Kerala High Court
Dr. Mathew A. Kuzhalnadan vs Pinarayi Vijayan on 28 March, 2025
Author: K.Babu
Bench: K. Babu
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
1
'C.R'
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. BABU
FRIDAY, THE 28TH DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 7TH CHAITHRA, 1947
CRL.REV.PET NO. 588 OF 2024
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT DATED 06.05.2024 IN CRMP NO.326
OF 2024 OF ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL JUDGE
(VIGILANCE), THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
REVISION PETITIONER/COMPLAINANT:
DR. MATHEW A. KUZHALNADAN,
AGED 45 YEARS,
KUZHALNATU HOUSE, PAINGATTOOR P.O.,
MOOVATTUPUZHA, KERALA, PIN - 686671
BY ADVS.
BINCY JOB
KURIAKOSE VARGHESE
V.SHYAMOHAN
SRADHAXNA MUDRIKA
KAVERI MOHAN
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENT NO.1-7:
1 *PINARAYI VIJAYAN,
CLIFF HOUSE, NANTHANCODE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695003
*AMENDMENT OF CAUSE TITLE OF RESPONDENT NO.1
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
2
PINARAYI VIJAYAN,
CHIEF MINISTER OF KERALA, CLIFF HOUSE,
NANTHANCODE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695003
(AMENDED AS PER ORDER DATED 04/07/24 IN
CRL.M.A.3/2024 OF CRL.R.P. 588/2024),
PIN - 695003
2 M/S. COCHIN MINERALS AND RUTILE LTD.
MARKET ROAD, ALWAYE, ERNAKULAM
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR,
SATHIVILAS NARAYAN KARTHA SASIDHARAN KARTHA,
PIN - 683101
3 SATHIVILAS NARAYAN KARTHA SASIDHARAN KARTHA,
MANAGING DIRECTOR,
M/S. COCHIN MINERALS AND RUTILE LTD.,
MARKET ROAD, ALWAYE, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 683101
4 M/S. KERALA MINERALS AND METALS LIMITED,
REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER, NH66,
SANKARAMANGALAM CHAVARA,
KOLLAM DISTRICT, PIN - 691583
5 M/S. INDIAN RARE EARTHS LTD.,
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR,
RARE EARTH DIVISION, UDYOGAMANDAL P.O.,
ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 683501
6 M/S. EXALOGIC SOLUTION PVT. LTD.
1051, 7TH MAIN, 80FT ROAD, KORAMANGALA,
BANGALORE
REPRESENTED BY MRS. VEENA THAIKANDIYIL,
PIN - 560034
7 MRS. VEENA THAIKANDIYIL,
PRAVIK, PINARAYI P.O.,
KANNUR,
FOUNDER AND OWNER OF EXALOGIC SOLUTIONS PVT.LTD.,
1051, 7TH MAIN, 80FT ROAD, KORAMANGALA,
BANGALORE,
PIN - 560034
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
3
8 *STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM,
KERALA -682031
*(IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 04/07/24 IN
CRL.M.A.2/2024 OF CRL.R.P. 588/24)
BY ADVS.
GILBERT GEORGE CORREYA
RAFIQ P.M.
LATHA ANAND
GOPIKRISHNAN NAMBIAR M
P.VIJAYA BHANU (SR.)(K/421/1984)
AJEESH K.SASI(K/166/2006)
M.REVIKRISHNAN(K/1268/2004)
RAHUL SUNIL(K/000608/2017)
NIKITA J. MENDEZ(K/2364/2022)
NANDITHA S.(K/000498/2024)
SRUTHY N. BHAT(K/000579/2017)
SOHAIL AHAMMED HARRIS P.P.(K/1395/2020)
SRUTHY K.K(K/117/2015)
K.JOHN MATHAI(K/413/1984)
JOSON MANAVALAN(J-526)
KURYAN THOMAS(K/131/2003)
PAULOSE C. ABRAHAM(MAH/58/2006)
RAJA KANNAN(K/356/2008)
SHRI.P.NARAYANAN, SPL. G.P. TO DGP AND ADDL. P.P.
SHRI.SAJJU.S., SENIOR G.P.
SRI.T.A.SHAJI, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PROSECUTION
THANUSHREE DAMODARAN(K/1566/2022)
S.VISHNU (ARIKKATTIL)(K/986/2012)
ABHIJITH M.A(K/001523/2021)
SRI.A.RAJESH, SPL GP
SMT.REKHA.S, SENIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY
HEARD ON 28.03.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
4
'C.R'
K.BABU, J.
--------------------------------------
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
---------------------------------------
Dated this the 28th day of March, 2025
ORDER
The challenge in this Criminal Revision Petition is to the order
dated 06.05.2024 in Crl.M.P No.326/2024 on the file of the Court of
the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thiruvananthapuram.
The revision petitioner is the complainant.
2. The learned Special Judge rejected the complaint, holding
that no offence was made out of the complaint and the other
materials produced by the complainant.
The allegations in the complaint.
3. Respondent No.1 in the complaint is the Chief Minister of
Kerala. Respondent No.7 is his daughter. The one-person company
owned by respondent No.7 is respondent No.6. Respondent No.2 is
M/s Cochin Minerals and Rutile Ltd (CMRL). Respondent No.3 is the
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
5
Managing Director of CMRL. Respondent No.4 is M/S Kerala
Minerals and Metals Limited (KMML). Respondent No.5 is M/S
Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL).
3.1. CMRL was incorporated on 18.08.1999. It requires 1 Lakh
metric ton ilmenite per annum for its regular production. Though
IREL had assured that it would supply the required quantity of
ilmenite, it was not honoured after 1999-2000. Since then, CMRL
has been importing low-quality ilmenite from abroad and incurring
losses. CMRL incorporated M/S Kerala Rare Earth and Minerals
Ltd (KREML) on 17.08.2001 with the object of commencing Mining
Project in Kerala. KREML purchased 20.84 hectares of land at
Lakshmithoppu in Thrikkunnapuzha Village and 3.67 hectares of
land in Arattupuzha Village. The lands were purchased for the
mining of minerals and for setting up the mineral complexes.
KREML is shown as a joint venture company. CMRL owns 49% of
KREML’s shares. 7% of shares are owned by CMRL Associates.
20% of the shares are with IREL, and 11% are with KSIDC. The
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
6
remaining 30% is with various financial institutions.
3.2. On 15.09.2004, the Department of Industries, Government
of Kerala, granted mining leases to KREML to extract minerals
from the Kerala coast. But the lease was cancelled on 25.09.2004.
