Telangana High Court
Dr. Bathula Venkata Durga Ashok vs The State Of Telangana on 27 December, 2024
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA WRIT PETITIONS No. 22368, 22926, 23098, 23275 AND 34487 OF 2023 COMMON ORDER:
Challenge in all these Writ Petitions is to
G.O.Ms.No. 107, dated 28.07.2023 issued by the 1st respondent
State of Telangana in its Health, Medical and Family Welfare
Department. By the said G.O., annual tuition fee for Private
Medical Un-aided Minority and Non-minority Professional
institutions was hiked for the block period 2023-26 in the range
of 118% to 554% which results in profiteering or collection of
capitation fee by the colleges and gross commercialisation of
Post-Graduate Medical/Dental Courses in the State, contends
petitioners who appeared for post-graduate entrance exam held
on 05.03.2023 by the National Eligibility and Entrance Test for
the academic year 2023-24 and results thereof were declared on
14.03.2023.
2. Since the issue covered in all these Writ Petitions is
one and the same, they are being heard together and disposed
of by this common order.
3. The grievance of petitioners is that pursuant to the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Islamic Academic
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of Education v. State of Karnataka 1, the erstwhile
Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O.Ms.No. 90, dated
22.12.2003 constituting a Committee headed by a retired Judge
of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for fixation of fee for the
students admitted into un-aided private professional
educational institutions (minority and non-minority) which,
though, was appointed initially for one year, subsequently, was
to continue till an appropriate legislation was passed by the
Parliament.
It is stated, pursuant to the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra 2,
the erstwhile Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O.Ms.No.
6, dated 08.01.2007 i.e. Andhra Pradesh Admission and Fee
Regulatory Committee for Professional Courses offered in Private
Un-aided Professional Institutions Rules, 2006, in terms of Rule
4 of which, the 3rd respondent – Telangana Admission and Fee
Regulatory Committee (TAFRC) is the body to call for, decide
and approve or alter and communicate the fee structure as
determined by it under the Rules to the Government for
1
2003(6) SCC 690
2
(2005) 6 SCC 537
3
notification. After reorganization of erstwhile State, vide
G.O.Rt.No. 160, dated 22.07.2015, the 3rd respondent was
constituted to regulate admissions and fix the fee structure for
private un-aided professional colleges in the State of Telangana.
Thereafter, pursuant to the recommendations of the 3rd
respondent for the block period of three years i.e. from 2010-11
to 2012-13, the 1 respondent issued G.O.Ms.No. 116, dated
14.05.2010 fixing fee structure
Subsequently, the 1st respondent issued
G.O.Ms.No. 29, dated 02.05.2016 for the academic year 2016-
17 fixing fee structure with percentage of fee hike at 10 only
Thereafter, the 1st respondent issued G.O.Ms.Nos.40, 41, 42
and 43, dated 09.05.2017 framing Rules for the academic year
2017-18, fixing fee at exorbitant and unreasonable rates.
Challenging the same, W.P(PIL) Nos. 130 and 133 of 2017 were
filed wherein this Court vide order dated 19.01.2022, while
quashing the said G.Os., directed that all students shall pay fee
fixed by the TAFRC notified vide G.O.Ms.No. 29, dated
02.05.2016 for the block period 2016-19; further directing the
colleges to return all original certificates forthwith to students;
refund the excess fee, if any collected within 30 days thereof.
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It is also stated, for the block period 2020-23, the
1st respondent issued G.O.Ms.No. 20, dated 14.04.2020 which
was resulting in profiteering or collection of capitation fee,
therefore, questioning the same, Writ Petition No. 6799 of 2020
and batch of cases were filed, wherein, by order dated
26.05.2020, this Court, inter alia, directed petitioners therein
and others belonging to Category-A to deposit 50% of the
amount mentioned in the G.O.; those falling in Category-B to
deposit 60% and the said Writ Petition is still pending.
While the matter stood thus, the 1st respondent
issued the impugned G.O. for the period 2023-26, the fee fixed
under the said G.O, is identical to the quantum of fee fixed
under G.O.Ms.No. 20, dated 14.04.2020. Petitioners have given
the comparative table from G.O.Ms.No. 29 to G.O.Ms.No. 20 to
G.O.Ms.No. 107.
4. At the time of admitting Writ Petitions, this Court
vide order dated 17.08.2023, taking into consideration the
direction issued in Writ Petition No. 6799 of 2020 where earlier
G.O.Ms.No. 20, dated 14.04.2000, was challenged, directed in
these Writ Petitions also that for candidates belonging to
category-A, fee should be collected at 60% of the amount
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payable as per the impugned G.O., for candidates belonging to
Category-B, @70%; candidates, who fall within the ambit of
either Category-A or B, shall, at the time of payment, furnish a
personal bond undertaking to pay the remaining amount on
disposal of the Writ Petition, in case, the same is required to be
paid; and in case, any of the candidates had already deposited
fee entirely, they cannot claim for refund of amount
immediately, however, request for refund shall be entertained
on disposal of Writ Petition in case they are entitled for such
refund.
5. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of
Respondents 10 and 11, it is stressed that fee fixation must
align with the Telangana Admission and Fee Regulatory
Committee (TAFRC) Rules, 2006, specifically Rule 4(iv), which
lists factors such as location, infrastructure, administrative
costs, and provisions for waivers for economically weaker
sections. The TAFRC, constituted under the TAFRC Rules,
evaluates fee proposals from institutions to ensure compliance
with these principles. Its composition includes a retired High
Court judge and domain experts in finance and education
Institutions submit detailed financial data for evaluation,
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including past expenditures, anticipated costs, and the need for
surplus funds. TAFRC reviews these proposals to prevent
profiteering or capitation fees and makes recommendations to
the state government, which then issues fee notifications.
The affidavit outlines the historical context leading
to issuance of impugned G.O. which fixed fees for the block
period 2023-26. It traces the fee fixation process from the
erstwhile combined Andhra Pradesh to the present, noting that
fees remained stagnant from 2010 to 2016 due to delays in
TAFRC’s constitution. A temporary 10% hike was applied in
2016, not based on actual financial data. Subsequently, TAFRC
undertook detailed evaluations for subsequent block periods,
including the current one. This fees was based on outdated
expenditures from 2009-10 and were not reflective of current
costs or inflation. Petitioners’ assertion that 5-10% annual hike
is reasonable is dismissed as contrary to Rule 4(iv) of the TAFRC
Rules, which mandates fee fixation based on actual financial
data and future requirements While acknowledging the
economic challenges posed by the pandemic, Respondents
argue that fee fixation must consider the institutions’ financial
realities, including inflation and need for surplus funds.
