such discretion is not guided by any criteria or guidelines.

41.3 As the Court found that no proper consultation and

consideration were given to the objections of MSOs, the

Regulation, so far as the required disclosure of the placement

agreements bilaterally entered into between the broadcasters and

the distributors was unsustainable. Paragraphs 54 to 58 are

extracted hereunder:

“54. It is admitted that the placement of the channels in the
Electronic Program Guide is now fully regulated and channels are to
be placed genre wise and language wise as provided by the TRAI.
Therefore, even if it is admitted that a discount given by a
broadcaster to the distributor for placement of a channel would
have a bearing on the rate at which a particular channel is carried
in the network, the requirement by the impugned Regulations that
all placement and marketing agreements also have to be reported to
the regulator is not a decision which could have been taken quite so
lightly without considering and addressing the objections of the
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MSOs on the point. Apart from relying on the access to Information
Regulations 2005 which empowers the TRAI to decide on the nature
of the information that is to be disclosed to the public, no
satisfactory answer is forthcoming with regard to the contention of
the petitioners of the confidentiality of their commercial
information. On the other hand, it is contended that all
placements/marketing/promotional activities and incentive and
claims for placing a channel in a particular slab forms part of the
Reference Interconnect Offer and are therefore not confidential
information. It is stated that the RIO being non-confidential in
nature, all agreements entered into with reference to the said RIO
are also non-confidential as they are based on the RIO published by
the broadcaster/distributor on their website and is available in their
portal. This, to my mind, is an apparent contradiction which vitiates
the decision of the authority.

55. Further, though it is contended that all trade and commercial
secrets and information protected by law and commercially and
financially sensitive information, the disclosure of which is likely to
cause unfair gain or unfair loss to the service provider or to
compromise his competitive position is exempt from disclosure, it is
not clear as to what the criteria are to decide what information that
is so exempt from disclosure. Further, the power of the TRAI under
the Access to Information Regulations also seems to be an absolute
power, in as much as, once the TRAI forms an opinion that it is
necessary or expedient to disclose the information in public
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interest, then, the order passed on the representation filed by the
service provider would be final. What, therefore, follows is that the
protection given by the Regulations from disclosure of commercially
and financially sensitive information is clearly at the total discretion
of the authority and the pleadings placed on record would show that
such discretion is not guided by any specific criteria or guidelines.

56. I also find that the authority has proceeded on the specific
premise that placement agreements are a part of interconnection
and are entered into under the RIO and therefore no further
consideration is required for bringing such placement agreements
within the scope of the Regulations with regard to maintenance of
Registers. This reasoning, according to me, is completely untenable
in view of the fact that specific issue is still pending consideration.
Therefore, even if it is accepted that the power of the TRAI to issue
Regulations is not limited to regulating inter-connection, the
exercise of the power should be strictly in accordance with the
statute. When the statute specifically provides for transparency in
the framing of the Regulations, the specific issues were required to
be put to consultation and the objections raised require a proper
consideration before any Regulations can be effected.

57. Having considered the consultation process supporting the
impugned regulations at considerable depth. I am of the considered
view that apart from stating that certain broadcasters contended
that DPOs are arm-twisting them to enter into exploitative
contracts, no proper consideration of the contention of the different
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stake holders has been undertaken by the authority. The very
question whether placement agreements are part of inter-
connection being still at large, the reasoning of the respondent that
placement agreements being agreements subject to the RIO are
automatically required to be registered cannot be accepted.

58. In the above view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the
impugned Regulations, in so far as they require a disclosure of the
placement agreements bilaterally entered into between the
broadcasters and the distributors are unsustainable. The challenge,
therefore, must succeed to that extent. The impugned regulations,
to the extent that they require registration of placement
agreements/Marketing are, therefore, set aside. There will be no
order as to costs.”

Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) v. Competiton Commisison
of India15
42 The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, after

considering the provisions of the Patent Act 1970 and the

Competition Act 2002, held that the Competition Act is general

legislation pertaining to anti-competitive agreements and abuse

of dominant position generally. It was further held that Chapter

15
Judgment dated 13.07.2023 in LPA 24/2016 and conn. cases
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XVI of the Patents Act is a complete code in itself on all issues

pertaining to unreasonable conditions in the agreements of

licensing of patents, abuse of status as patentee, inquiry in respect

thereof and relief that can be granted.

42.1 Paragraphs 50 to 55 of the said decision are extracted

here under:

“50. In our view, the Competition Act is a general legislation
pertaining to anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant
position generally. The inclusion of Section 84(6)(iv)¹¹ in the Patents
Act
by way of an amendment after the Competition Act was passed
with Section 3(5)(i)(b)2 is particularly instructive of the above
legislative intent as regards anti-competitive agreements.

51. For deciding an application for compulsory licensing, the
Controller is empowered by the Patents Act to consider the
reasonability of conditions imposed in a license agreement. The CCI
is empowered under the Competition Act to examine anti-
competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position. However,
the Competition Act makes provision for reasonable conditions
being imposed in an agreement concerning exercise of rights under
the Patents Act. Since such reasonable conditions are exempted
from examination under section 3(5)(i)(b) of the Competition Act, it
is indicative of the legislature’s intendment as to the exclusive
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domain of the Patents Act regarding reasonable conditions. Similar,
in our view, is the situation with the language of Section 83(f) of the
Patents Act as compared with that of Section 4 of the Competition
Act.

52. In our opinion, Chapter XVI of the Patents Act is a complete code
in itself on all issues pertaining to unreasonable conditions in
agreements of licensing of patents, abuse of status as a patentee,
inquiry in respect thereof and relief that is to be granted therefor.

53. In reconciling the two statutes, the subject matter that is in focus
is not merely anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant
position, which both the Patents Act (in Chapter XVI) and the
Competition Act (in Sections 3 and 4) deal with. The subject matter
that is relevant for this assessment is anti-competitive agreements
and abuse of dominant position by a patentee in exercise of their
rights under the Patents Act.

54. On this issue, there is no scope of doubt beyond the pale of doubt
that the Patents Act is the special statute, and not the Competition
Act
. It is also a fact that Chapter XVI of the Patents Act is a
subsequent legislation as compared to the Competition Act.

55. Therefore, when assessed by the maxim generalia specialibus non
derogant or by the maxim lex posterior derogat priori, the Patents Act
must prevail over the Competition Act on the issue of exercise of
rights by a patentee under the Patents Act. Even assessed by the
rigours of Ashoka Marketing (supra), which require the conflict to
be resolved by reference to the purpose and policy underlying the
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two enactments and the clear intendment conveyed by the language
of the relevant provisions therein, the Patents Act must necessarily
prevail over that of the Competition Act.”