The Government of Kerala also rejected other mining applications
filed by KREML after obtaining concurrence from the Ministry of
Mines. The orders passed by the Government of Kerala were
challenged before the Ministry of Mines, Government of India, in
revision. The Ministry of Mines, Government of India, set aside the
orders passed by the Government of Kerala and directed to
reconsider the matter. The Government of Kerala reiterated its
earlier order in the light of its Industrial Policy of 2007. KREML
challenged this order before the High Court. The Court quashed the
orders of the Government. The Government challenged the order
of this Court before the Supreme Court. In the meanwhile, as per
the order dated 20.02.2019, the Government of India amended the
Atomic Minerals Concession Rules, 2016, whereby mining of beach
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
7
sand minerals by private companies was prohibited. As per the
order dated 19.03.2019, the Chief Controller of Mines, Government of
India, decided that the mining lease can invariably be granted to
Government companies or Corporations only. The Chief Controller
also directed the premature termination of all existing mineral
concessions of beach sand minerals by private persons or
companies in India.
3.3. On 25.05.2016, respondent No.1 became the Chief Minister
of Kerala. During December 2016, CMRL entered into an agreement
to obtain IT and Marketing Consultancy Services from respondent
No.7. In March 2017, CMRL entered into another agreement with
respondent No.6. Based on this agreement, CMRL has agreed to
pay Rs.5 Lakhs per month to respondent No.7 and Rs.3 Lakhs per
month to respondent No.6-Company. Payments were made as
agreed. Neither respondent No.6 nor respondent No.7 provided any
services to CMRL. But they received Rs.1.72 Crores based on the
agreement with CMRL. These amounts were received by
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
8
respondent No.1 through his daughter (respondent No.7). BY
receiving these amounts through respondent Nos.6 and 7,
respondent No.1 has enriched himself unlawfully. These payments
were revealed to the Income Tax Department when the competent
officials raided the office of the CMRL in 2019. In the proceedings
before the Interim Board for Settlement under the Income Tax Act,
the Chief Finance Officer of CMRL revealed that respondent Nos.6
and 7 had not provided any service to them and CMRL was making
payments to various functionaries, members of various political
parties, media houses, police officials etc, for the smooth
functioning of their business, especially in view of the fact that they
obtained ilmenite, which is mined by Public Sector Undertakings as
their raw materials, which in turn caused adverse environmental
impact.
3.4. A man-made flood disaster was created in 2018 to help
KREML and CMRL. Thereafter, in the guise of Disaster
Management, the Government decided to remove the sand bar
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
9
formed on the Thottappally Spillway Mouth in the pretext of
protecting the Kuttanad area. An order was passed on 31.05.2019
allowing KMML to remove mineral sand from Thottappally Spillway
Mouth at the rate of Rs.464.55 per M3, excluding GST, excavation
and dredging charges. This was the highest amount offered by
KMML. While issuing this order, the prevailing rate of minerals per
M3 was purposefully not considered. The contract was granted for
a low rate. The sand mined by KMML was supplied to CMRL, which
was a favour given by the Government to the company. This was in
consideration of the amount received by respondent Nos.6 and 7
without providing any service to CMRL.
3.5. The Taluk Land Board initiated proceedings against
KREML. The company submitted applications seeking exemption
from ceiling limit as provided in Section 81 (3) of the Kerala Land
Reforms Act, 1963. Those applications were rejected by the
Government several times earlier. After the agreement between
respondent Nos.6 and 7 with CMRL, KREML initiated fresh attempts
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
10
to obtain exemption from ceiling limit from the Taluk Land Board.
3.6. On 05.07.2021, KREML again approached respondent No.1
with an application seeking exemption. Respondent No.1, without
considering the nature of averments in the application and the
previous decisions taken by the Government in this regard, directed
the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, to take an
appropriate decision. On 15.06.2022, the District Collector,
Alappuzha, convened a meeting and recommended the Land Board
to exempt the land from ceiling limits. This is another favour
shown by respondent No.1 to CMRL and KREML. This was also in
consideration of the amount received by respondent Nos.6 and 7.
All the respondents, therefore, have committed the offences
punishable under Section 13(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 and Sections 120B and 34 of IPC.
4. The complainant produced 28 documents along with the
complaint in support of his allegations.
5. The complainant initially prayed for forwarding the
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
11
complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.PC. Later, the
complainant did not press for this relief. Therefore, the Court
proceeded to consider whether there were materials to proceed
under Section 200 Cr.PC.
6. After hearing the counsel for the complainant and the
learned Public Prosecutor, the Court concluded that the complaint
is only to be rejected.
7. I have heard Sri.Kuriakose Varghese, the learned counsel
for the revision petitioner, Sri.Gilbert George Correya, the learned
counsel for respondent Nos.1, 6 and 7, Sri.P.Vijaya Bhanu, the
learned Senior Counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3, Smt.Latha
Anand, the learned counsel for respondent No.4, Sri.Gopikrishnan
Nambiar, the learned counsel for respondent No.5 and Sri.T.A.Shaji,
the learned Director General of Prosecution (DGP).
8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner made the
following submissions:
(a) The impugned order is in the teeth of Section
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
12190 Cr.PC.
(b) The Court did not take the statutory
parameters into judicial consideration.
(c) The learned Special Judge adopted a legal
procedure wholly unknown to law.
(d) The impugned order declared facts as non-
facts.
(e) The learned Special Judge conducted a mini-
trial.
(f) The learned Special Judge did not examine the
complaint in accordance with the mandate of
Section 200 Cr.PC.
(g) The learned Special Judge indulged in
subjective reasoning in the face of the
statutory bar.
(h) The learned Special Judge did not examine the
complainant on oath.
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
13
(i) The learned Special Judge illegally permitted
the Public Prosecutor to submit a report,
objections, etc., in violation of the mandate of
Sections 190 and 200 Cr.PC.
(j) The learned Special Judge unfairly rejected
the complaint at the threshold.
(k) The learned Special Judge grossly
misinterpreted the statutory provisions by
weighing and sifting evidence.
(l) The learned Special Judge unlawfully imputed
political motives against the complainant.
(m) The learned Special Judge recorded
speculative and abstract findings on ‘file
notings’.
(n) The learned Special Judge did not consider the
binding decision of the Interim Board for
Settlement under the Income Tax Act.
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
14
(o) The learned Special Judge incorrectly went
into the probability/improbability of the
involvement of the accused.
(p) The learned Special Judge departed from the
mandate of Section 190/200 Cr.PC, and
conducted a mini-trial, and finally rejected the
complaint, which is unknown to law.
9. The learned counsel for respondent Nos.1, 6 and 7 made
the following submissions:
9.1. There cannot be any presumption as to the existence of
the essential ingredients of the offence under the criminal
jurisprudence. The learned Special Judge, on receipt of a complaint
of facts, cannot interpret the documents relied on by the
complainant to assume the existence of certain facts constituting
an offence.
9.2. The order of the Interim Board for Settlement under
Section 245D(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, being a confidential
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
15document as provided in the statute itself, cannot be relied upon or
used against any other person in view of Section 245-I of the
Income Tax Act.