7
As regards scope of judicial review, it is stated,
Courts are generally reluctant to interfere with decisions made
by expert bodies like TAFRC unless there is evidence of
arbitrariness, perversity, or violation of legal provisions. The
petitioners have failed to demonstrate such grounds, as their
allegations lack supporting material or cogent evidence
It Is stated that fee fixation for each block period is
determined independently based on the expenditure incurred by
the institution during the preceding years, adjusted for inflation
and reasonable surplus for development, as mandated by Rule
4(iv) of the TAFRC Rules and upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in its judgments. The fee structure for the previous block
period has no bearing on the current determination. It is argued
that fee fixed under GO. Ms. No. 29, dated 02.05.2016, was
itself flawed and illegal, as it did not adhere to the parameters
prescribed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Rule 4(iv) of the
TAFRC Rules. It is stated that the 1st respondent is bound by
the recommendations of the 3rd respondent under Rule 4(v) of
the TAFRC Rules and judicial pronouncements. It has no
independent authority to alter the recommendations. Therefore,
the contention based on the pandemic’s economic impact is
8
untenable. Respondents emphasize that paying stipends to
postgraduate students is mandated by law, as acknowledged by
petitioners. G.O.Ms. No. 98 dated 01.09.2018 fixes the stipend
between Rs. 44,075/- and Rs. 48,973/- per month for
postgraduate students. The Petitioners’ argument that stipends
compensate for services rendered by students is dismissed as
specious. The services form part of their education and training,
mandatory for awarding degrees and professional preparation. It
is asserted that stipend often exceeds the fee collected from
Convener Quota students in clinical non-degree courses and
amounts to 80-100% of fees in degree courses. This creates a
financial imbalance for institutions, making the Petitioners’
stance untenable.
The issuance of G.O. Ms. No. 20 dated 14.04.2020
is a matter of record. This G.O, fixing the fee for the block period
2020-2023, was challenged in W.P. No. 6799 of 2020 and
related cases, which are pending adjudication. The Respondent
and other institutions have filed counters and vacate
applications against the order dated 14.04.2020. It is also
stated that filing of writ petition is premature, as petitioners
approached the Court immediately after submitting
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representation, without awaiting a response from the authorities
Respondents emphasize the need to balance student interests
with institutional sustainability. Subsidized fees for Convenor
Quota students address affordability concerns for middle-class
and meritorious students. The Petitioners’ claims lack
substantiation. They therefore, prays for vacating the interim
order dated 17.08.2023 and dismissal of Writ Petition.
6. Respondents 7 and 8 also filed the counter-affidavit
on similar lines as above, hence, need not be reproduced.
7. Learned counsel for petitioners Sri Sama Sandeep
Reddy submits that impugned GO is identical to G.O.Ms. No.
20, dated 14-04-2020 and the quantum of fee fixed is
exorbitantly high in comparison with fee fixed through G.O.Ms.
No. 29, dated 02-05-2016. According to him, 5 to 10% hike in
fee per annum could be reasonable and the abnormal hike
ranging from 118% to 554% is arbitrary, illegal and there is no
cogent basis for arriving such an exorbitant fee recommended
by the 3rd respondent and the same is liable to be set aside.
Learned counsel, relying on the judgment of Division Bench of
this Court in Consortium of Engineering Management
10
Association (CECMA) v. Government of Andhra Pradesh 3,
contends that recommendations made by the 3rd respondent
revising the fee structure, has not been placed in public domain.
Even the representation dated 07.08.2023 submitted by
petitioners to the 3rd respondent to provide them a copy of its
recommendations and other details was also not considered.
Further, it is argued that fee under CAT-C across all courses
and all institutions is broadly mentioned as ‘up to there times of
B-CAT’; this broad fixation is arbitrary and against the
judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Islamic Academic of
Education‘s case (supra). According to learned counsel, the
Committee has to approve or propose fee structure on the basis
of the relevant documents and books of accounts of each
institute and it has to arrive at a finite fee and not an abstract
fee such as three times B-CAT fee. If the impugned G.O. is
allowed to stand, it would hamper the hopes of students who
hail from middle class and lower middle-class aspiring to
pursue Post Graduate medical and dental courses.
8. Learned Government Pleader for Medical, Health
and Family Welfare submits that the 3rd respondent furnished
3
2013(3) ALD 609
11
its recommendations dated 14-07-2023 fixing fee structure for
PG dental medical and dental courses in the State of Telangana
for the block period 2023-26 in private unaided medical and
dental colleges, based on which, the impugned G.O. was issued,
hence, no illegality or arbitrariness can be attributed to the said
G.O.
9. Learned Standing counsel for the 3rd respondent,
Sri Katika Ravinder Reddy denying the allegations of petitioners,
inter alia, submits that the Committee after scrutinizing the
accounts and audited financial statements/income and
expenditure statements of each institution, fixed fee structure
and recommended to the government for issuance of necessary
orders. In view of increase of expenditure towards salaries of
teaching and non-teaching faculty and other staff and while
fixing the fee, the audited figures of the institution would be
taken into account and inflation @10% and furtherance of 15%
have been taken into account ie a total of 25% is added to the
expenditure of the institution and also considered stipends
payable to students by the institutions. It is further argued that
decision of the 3rd respondent quasi-judicial authority is not
amenable to judicial review and fee fixation is a matter to be
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determined by the 3rd respondent consisting of domain experts
(which, inter alia include, finance professionals and academic
experts of the concerned professional course), scrutinizing the
exercise done by them to arrive at the fee structure ordinarily
falls out of the purview of judicial review. Further, fee fixed does
not amount to profiteering or capitation fee and judicial review
would be limited to evaluate only if the decision-making process
while performing this function is in line with the settled
Constitutional principles.
