Karnataka High Court
Dr. Manjunatha R vs The Secretary To Government Of … on 8 July, 2025
Author: H. T. Narendra Prasad
Bench: H. T. Narendra Prasad
1 R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF JULY 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H. T. NARENDRA PRASAD
WRIT PETITION NO.15289 OF 2025(S-RES)
BETWEEN:
DR MANJUNATH R
S/O LATE RAJAPPA
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS
NO.2, 3RD CROSS,
VEERANJANEYA NAGARA
NEAR GOKUL COLLEGE,
KOLAR-563 101. ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI D ASHWATHAPPA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
6TH FLOOR, M S BUILDING
BENGALURU-560 001.
2. THE VICE CHANCELLOR
THE BENGALURU NORTH UNIVERSITY
TAMAKA, KOLAR-560 103.
3. THE BENGALURU NORTH UNIVERSITY
TAMAKA, KOLAR-560103
REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR. ....RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI VIKAS ROJIPURA, AGA FOR R1:
SRI SHOWRI H R, ADVOCATE FOR R2 & R3)
2THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES
226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
DIRECT TO QUASH THE ORDER BEARING NO. BUVV/
STAFF/AU/SB/36/2024-25 DATED: 09.04.2025 ISSUED BY
THE RESPONDENT NO:3 PRODUCED VIDE ANNEXURE-S
AND ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION, HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 27.06.2025, COMING ON
FOR PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS DAY, THE COURT, MADE
THE FOLLOWING:
CAV ORDER
This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 &
227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order
dated 09.04.2025 passed by respondent No.2 – Vice-
Chancellor, vide Annexure-S, relieving the petitioner
from the post of temporary Guest Lecturer in the
University and also ordered not to accept his
application for appointment to the post of Guest
Lecturer in the respondent – University, for a period of
three years.
2. The petitioner was appointed as a Guest
Lecturer in the Department of Journalism and Mass
3
Communication in Bangalore North University, Kolar,
in the year 2018, for the academic year 2018-19.
After short break, again for the next academic year, a
fresh appointment order has been issued. Likewise, he
was continuing till 2023-24. Last of the appointment
order dated 07.12.2024 vide Annexure-C is for the
academic year 2024-25, for a period of ten months,
with certain conditions. In the academic year 2024-
25, when he was working as a Guest Lecturer in the
University, on allegations, by the impugned order vide
Annexure-S dated 09.04.2025, the petitioner has
been relieved from the service and it was also ordered
not to accept his application for appointment as Guest
Lecturer in the University for a further period of three
years. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner is
before this Court.
4
3. Sri Ashwathappa, learned counsel for the
petitioner has raised the following contentions:
(i) Firstly, the impugned order – Annexure-S is
passed without giving any notice to the petitioner. The
same is in violation of the principles of natural justice
and contrary to the rights guaranteed to the petitioner
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
(ii) Secondly, in the impugned order, there is a
serious allegation made against the petitioner. There
are 12 charges made against the petitioner.
Therefore, the impugned order – Annexure-S is in a
punitive nature and it causes stigma on the petitioner.
Under these circumstances, without giving notice to
the petitioner and without conducting an enquiry, the
impugned order has been passed. Hence, the same is
unsustainable.
(iii) Thirdly, in the impugned order, there is
prohibition for the petitioner to apply for the Guest
5
Lecturer post in the University for a period of three
years from 09.04.2025. Such an order has been
passed without the authority of law, and the same is
contrary to the rights guaranteed to the petitioner
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the
respondents cannot replace one set of temporary
employees by another set of temporary employees.
In support of his contention, he relied on the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case
HARGURPRATAP SINGH vs. STATE OF PUNJAB
AND OTHERS reported in (2007) 13 SCC 292 and
in the case of MANISH GUPTA AND ANOTHER vs.
PRESIDENT, JAN BHAGIDARI SAMITI AND
OTHERS reported in (2022) 15 SCC 540.