9.3. Respondent No.1 has taken the decisions only by the
rules of business and with due diligence, responsibility and
transparency in consonance with all settled procedures being
followed by the Government.
9.4. The nature, quality, quantum and satisfaction of service
rendered by respondent No.7 is purely a matter to be decided by
the recipient of service (respondent No.2).
10. The learned DGP made the following submissions:
(i) In the complaint, no factual foundation of the
offences alleged is made out.
(ii) The complainant has not satisfied the pre-
requisite for initiating proceedings under Section
190 Cr.PC.
(iii) The necessity for invoking Section 200 Cr.PC
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
16
would arise only when the Magistrate takes
cognizance of the offence upon receiving a
complaint of facts containing sustainable facts
constituting the offence. The entries on loose
papers relied on by the de facto complainant
have no evidentiary value, and no prosecution
could be initiated based on them.
11. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent
Nos.2 and 3, submitted that the confession alleged to have been
given by the Chief Financial Officer of CMRL before the Interim
Board for Settlement has no evidentiary value and the same cannot
be relied upon to set the criminal law in motion.
12. Essentially, the complaint is based on the following
allegations:
(A) CMRL paid Rs.1.72 Crores to respondent Nos.6
and 7, which was a bribe paid to respondent No.1
for doing favours and misusing his official
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
17position.
(B) Respondent No.1 attempted to misuse his official
position to grant exemption for the landed
properties owned by KREML from the ceiling limit
under the Land Reforms Act.
13. The following are the facts pleaded in the complaint in
support of the above-mentioned allegations:
13.1. Respondent No.1 is the Chief Minister of Kerala.
Respondent No.7, his daughter manages respondent No.6 company.
CMRL, which was incorporated in 1999, needs 1 Lakh metric ton of
ilmenite per annum. They have been importing low-quality ilmenite
from abroad by incurring loss. The Government of Kerala granted a
mining lease to KREML to extract minerals from the Kerala coast
on 15.09.2004. The lease was cancelled on 25.09.2004 based on the
industrial policy restricting mineral concessions of beach sand to
Government companies.
13.2. On 25.05.2016, respondent No.1 became the Chief
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
18
Minister of Kerala. In 2016, CMRL agreed to obtain IT and Marketing
Consultancy Services from respondent No.7. In March 2017, CMRL
entered into another agreement with respondent No.6, based on
which, CMRL agreed to pay Rs.5 Lakhs per month to respondent
No.7 and Rs.3 Lakhs per month to respondent No.6 company.
Though payments were made to respondent Nos.6 and 7, they
extended no services to CMRL. Respondent Nos.6 and 7 received
Rs.1.72 Crores based on the above-referred agreement.
13.3. Respondent No.1, through his daughter (respondent
No.7), received these amounts and enriched himself unlawfully.
13.4. The payments made as mentioned above were revealed
to the Income Tax Department when officials raided the CMRL office
in 2019.
13.5. In the proceedings before the Interim Board for
Settlement under the Income Tax Act, the Chief Finance Officer of
CMRL stated that respondent Nos.6 and 7 did not provide any
service to them. He also submitted that CMRL was making
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
19
payments to members of various political parties, police, media
houses, etc,.
13.6. In 2018, a man-made flood disaster was created with the
intent to help KREML and CMRL, and thereafter, in the guise of
Disaster Management, the Government of Kerala decided to remove
the sand bar formed on the Thottappally Spillway Mouth. On
31.05.2019, KMML was allowed to remove mineral sand from the
Thottappally Spillway Mouth at the rate of Rs.464.55 per M 3. The
rate so fixed was less than the prevailing rate of minerals. The
sand mined by KMML was supplied to CMRL. This was in
consideration of the amount received by respondent Nos.6 and 7
from CMRL.
13.7. The applications submitted by KREML seeking exemption
from the ceiling limit under Section 81(3) of the Kerala Land
Reforms Act, 1963 were earlier rejected by the Government. After
respondent Nos.6 and 7 entered into an agreement with KREML,
they submitted fresh applications to obtain exemption from the
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
20
ceiling limit from the Taluk Land Board. On 05.07.2021, KREML
submitted a request to respondent No.1 seeking exemption.
Respondent No.1 referred the application for the appropriate
decision of the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries. On
15.06.2022, the District Collector, Alappuzha convened a meeting
and recommended that the Land Board exempt the land owned by
the KREML from the ceiling limit. This is also in consideration of
the bribe received by respondent No.1 from CMRL and KREML
through respondent Nos. 6 and 7.
The findings of the Special Court.
14. The complaint does not reveal the “facts” constituting the
offences alleged. The documents relied on by the complainant also
do not support the allegations of corruption. The alleged sale of
minerals by the KMML and IREL, the two Government Sector
Undertakings, to CMRL does not reflect any element of corruption
as the supply of minerals was done on payment at a rate fixed as
per norms. The complaint does not allege that the supply of
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
21
minerals was made at a concessional rate or for a rate beneficial to
CMRL. The complaint does not contain any allegation that CMRL
obtained raw materials such as ilmenite for a low price. When raw
materials are available locally, the cost of procurement may be
less compared to procurement from abroad. The complainant
could not place any material to establish an element of corruption
in this regard.
14.1. The allegation that respondent No.1 attempted to grant
exemption for the land owned by KREML from the ceiling limit is
not supported by any material. The endorsement made by
respondent No.1 in the application submitted by KREML, directing
the Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, to take an
appropriate decision cannot be the foundation for alleging
corruption against him. The course adopted is only a routine
procedure when a Minister receives similar petitions. No ulterior
motive can be inferred against respondent No.1 for the reason that
he forwarded the application to the Principal Secretary concerned
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
22
for necessary action. The decision taken by the District Collector,
Alappuzha, in favour of KREML in the ceiling proceedings cannot
have any link with respondent No.1.
14.2. On 28.04.2023, the request of KREML seeking land
exemption was rejected by the Government, which points to the fact
that the Government did not favour KREML in the ceiling matter.
The subsequent rejection of the application seeking exemption of
land from the ceiling limit submitted by KREML by the Government
on 25.10.2023 is also relevant. KREML is at liberty to make
successive applications under Section 81(3) of the Land Reforms
Act seeking exemption. If respondent No.1 ever intended to favour
KREML, he had two opportunities to do so: one, after getting a
favourable report from the District Collector and another, when the
application was later placed for reconsideration after the orders of
this Court.
14.3. There are no materials to show a direct business deal
between KMML and CMRL. The agreement for the removal of sand
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
23
does not show that IREL is jointly engaged with KMML. The mere
allegation of the supply of ilmenite by IREL to CMRL is not sufficient
to conclude that CMRL received a favour in return of the alleged
payments made to respondent Nos.6 and 7.