Pharmacy Council of India v. Dr S K Toshniwal Educational Trusts 16

43. The Supreme Court held that the Pharmacy Act 1948 is

a special Act and is a complete code in itself in the field of

Pharmacy. The Pharmacy Act shall prevail over the All India

Council of Technical Education (AICTE) Act 1987. The Supreme

Court held that there is a well-known rule that the subsequent

general Act does not affect a prior special Act by implication. The

maxim “Generalia specialibus non derogant”, i.e., general provisions

will not abrogate the special provisions, is a well-known rule of

interpretation of the Statute. In order to determine whether a

statute is special or general one, the court has to take into

consideration the principal subject matter of the statute and the

particular perspective for the reason that for certain purposes an

16
(2021) 10 SCC 657
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Act may be general and for certain other purposes it may be

special and such a distinction cannot be blurred. It was also held

that the Pharmacy Council of India, being an expert in Pharmacy

and other related subjects, must be given the power to regulate

the field of Pharmacy.

43.1 Paragraphs 14 to 16 and 20 to 22 are extracted

hereunder:

“14. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions and as observed hereinabove, the Pharmacy Act is a special
Act in the field of pharmacy and it is a complete code in itself in the
field of pharmacy, the Pharmacy Act shall prevail over the AICTE Act
which, as observed hereinabove, is a general statute dealing with
technical education/institutions. Therefore, the submission on
behalf of AICTE and/or educational institutions concerned that the
AICTE Act is a subsequent law and in the definition of “technical
education” it includes the “pharmacy” and therefore it can be said
to be an “implied repeal”, cannot be accepted. At his stage, it is
required to be noted that as such in the AICTE Act there is no specific
repeal of the Pharmacy Act, more particularly when, as observed
hereinabove, the Pharmacy Act is a special Act and the subsequent
enactment of the AICTE Act is general and therefore the Pharmacy
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Act being a special Act must prevail. Apart from that, with regard to
several aspects, there is no provision made in the AICTE Act which
are exclusively within the domain of PCI. Thus, it cannot be accepted
that there is “implied repeal” of the Pharmacy Act.

15. Now the next question which is required to be considered is
whether in the field of pharmacy, PCI would have the jurisdiction or
AICTE constituted under the AICTE Act which is held to be a general
law. The constitution and composition of Central Council under the
Pharmacy Council of India is as under:

“3. Constitution and composition of Central Council. The Central Government
shall, as soon as may be, constitute a Central Council consisting of the following
members, namely-

(a) six members, among whom there shall be at least one teacher of each of the
subjects, pharmaceutical chemistry, pharmacy, pharmacology and
pharmacognosy elected by the University Grants Commission from among
persons on the teaching staff of an Indian University affiliated thereto which
grants a degree or diploma in pharmacy; or a college

(b) six members, of whom at least four shall be persons possessing a degree or
diploma in, and practising pharmacy or pharmaceutical chemistry, nominated
by the Central Government;

(c) one member elected from amongst themselves by the members of the Medical
Council of India;

(d) the Director General, Health Services, ex officio or if he is unable to attend
any meeting, a person authorised by him in writing to do so;
(dd) the Drugs Controller, India, ex officio or if he is unable to attend any
meeting, a person authorised by him in writing to do so;

(e) the Director of the Central Drugs Laboratory, ex officio;

(f) a representative of the University Grants Commission and a representative
of the All India Council for Technical Education;

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(g) one member to represent each State elected from amongst themselves by
the members of each State Council, who shall be a registered pharmacist;

(h) one member to represent each State nominated by the State Government,
who shall be a registered pharmacist:”

Therefore, PCI consists of experts in the field of pharmacy and
related subjects connected with the education of pharmacy.
Therefore, under the statute, specialised persons in the field of
pharmaceutical, pharmacy, etc. shall be the members of PCI.
15.1. On the other hand, so far as AICTE is concerned, only one
member would be from the field of pharmacy and that too
representative of PCI. Under the circumstances, PCI is the body of
experts connected with the subject of pharmacy and related subjects
and therefore it will be in the larger interest and more particularly
in the interest of education of pharmacy that PCI shall alone have
the jurisdiction in the field of pharmacy, rather than AICTE.

16. The aforesaid question is also required to be viewed from
another angle. Both, PCI and AICTE are the creature of the statute.
Therefore, it is not at all healthy that the two regulators, both being
Central authorities, can be permitted to fight for supremacy. The
fight of supremacy between both the regulators is unhealthy for the
education sector as well as the institutions to permit two regulators
to function in the same field. Therefore, also and more particularly
when PCI consists of the experts in the field of pharmacy and other
related subjects, it is in the larger interest of the field of pharmacy
that PCI must be given the power to regulate in the field of
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pharmacy.

*** *** ***

20. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, it is held
that in the field of pharmacy education and more particularly so far
as the recognition of degrees and diplomas of pharmacy education
is concerned, the Pharmacy Act, 1948 shall prevail. The norms and
regulations set by PCI and other specified authorities under the
Pharmacy Act would have to be followed by the institutions
concerned imparting education for degrees and diplomas in
pharmacy, including the norms and regulations with respect to
increase and/or decrease in intake capacity of the students and the
decisions of PCI shall only be followed by the institutions imparting
degrees and diplomas in pharmacy. The questions are answered
accordingly.

21. Now the next question which is required to be considered is with
respect to students already admitted pursuant to the orders passed
by this Court and the High Courts concerned. The conflict and the
dispute arose because despite refusal by PCI, AICTE increased the
intake capacity in the respective institutions, which were not
approved by PCI. By the interim orders, this Court and the
respective High Courts have directed to allow those students to
appear in the examinations and to register them as pharmacists.
Such interim orders are also made final. Therefore, the present
decision shall not affect those students admitted in the increased
intake capacity and/or pursuant to the interim orders passed by this
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Court and/or final judgments and orders passed by the respective
High Courts. PCI is therefore directed to give consequential benefit
of registration to such students. However, at the same time, all
pending applications for increase in intake capacity and/or for
recognition and/or approval of course/institutions in pharmacy
shall be as per the provisions of the Pharmacy Act, 1948 and the
regulations, if any, thereunder and as per the norms and regulations
fixed by PCI.

22. It is further directed that the institutions concerned who
increased their intake capacity as approved by AICTE and their
increase in intake capacity was not approved by PCI, shall apply
afresh for increase in intake capacity and/or evening shift for the
next academic year within a period of four weeks from today and
their cases for increase in intake capacity and/or applications for
recognition and/or applications for approval of the course or
evening shift shall be considered by PCI in accordance with the
Pharmacy Act, 1948 and rules and regulations framed therein and
the norms prescribed by PCI.”