10. Sri R. Panduranga Reddy, learned counsel for
Respondents 7 and 8 submits that right of management to
establish and administer educational institutions, including
right to fix fees, is protected under Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution of India, as upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka 4.. Subsequent
judgments in Islamic Academy of Education vs. State of
Karnataka (supra) and P.A. Inamdar vs. State of
Maharashtra (supra) mandate that fee proposals submitted by
institutions be scrutinized by the Admission and Fee Regulatory
Committee (AFRC)
4
(2002) 8 SCC 481
13
11. Heard Sri K. Siddhartha Rao, learned counsel for
the 6th respondent, Ms. G. Lakshmi, learned counsel for
Respondent No 19, Sri Peri Prabhakar, learned counsel for
Respondent No. 12, Sri A. Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel
on behalf of Sri Srinivas Rao Pachwa, learned counsel, Sri
Vikram Poosarla, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of Sri
Mallipeddi Abhinay Reddy, learned counsel for Respondents 10,
11 and 24.
12. Having heard learned counsel on either side and
having perused the material on record, at the outset, this Court
Wishes to discuss the legal position laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court:
In T.M.A.Pai Foundation v. State Of Karnataka,
it has been held as under:
” 38. The scheme in Unni Krishnan’s case has the effect of
nationalizing education in respect of important features, viz., the right of
a private unaided institution to give admission and to fix the fee. By
framing this scheme, which has led to the State Governments legislating
in conformity with the scheme the private institutions are
undistinguishable from the government institutions, curtailing all the
essential features of the right of administration of a private unaided
educational institution can neither be called fair or reasonable. Even in
the decision in Unni Krishnan’s case, it has been observed by Jeevan
Reddy, J., at page 749, para 194, as follows:
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“The hard reality that emerges is that private educational institutions
are a necessity in the present day contest. It is not possible to do
without them because the Governments are in no position to meet the
demand particularly in the sector of medical and technical education
which call for substantial outlays. While education in one of the most
important functions of the Indian State it has no monopoly therein.
Privute educational institutions including minority educational
institutions too have a role to play”.
39. That private educational instructions are a necessity becomes
evident from the fact that the number of government- maintained
professional colleges has more or less remained stationary, while more
private institutions have been established. For example, in the State of
Karnataka there are 19 medical colleges out of which there are only 4
government- maintained medical colleges. Similarly, out of 14 Dental
Colleges in Karnataka, only one has been established by the
government, while in the same State, out of 51 Engineering Colleges,
only 12 have been established by the government. The aforesaid figures
clearly indicate the important role played by private unaided educational
institutions, both minority and non-minority, which cater to the needs of
students seeking professional education.
53. With regard to the core components of the rights under Article
19 and 26(a), it must be held that while the state has the right to
prescribe qualifications necessary for admission, private unaided
colleges have the right to admit students of their choice, subject to an
objective and rational procedure of selection and the compliance of
conditions, if any, requiring admission of a small percentage of students
belonging to weaker sections of the society by granting them freeships or
scholarships, if not granted by the Government. Furthermore, in setting
up a reasonable fee structure, the element of profiteering is not as yet
accepted in Indian conditions. The fee structure must take into
consideration the need to generate funds to be utilized for the
betterment and growth of the educational institution, the betterment of
education in that institution and to provide facilities necessary for the
benefit of the students. In any event, a private institution will have the
right to constitute its own governing body, for which qualifications may
15
be prescribed by the state or the concerned university. It will, however,
be objectionable if the state retains the power to nominate specific
individuals on governing bodies. Nomination by the state, which could
be on a political basis, will be an inhibiting factor for private enterprise
to embark upon the occupation of establishing and administering
educational institutions. For the same reasons, nomination of teachers
either directly by the department or through a service commission will
be an unreasonable inroad and an unreasonable restrictions on the
attorney of the private unaided educational institution.
54. The right to establish an educational institution can be
regulated, but such regulatory measures must, in general, be to ensure
the maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and
infrastructure (including qualified staff) and the prevention of mal-
administration by those in charge of management. The fixing of a rigid
fee structure, dictating the formation and composition of a government
body, compulsory nomination of teachers and staff for appointment or
nominating students for admissions would be unacceptable restrictions.
69. In such professional unaided institutions, the Management will
have the right to select teachers as per the qualifications and eligibility
conditions laid down by the State/University subject to adoption of a
rational procedure of selection.
A rational fee structure should be adopted by the
Management, which would not be entitled to charge a capitation fee.
Appropriate machinery can be devised by the state or university to
ensure that no capitation fee is charged and that there is no
profiteering, though a reasonable surplus for the furtherance of
education is permissible. Conditions granting recognition or affiliation
can broadly cover academic and educational matters including the
welfare of students and teachers.”
In Islamic Academy Of Education v State Of
16
Karnataka 5, it has been held thus:
” Both sides relied upon various passages from the majority
judgment in support of the respective submissions. These passages are
reproduced hereinafter. In view of the rival submissions the following
questions arise for consideration:
Whether the educational institutions are entitled to fix their
own fee structure,
7. So far as the first question is concerned, in our view the
majority judgment is very clear. There can be no fixing of a rigid fee
structure by the government. Each institute must have the freedom to
fix its own fee structure taking into consideration the need to generate
funds to run the institution and to provide facilities necessary for the
benefit of the students. They must also be able to generate surplus
which must be used for the betterment and growth of that educational
institution. In paragraph 56 of the judgment it has been categorically
laid down that the decision on the fees to be charged must necessarily
be left to the private educational institutions that do not seek and which
are not dependent upon any funds from the Government. Each institute
will be entitled to have its own fee structure. The fee structure for each
institute must be fixed keeping in mind the infrastructure and facilities
available, the investments made, salaries paid to the teachers and staff,
future plans for expansion and/or betterment of the institution etc. Of
course there can be no profiteering and capitation fees cannot be
charged. It thus needs to be emphasized that as per the majority
judgment imparting of education is essentially charitable in nature.