14.4. The orders dated 28.04.2023 and 25.10.2023 on the
applications seeking exemption of land owned by KREML from the
ceiling limit were passed after the alleged payment of 1.72 Crores
by CMRL to respondent Nos.6 and 7. Therefore, if the complainant’s
suspicion was true, there would have been a favourable order
from the Government.
14.5. The allegation that four mining leases granted to KREML
on 15.09.2004 were not cancelled despite the directions given by the
Central Government and the leases were cancelled only after the
complainant approached the VACB on 05.10.2023 cannot be
stretched to any involvement of respondent No.1 as he had sought
legal opinion from the learned Advocate General in this regard.
14.6. The extra-judicial confession of the Chief Financial
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
24
Officer of CMRL before the Interim Board for Settlement cannot be
used to contend that those who received the payments have
favoured CMRL in any manner. The argument that the complaint is
politically motivated is strengthened when investigation is sought
only against respondent Nos.1, 6 and 7.
Consideration
15. The complainant filed a complaint as defined in Section
2(d), under Section 190(1)(a) of the Cr.PC. It is profitable to extract
the relevant statutory provisions. Section 2(d) of the Cr.PC reads
thus:
“2. Definitions.-
xxx xxx xxx
(d) “complaint” means any allegation made orally or in
writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under
this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown,
has committed an offence, but does not include a police
report.”
Section 190 of the Cr.PC reads thus:
“190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.-
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any
Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the
second class specially empowered in this behalf under
sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence –
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
25
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which
constitute such offence;
(b) upon a police report of such facts;
(c) upon information received from any person
other than a police officer, or upon his own
knowledge, that such offence has been
committed.
(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any
Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under
Sub-Section (1) of such offences as are within his
competence to inquire into or try.”
16. A competent court may take cognizance of any offence
upon receiving a complaint under Section 2(d), but such complaint
shall be a complaint of facts which constitute such offence.
17. It is relevant to note that the words ‘or suspicion’ in the
old Section 190 have been omitted in the corresponding Section in
the Code of 1973. Section 190 of the old Code had enabled the
Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence not only on his
knowledge but also ‘on suspicion’ that an offence has been
committed. The Law Commission, in its 41st Report observed;
“We recognize that a police officer can, in certain
circumstances, act on suspicion-(reasonable of
course) that an offence has been committed, but we do
not think it wise to place such a responsibility on a
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
26Judicial Officer, and we therefore, propose to delete
that provision from the clause.”
18. Based on the Law Commission Report the legislature had
intentionally removed the words “or suspicion” from Section 190 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Under Section 190 of the
Code of 1973 and under Section 210 of the BNSS, a Magistrate may
take cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint of “facts”
which constitute an offence or upon knowledge that such offence
has been committed and not on “suspicion”.
19. A mere complaint within the meaning of Section 2(d)
without the qualification “facts which constitute an offence” is not
sufficient for the competent court to take cognizance of the
offences alleged {Vide: Oommen Chandy v. State of Kerala and
Others [2016 (3) KHC 621] : [2016 (3) KLT 126] : [2016 SCC OnLine Ker
20433]}.
20. A Magistrate is not bound to take cognizance of an
offence merely because a complaint is filed before him. The
complaint shall contain necessary facts constituting the offence
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
27
alleged. He is required to carefully apply his mind to the contents
of the complaint to see if the facts disclosed the offence alleged
before taking cognizance of the offence alleged therein {Vide: Delhi
Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(2024) 10 SCC 690] and Usha
Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal (2023 KHC 6085) : (AIR 2023
SC 688) : [(2023) 15 SCC 135]}.
21. On receipt of a written complaint, the five options
available to a Judicial Magistrate/Special Judge who is competent
to take cognizance of the case are the following:
1) Rejection of complaint : If the complaint on the face of it
does not at all make out any offence, then the Magistrate
may reject the complaint. This power of rejection at the
pre-cognizance stage is inherent in any Magistrate.
2) Where the Magistrate does not reject the complaint at the
threshold, he may, without taking cognizance of the
offence, order an investigation by the police under S.156(3)
CrPC and forward the complaint to the officer in charge of
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
28the police station concerned provided that the complaint
alleges the commission of a cognizable offence. Such a
course can be adopted by the Magistrate only at the
precognizance stage.
3) Taking cognizance of the offence: Where the Magistrate
does not order investigation by the police under S.156(3)
Cr.PC at the pre-cognizance stage and does not reject the
complaint at the threshold, then he may decide to proceed
under Chapter XV Cr.PC and thereby take cognizance of
the offence provided the allegations in the complaint
prima facie make out an offence. If after applying his mind
to the allegations made in the complaint the Magistrate
takes judicial notice of the accusations and decides to
proceed under Chapter XV Cr.PC, he can then be said to
have taken cognizance of the offence. But if the
Magistrate, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV Cr.PC,
takes any other action such as issuing search warrant or
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
29ordering investigation under S. 156(3) Cr.PC, then he
cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.
4) Issuing process after S.202 enquiry/investigation : If after
himself conducting an enquiry or directing investigation
under S.202(1) CrPC the Magistrate is of the opinion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall then
issue summons or warrant against the accused under
S.204(1) CrPC depending on the nature of the case.
5) Dismissal of complaint after Sec.202 enquiry/
investigation: If after considering the statements on
oath of the complainant and the witnesses if any and the
result of the enquiry or investigation if any, under S.202
CrPC the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall then dismiss the
complaint after briefly recording his reasons for doing so.
(See Section 203 Cr.PC). {Vide: Raju Puzhankara v. State of
Kerala and others [2008 (2) KHC 318], CREF Finance Ltd. v.
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
30
CREF Finance Ltd. v. Shree Shanthi Homes (P) Ltd., [2005
(7) SCC 467], Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar (AIR 1971 SC
1708), Nagraj v. State of Mysore (AIR 1964 SC 269), Dilawar
Singh v. State of Delhi (AIR 2007 SC 3234), Suresh Chand
Jain v. State of M.P. [2001 (2) SCC 628], Tula Ram v Kishore
Singh [1977 (4) SCC 459], Mohd. Yousuf v. Smt. Afaq Jahan
[2006 (1) SCC 627], Madhu Bala v. Suresh Kumar [AIR 1997
SC 3104], George v. Jacob Mathews (1996 KHC 19),
Devarapally Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy
[1976 (3) SCC 252], Narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das
Partani, (2000) 7 SCC 183 [2000 (7) SCC 183], S.K.Sinha,
Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd.,
[2008 (2) SCC 492], Punya Prasad Sankota v. Balvadra
Dahal [1985 CriLJ 159 (Sikkim)], Manimekhala S. State of
Kerala [2024 (2) KHC 37] Biju Purushothaman v. State of
Kerala and Others [2008 (3) KHC 24]}.