All India Council for Technical Education v. Sri Prince Shivaji
Maratha Boarding House’s College of Architecture17

44. The Supreme Court considered the question as to

17
2019 SCC OnLine SC 1445
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whether the mandate of the Council of Architecture (CoA) is that

of the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) would

prevail on the question of granting approval and related to

matters of Institutions for conducting architectural education

courses, if there is any contradiction in the opinion of these two

bodies which are regulatory bodies constituted by the two

parliamentary legislations.

44.1 It was held that Section 10 of the AICTE Act mandates

AICTE to undertake the duties on the subjects specified therein.

AICTE exercises the power to regulate institutions imparting

architectural education to the strength of the definition of

technical education, which has been defined to mean programs of

education, research and training in architecture. The Supreme

Court held in respect of the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the 1987

Act, the definition of “technical education” would have to be given

such a construction and the word “architecture” should be treated
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to have been inapplicable in cases where the AICTE imports its

regulatory framework for institutions undertaking technical

education. Furthermore, so far as recognition of degrees and

diplomas of architecture education is concerned, the 1972 Act

prevails, and AICTE will not be entitled to impose any regulatory

measure in connection with the degrees and diplomas in the

subject of architecture. Norms and Regulations set by CoA and

other specified authorities under the 1972 Act would have to be

followed by an institution imparting education for degrees and

diplomas in architecture.

Discussion:

45. The ADNPL is a Multi-System Operator in the business of

providing digital cable services predominantly in Kerala. It also

operates in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Orissa for

more than 30 years. The SIPL, including its subsidiaries and group

companies, is a broadcaster of satellite-based TV channels in
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India, having multiple channels of different languages and various

genres. ADNPL receives broadcasting signals from SIPL for

monetary consideration, and they have had a business

relationship for more than 22-23 years. In terms of the successive

regulations selected by the TRAI, the broadcasters have to ensure

non-discrimination in pricing and the terms across different

MSOs/distributors. According to the ADNPL, the SIPL has

consistently flouted the principles of non-discrimination and has

offered better terms and prices to its competitors. There have

been several disputes between the parties before the TDSAT in the

past.

45.1 The present dispute has emanated post the introduction

the Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services

Interconnection (Addressable Systems) Regulations 2017 (for

short, ‘Interconnection Regulations 2017’) and the

Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Eighth)
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(Addressable Systems) Tariff Order 2017 (Collectively, New

Regulatory Framework). The SIPL has unsuccessfully challenged

the new regulatory framework up to the Supreme Court. The

Supreme Court, in its judgment in Star India Pvt Ltd v. Department

of Industrial Policy and Promotion18, [Civil Appeal Nos 7326- 7327

of 2018 and 7328 – 7329 of 2018], had upheld the validity of the new

regulatory framework.

45.2 The concept of Maximum Retail Price (MRP) for each

paid channel has been introduced in the new regulatory

framework. Interconnection Regulations 2017 mandate

broadcasters to deal with distributors on a non-discriminatory

basis. Regulation 3(2) of the Interconnection Regulations 2017 is

relevant, which is extracted hereunder:

“Clause 3. General obligations of broadcasters:

(1) ……

(2) Every broadcaster shall, within sixty days of receipt of written
request from a distributor of television channels for obtaining

18
(2019) 2 SCC 104
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signals of television channel or within thirty days of signing of
interconnection agreement with the distributor, as the case may be,
provide, on non-discriminatory basis, the signals of television
channel to the distributor
Provided that imposition of any term or condition by the
broadcaster, which is unreasonable, shall be deemed to constitute a
denial of request:

Provided further that this sub-regulation shall not apply to a
distributor of television channels, who requests signals of a
particular television channel from a broadcaster while at the same
time demands carriage fee for distribution of that television channel
or who is in default of payment to the broadcaster and continues to
be in such default.”

45.3 As mentioned above, the Regulation further capped the

total discount (15% of MRP) and distribution fees (20% of MRP)

payable to distributors at 35% of MRP. Regulation 7(4) of the

Interconnection Regulations 2017 mandates broadcasters to offer

discounts based on fair, transparent, and non-discriminatory

terms to ensure a level playing field for distributors. Regulation

7(4) is extracted hereunder:

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“Clause 7. Publication of reference interconnection offer by
broadcaster for pay channels:

(1) …

(2) …

(3)….

(4) It shall be permissible to a broadcaster to offer discounts on the
maximum retail price of pay channel or bouquet of pay channels, to
distributors of television channels, not exceeding fifteen percent of
the maximum retail price:

Provided that the sum of distribution fee declared by a broadcaster
under sub-regulation (3) and discounts offered under this sub-
regulation in no case shall exceed thirty five percent of the
maximum retail price of pay channel or bouquet of pay channels, as
the case may be:

Provided further that offer of discounts, if any, to distributors of
television channels, shall be on the basis of fair, transparent and
non-discriminatory terms:

Provided also that the parameters of discounts shall be measurable
and computable.”

45.4 The Subscription License Agreement dated 17.12.2018

was executed between SIPL and ADNPL under the New Regulatory

Framework for signals of Channels with effect from 01.02.2019 for

a period of one year, which was extended till August 2021. It is
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stated that despite the provisions under the Interconnection

Regulations 2017 that no extra benefits should be offered to any

MSOs, the ADNPL started losing subscribers to KCCL as the SIPL

allegedly offered lower prices to KCCL, which was passed on to the

subscribers. It was said that up to a 50% discount was given to

KCCL instead of 15% as per the Interconnections Regulations 2017.

These additional discounts were offered in the form of promotion

and advertisement payments to KCCL.

Analysis:

46. The questions which are required to be considered in

these petitions are:

(I) Whether the TRAI Act is a special statute and the Competition

Act is said to be a general statute dealing with the anti-

competitive practices, or whether both these statutes are special

statutes for the subject matters of telecom and broadcasting

services as well as the anti-competitive practices?
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(II) Whether the CCI would not have the jurisdiction to entertain

the information of the ADNPL regarding the allegation of misuse

of the dominant position by the SIPL in the relevant market as

defined under Section 4 of the Competition Act?

(III) Whether the TRAI, being the sectoral regulation in respect of

the telecom and broadcasting services, should first examine the

allegation, and the ADNPL should have filed the complaint before

the TRAI/TDSAT and not have approached the CCI at the first

instance?