(iv) Fourthly, vide Annexure-E dated
30.12.2024, it is alleged that the petitioner has
conducted a press meet and made allegations against
the Higher Education Minister and the Deputy
6
Commissioner. Pursuant to that notice, petitioner
submitted a detailed reply stating that no allegation
has been made against the Minister or the Deputy
Commissioner. As a citizen of this Country and a
resident of Kolar District, since the Kolar District is
declared as a Mines effected area, the grant
sanctioned by the Government has not reached the
needy people, hence, he raised the voice against the
concerned people. No allegation has been made
against the University or the officers of the University.
This action of the petitioner is under the right
guaranteed to him under Article 19 of the Constitution
of India.
(v) Fifthly, the University called for a Syndicate
meeting on 04.02.2025. The agenda in the meeting is
only in respect of the Press statement given by the
petitioner. Without any notice to the members
regarding the other issues and without any agenda,
7
the other issues are also included in the resolution
passed in the Syndicate and there is no material
placed before the Syndicate regarding the other
allegations.
(vi) Sixthly, except the first charge, in respect of
the other charges, no notice has been given to the
petitioner seeking any explanation. In fact, the
petitioner has given an explanation in writing on all
the allegations made against him by the University,
and he has not admitted any allegation and also
stated that he has not conducted any mis-conduct.
(vii) Lastly, some of the charges made in the
impugned order are serious in nature. One of the
allegations is that of harassment of women
employees. Without any materials against the
petitioner and without giving any opportunity, in the
impugned order, it is mentioned that the petitioner
has committed such an offence. Even the matter is
8
also not referred under the Sexual Harassment of
Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and
Redressal) Act, 2013. Hence, he sought to allow the
writ petition.
4. Per contra, Sri Shouri, the learned counsel
appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 raised the
following contentions:
(i) Firstly, the petitioner has not approached this
Court with clean hands. In Annexure-C – appointment
order, in the last page, he has inserted some
paragraphs by manuscript.
(ii) Secondly, the petitioner has been appointed
on a contract basis as a temporary Guest Lecturer for
ten months from 07.12.2024. As per the appointment
order vide Annexure-C, certain conditions have been
mentioned and if there is any violation of the
conditions, his service will be terminated. The
petitioner, accepting the said conditions, joined the
9service. Since he has violated the conditions
mentioned in the appointment order, after following
all procedures of law, he has been relieved from
service.
(iii) Thirdly, the petitioner was making an
allegation against the University and its employees,
but the allegations are not based on any materials.
Since he has damaged the image of the institution, in
the Syndicate meeting, a decision has been taken to
relieve him from the service as per the appointment
order. Thereafter, for each allegation, a specific
notice has been issued to the petitioner and the
petitioner has replied the same. In reply, he has
admitted the allegations. After considering the same,
the matter has been placed before the Syndicate and
on the decision of the Syndicate, the impugned order
has been passed relieving him from service.
Therefore, the petitioner cannot contend that the
10
impugned order is passed without giving any notice to
the petitioner.
(iv) Fourthly, under the University Act and
Statutes, in the Syndicate meeting, with the
permission of the Vice-Chancellor, the other subjects
which are not in the agenda, can be discussed. Some
of the charges made against the petitioner, even
though not in the agenda, on permission of the Vice-
Chancellor, the issue has been discussed and the
resolution has been passed.
(v) Fifthly, when notice has been issued to the
petitioner, in reply, he has admitted the allegations
made in the notice. Under the circumstances, the
enquiry is not required. In support of his contentions,
he relied on the judgment of the Kerala High Court in
the case of P.K.THANKACHAN vs. THALANADU
SERVICE CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD. AND
ANOTHER reported in (1994) SCC Online Kerala
11
31 and in the case of MANJUNATHA GOWDA vs.
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CENTRAL RESERVE
POLICE FORCE reported in 1994 SCC Online
Kar.283 and judgment of the Apex Court in the case
of CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA LTD. vs.
KARUNAMOY BANERJEE reported in AIR 1968 SC
266.