Thus the surplus/profit that can be generated must be only for the
benefit/use of that educational institution. Profits/surplus cannot be
diverted for any other use or purpose and cannot be used for personal
gain or for any other business or enterprise. As, at present, there are
statutes/regulations which govern the fixation of fees and as this Court
has not yet considered the validity of those statutes/regulations, we
5
2003(6) SCC 697
17
direct that in order to give effect to the judgment in TMA PAI‘s case the
respective State Governments concerned authority shall set up, in each
State, a committee headed by a retired High Court judge who shall be
nominated by the Chief Justice of that State The other member, who
shall be nominated by the Judge, should be a Chartered Accountant of
repute. A representative of the Medical Council of India (in short ‘MCI) or
the All India Council for Technical Education (in short ‘AICTE),
depending on the type of institution, shall also be a member The
Secretary of the State Government in charge of Medical Education or
Technical Education, as the case may be, shall be a member and
Secretary of the Committee. The Committee should be free to
nominate/co-opt another independent person of repute, so that total
number of members of the Committee shall not exceed 5. Each
educational Institute must place before this Committee, well in advance
of the academic year, its proposed fee structure. Along with the
proposed fee structure all relevant documents and books of accounts
must also be produced before the committee for their scrutiny. The
Committee shall then decide whether the fees proposed by that institute
are justified and are not profiteering or charging capitation fee.. The
Committee will be at liberty to approve the fee structure or to propose
some other fee which can be charged by the institute. The fee fixed by
the committee shall be binding for a period of three years, at the end of
which period the institute would be at liberty to apply for revision. Once
fees are fixed by the Committee, the institute cannot charge either
directly or indirectly any other amount over and above the amount fixed
as fees. If any other amount is charged, under any other head or guise
eg. Donations the same would amount to charging of capitation fee. The
Governments/appropriate authorities should consider framing
appropriate regulations, if not already framed, where under if it is found
that an institution is charging capitation fees or profiteering that
institution can be appropriately penalised and alsó face the prospect of
losing its recognition/affiliation
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8. It must be mentioned that during arguments it was
pointed out to us that some educational institutions are collecting, in
advance, the fees for the entire course ie for all the years. It was
submitted that this was done because the institute was not sure
whether the student would leave the institute midstream. It was
submitted that if the student left the course in midstream then for the
remaining years the seat would lie vacant and the institute would suffer
In our view an educational institution can only charge prescribed fees
for one semester/year. If an institution feels that any particular student
may leave in midstream then, at the highest, it may require that student
to give a bond/bank guarantee that the balance fees for the whole
course would be received by the institute even if the student left in
midstream. If any educational institution has collected fees in advance,
only the fees of that semester/year can be used by the institution. The
balance fees must be kept invested in fixed deposits in a nationalised
bank. As and when fees fall due for a semester/year only the fees falling
due for that semester/year can be withdrawn by the institution. The rest
must continue to remain deposited till such time that they fall due. At
the end of the course the interest earned on these deposits must be paid
to the student from whom the fees were collected in advance”.
In P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra 6, it is
observed as under:
” Q. 3 Fee, regulation of 139:
To set up a reasonable fee structure is also a component of “the right to
establish and administer an institution” within the meaning of Article
30(1) of the Constitution, as per the law declared in Pai Foundation.
Every institution is free to devise its own fee structure subject to the
limitation that there can be no profiteering and no capitation fee can be
6
2005(6) SCC 537
19
charged directly or indirectly, or in any form (Paras 56 to 58 and 161
[Answer to Q.50] of Pai Foundation are relevant in this regard).
Capitation Fees
140. Capitation fee cannot be permitted to be charged and
no seat can be permitted to be appropriated by payment of capitation
fee. Profession’ has to be distinguished from business’ or a mere
occupation’ While in business, and to a certain extent in occupation,
there is a profit motive, profession is primarily a service to society
wherein earning is secondary or incidental. A student who gets a
professional degree by payment of capitation fee, once qualified as a
professional, is likely to aim more at earning rather than serving and
that becomes a bane to the society. The charging of capitation fee by
unaided minority and non-minority institutions for professional courses
is just not permissible Similarly, profiteering is also not permissible.
Despite the legal position, this Court cannot shut its eyes to the hard
realities of commercialization of education and evil practices being
adopted by many institutions to earn large amounts for their private or
selfish ends. If capitation fee and profiteering is to be checked, the
method of admission has to be regulated so that the admissions are
based on merit and transparency and the students are not exploited. It
is permissible to regulate admission and fee structure for achieving the
purpose just stated
141. Our answer to Question-3 is that every institution is
free to devise its own fee structure but the same can be regulated in the
interest of preventing profiteering. No capitation fee can be charged
Q.4. Committees formed pursuant to Islamic Academy
142. Most vehement attack was laid by all the learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner-applicants on that part of Islamic
Academy which has directed the constitution of two committees dealing
with admissions and fee structure. Attention of the Court was invited to
paras 35,37, 38 45 and 161 (answer to question 9) of Pai Foundation
wherein similar scheme framed in Unni Krishnan was specifically struck
down. Vide para 45, Chief Justice Kirpal has clearly ruled that the
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decision in Unni Krishnan insofar as it framed the scheme relating to
the grant of admission and the fixing of the fee, was not correct and to
that extent the said decision and the consequent directions given to
UGC, AICTE, MCI, the Central and the State Governments etc are
overruled. Vide para 161. Pai Foundation upheld Unni Krishnan to the
extent to which it holds the right to primary education as a fundamental
right, but the scheme was overruled However, the principle that there
should not be capitation fee or profiteering was upheld. Leverage was
allowed to educational institutions to generate reasonable surplus to
meet cost of expansion and augmentation of facilities which would not
amount to profiteering. It was submitted that lalamic Academy has once
again restored such Committees which were done away with by Pai
Foundation.
143. The learned senior counsel appearing for different
private professional institutions, who have questioned the scheme of
permanent Committees set up in the judgment of Islamic Academy, very
fairly do not dispute that even unaided minority institutions can be
subjected to regulatory measures with a view to curb commercialisation
of education, profiteering in it and exploitation of studenta. Policing is
permissible but not nationalization or total take over, submitted Shri
Harish Salve, the learned senior counsel. Regulatory measures to ensure
fairness and transparency in admission procedures to be based on merit
have not been opposed as objectionable though a mechanism other than
formation of Committees in terms of Islamic Academy was insisted on
and pressed for Similarly, it was urged that regulatory measures, to the
extent permissible, may form part of conditions of recognition and
affiliation by the university concerned and/or MCI and AICTE for
maintaining standards of excellence in professional education. Such
measures have also not been questioned as violative of the educational
rights of either minorities or non-minorities.
144. The two committees for monitoring admission
procedure and determining fee structure in the judgment of Islamic
Academy, are in our view, permissive as regulatory measures aimed at
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protecting the interest of the student community as a whole as also the
minorities themselves, in maintaining required standards of professional
education on non- exploitative terms in their institutions. Legal
provisions made by the State Legislatures or the scheme evolved by the
Court for monitoring admission procedure and fee fixation do not violate
the right of minorities under Article 30(1) or the right of minorities and
non-minorities under Article 19(1)(g). They are reasonable restrictions in
the interest of minority institutions permissible under Article 30(1) and
in the interest of general public under Article 19(6) of the Constitution.”