(IV) When the information contains the allegation of misuse of the

dominant position in the relevant market, as well as the violation

of the Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services

Interconnection (Addressable Systems) Regulations 2017 (for

short, ‘Interconnection Regulations 2017’) and the

Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Eighth)

(Addressable Systems) Tariff Order 2017 (Collectively, New
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Regulatory Framework), the CCI should direct the informant, the

ADNPL, to approach the TRAI and once the jurisdictional facts are

determined by the TRAI, then only the CCI should proceed with

the matter, if it is so required?

47. Mr Maninder Singh, learned Senior Counsel, has

submitted that primarily the allegations in the Information filed

by the ADNPL before the CCI are about the non-compliance of the

Interconnection Regulations 2017. The entire gravamen of the

ADNPL in its Information with the CCI is that the SIPL is

circumventing TRAI’s Regulation. The TRAI, being a specific

sectoral regulator, is assigned the powers, duties and

responsibilities to regulate broadcasting activities/services under

the provisions of the TRAI Act and the Regulations made

thereunder. Therefore, if the primary allegation is non-

compliance with the Interconnection Regulations 2017, the

sectoral regulator needs to first examine the issue to decide the
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jurisdictional fact and then if it is of the opinion that the issue

involves misuse of the dominant position in the relevant market,

it can refer to the said aspect for investigation and decision of the

CCI. The TRAI Act is a complete code in itself. It covers all aspects,

including competition, and the Competition Act is a general law

dealing with competition. The TRAI, being a special statute to

regulate broadcasting services, including anti-competitive

conduct, shall prevail over the general competition law under the

Competition Act.

Issue No.I: Whether the TRAI Act is a special statute and the
Competition Act is said to be a general statute dealing with the anti-
competitive practices, or whether both these statutes are special
statutes for the subject matters of telecom and broadcasting services as
well as the anti-competitive practices?

48. The CCI has been enacted to ensure fair competition in

India by prohibiting trade practices which cause an appreciable

adverse effect on competition within markets in India and for the

establishment of an expert body in the form of the Competition
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Commission of India, having the duty to curb negative aspects of

competition. The Competition Act‘s salient provisions have

already been noted in the preceding paragraph; therefore, the

same is not reproduced herein. However, it is relevant to mention

here that Section 60 of the Competition Act provides for the

overriding effect of the provisions of the CCI Act in the event of

any inconsistency in any other law. The objective behind the

Competition Act has been stated in paragraph 21 in Excel Crop

Care Limited v. Competition Commission of India19 , and is

reproduced hereunder:

“21. In the instant case, we are concerned with the first type of
practices, namely, anti-competitive agreements. The Act, , which
prohibits anti-competitive agreements, has a laudable purpose
behind it. It is to ensure that there is a healthy competition in the
market, as it brings about various benefits for the public at large as
well as economy of the nation. In fact, the ultimate goal of
competition policy (or for that matter, even the consumer policies)
is to enhance consumer well-being. These policies are directed at

19
(2017) 8 SCC 47
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ensuring that markets function effectively. Competition policy
towards the supply side of the market aims to ensure that
consumers have adequate and affordable choices. Another purpose
in curbing anti-competitive agreements is to ensure “level playing
field” for all market players that helps markets to be competitive. It
sets “rules of the game” that protect the competition process itself,
rather than competitors in the market. In this way, the pursuit of
fair and effective competition can contribute to improvements in
economic efficiency, economic growth and development of
consumer welfare. How these benefits accrue is explained in the
ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy, in the following
manner:

“2.2. Main Objectives and Benefits of Competition Policy 2.2.1.1.
Economic efficiency: Economic efficiency refers to the effective use
and allocation of the economy’s resources. Competition tends to
bring about enhanced efficiency, in both a static and a dynamic
sense, by disciplining firms to produce at the 16 (2017) 8 SCC
47 lowest possible cost and pass these cost savings on to consumers,
and motivating firms to undertake research and development to
meet customer needs.

2.2.1.2. Economic growth and development:

Economic growth–the increase in the value of goods and services
produced by an economy–is a key indicator of economic
development. Economic development refers to a broader definition
of an economy’s well-being, including employment growth, literacy
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and mortality rates and other measures of quality of life.
Competition may bring about greater economic growth and
development through improvements in economic efficiency and the
reduction of wastage in the production of goods and services. The
market is therefore able to more rapidly reallocate resources,
improve productivity and attain a higher level of economic growth.
Over time, sustained economic growth tends to lead to an enhanced
quality of life and greater economic development.
2.2.1.3. Consumer Welfare: Competition policy contributes to
economic growth to the ultimate benefit of consumers, in terms of
better choice (new products), better quality and lower prices.
Consumer welfare protection may be required in order to redress a
perceived imbalance between the market power of consumers and
producers. The imbalance between consumers and producers may
stem from market failures such as information asymmetries, the
lack of bargaining position towards producers and high transaction
costs. Competition policy may serve as a complement to consumer
protection policies to address such market failures.”

49. The CCI is entrusted with duties, powers and functions

to deal with three kinds of anti-competitive practices and to

eliminate such practices which are having adverse effect on the

competition, for which the CCI has been given ample power in this
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regard.

50. Thus, this Court is of the considered view that the CCI is

a special Act to inquire into any allegations regarding the three

kinds of anti-competitive practices, including misuse of the

dominant position by a market player in the relevant market. The

relevant market has been defined in both its product and

geographic dimensions. The objective is to identify the

competitors that can constrain those undertakings’ behaviour

and prevent them from behaving independently of effective

competitive pressure. Thus, it would not be proper to say that the

Competition Act is general, but it is a special Act which deals with

anti-competitive practices as defined under the Act itself. The

CCI is a sectoral regulator, so far as it relates to the curbing of anti-

competitive practices in India is concerned.

51. The TRAI Act has been enacted to bring the quality of

telecom services to world standards, to provide a wide range of
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services to meet the consumers’ demand at a reasonable price, and

to ensure the participation of companies registered in India as

well as value added telecom services and making

arrangements/provisions for protection and promotion of

consumer interest and ensuring fair competition. To protect the

interests of service providers and consumers of the telecom

sector, to ensure technical compatibility and effective inter-

relationship between different service providers and to ensure

compliance with license conditions by all the service providers, a

sectoral regulator, i.e., TRAI, has been constituted under the TRAI

Act.