(vi) Sixthly, since the petitioner is a temporary
Guest Lecturer, he cannot claim that, in view of Article
311 of the Constitution of India, an enquiry has to be
conducted before termination. In support of his
contention, he relied on the order passed by Jammu
and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court in WP(C)
No.3932/2019 decided on 11.07.2023 and the order
passed by the Delhi High Court in WP (C)
No.12186/2016 decided on 13.02.2018 and the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of UNION
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION vs. GIRISH
12
JAYANTI LAL VAGHELA AND OTHERS reported in
(2006) 2 SCC 482.
(vii) Lastly, even if this Court allows the writ
petition, and the matter is remanded back to the
respondents for fresh enquiry, this Court cannot direct
to reinstate the petitioner. In support of his
contention, he relied on the judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND OTHERS vs. RAJIT SINGH reported in (2022)
15 SCC 254 and in the case of STATE OF HARYANA
AND ANOTHER vs. JAGDISH CHANDER reported in
(1995) 2 SCC 567. Hence, he sought for dismissing
the writ petition.
5. In rejoinder, learned counsel for the petitioner
has contended that before passing the impugned
order – Annexure-S, terminating the service of the
petitioner, no notice has been given to the petitioner
and contended that even in the Syndicate meeting,
13
there is no agenda in respect of the allegation made
by the University in the impugned order. He also
produced Annexures V and V1 – the statements given
by the Syndicate members before the police. In
respect of the allegations made against the petitioner,
there was no discussion in the meeting and there is no
agenda and members have not been given any prior
notice to discuss about the agenda. Therefore, he
contended that some of the issues which have been
mentioned in the resolution were inserted only with
the intention to terminate the petitioner from service.
6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the petition papers.
7. The petitioner was appointed as a Guest
Lecturer in the Department of Journalism and Mass
Communication in Bangalore North University, Kolar,
in the year 2018, for the academic year 2018-19.
14
After short break, again for the next academic year, a
fresh appointment order has been issued. Likewise, he
was continuing till 2023-24. Last of the appointment
order dated 07.12.2024 vide Annexure-C is for the
academic year 2024-25, for a period of ten months,
with certain conditions. When he was working as a
Guest Lecturer, on the basis of the serious allegations,
the impugned order vide Annexure-S has been passed
and he has been terminated from service and it was
also ordered not to accept his application for the post
of Guest Lecturer for a period of three years.
8. I have perused the impugned order vide
Annexure-S dated 09.04.2025. There are 12
allegations made against the petitioner, and all the
allegations are serious in nature. The first allegation
is that the petitioner has made a newspaper
statement and made allegations against the Deputy
Commissioner and the Higher Education Minister. In
15
respect of the first allegation is concerned, notice has
been issued vide Annexure-E dated 30.12.2024. The
petitioner submitted his reply as per Annexure-F dated
31.12.2024, stating that the petitioner is a resident of
Kolar District, and the said District is declared as Mine
Affected Areas, the grant sanctioned to the District on
that account was utilised by the Deputy Commissioner
erratically, and no useful provision was made to the
public of the district. The Higher Education Minister,
who also belongs to the same district has not taken
any positive initiative towards the welfare of the
citizens of the district in any manner. By looking into
the allegations and the reply submitted by the
petitioner, it is very clear that he has not made any
allegation against the University or officers of the
University. As the resident of the Kolar District, in the
public interest, has made the paper statement since it
is the right guaranteed to the petitioner under Article
16
19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the
newspaper statement made by the petitioner is not
misconduct. Even the U.S. Supreme Court in Pickering
vs. Board of Education (20th Law Edition, Volume 20 of
Second Series of Lawyers Edition United States
Supreme Court report Page 811), has held as follows:
“Termination of service of a public school
teacher on the basis of a letter written to the
editor of a local newspaper criticising the way
in which the Board of Education and the
Superintendent of Schools had handled past
proposals to raise new revenue for the schools
came up for consideration. The Board of
Education-the employer – had held that the
publication of the letter was detrimental to the
employer, and that the interests of the school
required the teacher’s dismissal. The Circuit
Court of Will County, Illinois and the Supreme
Court of Illinois upheld the dismissal. But, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the
State Supreme Court decision holding that:
“in a case like this, absent proof of false
statements knowingly or recklessly made by
17him, a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak
on issues of public importance may not furnish
the basis for his dismissal, from public
employment.”