In Modern School v Union Of India 7, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court decided that
” Indisputably, the standard of education, the curricular and
co-curricular activities available to the students and various other
factors are matters which are relevant for determining of the fee
structure. The courts of law having no expertise in the manner and/or
having regard to its own limitations keeping in view the principles of
judicial review always refrain from laying down precise formulae in such
matters. Furthermore, while undertaking such exercises the respective
cases of each institution, their plans and programmes for the future
expansion and several other factors are required to be taken into
consideration. The Constitution Bench in Islamic Academy of Education
(supra) which as noticed hereinbefore subject to making of an
appropriate legislation directed setting up of two committees, one of
which would be for determining fee structure. This Court both in T.M.A.
Pai Foundation (supra) and Islamic Academy of Education (supra) had
upheld the rights of the minorities and unaided private institutions to
generate a reasonable surplus for future development of education”.
7 2004(5) SCC 583 22 In Vasavi Engineering College Parents'
Association v. State of Telangana 8, it is held as under:
” 14. The detailed and elaborate nature of the information
sought by the TAFRC from an educational institution regarding the
proposed fee structure submitted to it under the prescribed guidelines
has already been noticed hereinabove. The TAFRC has also interacted
with the representative of the respondent institutions and sought
clarifications before the final determination by it. The proposition that
the TAFRC is precluded from acting like a chartered accountant
inhibiting scrutiny by it for justification of a proposal submitted to it by
an institution is too wide a proposition fraught with possibilities which
may inhibit the statutory functions of the TAFRC itself making it a
toothless tiger In other words, the examination of the proposal will have
to be done by the TAFRC in a manner commensurate and appropriate to
an educational institution and not by rigid adherence to the abstract
principles of chartered accountancy in general, and which may call for
some flexibility.
15. In our considered opinion, the crux of the controversy is
the jurisdiction and the extent to which the court can examine the
determination of the fee structure by the TAFRC and approved by the
State government, in exercise of the powers of judicial review The
TAFRC, a statutory body headed by a retired High Court Judge, consists
of domain experts from various fields including two from the finance
sector, one of which is from the Government. Rule 3(vii) vests the TAFRC
with the power to frame its own procedure in accordance with
regulations notified by the Government in that regard and pursuant to
which the guidelines for fee fixation have been framed by it. The
recommendations of the TAFRC being the resultant of a quasi-judicial
decision making process, it will undoubtedly be amenable to the
jurisdiction of the court for scrutiny by judicial review, so as to ensure8
(2019) 7 SCC 172
23adherence to the constitutional principles of reasonableness, fairness
and adherence to the law under Article 14 of the Constitution.
16. Judicial review, as is well known, lies against the
decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. If the
decision making process is flawed inter alia by violation of the basic
principles of natural justice, is ultra-vires the powers of the decision
maker, takes into consideration irrelevant materials or excludes relevant
materials, admits materials behind the back of the person to be affected
or is such that no reasonable person would have taken such a decision
in the circumstances, the court may step in to correct the error by
setting aside such decision and requiring the decision maker to take a
fresh decision in accordance with the law. The court, in the garb of
judicial review, cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the decision maker and
make the decision itself. Neither can it act as an appellate authority of
the TFARC
18. It needs no emphasis that complex executive decisions
in economic matters are necessarily empiric and based on
experimentation. Its validity cannot be tested on any rigid principles or
the application of any straitjacket formula. The court while adjudging
the validity of an executive decision in economic matters must grant a
certain measure of freedom or play in the joints to the executive. Not
mere errors, but only palpably arbitrary decisions alone can be
interfered with in judicial review. The recommendation made by a
statutory body consisting of domain experts not being to the satisfaction
of the State Government is an entirely different matter with which we
were not concerned in the present discussion. The court should
therefore be loath to interfere with such recommendation of an expert
body, and accepted by the government, unless it suffers from the vice of
arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity or violates any provisions of the
law under which it is constituted. The court cannot sit as an appellate
authority, entering the arena of disputed facts and figures to opine with
regard to manner in which the TAFRC ought to have proceeded without
any finding of any violation of rules or procedure. If a statutory body has
24not exercised jurisdiction properly the only option is to remand the
matter for fresh consideration and not to usury the powers of the
authority”.
In CONSORTIUM OF ENGINE GOVERNMENT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, it has been observed thus:
” 141. The Capitation Fee Act is a State legislation that
precedes the Unnikrishnan judgment by a decade and fell for
consideration therein. The “free seats” and “payment seats” matrix
propounded in Unnikrishnan with a cross-subsidization formula thrown
in was however not the product of the textual authority of any provision
of the Capitation Fee Act. The classification of seats and the cross-
subsidization methodology was a curial evolved formula integrated in
the scheme evolved in Unnikrishnan.
142. Section 7 enables the Government by notification to
regulate the tuition fee or any other fee that may be levied and collected
by an educational institution in respect of each class of students, and
enjoins that no educational institution shall collect a fee in excess of the
fee notified under sub-section-1 thereof. As the Unni Krishnan scheme
was invalidated in TMA Pai Foundation which also declared the con
tours of operational administrative autonomy of private unaided
educational institutions but preserved authority of the State or its
instrument, the AFRC to regulate a fee structure proposed by a private
unaided educational institution only to ensure exclusion of profiteering
and capitation, the powers consecrated to the State under Section 7
must be interpreted consistent with the redefined architecture of the
State’s regulatory power, post Unnikrishnan and in the legal
environment consequent on TMA Pai Foundation, Islamic Academy of
Education and PA Inamdar.
143. On a grammatical construction of Rule 4 (of the AFRC
Rules) particularly, sub-rules (Hi), (iv)(g) && (v), it is possible to infer
that under the provisions of Section 7 of the Capitation Fee Act read
25with provisions of this Rule, the AFRC is empowered to fix or determine
the fee itself. On a true and fair construction of the pluri-signative
phraseology of Rule 4 and interpreted to confirm to the law declared in
TMA Pai Foundation, Islamic Academy of Education and PA Inamdar
however, the provisions of Section 7 and the prescriptions of Rule – 4
must be read down. PA Inamdar inter alia set out to clarify whether
regulation of fee structure could be taken over by the Committees
ordered to be constituted by the judgment in Islamic Academy of
EducationHeld: ….every institution is free to devise its own fee
structure which may however be regulated to prevent profiteering, no
capitation fee may be charged a committeefor determining fee structure
qua the judgment in Islamic Academy of Education is permissible as a
regulatory measure aimed at protecting the interests of the students
community as a whole and in maintaining the required standards of
professional education on non-exploitative terms in the Institution.