22. If the complaint, on the face of it, does not disclose the
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
31
commission of any offence, the Magistrate shall not take
cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) of the Cr.PC. Then, the complaint
is simply to be rejected {Vide: Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir
Mohammad Tunda (2015 KHC 2763) : [(2015) 12 SCC 420]}.
23. If, after perusing the complaint, the Magistrate is of the
opinion that the averments therein do not at all spell out any
offence, then he should definitely possess the power to throw away
the complaint and terminate the matter then and there. The
Magistrate can, in such a case, reject the complaint {Vide: Biju
Purushothaman v. State of Kerala [2008 (3) KHC 24]: 2008 (3) KLT
85] : [2008 SCC OnLine Ker 147] and Shailaja P. v. Vigilance and Anti
Corruption Bureau [2021 (2) KHC 11]: [2021 (2) KLT 294]: [2021 SCC
OnLine Ker 836]}.
24. On receipt of a private complaint, the Magistrate must
first scrutinise it to examine if the allegations made in the private
complaint, inter alia, smack of an instance of frivolous litigation;
and second, examine and elicit the material that supports the case
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
32
of the complainant. The Court/Magistrate is judiciously employed to
stem the flow of frivolous litigation. He has the duty to identify and
dispose of frivolous litigation at an early stage by exercising,
substantially and to the fullest extent, the powers conferred on him
{Vide: Krishna Lal Chawla v. State of U.P (2021 KHC 6148): (AIR 2021
SC 1381)}.
25. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the
impugned order is in the teeth of Section 190 Cr.PC. It is submitted
that the learned Special Judge had not examined the complainant
by the mandate of Section 200 Cr.PC and unfairly rejected the
complaint at the threshold.
26. The crux of the argument is that the learned Special
Judge ought to have taken cognizance of the offence and proceeded
to examine the complainant. It is submitted that taking cognizance
merely means the judicial application of mind by the Special Judge
to the facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to taking further
action. It is argued that cognizance merely means ‘become aware
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
33
of’, and when used with reference to a Judge, it connotes “to take
notice of judicially”. It only points to a process in which the judge
takes judicial notice of the offence alleged with a view to initiating
proceedings in respect of this. Initiation or commencement of
proceedings under Chapter XVI is an entirely different process, and
cognizance is only a condition precedent to the initiation of the
proceedings by the Magistrate or the Special Judge.
27. As I have mentioned above, the Court may take
cognizance of any offence only upon receiving a complaint of facts
which constitute such offence. If the complaint does not at all
make out any offence on the face of it, then the Magistrate may
reject the complaint. Examination of the complainant arises only
when a Court takes cognizance of the offence and proceeds under
Section 200 Cr.PC.
28. In the present case, the Special Judge was rejecting the
complaint at the precognizance stage. The question to be
considered here is whether the Special Judge was justified in
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
34
rejecting the complaint at the threshold, that is, in the
precognizance stage.
29. The allegations in the complaint were that respondent
Nos.6 and 7 received money, which was a bribe paid to respondent
No.1 for doing favours to CMRL. In support of the allegations, the
complainant relied on certain facts. The question is whether the
facts relied on by the complainant disclose the offence alleged. The
petitioner essentially alleges the following:
(a) Respondent Nos.6 and 7 entered into an
agreement with CMRL to provide IT and Marketing
consultancy Services for which a sum of Rs.1.72
Crores was transferred to them.
(b) No service was rendered by respondent Nos.6 and
7 to CMRL.
(c) Respondent Nos.6 and 7 received the amount from
CMRL to be given to respondent No.1.
(d) Respondent No.1 made efforts to grant exemption
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
35
from ceiling limit to the land owned by KREML
under the Kerala Land Reforms Act.
30. The facts relied on by the petitioner to connect
respondent No.1 with the above allegations are:
30.1. KMML and IREL supplied minerals to KREML. when an
application seeking exemption from the ceiling limit in respect of
the property owned by KREML was presented before respondent
No.1, he forwarded the same to the Secretary concerned for
necessary action. The District Collector, Alappuzha recommended
exemption of the property owned by KREML from the ceiling limit
under the Land Reforms Act. In a proceeding before the Interim
Board for Settlement, the Chief Finance Officer of CMRL revealed
that respondent Nos.6 and 7 did not provide any service to them,
and the company made payments to various political leaders,
including respondent No.1.
31. Do these facts constitute the offences alleged? The
complainant alleged offences under Section 13(1)(b) of the
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
36Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 120 (b) and 34 of the
Indian Penal Code. These facts at the most triggered a suspicion.
With these facts on the face of the complaint, a Court cannot take
judicial notice of the alleged offences.
32. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted
that the Special Judge did not consider the binding decision of the
Interim Board for Settlement under the Income Tax Act. A copy of
the order of the Interim Board for Settlement was produced before
the Special Judge. The learned counsel submitted that the
observation of the Interim Board for Settlement is a “juridical fact”
sufficient to set the law in motion against respondent Nos.1, 6 and 7.
33. The proceedings in the Interim Board for Settlement was
based on an application filed by the assessee company (CMRL)
seeking exemption of certain payments. The proceedings related to
income for the assessment years 2013-2014 to 2019-2020. The
company wanted to treat huge amounts towards business
expenditure, which was rejected by the Department. The Board
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
37
held that 1.72 Crores paid to respondent Nos.6 and 7 during the
assessment years 2017-2018 to 2019-2020 did not qualify as
business expenditure. The authorised officer of the company gave
a statement before the Board that respondent Nos.6 and 7 did not
provide any service to the company. He also stated that huge sums
of money were delivered to political leaders, police officers, media
people, etc. The observation of the Board was based on the
statement of the authorised representative of the assessee
company.
34. The learned counsel for respondent Nos.1, 6 and 7, relying
on Sections 132 (4) and 245-I of the Income Tax Act, 1961 submitted
that the order of the Interim Board for Settlement is a confidential
document, which cannot be relied upon in any other proceedings.
Section 132(4) of the Income Tax Act says that any statement made
during the examination under this section by any person may be
used in evidence in any proceeding under the Income Tax Act, 1961.
35. As per Section 245-I of the Income Tax Act, every order of
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
38
settlement passed under sub-section (4) of section 245D shall be
conclusive as to the matter stated therein. No matter covered by
such order shall, save as otherwise provided in Chapter XIXA, be
reopened in any proceeding under the Act or any other law for the
time being in force.
36. I cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel for
respondent Nos.1, 6 and 7 that the order of the Interim Board for
Settlement is a confidential document based on the above-referred
statutory provisions.
37. The learned DGP submitted that the statement made by
the authorised officer of CMRL before the Interim Board for
Settlement based on certain loose papers regarding the receipt of
money by political leaders cannot be treated as a fact constituting
the offence alleged. The learned DGP, relying on Section 34 of the
Indian Evidence Act, submitted that what is relevant under Section
34 of the Evidence Act is entries in the books of account, and a
‘Book’ means a collection of sheets of paper or other material
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
39
fastened or bound together so as to form a material whole. The
learned DGP submitted that loose sheets or scraps of paper cannot
be termed as ‘books’ as they can be easily detached and replaced.