9. Even the Apex Court in the case of
KAMESHWAR PRASAD AND OTHERS vs. STATE
OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER reported in AIR 1962
SC 1166 has held that Rule 4-A of the Bihar
Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956,
prohibiting “any form of demonstrations” is violation
of the fundamental right guaranteed under Articles.
19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India. It
was held that:
“Broadly stated that a demonstration is a
visible manifestation of the feelings or
sentiments of an individual or a group. It is
thus a communication of one’s ideas to others
to whom it is intended to be conveyed. It is in
effect, therefore, a form of speech or of
expression, because speech need not be vocal
18since signs made by a dumb person would also
be a form of speech.”
It was held that demonstrations which were not
disorderly or violent would be protected by the
guaranteed freedom of speech, and only such
demonstrations as were disorderly or violent could be
prohibited in exercise of the power under Article 19(2)
of the Constitution of India.
10. Therefore, from the above judgment, it is
very clear that the statement made by the petitioner
in the newspaper is in the interest of public and he
has a right under Article 19(1) of the Constitution of
India.
11. In respect of the other allegations are
concerned, there are 11 allegations made against the
petitioner, they are all serious allegations. For only
two allegations, they have given a notice, that too,
19
without providing any materials. For that, the
petitioner has given explanation. He has not admitted
any allegations made against him. The allegations
made against the petitioner in the impugned
termination order are extracted below:
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30
12. The impugned termination order is stigmatic
and the same has been passed without giving any
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is well
settled law that, if the order of termination is
stigmatic, the principle of natural justice has to be
followed. After hearing the parties, an order has to be
passed.
13. The contention of the learned counsel
appearing for the respondent – University is that the
petitioner is a contract employee and conducting an
enquiry is not necessary. As per the terms of the
contract, notice has been given. After considering his
reply, the impugned order has been passed.
14. In view of the above, the point for
consideration in this petition is,
Can the Vice-Chancellor terminate the
service of the contract employee without giving
any proper opportunity of hearing to the
31
employee when the order of termination is not
termination simplicitor, it is ex-facie stigmatic?
15. The learned counsel for the respondents
contended that the contract employees are not
holding civil posts, they can be terminated without
giving any personal hearing. In support of his
contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of UNION PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION (supra).
16. In this case, respondent No.1 was appointed
as Drugs Inspector on short term contract basis for a
period of six months. The appointment was renewed
after every short breaks and continued for over five
years. In the meantime, Notification was issued for
selection to the post of Drugs Inspectors and the
Recruitment Rule was amended. The upper age limit
of 30 years was relaxed for the Government servant
upto five years. The respondent No.1 also claimed the
32
same benefit, but it was denied. He has challenged
the same before the Court. In the meantime, regular
appointment was made and the respondent No.1’s
term has come to an end and it was not continued. In
that case, the Apex Court has held that he is not a
Government servant, he cannot seek protection under
Article 311 of the Constitution of India. But in the
case on hand, the petitioner was terminated by a
stigmatic order, without giving personal hearing.
17. A three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in
the case of DR.VIJAYA KUMARAN C.P.V. vs.
CENTRAL UNIVERSITY OF KERALA AND OTHERS
reported in (2020) 12 SCC 426 in respect of
probationary employees are concerned, held that the
termination order was stigmatic and could be issued
only after subjecting the appellant to regular enquiry
as per the Service Rules. The relevant portion at
paragraph Nos. 7 to 12 are extracted below:
33
“7. Accordingly, the moot question before
us is whether the order dated 30-11-2017 can
be regarded as order of termination simpliciter
or is ex facie stigmatic? Going by the tenor of
the stated order, it is incomprehensible as to
how the same can be construed as termination
simpliciter, when it has made the report of the
inquiry conducted by the Internal Complaints
Committee and the decision of the Executive
Council dated 30-11-2017 as the foundation, in
addition to the ground of academic
performance. Had it been a case of mere
unsatisfactory academic performance, the
situation would have been entirely different.