144.This judgment also dealt with the criticism as to the
ham-handed, insensitive and stereo-typical ap-proach by Committees
while dealing with oversight of fee regulation. The observations on this
aspect are found in paras 49 & 150 of PA Inamdar (extracted herein
above)
145. In the light of the principles evolving from TMA Pai
Foundation to PA Inamdar and to sustain the pro-visions of Section – 7
and Rule-4, we consider it appropriate to read down these provisions(1) As enabling the AFRC to consider institution-specific fee proposals,
course-wise on the bases of the parameters indicated in clauses (a) to €
and (g) of sub-rule- (iv) of Rule-4
(ii) to analyze fee proposals to verify whether they incorporate or
camouflage any profiteering or capitation fee and
(iii) to approve, modify or alter the fee structure proposed by each
institution, only for the purpose of excising pro tanto any element of
26profiteering/capitation fee. If fee proposals of an institution, duly
substan-tiated by relevant data, audited accounts and balance-sheets,
do not incorporate elements of profiteering or capitation fee (on
analyses of the proposals within the contours of the guidelines in Rule-
4), the AFRC must accept the same The AFRC cannot transgress the
law declared in TMA Pai Foundation, Islamic Academy of Education
and PA Inamdar (that every institution enjoys the operational
autonomy to devise its own fee structure) by resorting to a
misconceived mission, of formulating a common fee structure for
private unaided educational institutions(1) Section-7 of the Capitation Fee Act (insofar as Regulations issued
thereunder pertain to private unaided educational institutions whether
minority or non-minority), enables issue of Regulation of fee structure
pro- posed by an educational institution, only insofar as modification or
alteration of the proposed fee structure is to ensure that the institution
does not indulge in profiteering or collection of capitation fee Section -7
does not enable the State itself to fix and notify a fee structure that
would impermissibly trench upon the operational autonomy of self-
financing educational institutions
(ii) Section 7 enacts a power coupled with a corresponding
obligation on the State. Therefore, appropriate Regulations must be
issued and executed to ensure oversight and excision of profiteering or
collection of capitation fee by every private unaided educational
institution. Consequently, neither the State nor its instrumentality -the
AFRC, may recommend or notify a fee structure or permit collection of
fee by any unaided private educational institution that does not submit
its fee proposals together with the relevant data (of income and
expenditure, developmental needs and audited books of accounts, for
verification and scrutiny
(iii) Since cross-subsidy of the fee payable by one class of
students by the other is unconstitutional and thus impermissible, the
27
AFRC while calling for applications for recommending the fee structure
and the State Government while notifying the fee structure shall not call
for or notify differential fee structure for different classes of seats, whether
called ‘A’ or ‘B’ categories or otherwise, which does not represent the per
capita cost and therefore incorporates elements of cross-subsidy (iv) The
fee chargeable from every student admitted to a specific course of study in
a specific discipline in each private unaided educational institution shall
reflect the per capita cost of such education, on the parameters
enumerated in rule (iv), clauses (a) to € & (g) of the rules issued in
G.O.Ms.No.6, Higher Education Department, dated 08-01-2007 (The AFRC
Rules)
The AFRC may recommend and the State Government notify a higher fee
for students admitted to 15% of the sanctioned intake in each course of
study in each private unaided educational institution (presently
categorized as NRI/NRI sponsored) so however that the higher (over and
above the fee fixed for generality of seats whether called ‘A’ category or
‘B’ category) fee so collected shall be deposited by the private
educational institution in a separate account to be employed for the
benefit of students from economically weaker sections of society, whom,
on well-defined criteria, the educational institution may admit on
subsidized payment of their fee. To regulate proper utilization and audit
of the amount in this separate account, the State shall issue specific
regulation and till such regulation is issued, the AFRC may formulate
guidelines for identifying the class or category of students in whose
favour the fee subsidy or waiver may be made, duly specifying the
criteria for identifying such student or class of students and the manner
in which the funds from this special account shall be deployed (v)
(vi) The AFRC while issuing a notification calling for fee
proposals shall clearly specify that such proposals should incorporate a
uniform fee for all category of students, whether admitted to ‘A’ or ‘B’
categories and that the proposals may indicate the higher fee proposed to
be charged from NRI/NRIsponsored candidates (and to the limit of 15% of
28
the sanctioned intake) for each course of study in each private unaided
educational institution (vii) Clause (f) of Rule (iv) of the AFRC rules impairs
the operational autonomy available to private unaided educational
institutions, as delineated in the judgments of the Supreme Court in TMA
Pai Foundation, Islamic Academy of Education and PA Inamdar, and is
declared invalid
(viii) The AFRC shall specify in the notification to be issued
(calling for fee proposals from private unaided educational institutions)
that an institution which is unresponsive or does not submit statements of
income and expenditure, audited balance sheets, and requirements for
developmental needs for the immediately preceding year particulars of
expenditure incurred on salaries and infrastructure and other particulars
as may be specified (with supporting bills, vouchers or receipts, etc.), shall
not be permitted to collect any fee. While notifying a fee structure,
exercising power under Section 7of the Capitation Fee Act. The State shall
record a similar stipulation
(ix) The AFRC is required to recommend and the State
Government notify institution-specific fee structure and for the generic
variety of institutions offering different courses of study. Therefore, the
AFRC shall issue notification(s) calling for fee proposals well-in-advance of
commencement of the academic year (whether for fixing block fee
structure, applicable for three academic years or revising fee structure
already notified for any particular academic year), by the first week of
December preceding the relevant academic year for which the fee structure
notification or revision is to be issued by the State Government
(x) Where the AFRC considers it appropriate to outsource
the administrative function of vetting or verification of fee proposals
received from the several private unaided educational institutions (whether
to a chartered accountant firm or otherwise), the details of the functions
entrusted by the AFRC to such agency(ies) shall be placed in the public
domain and published in English and local language newspapers having
sufficient circulation in the State, to enable public information of
particulars of such entrustment
29
(xi) The AFRC shall instruct the agency or agencies (to
whom it entrusts the function of vetting or verification of fee proposals
along with the accompanying records and data) to specifically verify and
identify whether there is an element of profiteering or collection of
capitation fee and to record observations on this aspect, in respect of each
private educational institution which submits fee structure proposals (xii)
Copies of the report/recommendations prepared and forwarded by such