38. The statements made by the authorised representative of
the assessee company before the Interim Board for Settlement
based on the entries in a diary and the observation of the Board
thereupon are sought to be treated as “juridical facts” sufficient to
enable the Trial Court to proceed further on the complaint under
Section 200 Cr.PC. Are those statements “juridical facts” in the
context of the offences alleged? The facts that triggered the law to
respond in a certain way are called “juridical facts”. The law
acknowledges various kinds of juridical facts, each with its own
legal consequences leading to a particular legal effect. It is to be
noted that the statements made by the authorised officer of the
company before the Interim Board for Settlement are to be treated
as statements taken at the back of the persons whose names had
been referred to. The foundation of the said statements is the
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
40
entries in a diary not maintained in the regular course of business
which are prima facie not admissible under Section 34 of the
Evidence Act. Therefore, the statements referred to above and the
observation of the Board based on them are not juridical facts with
reference to the offences alleged. Those statements and the
observation of the Board cannot be treated as facts constituting the
offences alleged.
39. To substantiate the contentions that the learned Special
Judge was not expected to look into the merit of the allegations but
was bound to examine the complainant and the witnesses to satisfy
whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding based on the
complaint, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied on
the following judgments:
1. Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal [(1973) 3
SCC 753]
2. Nagawwa v. V.S. Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736]
3. H.S.Bains, Director, Small Saving-cum-Deputy Secretary
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
41Finance, Punjab Chandigarh v. State (Union Territory of
Chandigarh) [(1980) 4 SCC 631]
4. Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259]
5. Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [(2012) 3 SCC
64]
6. Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2012) 5 SCC 424]
7. State of Chhattisgarh v. Aman Kumar Singh [(2023) 6 SCC
559]
8. Kailash Vijayvargiya v. Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri (2023 SCC
OnLine SC 569).
9. Dilip Kumar v. Brajraj Shrivastava (2023 SCC OnLine SC
916)
10. Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 459]
40. In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal [(1973) 3
SCC 753], the Supreme Court observed that a Magistrate taking
cognizance of an offence under Chapter XV of the Code has to
examine the complainant and the witnesses. The object of such
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
42
examination is to ascertain whether there is a prima facie case
against the person accused of the offence in the complaint, and to
prevent the issue of process on a complaint which is either false or
vexatious or intended only to harass such a person. Such
examination is provided, therefore, to find out whether there is or is
not sufficient ground for proceeding.
41. In Nagawwa v. V.S. Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736], the
Supreme Court held that at the stage of issuing process, the
Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the
complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only
to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for
proceeding against the accused.
42. In H.S.Bains, Director, Small Saving-cum-Deputy
Secretary Finance, Punjab Chandigarh v. State (Union Territory of
Chandigarh) [(1980) 4 SCC 631], the Supreme Court observed that
while taking cognizance of an offence on complaint, the Magistrate
is required by Section 200 to examine the complainant and the
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
43
witnesses present, if any upon oath.
43. In Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259],
the Supreme Court observed that it is not necessary that a
complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of his
complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. Nor is it
necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that
the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent.
44. In Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [(2012) 3 SCC
64] the Supreme Court held that at the time of taking cognizance of
the offence, the court is required to consider the averments made
in the complaint or the charge-sheet filed under Section 173 and it
is not open for the court to analyse the evidence produced at that
stage and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made
out for proceeding further in the matter.
45. In Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2012) 5 SCC
424] on the expression “cognizance”, in paragraph 11 of the
judgment, the Supreme Court observed thus:-
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
44“11. In Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd.
[(2008) 2 SCC 492 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 471] (SCC p. 499, para 19) the
expression “cognizance” was explained by this Court as “it merely
means ‘become aware of’ and when used with reference to a court or a
Judge, it connotes ‘to take notice of judicially’. It indicates the point
when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a
view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have
been committed by someone.” It is entirely a different thing from
initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the
initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is
taken of cases and not of persons. Under Section 190 of the Code, it is
the application of judicial mind to the averments in the complaint that
constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied
whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether
there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is
adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the
trial and not at the stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for
proceeding then the Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process
under Section 204 of the Code.”
46. In State of Chhattisgarh v. Aman Kumar Singh [(2023) 6
SCC 559], the Supreme Court observed that if criminal prosecution
is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise
justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant
political overtones and mala fide motives.
47. In Kailash Vijayvargiya v. Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri (2023
SCC OnLine SC 569):[(2023) 14 SCC 1], the Supreme Court held that
even when a private complaint is filed, the Magistrate is not bound
to take cognizance under Section 190 as the word used therein is
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
45
“may”, which should not be construed as “must” for obvious
reasons.
48. In Dilip Kumar v. Brajraj Shrivastava (2023 SCC OnLine
SC 916), the Supreme Court observed that after taking recourse to
sub-Section (1) of Section 202 of the Cr.P.C., before dismissing a
complaint by taking recourse to Section 203 of the Cr.PC., the
learned Magistrate has to consider the statements of the
complainant and his witnesses.
49. In Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 459] the
Supreme Court held thus:-
“8. Section 190 of the Code runs thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It seems to us that there is no special charm or any magical
formula in the expression “taking cognizance” which merely
means judicial application of the mind of the Magistrate to the
facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to taking further
action. Thus what Section 190 contemplates is that the
Magistrate takes cognizance once he makes himself fully
conscious and aware of the allegations made in the complaint
and decides to examine or test the validity of the said
allegations.”
50. The requirement of the examination upon oath of the
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
46
complainant and the witnesses highlighted in the above precedents
is at the stage when the Magistrate proceeds under Chapter XV of
the Code after taking cognizance of the offence.
51. The learned Director General of Prosecution relied on the
following decisions:
(1) Manimekhala S v. State of Kerala [2024 (2) KHC
37].
(2) Manoj Abraham, IPS v. P.P.Chandrasekharan Nair
(2017 (3) KHC 983).
(3) Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India [(2017) 11
SCC 777].
52. Relying on Manimekhala S v. State of Kerala (2024 (2)
KHC 37):[2024 (1) KLT 781], the learned DGP submitted that the
power of rejection at the precognizance stage is inherent in the
Magistrate, and he is bound to reject the complaint, if it does not
make out any offence on the face of it.
53. In Manoj Abraham, IPS v. P.P.Chandrasekharan Nair (2017
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
47
(3) KHC 983) this Court held thus:-
“…..Every Special Judge functioning under the Prevention of
Corruption Act must be conscious of his duties and obligations, and
also the nature of his functions as a Special Judge. What matters is
not just that the complaint alleges an offence. The complaint must
disclose an offence. The term `disclose’ does not simply mean, that
the complaint alleges or reveals an offence. Simply on a complaint
which is not supported by any material, investigation cannot be
ordered by the Special Courts under the PC Act. The Court must be
satisfied that an offence is `disclosed’ by the materials including
documents, circumstances, etc. Substantiating the allegations in the
complaint.”