The stated order not only adverts to the report
of the Internal Complaints Committee, but also
the decision taken by the Executive Council,
which in turn highlights the fact that the
appellant had to face an inquiry before the
Committee in reference to the allegations of
serious misconduct committed by him.
Notably, the appellant has been subjected to a
formal inquiry before the Committee
constituted under statutory regulations to
inquire into the allegations bordering on moral
turpitude or misconduct committed by the
34appellant and that inquiry culminated in a
finding of guilt against the appellant with
recommendation of the Executive Council to
proceed against the appellant as per the
service rules. In such a situation, it is
unfathomable to construe the order as order of
termination simpliciter.
8. It is well-established position that the
material which amounts to stigma need not be
contained in the order of termination of the
probationer, but might be contained in “any
document referred to in the termination order”.
Such reference may inevitably affect the future
prospects of the incumbent and if so, the order
must be construed as ex facie stigmatic order
of termination. A three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Indra Pal Gupta v. Model Inter College
had occasion to deal with somewhat similar
situation. In that case, the order of termination
referred to the decision of the Managing
Committee and subsequent approval by the
competent authority as the basis for
termination. The resolution of the Managing
Committee in turn referred to a report of the
Manager which indicated serious issues and
35
that was made the basis for the decision by the
Committee to terminate probation of the
employee concerned.
9. Relying on the aforementioned decision, the
Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra
Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences,
observed as follows: (Dipti Prakash Banerjee
case, SCC pp. 75-76, paras 32-35)
“32. The next question is whether the
reference in the impugned order to the three
earlier letters amounts to a stigma if those
three letters contained anything in the nature
of a stigma even though the order of
termination itself did not contain anything
offensive.
33. Learned counsel for the appellant relies
upon Indra Pal Gupta v. Model Inter College³
decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court.
In b that case, the order of termination of
probation, which is extracted in the judgment,
reads as follows: (SCC p. 386, para 1)
36
‘1…. With reference to the above (viz.
termination of service as Principal), I have to
mention that in view of Resolution No. 2 of the
Managing Committee dated 27-4-1969 (copy
enclosed) and subsequent approval by the
DIOS, Bulandshahr you are hereby informed
that your service as Principal of this Institution
is terminated….’
Now the copy of the resolution of the Managing
Committee appended to the order of
termination stated that the report of the
Manager was read at the meeting and that the
facts contained in the report of the Manager
being serious and not in the interests of the
institution, that therefore the Committee
unanimously resolved to terminate his
probation. The report of the Manager was not
extracted in the enclosure to the termination
order but was extracted in the counter filed in
the case and read as follows: (SCC p. 388,
para 3)
3….”It will be evident from the above that the
Principal’s stay will not be in the interest of the
Institution. It is also evident that the
37
seriousness of the lapses is enough to justify
dismissal but no educational institution should
take all this botheration. As such my
suggestion is that our purpose will be served
by termination of his services. Why, then, we
should enter into any botheration. For this i.e.
for termination of his period of probation, too,
the approval of the DIOS will be necessary.
Accordingly, any delay in this matter may also
be f harmful to our interests.
Accordingly I suggest that instead of taking
any serious action, the period of probation of
Shri Inder Pal Gupta be terminated without
waiting for the period to end.”‘
It was held by Venkataramiah, J. (as he then
was) (p. 392) that the letter of termination
referred to the resolution of the Managing
Committee, that g the said resolution was
made part of the order as an enclosure and
that the resolution in its turn referred to the
report of the Manager. A copy of the Manager’s
report had been filed along with the counter
and the said report was the “foundation”.
Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) held that
38
the Manager’s report contained words
amounting to a stigma. The learned Judge
said: “This is a clear case where the order of
termination issued is merely a camouflage for
un order imposing a penalty of termination of
service on the ground of misconduct…’, that
these findings in the Manager’s report
amounted to a “mark of disgrace or infamy”
and that the appellant there was visited with
evil consequences. The officer was reinstated
with all the benefits of back wages and
continuity of service.
34. It will be seen from the above case that
the resolution of the Committee was part of
the termination order being an enclosure to it.
But the offensive part was not really contained
in the order of termination nor in the resolution
which was an enclosure to the order of
termination but in the Manager’s report which
was referred to in the enclosure. The said
report of the Manager was placed before the
Court along with the counter. The allegations
in the Manager’s report were the basis for the
termination and the said report contained
39words amounting to a stigma. The termination
order was, as stated above, set aside.
35. The above decision is, in our view, a clear
authority for the proposition that the material
which amounts to stigma need not be
contained in the order of termination of the
probationer but might be contained in any
document referred to in the termination order
or in its annexures. Obviously, such a
document could be asked for or called for by
any future employer of the probationer. In
such a case, the order of termination would
stand vitiated on the ground that no regular
enquiry was conducted. We shall presently
consider whether, on the facts of the case
before us, the documents referred to in the
impugned order contain any stigma.”
10. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay
Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences, the Court
observed thus: (SCC p. 528, para 21)
“21. One of the judicially evolved tests to
determine whether in substance an order of
termination is punitive is to see whether prior
40
to the termination there was (a) a full-scale
formal enquiry (6) into allegations involving
moral turpitude or misconduct which (c)
culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three
factors are present the termination has been
held to be punitive irrespective of the form of
the termination order. Conversely if any one of
the three factors is missing, the termination
has been upheld.”
11. In the present case, all the three elements
are attracted, as a result of which it must
follow that the stated order is ex facie
stigmatic and punitive. Such an order could be
issued only after subjecting the incumbent to a
regular inquiry as per the service rules. As a
matter of fact, the Internal Complaints
Committee had recommended to proceed
against the appellant appropriately but the
Executive Council proceeded under the
mistaken belief that in terms of Clause 7 of the
contract, it was open to the Executive Council
to terminate the services of the appellant
without a formal regular inquiry as per the
service rules. Indisputably, in the present case,
the Internal Complaints Committee was
41
constituted in reference to the complaints
received from the girl students about the
alleged misconduct committed by the
appellant, which allegations were duly inquired
into in a formal inquiry after giving opportunity
to the appellant and culminated with the report
recording finding against the appellant with
recommendation to proceed against him.
12. Upon receipt of complaints from aggrieved
women (girl students of the University) about
the sexual harassment at workplace (in this
case, University campus), it was obligatory on
the Administration to refer such complaints to
the Internal Committee or the Local
Committee, within the stipulated time period
as predicated in Section 9 of the Sexual
Harassment of Women at Workplace
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act,
2013 (for short “the 2013 Act”). Upon receipt
of such complaint, an inquiry is required to be
undertaken by the Internal Committee or the
Local Committee in conformity with the
stipulations in Section 11 of the 2013 Act. The
procedure for conducting such inquiry has also
been amplified in the 2015 Regulations. Thus
42
understood, it necessarily follows that the
inquiry is a formal inquiry required to be
undertaken in terms of the 2015 Regulations.
The allegations to be inquired into by such
Committee being of “sexual harassment”
defined in Section 2(n) read with Section 3 of
the 2013 Act and being a serious matter
bordering on criminality, it would certainly not
be advisable to confer the benefit on such
employee by merely passing a simple order of
termination. Such complaints ought to be
taken to its logical end by not only initiating
departmental or regular inquiry as per the
service rules, but also followed by the other
actions as per law. In such cases, a regular
inquiry or departmental action as per service
rules is also indispensable so as to enable the
employee concerned to vindicate his position
and establish his innocence. We say no more.