entrusted agency/agencies to the AFRC (which would be the material
considered by the AFRC in formulating its recommendations on institution
specific proposals and these would also be the material for the eventual fee
structure notifications by the State) shall be furnished to each private
unaided educational institution which responds to the AFRC notification
(inviting fee proposals) and has duly submitted the relevant data,
documents and particulars, requisitioned by the AFRC for submission
along with fee proposals
(xiii) The reports/recommendations prepared by the
entrusted agency/agencies and the recommendations by the AFRC
submitted to the State Government shall simultaneously be placed in the
public domain
(xiv) The State Government shall issue the fee structure
notifications by the 1 week of March, preceding the academic year or block
of academic years, as the case may be, for which the fee structure
notifications are intended to apply
(xv) As a consequence of the above analyses, declarations
and directions, the fee structure Notifications is-sued in G.O.Ms. No.76,
Higher Education Department, dated 13-08-2010 G.O.Ms. No.77, Higher
Education Department, dated 13-08-2010 G.O. Ms.No.85, Higher
Education Department, dated 02-08-2011 and G.O.Ms.No.86, Higher
Education Department, dated 04-08-2011 together with the
recommendations of the AFRC contained in Order No.13/AFRC/FF/2010-
11.41, dated 06-08-2010 and Order No. 14/AFRC/FF/2010- 11/552,
dated 07-08-2010, are declared invalid and quashed
30
(xvi) For the academic years 2010-11, 2011-12 & 2012-13,
the AFRC shall now consider afresh the fee structure proposals submitted
by those private educational institutions which have responded (to its
notification dated 27-04-2010) and forwarded fee structure proposals
together with the particulars spelt out by the AFRC in the annexure to the
said notification (either wholly or substantially) and shall verify the same
for identifying whether the proposals incorporate elements of profiteering
or capitation fee (institution and course wise). If any further particulars,
documents, registers or data are required, the AFRC may issue a written
notice to the concerned educational institution to furnish the specified
particulars, documents, registers or data required by it. After scrutiny and
verification of the material available, the AFRC shall draw up a report
containing its recommendations on the fee structure for each course of
study in respect of each responsive institution duly incorporating in its
report the seat-wise cost in respect of each course of study in specific
institutions recommending a uniform fee for ‘A’ & ‘B’ category students.
The AFRC may however recommend a higher fee for 15% of the sanctioned
intake earmarked for NRI/NRI category students. This exercise shall be in
accordance with the observations and directions in this judgment.
(xvii) The State shall notify fee structure proposals afresh for
the academic years 2010-11, 2011-12 & 2012-13 after due consideration
of the recommendations of the AFRC and in the light of the principles and
directions contained in this judgment and
(xviii) The relevant exercise by the AFRC and the State, as
directed in sub- paras (xvi) and (xvii), shall be expeditiously processed and
concluded, including by the issuance of appropriate notifications by the
State, in any case within a period of three (3) months from today The
several writ petitions are allowed as above, but in the circumstances
without costs”.
13. Coming to merits of the matter, to determine fee
structure in educational institutions offering professional
31
courses, it is necessary to look into the relevant statutory
provisions. Section 7 of the Telangana Educational Institutions
(Regulation of Admissions and Prohibition of Capitation Fee)
Act, 1983 (for short, ‘the Act’) relates to regulation of fees. Under
sub-section (1) thereof, it shall be competent for the
Government, by notification, to regulate tuition fee or any other
fee that may be levied and collected by any educational
institution in respect of each class of students. Section 7(2)
stipulates that no educational institution shall collect any fees,
in excess of the fee notified under sub-section (1), Section 7(3)
requires every educational institution to issue an official receipt
for the fee collected by it. Further Section 7 confers power,
coupled with obligation, on the State to issue and execute
appropriate Regulations to ensure every private unaided
educational institution is not profiteering or collection of
capitation Fee (Consortium of Engineering Colleges
Managements Association (CECMA) Section 7, (in so far as
Regulations issued thereunder pertain to private unaided
educational institutions-whether minority or non- minority),
enables issue of Regulations, (in relation to the fee structure
proposed by an educational institution and in so far as
32
modification or alteration of the proposed fee structure is
concerned), in order to ensure that the institution does not
indulge in profiteering or collection of capitation fee. Further,
Section 15 of the 1983 Act relates to the power to make rules
and, under sub-section (1) thereof, the Government may, by
notification, make rules for carrying out all or any of the
purposes of the 1983 Act. In exercise of the powers conferred by
Section 15 read with Sections 3 and 7 of the 1983 Act, the
Telangana Admission and Fee Regulatory Committees (for
professional courses offered in private Un-Aided Professional
Institutions) Rules, 2006 (hereinafter called as ‘the 2006 Rules)
were made and notified in G.O. Ms. No. 6, dated 08.01.2007
Rule 1(ii) of the 2006 Rules stipulates that these Rules shall
apply to all private un-aided professional institutions offering
professional courses in the State. Rule 2(b) defines ‘Admission
and Fee Regulatory Committee’ (AFRC) to mean the committee
constituted by the Government for regulating admissions and
for fixation of fees to be charged from candidates seeking
admission into private un-aided minority and non-minority
professional institutions. Rule 2(h) defines ‘fees’ to mean all fees
including tuition fee and development charges. Rule 2(2)
33
stipulates that words and expressions used, but not defined in
these Rules, shall have the same meaning assigned to them in
the 1983 Act Rule 4 relates to fee fixation and prescribes a
detailed procedure for AFRC to call for information and to fix the
fees. While freedom is given to AFRC to determine the fee
structure, Rule 4(ii) requires AFRC to decide whether fees
proposed by the institution is justified and does not amount to
profiteering or charging capitation fee. Rule 4(iv) requires the
TAFRC to take into consideration the following factors for
prescribing the fees ie (a) location of the professional institution;
(b) nature of the professional course; (c) cost of available
infrastructure; (d) expenditure on administration and
maintenance; € a reasonable surplus required for growth and
development of the professional institution; (f) the revenue
foregone on account of waiver of fee, if any, in respect of
students belonging to schedule castes, schedule tribes and
whenever applicable to the socially and educationally-backward
classes and other economically-weaker sections of society, to
such extent as shall be notified by the Government from time to
time; and (g) any other relevant factor. Under the Proviso to Rule
4(iv), no such fees, as may be fixed by TAFRC, shall amount to
34
profiteering or commercialization of education. It is evident from
Rule 4(iv) of the 2006 Rules that a reasonable surplus, for the
growth and development of professional institution, is also
required to be taken into consideration, by the TAFRC, in
prescribing the fees structure. Rule 4(vi) stipulates that fees or
scale of fees determined by AFRC shall be valid for a period of
three years.
14. It is not in dispute that TAFRC had called for the
expenditure data from each institution and evaluated the same
with the help of charted accountants and other relevant experts;
petitioners have not made any allegation as to the procedure
and process of evaluation adopted by AFRC in determining the
Fee structure. The entire allegation of petitioners is that fee
fixed through impugned GO is exorbitant in comparison to
G.O.Ms.No. 29, dated 02-05-2016, as such, it is clear that
petitioners have not made any allegation as to the procedure
adopted and process of evaluation of fee structure by AFRC.
However, in the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Vasavi Engineering College‘s case (supra),
this Court can interfere only when there is a flaw in decision-
making process inter alia by violation of basic principles of
35
natural justice, but not the merits of the decision itself. The
Hon’ble Apex Court clearly laid down the law in para 16 of the
said judgement that if the decision-maker takes into
consideration irrelevant material or excludes relevant material
or admits material behind the back of the person to be affected
or no reasonable person would have taken such decision in the
circumstances, the Court may step into the error by setting
aside the order. The Hon’ble Apex Court further stated that the
Courts, in the garb of judicial review, cannot reserve the
jurisdiction of the decision-maker and make decision itself. In
other words, this Court cannot examine the reasonableness of
the quantum of fee fixed by the expert body having quasi-
judicial powers. In this regard, the observations made by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in para 19 of the said judgement is relevant.
” 19. It needs no emphasis that complex executive decisions
in economic matters are necessarily empiric and based on
experimentation. Its validity cannot be tested on any rigid principles or
the application of any straitjacket formula. The court while adjudging
the validity of an executive decision in economic matters must grant a
certain measure of freedom or play in the joints to the executive. Not
mere errors, but only palpably arbitrary decisions alone can be
interfered with in judicial review. The recommendation made by a
statutory body consisting of domain experts not being to the satisfaction
of the State Government is an entirely different matter with which we
36were not concerned in the present discussion. The court should
therefore be loath to interfere with such recommendation of an expert
body, and accepted by the government, unless it suffers from the vice of
arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity or violates any provisions of the
law under which it is constituted. The court cannot sit as an appellate
authority, entering the arena of disputed facts and figures to opine with
regard to manner in which the TAFRC ought to have proceeded without
any finding of any violation of rules or procedure If a statutory body has
not exercised jurisdiction properly the only option is to remand the
matter for fresh consideration and not to usurp the powers of the
authority”.
It is to be noted that this Court does not, ordinarily, interfere
with the recommendations made by the 3rd respondent which
were given by a retired High Court Judge and domain experts,
unless there is arbitrariness, perversity and violation of
provisions of law under which it is constituted and this Court
cannot sit as appellate authority. It is to be further noted that
the only stipulation under law, as settled, is that institutions
shall not charge capitation fee or resort to profiteering while
fixing fees and that the 3rd respondent’s job is to ensure that it
does not happen. Though petitioners averred that Respondents
institutions are profiteering, they have chosen to file neither a
pleading nor any material demonstrating profiteering or
charging of capitation fees, when the burden of proving it lies
37
entirely on them. In the instant case, except repeatedly averring
that fee fixed in the impugned GO is arbitrary, nothing has been
pleaded or placed on record to demonstrate how it is arbitrary.
Insofar as the comparison carried out with G.O.Ms. No. 29,
dated 02.05.2016 to the impugned G.O. is concerned, the same
is devoid of any merits. The fee structure for the previous block
period has no bearing on the current determination. It is argued
by respondents that fee fixed under G.O.Ms. No. 29, dated
02.05.2016, was itself flawed and illegal, as it did not adhere to
the parameters prescribed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and
Rule 4(iv) of the TAFRC Rules. Admittedly, the 1st respondent is
bound by the recommendations of the 3rd respondent under
Rule 4(v) of the TAFRC Rules and judicial pronouncements. It
has no Independent authority to alter the recommendations.
Further, paying stipends to postgraduate students is mandated
by law; G.O.Ms. No. 98, dated 01.09.2018 fixes the stipend
between Rs. 44,075/ and Rs. 48,973/- per month for
postgraduate students. In this regard, petitioners’ argument
that stipends compensate for services rendered by students is
dismissed as specious as the services form part of their
education and training, mandatory for awarding degrees and
38
professional preparation. Moreover, stipend often exceeds the
fee collected from Convener Quota students in clinical non-
degree courses and amounts to 80-100% of fees in degree
courses.
15. In view of the above discussion and in the light of
legal position more particularly with reference to the principles
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as to the powers of the
Courts to judicial review of administrative actions and decisions
of the Tribunals, this Court is refraining from interfering with
the impugned GO. It is also to be seen that the allegation of
petitioners that fee fixed through the impugned GO is exorbitant
in comparison to G.O.Ms.No. 29, dated 02-05-2016 and it was
increased from 118.75 to 142% in case of competitive authority
quota seats and from 296.5 to 313.8% in case of management
quota seats of clinical courses. As per G.O.Ms.No. 29, fee for
competitive authority quota seats was Rs. 3,20,000/-; even as
per petitioners, 5 to 10% hike would be reasonable; if it is
calculated with 10% hike per annum, fee in 2023 would be Rs.
6,24,000/- approximately. It is more or less equal to the fee
fixed for competitive authority quota seats through impugned
GO. And there is no increase of 118% to 140%, as stated by
39
petitioners. Hence, even on bare perusal of facts, there is no
merit in the allegation of petitioners All the Writ Petitions are
therefore, liable to be dismissed.
16. The Writ Petitions are accordingly, dismissed. No
costs.
17. Consequently, miscellaneous Applications, if any
shall stand closed.
————————————-
NAGESH BHЕЕМАРАКА, J
27th December 2024
Ksld