51.1 TRAI performs a recommendatory/advisory and

regulatory body discharging the functions envisaged under sub-

section (1) of Section 11 of the said Act. TRAI, inter alia, is required

to ensure fair competition amongst the service providers,

including fixing the terms and conditions of inter-connection
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between the service providers and laying down the standards of

Quality of Service (QoS) to be provided by each service

provider. The TRAI, a sectoral regulator in the telecom sector,

has been constituted to ensure orderly and healthy growth of the

telecommunication infrastructure, apart from the protection of

consumer interests. This is evident from the statement of the

object and the reasons of the TRAI Act. Thus, the TRAI Act is

constituted as an expert regulatory body to govern the telecom

sector, and thus, TRAI is a special statute in the field of

telecommunication, and TRAI is a sectoral regulator.

52. Considering the above, this Court is of the view that both

the Competition Act and the TRAI Act are special legislation in

their respective field. There may be some overlapping while

discharging the functions by the CCI and the TRAI in respect of the

telecom market in India is concerned, but there is no provision

under the TRAI Act to deal with the three anti-competitive
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practices as mentioned above, including misuse of the dominant

position of a market player as defined under Section 4 of the

Competition Act.

Issue II: Whether the CCI would not have the jurisdiction to entertain the
information of the ADNPL regarding the allegation of misuse of the
dominant position by the SIPL in the relevant market as defined under
Section 4 of the Competition Act?

53 As discussed above, when the allegations are regarding

the misuse of the dominant position by the SIPL, the petitioner in

the relevant market, as defined under Section 4 of the

Competition Act, predominantly, it is the CCI which will have the

jurisdiction to determine the said issue of misuse of the dominant

position and not the TRAI. However, if there are allegations of

non-compliance with the license conditions or violation of the

Regulations framed by the TRAI, it would be the TRAI which shall

examine the said allegations and not the CCI. Both the authorities

operate in different and distinct fields, and some overlapping of

the jurisdiction will not oust the jurisdiction of one sectoral
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regulator at the expense of the other. The CCI, which is the

sectoral regulator for dealing with anti-competitive practices in

the relevant market and misuse of the dominant position, will

have the jurisdiction to deal with the said allegation and not the

TRAI. If there are allegations regarding violation of the terms of

the license conditions or the provisions of the Regulations framed

by the TRAI, the TRAI, being the sectoral regulator of the field,

would assume jurisdiction to deal with those allegations.

This Court, therefore, is of the view that there is no conflict insofar

as the jurisdiction of the two sectoral regulators is concerned.

Issue Nos III and IV
Whether the TRAI, being the sectoral regulation in respect of the telecom
and broadcasting services, should first examine the allegation, and the
ADNPL should have filed the complaint before the TRAI/TDSAT and not
have approached the CCI at the first instance?
When the information contains the allegation of misuse of the dominant
position in the relevant market, as well as the violation of the
Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services Interconnection
(Addressable Systems) Regulations 2017 (for short, ‘Interconnection
Regulations 2017’) and the Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable)
Services (Eighth) (Addressable Systems) Tariff Order 2017 (Collectively,
New Regulatory Framework), the CCI should direct the informant, the
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ADNPL, to approach the TRAI and once the jurisdictional facts are
determined by the TRAI, then only the CCI should proceed with the
matter, if it is so required?

54. It is also important to mention here that the order

passed under Section 26 of the Competition Act does not have civil

consequences, and it is an order in rem. The petitioners will have

an opportunity to address their arguments before the CCI even

regarding its jurisdiction. This Court, therefore, at this stage of

the proceedings before the CCI, does not want to scuttle the

proceedings, and the CCI itself is competent to deal with the

jurisdictional issue as well.

Conclusion:

55. In view thereof, the present writ petitions, so far as the

Order dated 28.02.2022 passed by the Competition Commission of

India under Section 26 of the Competition Act is concerned, are

dismissed. However, the petitioners shall have the liberty to

address their arguments on jurisdiction before the CCI itself, and
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the CCI will decide the issue of jurisdiction at the first instance

before proceeding with the matter on merit.

Result:

Thus, the writ petitions are dismissed with the above

observation, however, without costs.

All Interlocutory Applications regarding interim matters

stand closed.

Sd/-D K SINGH
JUDGE

jjj
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) 29767/2022

PETITIONER EXHIBITS

Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.02.2022 ISSUED
BY RESPONDENT NO. 1 IN CASE NO. 9 OF 2022.

Exhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF INFORMATION ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT NO. 2 IN CASE NO. 9 OF 2022 BEFORE THE
CCI.

Exhibit P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 01.09.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE NCLAT IN COMPETITION APPEAL (AT)
NO. 12 OF 2022.

Exhibit P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION NO. 39 BEARING
ORDER NO. SO 44(E) DATED 09.01.2004.

Exhibit P4 A A LEGIBLE TYPED COPY OF THE EXT. P4 NOTIFICATION
NO. 39 BEARING ORDER NO. SO 44(E) DATED
09.01.2004.

Exhibit P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE TELECOMMUNICATION
(BROADCASTING AND CABLE) SERVICES INTERCONNECTION
(ADDRESSABLE SYSTEMS) REGULATIONS, 2017 AND THE
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA THERETO ISSUED BY TRAI.

Exhibit P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE TRAI CONSULTATION PAPER TITLED
“ISSUES RELATED TO NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
BROADCASTING AND CABLE SERVICES” DATED
07.05.2022. .

Exhibit P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE AUTHORIZATIONS ISSUED BY THE
PETITIONER COMPANY AUTHORIZING SHRI. BIJU K.S. TO
REPRESENT THE PETITIONER FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS
WRIT PETITION.

Exhibit P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY AFFIDAVIT SERVED ON THE
PETITIONER ON 09.05.2022 BY RESPONDENT NO. 1 IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 3860 OF 2022 BEFORE THE HON’BLE
BOMBAY HIGH COURT.

Exhibit P9 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY AFFIDAVIT DATED
04.06.2022 FILED BY RESPONDENT NO. 2 IN WRIT
PETITION NO. 3860 OF 2022 BEFORE THE HON’BLE
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 129

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BOMBAY HIGH COURT.

Exhibit P10 A TRUE COPY OF THE REJOINDER DATED 03.06.2022
FILED BY THE PETITIONER IN RESPONSE TO EXT. P8.

Exhibit P11 A TRUE COPY OF THE REJOINDER DATED 24.06.2022
FILED BY THE PETITIONER IN RESPONSE TO EXT. P9.

Exhibit P12 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 06.04.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3860 OF 2022.

Exhibit P13 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 08.06.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3860 OF 2022.

Exhibit P14 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.06.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3860 OF 2022.

Exhibit P15 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 10.08.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3860 OF 2022.

Exhibit P16 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 19.08.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3860 OF 2022.

Exhibit P17 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 11.04.2022 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER.

Exhibit P18 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 22.04.2022 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER.