18. Even in the latest decision of the Apex Court
in the case of SWATI PRIYADARSHINI vs. STATE
OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS reported in
2024 SCC Online SC 2139, in which, the ratio laid
down by the Apex Court is to the effect that even for
43contractual appointment, if any stigmatic order is to
be passed, it has to be passed after holding a proper
enquiry and after giving due opportunity of hearing to
the concerned employee. The relevant portion is at
paragraph 34, which is extracted below:
“34. It is profitable to refer to what five
learned Judges of this Court laid down in
Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1957
SCC OnLine SC 5:
“28. The position may, therefore, be summed
up as follows: Any and every termination of
service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction
in rank. A termination of service brought about
by the exercise of a contractual right is not per
se dismissal or removal, as has been held by
this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of
India [(1953) 1 SCC 420: 1953 SCR 655].
Likewise the termination of service by
compulsory retirement in terms of a specific
rule regulating the conditions of service is not
tantamount to the infliction of a punishment
and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also
been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State
of Uttar Pradesh [(1954) 1 SCC 572: (1955) 1
44SCR 26). In either of the two abovementioned
cases the termination of the service did not
carry with it the penal consequences of loss of
pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the
Fundamental Rules. It is true that the
misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other
disqualification may be the motive or the
inducing factor which influences the
Government to take action under the terms of
the contract of employment or the specific
service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists,
under the contract or the rules, to terminate
the service the motive operating on the mind
of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said
in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India, [58 Bom
LR 673: AIR 1956 Bom 455] wholly irrelevant.
In short, if the termination of service is
founded on the right flowing from contract or
the service rules then, prima facie, the
termination is not a punishment and carries
with it no evil consequences and so Article 311
is not attracted. But even if the Government
has, by contract or under the rules, the right to
terminate the employment without going
through the procedure prescribed for inflicting
the punishment of dismissal or removal or
45reduction in rank, the Government may,
nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and
if the termination of service is sought to be
founded on misconduct, negligence,
inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a
punishment and the requirements of Article
311 must be complied with. As already stated
if the servant has got a right to continue in the
post, then, unless the contract of employment
or the rules provide to the contrary, his
services cannot be terminated otherwise than
for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or
other good and sufficient cause. A termination
of the service of such a servant on such
grounds must be a punishment and, therefore,
a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it
operates as a forefeiture of his right and he is
visited with the evil consequences of loss of
pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma
on the officer affecting his future career. A
reduction in rank likewise may be by way of
punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If
the government servant has a right to a
particular rank, then the very reduction from
that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will
then lose the emoluments and privileges of
46that rank. If, however, he has no right to the
particular rank, his reduction from an
officiating higher rank to his substantive lower
rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But
the mere fact that the servant has no title to
the post or the rank and the Government has,
by contract, express or implied, or under the
rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post
does not mean that an order of reduction of a
servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any
circumstances be a punishment. The real test
for determining whether the reduction in such
cases is or is not by way of punishment is to
find out if the order for the reduction also visits
the servant with any penal consequences. Thus
if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture
of his pay or allowances or the loss of his
seniority in his substantive rank or the
stoppage or postponement of his future
chances of promotion, then that circumstance
may indicate that although in form the
Government had purported to exercise its right
to terminate the employment or to reduce the
servant to a lower rank under the terms of the
contract of employment or under the rules, in
truth and reality the Government has
47terminated the employment as and by way of
penalty. The use of the expression “terminate”
or “discharge” is not conclusive. In spite of the
use of such innocuous expressions, the court
has to apply the two tests mentioned above,
namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to
the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has
been visited with evil consequences of the kind
hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies
either of the two tests then it must be held
that the servant has been punished and the
termination of his service must be taken as a
dismissal or removal from service or the
reversion to his substantive rank must be
regarded as a reduction in rank and if the
requirements of the rules and Article 311,
which give protection to government servant
have not been complied with, the termination
of the service or the reduction in rank must be
held to be wrongful and in violation of the
constitutional right of the servant.”