54. In Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India [(2017) 11 SCC
731], the Supreme Court held that loose sheets of paper are wholly
irrelevant as evidence and are not admissible under Section 34 of
the Evidence Act so as to constitute evidence with respect to the
transactions mentioned therein being of no evidentiary value. In
paragraph 283 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed thus:
“283. We are constrained to observe that the Court has to be
on guard while ordering investigation against any important
constitutional functionary, officers or any person in the
absence of some cogent legally cognizable material. When
the material on the basis of which investigation is sought is
itself irrelevant to constitute evidence and not admissible in
evidence, we have apprehension whether it would be safe to
even initiate investigation. In case we do so, the investigation
can be ordered as against any person whosoever high in
integrity on the basis of irrelevant or inadmissible entry
falsely made, by any unscrupulous person or business house
that too not kept in regular books of accounts but on random
papers at any given point of time. There has to be some
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
48relevant and admissible evidence and some cogent reason,
which is prima facie reliable and that too, supported by some
other circumstances pointing out that the particular third
person against whom the allegations have been levelled was
in fact involved in the matter or he has done some act during
that period, which may have co-relations with the random
entries. In case we do not insist for all these, the process of
law can be abused against all and sundry very easily to
achieve ulterior goals and then no democracy can survive in
case investigations are lightly set in motion against
important constitutional functionaries on the basis of
fictitious entries, in absence of cogent and admissible
material on record, lest liberty of an individual be
compromised unnecessarily. We find the materials which
have been placed on record either in the case of Birla Group
or in the case of Sahara Group are not maintained in regular
course of business and thus lack in required reliability to be
made the foundation of a police investigation.”
55. The question of the admissibility of the entries in the diary
maintained by one of the officials of CMRL and the statement given
by him before the Interim Board for Settlement based on such
entries is important. The law on the evidentiary value of such
entries was considered by the Supreme Court in CBI v. V.C. Shukla
[(1998) 3 SCC 410]. Considering the scope of Section 34 of the
Evidence Act, the Supreme Court held that such entries are
irrelevant and have no admissibility under Section 34 of the
Evidence Act and that only where the entries are made in the books
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
49
of accounts regularly kept, depending on the nature of work, that
those are admissible. Following V.C. Shukla in Manohar Lal
Sharma (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated this principle. A
material which is prima facie not admissible cannot be relied upon
by a court of law to take cognizance of an offence in the absence of
any other credible material.
56. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted
that the Court below has conducted a mini-trial weighing and
sifting evidence. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner
contended that the Special Court treated the facts as non-facts. I
am unable to accept this contention. In the given materials, the
facts constituting the offences alleged for taking cognizance are
not available.
57. It is trite that weighing and sifting of evidence to see
whether the accused deserves a conviction is not the object of the
procedure undertaken by the Magistrate while receiving a
complaint under Section 190(1) Cr.PC.
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
50
58. In the present case, the attempt of the learned Special
Judge was to scrutinise and examine if the allegations made in the
complaint disclosed the commission of any offence. It was an
examination of the material placed before the Special Court to see
if they supported the case of the complainant.
59. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted
that the Special Judge committed an illegality in permitting the
Public Prosecutor to submit objections and report. While a
Magistrate/Special Judge proceeds with a complaint under Chapter
XIV of the Cr.PC, the Public Prosecutor has no role to play. I am of
the view that the Court below should not have permitted the Public
Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings at that stage.
60. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner further
submitted that the observation of the learned Special Judge that
the complaint was politically motivated was unwarranted.
61. On the ground that the revision petitioner had not taken
any steps against other political leaders whose names were
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
51
highlighted as persons who received payments from CMRL, the
learned Special Judge relying on Ramesh Chennithala v. State of
Kerala and Another (2018 KHC 716) observed that the act of
pressing investigation against respondent Nos.1, 6 and 7 would
strengthen the argument that complaint was politically motivated.
Any member of society must have the locus standi to initiate a
criminal proceeding in the interest of the society. One of the
essential facets of criminal justice administration is the initiation of
criminal proceedings by the citizen or member of polity for the
purpose of punishment of an offender in the interest of the society.
The revision petitioner is a political leader and a member of the
Legislative Assembly. As I have stated above, the facts relied on by
the petitioner might probably have sparked suspicion. It was
premature for the Special Court to make an observation that
political motive might have triggered the revision petitioner for the
initiation of the prosecution of the complaint. In my view, the
observation was unwarranted, and the same stands quashed.
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
52
62. Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or,
the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-
consideration of any relevant material, or there is palpable
misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in
setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible.
The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an Appellate Court. The
whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the
power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of
criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under
Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C is not to be equated with that of an
appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to
be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is
grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision
is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly
ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in
exercise of their revisional jurisdiction. {Vide: Sanjaysinh Ramrao
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
53
Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [(2015) 3 SCC 123], Munna Devi
v. State of Rajasthan & Anr [(2001) 9 SCC 631)] and Asian
Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of
Investigation [(2018) 16 SCC 299)]}.
63. In the present case, the complainant could only place
certain materials highlighting ‘suspicions’ based on the allegations
in the complaint and ‘not facts’ constituting the offences alleged.
64. An unnecessary investigation or an enquiry into an
offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act against a public
servant based on such suspicions may cause a blemish on his
career or reputation. Being called to appear before a criminal court
as an accused is a serious matter that affects one’s dignity, self-
respect and image in the society {Vide: Mehmood Ul Rehman v.
Khazir Mohammad Tunda, [(2015) 12 SCC 420], Abhijit Pawar v.
Hemant Madhukar Nimbalkar [(2017) 3 SCC 528] and Vijayan S. v.
Central Bureau of Investigation and Others [2021 (6) KHC 467]}.
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
54
65. In view of the finding that the complainant failed to place
facts constituting the offences alleged, the revision petition is only
to be dismissed.
66. It is made clear that rejection of the complaint does not
preclude the complainant from filing a fresh complaint with
adequate materials in future.
The Criminal Revision Petition stands dismissed.
Sd/-
K.BABU,
JUDGE
KAS/TKS
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
55
APPENDIX OF CRL.REV.PET 588/2024
PETITIONER ANNEXURES
Annexure A1 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER BEARING NO.695
DATED NIL ISSUED BY KSIDC TO THE
DISTRICT COLLECTOR, ALAPPUZHA
Annexure A1(a) TRUE TYPED COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT
OF THE LETTER BEARING NO.695 DATED NIL
ISSUED BY KSIDC TO DISTRICT COLLECTOR
Annexure A2 TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT OF
THE PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED BY KREML
Annexure A3 TRUE COPY OF THE GOVERNMENT ORDER
BEARING GO (RT) NO. 385/2019 DATED
31.05.2019 ISSUED BY THE WATER
RESOURCES (IR) DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT
OF KERALA
Annexure A4 TRUE COPY OF THE AGREEMENT NO.