Exhibit P19 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 11.05.2022 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER.

Exhibit P20 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 19.05.2022 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER.

Exhibit P21 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 07.07.2022 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER.

Exhibit P22 A TRUE COPY OF THE SUMMONS DATED 05.09.2022
ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 130

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Exhibit P23 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 08.09.2022 ISSUED
BY THE PETITIONER.

Exhibit P24 A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION
DATED 12.09.2022 FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE
THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT.

Exhibit P25 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED
16.09.2022 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH
COURT IN WRIT PETITION NO. 3860 OF 2022.

Exhibit P26 A LIST OF DATES IN RELATION TO THE SUBSCRIPTION
LICENSE AGREEMENT AND VARIOUS INTERIM EXTENSIONS
GRANTED BY STAR INDIA PVT. LTD. TO ASIANET
DIGITAL NETWORK PVT. LTD.

Exhibit P27 A LIST OF DATES FOR CORRESPONDENCES BETWEEN STAR
INDIA PVT. LTD. AND ASIANET DIGITAL NETWORK PVT.
LTD.

Exhibit P28 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT IN CCI V. BHARTI AIRTEL LTD.
REPORTED IN (2019) 2 SCC 521.

Exhibit P29 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE HON’BLE BOMBAY
HIGH COURT TITLED AS STAR INDIA PVT. LTD. V. CCI
REPORTED IN 2019 SCC ONLINE BOM 3038.

Exhibit P30 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 06.03.2020 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT IN SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITION NO. 3832 OF 2020.

Exhibit P31 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 22.05.2020 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT IN SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITION NO. 3832 OF 2020.

Exhibit P32 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 05.06.2020 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT IN SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITION NO. 3832 OF 2020.

Exhibit P33 A TABLE TITLED ‘LIST OF DATES OF PAST LITIGATION
BETWEEN THE PARTIES’ WITH RELEVANT PARTICULARS OF
ALL THE PETITIONS / REPLIES / TDSAT ORDERS IN
DISPUTES RELATING TO INTERCONNECTION RAISED BY
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 131

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RESPONDENT NO. 2.

Exhibit P34 A TRUE COPY OF JUDGMENT OF THE HON’BLE KERALA
HIGH COURT IN ALL INDIA DIGITAL CABLE FEDERATION
V. TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA REPORTED
IN
2021 SCC ONLINE KER 7162.

Exhibit P35 A CHART TITLED ‘CHART DEPICTING INHERENT
CONTRADICTIONS IN THEIR OWN SUBSCRIBER CLAIMS BY
ASIANET DIGITAL NETWORK PVT. LTD. NUMBERS’ WHICH
SHOWS THE FLUCTUATING CLAIMS OF SUBSCRIBERS OF
RESPONDENT NO.2 VIS-À-VIS KCCL AS PER RESPONDENT
NO.2’S OWN PLEADINGS / LETTERS.

Exhibit P36 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 19.03.2018 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY IN W.P. NO.
975 OF 2018.

Exhibit P37 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 01.04.2019 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY IN W.P. NO.
975 OF 2018.

Exhibit P38 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 16.08.2018 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN W.P.
9175/2018.

Exhibit P39 TRUE COPY OF THE TARIFF ORDER 2022 ISSUED BY TRAI
DATED 22/11/2022.

RESPONDENT EXHIBITS

Exhibit R2(a) A TRUE COPY OF THE DAILY ORDER PASSED BY THE 1ST
RESPONDENT ON 21.03.2023

Exhibit R2(b) A TRUE COPY OF THE EMAIL DATED 23.02.2023 SENT BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER

Exhibit R2(c) A SAMPLE COPY OF THE INVOICE DOCUMENT NO.

M03300007054 DATED 10.01.2023 UNDER THE PREVIOUS
RIO AGREEMENT

Exhibit R2(d) A SAMPLE COPY OF THE INVOICE DOCUMENT.

NO.M03300007420 DATED 12.05.2023 UNDER THE NEW
RIO AGREEMENT ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER IN THE
WRIT PETITION
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 132

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Exhibit R2(e) A TRUE COPY OF THE DISCONNECTION NOTICE DATED
25.8.2023 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER IN THE WRIT
PETITION TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT

Exhibit R2(f) TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 28.08.2023 ISSUED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER IN THE WRIT
PETITION

Exhibit R2-(g) THE ACCOUNTING STATEMENT OF ASIANET DIGITAL
NETWORK PRIVATE LIMITED & STAR INDIA PVT LTD AS
ON 24 AUGUST, 2023 (BILLING UP TO 31, JULY 2023
AND COLLECTIONS AS ON 23RD AUGUST 2023) PREPARED
BY STAR INDIA PVT LTD AS ATTACHED TO THE
DISCONNECTION NOTICE

Exhibit R2-(h) TRUE COPY OF THE TABLE PREPARED BY THE SECOND
RESPONDENT ELUCIDATING THE CALCULATIONS, BASIS
THE MARKET INTELLIGENCE, DEMONSTRATING THE
DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT

PETITIONER EXHIBITS

Exhibit P42 True Copy of Telecommunication (Broadcasting and
Cable) Services (Eighth) (Addressable Systems)
Tariff (Third Amendment) order 2022 dated
22.11.2022

Exhibit P43 True Copy of Press release issued by the 2nd
respondent dated 22.11.2022

Exhibit P44 True Copy of list of Members of AIDCF

Exhibit P40 True copy of Interim Order dated 06.10.2022 in
WPC 29767/2022.

Exhibit P41 True Copy of Telecommunication (Broadcasting and
Cable) Services Interconnection (Addressable
Systems) (Fourth Amendment) Regulations 2022
dated 22.11.2022

Exhibit P45 True Copy of Memorandum of Writ petition filed by
AIDCF numbered as W.P.C 193/2023 before this
Honourable Court
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 133

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Exhibit P46 True Copy of Interim Order dated 06.01.2023 in
W.P.C 193/2023 of this Honourable Court

Exhibit P47 True Copy of direction issued by TRAI dated
19.01.2023

Exhibit P48 True Copy of Disconnection Notice dated
15.02.2023 Issued to the 2nd respondent by the
petitioner

Exhibit P49 True Copy of IA. No. 4 of 2023 dated 16.02.2023
in W.P.C 193 of 2023

Exhibit P50 True Copy of the SLA dated 24.02.2023

Exhibit P51 True Copy of Judgement Dated 04.04.2023 in W.P.C
193 of 2023

Exhibit P52 True Copy of Case Status of WA. No. 852 of 2023

Exhibit P53 True copy of the disconnection notice issued to
the 2nd respondent by the petitioner dated
25.08.2023

Exhibit P54 True copy of reply sent to the petitioner by the
2nd respondent dated 28.08.2023

Exhibit P55 True Copy of response dated 09.09.2023 issued by
the petitioner to the 2nd respondent

Exhibit P56 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 23.10.2023 ISSUED
BY THE PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NO. 2

Exhibit P57 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 30.10.2023 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 2 TO THE PETITIONER

Exhibit P58 A COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 24.11.2023 PASSED BY
THE LD. TDSAT

Exhibit P59 A COPY OF THE EMAIL DATED 08.11.2023 ALONG WITH
THE INVOICES ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER UPON THE
RESPONDENT NO. 2 AND THE STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS OF
THE RESPONDENT NO. 2 .

Exhibit P60 A COPY OF THE EMAIL DATED 14.12.2023 OF THE
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 134

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PETITIONER

Exhibit P61 A COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 08.01.2024 PASSED BY
THE LD. DIVISION BENCH OF THIS HON’BLE COURT

Exhibit P62 A COPY OF THE EMAIL DATED 08.01.2024 OF THE
PETITIONER

Exhibit P63 A COPY OF THE EMAIL DATED 10.01.2024 OF
RESPONDENT NO. 2

Exhibit P64 A COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS OF THE
PETITIONER

RESPONDENT EXHIBITS

Exhibit R2(i) TRUE COPY OF THE TABLE PREPARED BY THE ADNPL
ELUCIDATING THE CALCULATIONS, BASIS THE MARKET
INTELLIGENCE, DEMONSTRATING THE DISCRIMINATORY
TREATMENT

Exhibit R2(j) TABLE PREPARED BY THE APPLICANT/ 2ND RESPONDENT
ELUCIDATING THE CALCULATIONS , BASIS THE MARKET
INTELLIGENCE, DEMONSTRATING DISCRIMINATORY
TREATMENT

PETITIONER EXHIBITS

Exhibit P65 A true copy of the letter dated 07.02.2024 issued
by the Writ Petitioner to Respondent No. 2 in the
Writ Petition

Exhibit P66 A Statement of Accounts as on 05.02.2024

RESPONDENT ANNEXURES

Annexure Annexure 1-2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1226
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 135

2025:KER:36755

APPENDIX OF WP(C) 29768/2022

PETITIONER EXHIBITS

Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.02.2022 ISSUED
BY RESPONDENT NO. 1 IN CASE NO. 9 OF 2022.

Exhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF INFORMATION ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT NO. 2 IN CASE NO. 9 OF 2022 BEFORE THE
CCI.

Exhibit P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 01.09.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE NCLAT IN COMPETITION APPEAL (AT)
NO. 12 OF 2022.

Exhibit P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION NO. 39 BEARING
ORDER NO. SO 44(E) DATED 09.01.2004.

Exhibit P4 A A LEGIBLE TYPED COPY OF THE EXT. P4 NOTIFICATION
NO. 39 BEARING ORDER NO. SO 44(E) DATED
09.01.2004.

Exhibit P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE RELIEF EXHIBITS OF
TELECOMMUNICATION (BROADCASTING AND CABLE)
SERVICES INTERCONNECTION (ADDRESSABLE SYSTEMS)
REGULATIONS, 2017 AND THE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA
THERETO ISSUED BY TRAI.

Exhibit P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE TRAI CONSULTATION PAPER TITLED
“ISSUES RELATED TO NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
BROADCASTING AND CABLE SERVICES” DATED
07.05.2022.

Exhibit P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE AUTHORIZATIONS ISSUED BY THE
PETITIONER COMPANY AUTHORIZING SHRI. BIJU K.S. TO
REPRESENT THE PETITIONER FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS
WRIT PETITION.

Exhibit P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY AFFIDAVIT DATED
06.05.2022 BY RESPONDENT NO. 1 IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3845 OF 2022 BEFORE THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH
COURT.

Exhibit P9 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY AFFIDAVIT DATED
03.06.2022 FILED BY RESPONDENT NO. 2 IN WRIT
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 136

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PETITION NO. 3845 OF 2022 BEFORE THE HON’BLE
BOMBAY HIGH COURT.

Exhibit P10 A TRUE COPY OF THE REJOINDER DATED 03.06.2022
FILED BY THE PETITIONER IN RESPONSE TO EXT. P8.

Exhibit P11 A TRUE COPY OF THE REJOINDER DATED 24.06.2022
FILED BY THE PETITIONER IN RESPONSE TO EXT. P9.

Exhibit P12 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 06.04.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3845 OF 2022.

Exhibit P13 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 08.06.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3845 OF 2022.

Exhibit P14 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.06.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3845 OF 2022.

Exhibit P15 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 10.08.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3845 OF 2022.

Exhibit P16 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 19.08.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3845 OF 2022.

Exhibit P17 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 11.04.2022 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER.

Exhibit P18 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 26.04.2022 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER.

Exhibit P19 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 04.05.2022 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER.

Exhibit P20 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 07.07.2022 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER.

Exhibit P21 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED
16.09.2022 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH
COURT IN WRIT PETITION NO. 3845 OF 2022.

WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 137

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Exhibit P22 A LIST OF DATES IN RESPECT OF PETITIONER’S RIO
AGREEMENT ALONG WITH THE NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT AND
ALL INTERIM EXTENSIONS PROVIDED THERETO.

Exhibit P23 LIST OF DATES COMPRISING THE BRIEF DETAILS OF ARE
ALL CORRESPONDENCES EXCHANGED BETWEEN SIPL AND
RESPONDENT NO. 2 DURING JUNE NOVEMBER 2021.

Exhibit P24 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT IN CCI V. BHARTI AIRTEL LTD.
REPORTED IN (2019) 2 SCC 521.

Exhibit P25 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE HON’BLE BOMBAY
HIGH COURT TITLED AS STAR INDIA PVT. LTD. V. CCI
REPORTED IN 2019 SCC ONLINE BOM 3038.

Exhibit P26 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 06.03.2020 ISSUED
BY THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITION NO. 3832 OF 2020.

Exhibit P27 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 22.05.2020 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT IN SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITION NO. 3832 OF 2020.

Exhibit P28 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 05.06.2020 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT IN SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITION NO. 3832 OF 2020.

Exhibit P29 A TRUE COPY OF JUDGMENT OF THE HON’BLE KERALA
HIGH COURT IN ALL INDIA DIGITAL CABLE FEDERATION
V. TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA REPORTED
IN
2021 SCC ONLINE KER 7162.

Exhibit P30 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 19.03.2018 ISSUED
NY THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY IN W.P. NO.
975 OF 2018.

Exhibit P31 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 01.04.2019 ISSUED
BY THE HON’ BLE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY IN W.P. NO.
975 OF 2018.

Exhibit P32 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 16.08.2018 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN W.P.
9175/2018.

WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 138

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Exhibit P33 TRUE COPY OF THE TARIFF ORDER 2022 ISSUED BY TRAI
DATED 22/11/2022.

RESPONDENT EXHIBITS

Exhibit R2(i) TRUE COPY OF THE TABLE PREPARED BY THE ADNPL
ELUCIDATING THE CALCULATIONS, BASIS THE MARKET
INTELLIGENCE, DEMONSTRATING THE DISCRIMINATORY
TREATMENT
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 139

2025:KER:36755

APPENDIX OF WP(C) 29766/2022

PETITIONER EXHIBITS

Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.02.2022 ISSUED
BY RESPONDENT NO. 1 IN CASE NO. 9 OF 2022.

Exhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF INFORMATION ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT NO. 2 IN CASE NO. 9 OF 2022 BEFORE THE
CCI.

Exhibit P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 01.09.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE NCLAT IN COMPETITION APPEAL (AT)
NO. 12 OF 2022.

Exhibit P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION NO. 39 BEARING
ORDER NO. SO 44(E) DATED 09.01.2004.

Exhibit P4A LEGIBLE TYPED COPY OF EXHIBIT P4

Exhibit P5 A TRUE COPY OF RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATION (BROADCASTING AND CABLE)
SERVICES INTERCONNECTION (ADDRESSABLE SYSTEMS)
REGULATIONS, 2017 AND THE COMPLETE EXPLANATORY
MEMORANDA THERETO ISSUED BY TRAI.

Exhibit P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE CONSULTATION PAPER DATED
07.05.2022

Exhibit P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE AUTHORIZATION LETTER
AUTHORIZING SHRI. BIJU K.S. TO REPRESENT THE
PETITIONER FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS WRIT PETITION

Exhibit P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY AFFIDAVIT FILED BY
RESPONDENT NO. 1 IN WRIT PETITION NO. 3755 OF
2022 BEFORE THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT.

Exhibit P9 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY AFFIDAVIT FILED BY
RESPONDENT NO. 2 IN WRIT PETITION NO. 3755 OF
2022 BEFORE THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT.

Exhibit P10 A TRUE COPY OF THE REJOINDER FILED BY THE
PETITIONER IN RESPONSE TO THE REPLY AFFIDAVIT
FILED BY RESPONDENT NO. 1 IN WRIT PETITION NO.
3755 OF 2022 BEFORE THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 140

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COURT.

Exhibit P11 A TRUE COPY OF THE REJOINDER FILED BY THE
PETITIONER IN RESPONSE TO THE REPLY AFFIDAVIT
FILED BY RESPONDENT NO. 2 IN WRIT PETITION NO.
3755 OF 2022 BEFORE THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH
COURT.

Exhibit P12 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 06.04.2022 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3755 OF 2022.

Exhibit P13 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 08.06.2022 PASSED BY
THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3755 OF 2022.

Exhibit P14 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.06.2022 PASSED BY
THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3755 OF 2022.

Exhibit P15 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 10.08.2022 PASSED BY
THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3755 OF 2022.

Exhibit P16 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 19.08.2022 PASSED BY
THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION
NO. 3755 OF 2022.

Exhibit P17 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 11.04.2022 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER

Exhibit P18 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 22.04.2022 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER

Exhibit P19 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 11.05.2022 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER

Exhibit P20 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 18.05.2022, ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER

Exhibit P21 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE 24.05.2022 ISSUED BY THE
RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER

Exhibit P22 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 07.07.2022 ISSUED
BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 5 TO THE PETITIONER
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 141

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Exhibit P23 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED
16.09.2022 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH
COURT IN WRIT PETITION NO. 3755 OF 2022

Exhibit P24 A LIST OF DATES IN RELATION TO THE SUBSCRIPTION
LICENSE AGREEMENT AND VARIOUS INTERIM EXTENSIONS
GRANTED BY STAR INDIA PVT. LTD. TO ASIANET
DIGITAL NETWORK PVT. LTD.

Exhibit P25 A LIST OF DATES FOR CORRESPONDENCES EXCHANGED
BETWEEN STAR INDIA PVT. LTD. AND THE RESPONDENT
NO. 2, ASIANET DIGITAL NETWORK PVT. LTD. DURING
JUNE – NOVEMBER 2021.

Exhibit P26 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME
COURT IN CCI V. BHARTI AIRTEL LTD. REPORTED IN
(2019) 2 SCC 521.

Exhibit P27 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE HON’BLE BOMBAY
HIGH COURT TITLED AS STAR INDIA PVT. LTD. V. CCI
REPORTED IN 2019 SCC ONLINE BOM 3038.

Exhibit P28 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 06.03.2020 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT IN SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITION NO. 3832 OF 2020.

Exhibit P29 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 22.05.2020 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT IN SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITION NO. 3832 OF 2020.

Exhibit P30 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 05.06.2020 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT IN SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITION NO. 3832 OF 2020.

Exhibit P31 A TRUE COPY OF JUDGMENT OF THE HON’BLE KERALA
HIGH COURT IN ALL INDIA DIGITAL CABLE FEDERATION
V. TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA REPORTED
IN
2021 SCC ONLINE KER 7162.

Exhibit P32 A COPY OF THE ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION SERVICES
AGREEMENT DATED 25.11.2019.

Exhibit P33 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 19.03.2018 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY IN W.P. NO.
WP(C) NOs. 29766, 29767
and 29768 OF 2022 142

2025:KER:36755

975 OF 2018.

Exhibit P34 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 01.04.2019 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY IN W.P. NO.
975 OF 2018.

Exhibit P35 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 16.08.2018 ISSUED
BY THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN W.P.
9175/2018.

Exhibit P36 True Copy of the Tariff Order dated 22.11.2022

RESPONDENT EXHIBITS

Exhibit R3(1) TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE NCLT DATED
20.01.2023

Exhibit R3(2) TRUE COPY OF LETTER DATED 10.05.2023 OF THE
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

Exhibit R2(i) TRUE COPY OF THE TABLE PREPARED BY THE ADNPL
ELUCIDATING THE CALCULATIONS, BASIS THE MARKET
INTELLIGENCE, DEMONSTRATING THE DISCRIMINATORY
TREATMENT



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