19. The Apex Court in the case of U.P. STATE
ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS
48
vs. BRIJESH KUMAR AND OTHERS reported in
(2024) SCC Online SC 2282, held as below:
“19.The services of the respondent have
been determined solely on the ground of
misconduct as alleged but without holding any
regular inquiry or affording any opportunity of
hearing to him. The termination order has
been passed on the basis of some report which
probably was not even supplied to the
respondent. No show cause notice appears to
have been issued to the respondent. Therefore,
the order of termination of his services, even if
on contractual basis, has been passed on
account of alleged misconduct without
following the Principles of Natural Justice. The
termination order is apparently stigmatic in
nature which could not have been passed
without following the Principles of Natural
Justice.”
20. From the above judgment, it is very clear that
the order of termination of service of contract
employee is stigmatic. Before passing such an order,
the authority is required to conduct an enquiry by
49
giving an opportunity of hearing to the employee. In
the case on hand, in the impugned order, there are
serious allegations made against the petitioner. The
termination order at Annexure-S is stigmatic and the
same is passed without hearing the petitioner.
Therefore, the said order requires to be set aside and
the matter requires to be sent back to the respondent
– University for re-consideration. The point for
consideration is answered accordingly.
21. The learned counsel for the respondent –
University submitted that, even if this Court allows the
writ petition and if the matter is sent back to the
respondent – University for fresh enquiry, there
cannot be a direction to re-instate the petitioner into
the service. In support of his contention, he relied on
the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of
RAJIT SINGH (supra) and JAGDISH CHANDER
(supra).
50
22. But, in the judgment of three Judge Bench of
the Apex Court in the case of DR.VIJAYAKUMARAN
C.P.V. (supra), the Apex Court held as follows:
“13. A priori, we have no hesitation in
concluding that the impugned termination
order dated 30-11-2017 is illegal-being ex
facie stigmatic as it has been issued without
subjecting the appellant to a regular inquiry as
per the service rules. On this conclusion, the
appellant would stand reinstated, but whether
he should be granted back wages and other
benefits including placing him under
suspension and proceeding against him by way
of departmental or regular inquiry as per the
service rules, is, in our opinion, a matter to be
taken forward by the authority concerned in
accordance with law. We do not intend to issue
any direction in that regard keeping in mind
the principle underlying the exposition of the
Constitution Bench in ECIL. v. B. Karunakar. In
that case, the Court was called upon to decide
as to what should be the incidental order to be
passed by the Court in case after following
necessary procedure, the Court/Tribunal was
51to set aside the order of punishment. The
Court observed thus:(SCC p. 758. para 31)
“31…. Where after following the above
procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the
order of punishment, the proper relief that
should be granted is to direct reinstatement of
the employee with liberty to the authority/ g
management to proceed with the inquiry, by
placing the employee under suspension and
continuing the inquiry from the stage of
furnishing him with the report. The question
whether the employee would be entitled to the
back wages and other benefits from the date of
his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if
ultimately ordered, should invariably he left to
be decided by the authority concerned
according to law, after the culmination of the
proceedings and depending on the final
outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh
inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the
authority should be at liberty to decide
according to law how it will treat the period
from the date of dismissal till the
reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and
the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled.
The reinstatement made as a result of the
52setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish
the report, should be treated as a
reinstatement for the purpose of holding the
fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the
report and no more, where such fresh inquiry
is held. That will also be the correct position in
law.”
Following the principle underlying the above
quoted exposition, we proceed to hold that
even though the impugned order of
termination dated 30.11.2017 is set aside in
terms of this judgment, as a result of which
the appellant would stand reinstated, but at
the same time, due to flawed approach of the
respondent No. 1 – University, the entitlement
to grant backwages is a matter which will be
subject to the outcome of further action to be
taken by the University as per the service rules
and in accordance with law.
23. In view of the above, the following order is
passed:
(i) The writ petition is allowed.
53
(ii) The impugned order dated 09.04.2025 vide
Annexure-S, passed by respondent No.2 is set aside.
(iii) The respondent – University is directed to
re-instate the petitioner into service.
(iv) The liberty is reserved to the respondent –
University to conduct an enquiry afresh, in accordance
with law.
Sd/-
(H T NARENDRA PRASAD)
JUDGE
CM/-
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