47/SE/ISC/2019-20 DATED 11.10.2019
Annexure A5 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER BEARING NO. DMC
2-513/2016 DATED 22.05.2020 ISSUED BY
DISTRICT DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
Annexure A6 TRUE COPY OF THE SHOW CAUSE NOTICE
DATED 04.06.2020 ISSUED BY THE OFFICE
OF COLLECTORATE, ALAPPUZHA
Annexure A7 TRUE COPY OF THE DISTRICT DISASTER
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY ALAPPUZHA
(DISTRICT COLLECTOR) VIDE ORDER BEARING
NO. DMC 2-513/16 DATED 24.06.2020
Annexure A8 TRUE COPY OF RELEVANT EXTRACT OF FILE
NOTE BEARING NO. 21 DATED 03.04.2021
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
56
Annexure A9 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER BEARING NO.
02023/KREML/2021/001 DATED 05.07.2021
FROM KREML TO RESPONDENT NO. 1
Annexure A10 TRUE COPY OF RELEVANT EXTRACT OF FILE
NOTE BEARING NO. 74 DATED 19.11.2021
Annexure A11 TRUE COPY OF RELEVANT EXTRACT OF FILE
NOTE DATED 19.08.2022 PREPARED BY
VARSHA LAKSHMANAN
Annexure A12 TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT OF
FILE NOTE BEARING NO. 94 DATED NIL
Annexure A13 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 12.06.2023
PASSED BY THE LD. INTERIM BOARD FOR
SETTLEMENT-II, NEW DELHI
Annexure A14 TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT DATED
05.10.2023 FILED BEFORE THE DIRECTOR,
VIGILANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
Annexure A15 TRUE COPY OF THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
RECEIPT OF PETITION BEARING PETITION
NO. 42331/2023/DVACB DATED 05.10.2023
ISSUED BY THE DIRECTORATE, VIGILANCE
AND ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU
Annexure A16 TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT DATED
19.02.2024 FILED BEFORE THE VIGILANCE
AND ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
Annexure A17 TRUE COPY OF THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
RECEIPT BEARING NO. 8484, ISSUED BY THE
DIRECTORATE, VIGILANCE AND ANTI-
CORRUPTION BUREAU, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
57
Annexure A18 TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT BEARING CRL.
M.P. NO. 326 OF 2024 DATED 26.02.2024
FILED BEFORE THE LD. ENQUIRY
COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL JUDGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, WITHOUT ANNEXURES
Annexure A19 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER BEARING FILE
NO. 1/1/2019-M.VI DATED 01.03.2019
ISSUED BY MINISTRY OF MINES
Annexure A19(a) TRUE TYPED COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT
OF THE LETTER BEARING FILE NO.
1/1/2019-M.VI DATED 01.03.2019 ISSUED
BY MINISTRY OF MINES
Annexure A20 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER BEARING NO.
SPA(C)/37/GP/2017 CCOM DATED 19.03.2019
ISSUED BY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
CONTROLLER OF MINES, MINISTRY OF MINES
Annexure A20(a) TRUE TYPED COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT
OF THE LETTER BEARING NO.
SPA(C)/37/GP/2017 CCOM DATED 19.03.2019
ISSUED BY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
CONTROLLER OF MINES, MINISTRY OF MINES
Annexure A21 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER BEARING NO.
2955/M1/ 2019 DATED 12.04.2019 ISSUED
BY THE DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF MINING
AND GEOLOGY
Annexure A21(a) TRUE TYPED COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT
OF THE LETTER BEARING NO. 2955/M1/ 2019
DATED 12.04.2019 ISSUED BY THE
DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF MINING AND
GEOLOGY
Annexure A22 TRUE COPY OF THE CIRCULATION NOTE
ISSUED BY THE INDUSTRIES (A) DEPARTMENT
DATED 19.10.2019
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
58
Annexure A22(a) TRUE TYPED COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT
OF THE CIRCULATION NOTE ISSUED BY THE
INDUSTRIES (A) DEPARTMENT DATED
19.10.2019
Annexure A23 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER ISSUED BY THE
OFFICE OF EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
IRRIGATION DEPARTMENT
Annexure A23(a) TRUE TYPED COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT
OF THE LETTER ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF
EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, IRRIGATION
DEPARTMENT
Annexure A24 TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACTS OF
THE ANNUAL REPORT OF CMRL FOR THE YEAR
2020-2021
Annexure A24(a) TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT OF
LIST OF E-WAY BILLS OF MARCH 2022
Annexure A25 TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT OF
THE FILE NOTE BEARING NO. 75 DATED
10.01.2023 PREPARED BY SINDHUJA K. R.
Annexure A25(a) TRUE COPY OF THE FILE NOTE BEARING NO.
100 DATED 10.01.2023 PREPARED BY VARSHA
LAKSHMANAN
Annexure A26 TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT OF
THE FILE NOTE BEARING NO. 102 PREPARED
BY MANOJ P
Annexure A27 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGEMENT DATED
03.08.2023 PASSED BY THIS HON’BLE COURT
IN WP(C) NO. 21546 OF 2023
Annexure A28 TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT OF
THE ANNUAL REPORT OF KMML OF THE YEAR
2021-2022
2025:KER:26809
Crl.R.P No.588 of 2024
59
Annexure A29 TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT OF
LIST OF E-WAY BILLS FOR JANUARY 2024
Annexure A30 TRUE COPY OF THE AFFIDAVIT DATED
26.02.2024 FILED BY THE APPLICANT IN
CRL. M. P. 326 OF 2024 BEFORE THE LD.
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL JUDGE
(VIGILANCE) COURT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
Annexure A31 TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT OF
LIST OF PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS
PUBLISHED BY BPT
Annexure A32 TRUE COPY OF THE LIST OF E-WAY BILLS OF
MARCH 2024
Annexure A33 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED
13.03.2024 FILED BY SRI. RENJITH KUMAR
L. R., LD. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN CRL. M.
P. NO. 326 OF 2024
Annexure A34 TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION DATED
02.04.2024 FILED BY THE APPLICANT IN
CRL. M. P. 326 OF 2024 BEFORE THE LD.
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL JUDGE
(VIGILANCE) COURT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
Annexure A35 TRUE COPY OF THE ADVANCE PETITION DATED
02.04.2024 FILED BY THE APPLICANT IN
CRL. M. P. 326 OF 2024 BEFORE THE LD.
ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND SPECIAL JUDGE
(VIGILANCE) COURT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM