Delhi High Court
Education Department & Anr vs Ms Asiya Jamil on 21 August, 2025
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: August, 21, 2025
+ RC.REV. 239/2025, CM APPL. 50340/2025-Stay, CM APPL.
50341/2025-Exp
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT & ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Abhinav Sharma, Mr.
Shubham, Advocates alongwith Mr.
Vikas Kalia, Additional Director,
DOE.
Versus
MS ASIYA JAMIL .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Manmohan Gupta and Mr.
Vaibhav Kumar, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAURABH BANERJEE
J U D G M E N T (Oral)
1. The respondent/ landlord1 filed an Eviction Petition under Section
14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 19582
before the learned Additional Rent Controller-01, Central District, Tis
Hazari Courts, Delhi3, seeking eviction of the petitioners/ tenant4 from the
first and second floor of the property bearing nos.2376 to 2382, situated in
Municipal Ward No.VI, Ballimaran, Delhi5, on the ground of her bona fide
requirement of the subject premises for her own residence.
1
hereinafter referred to as “landlord”
2
hereinafter referred to as “DRC Act”
3
hereinafter referred to as “ARC”
4
hereinafter referred to as “tenant”
5
hereinafter referred to as “subject premises”
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2. Essentially, it was the case of the landlord that she is a single lady
aged about 69 years, who is suffering from various age related diseases/
ailments and has no one to look after her at her present address at
Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh. Additionally, as per landlord since she was
born, educated and had spent substantial part of her life in Delhi, as also
since all her near and close relatives reside there, she intends to return and
reside in Delhi. Also, in the eviction petition, the landlord gave the details
of other properties owned by her in the same premises, however, since
they were all in the occupation of other tenants, it was her case that she
had no other reasonably suitable portion thereof for the aforesaid purpose.
3. The petitioner no.1, after service of summons as per Third Schedule
of the DRC Act, filed an application for leave to defend under Section(s)
25(4) and (5) of the DRC Act wherein it primarily contended that there
was a school being run from the subject premises for the marginalized
female student (specially minority communities), as also that being owner
of other properties the landlord had no bona fide requirement, moreover,
since she had not filed any such eviction petition qua those properties and
finally that she is simply interested in letting out the subject premises at a
higher rent.
4. Be that as it may, in the same leave to defend application, the tenant
has fairly admitted that it was regularly paying the rent to the landlord as
also that it was willing/ continue to pay the enhanced/ increased rent along
with arrears, subject to approval of the Competent Authority.
5. After hearing both parties, the learned ARC, by virtue of the
impugned order dated 08.04.2025, held that there, admittedly, existed a
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landlord-tenant relationship between the respondent and the petitioners, as
also that the tenant had failed to raise any triable issue either on the aspect
of bona fide requirement or on the aspect of alternative accommodation.
Based thereon, the leave to defend application of the tenant was dismissed
and consequently an eviction order under Section 14(1)(e) read with
Section 25B of the DRC Act was passed in the favour of the landlord.
6. Aggrieved thereby, the tenant has preferred the present revision
petition under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act assailing the order dated
08.04.2025 passed by the learned ARC in RC ARC No. 340/2024 titled
Ms. Asiya Jamil v. Education Department, GNCTD & Anr.6
7. When the present petition was listed on 18.08.2025 for the first
time, this Court after hearing Mr. Abhinav Sharma, learned counsel for the
tenant, passed the following order:-
“After some arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners fairly
seeks, and is granted, a period of two days for seeking appropriate
instructions qua the feasible time period within which the
petitioners would be able to vacate the subject property and terms
of payment (rent) it is willing to pay to the respondent for the
extended period.”
8. In response thereto, today Mr. Abhinav Sharma, learned counsel for
the tenant submits that he has no instructions qua the same and therefore is
going to proceed with his arguments.
9. As such, this Court has taken up the present petition for disposal of
the same after hearing learned counsel for the parties.
10. Mr. Abhinav Sharma submits that the learned ARC has dismissed
the application for leave to defend of the tenant in a mechanical and
6
hereinafter referred to as “impugned order”
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cursory manner without even appreciating the facts and circumstances
involved therein, primarily since it has been wrongly held that no triable
issue was raised before him.
11. Mr. Abhinav Sharma then submits that the landlord has been living
in Ghaziabad for substantial part of her life and her sudden shifting from
Ghaziabad to Delhi raises a triable issue regarding the genuineness of her
bona fide requirement of the subject premises and therefore the burden
was on the landlord to prove such requirement, which the learned ARC
failed to consider. To buttress his submission, he placed reliance on
Charan Dass Duggal v. Brahma Nand7, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, while dealing with a similar case of landlord-tenant dispute
involving a case wherein the landlord, who was residing outside Delhi,
filed an eviction petition with respect to the property in Delhi in the
occupation of the tenant, held that leave to defend can be granted.
12. Mr. Abhinav Sharma further submits the landlord has wrongly
pleaded that no other alternative accommodation is available with her
when it is her own case that there exist various tenanted shops on the
ground floor of the same premises, which would have been more suitable
for her.
13. Lastly, Mr. Abhinav Sharma submits that the alleged requirement of
the landlord is not bona fide and that her real intention is to let out the
premises at increased rent, which is evident from the fact that landlord has
not filed any eviction petition against the other tenant on the ground floor.
14. Issue notice.
7
(1983) 1 SCC 301
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15. Mr. Manmohan Gupta, learned counsel for the landlord accepts
notice and controverting the aforesaid submissions made by Mr. Abhinav
Sharma, learned counsel for the tenant, submits that the learned ARC has
rightly dismissed the tenant’s leave to defend application. He submits that
the landlord, being an old lady of about 69 years and suffering from
various age related disease/ ailment requires to shift to Delhi from
Ghaziabad where her near and close relative resides, and therefore, the
landlord is in a bona fide requirement of the subject premises for her own
occupation and she has no other suitable accommodation for the said
purpose.
16. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties, as also has
gone through the pleadings and documents therewith on record and has
perused the case law cited at the Bar.
17. In effect, this Court finds that Mr. Abhinav Sharma is trying to
canvass the very same arguments which have already been negated by the
learned ARC vide the impugned order.
18. In any event, while dealing with the proceedings involving an
eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the Court is to
take into consideration the following prime factors:
(a) Landlord-tenant relationship
(b) Bona fide requirement
(c) Alternate suitable accommodation.
19. Qua the first aspect of landlord-tenant relationship involved in the
present proceedings, since admittedly, the tenant has itself in its leave to
defend application before the learned ARC pleaded that “… …the
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proposal for payment of rent in respect of the said premises was regularly
being paid by the answering respondent till March, 2024… …” as also
that “… …the enhanced/ increased rent would be paid to the petitioner in
accordance with the approval from the Competent Authority, along with
arrears, in the Court or as directed by this Hon’ble Court and the
Respondent Department shall continue to pay rent to the petitioner
regularly in future as well… …”, there is no reason for this Court to go
into the aspect of landlord-tenant relationship. This, more particularly
since the learned ARC has also (rightly) held in the impugned judgment
that “… …the first ingredient of landlord-tenant relationship between the
parties in the present case, stands established… …”.
20. In any event, the tenant has nowhere contended, much less, denied
before any forum that it is not the tenant of the landlord. The aforesaid
aspect, thus, stands duly established in favour of the landlord.
21. Qua the second aspect of bona fide requirement of the subject
premises by the landlord, since it is not denied by the tenant, it is an
undisputed position that the landlord is indeed a senior citizen lady of
about 69 years, who is suffering from various old age disease/ ailment.
Under such circumstances, it is completely reasonable for her to shift to
Delhi, where the medical facilities are much more advance and better than
those available at Ghaziabad. This need of the landlord is further
accentuated by the fact that she has no one to look after her at Ghaziabad,
which, has also not been denied by the tenant. Moreover, the landlord also
has all her near and close relatives residing at Delhi. In fact, the
Relinquishment Deed filed before the learned ARC shows at least three
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relatives/ siblings of the landlord residing at Delhi.
22. Even otherwise, the aforesaid aspect of bona fide requirement,
when viewed from the eyes of a tenant are also insufficient since the
averments made by it in its leave to defend application before the learned
ARC are vague and bereft of any particulars. Sans any such pleading(s),
there was hardly any chance for the learned ARC to conclude that the
tenant was raising any triable issue worthy of consideration for allowing
its leave to defend application. Same is the position with this Court as
well. Under such circumstances, the learned ARC while dealing with an
application for leave to defend is not expected to go into the minute
nuances, especially, when there are cogent and supportive material(s).
23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish
Saini8 while dealing with a pari materia provision has enunciated the
aforesaid principle in the following words:
“In our view there are inbuilt protections in the relevant provisions,
for the tenants that whenever the landlord would approach the court
he would approach when his need is genuine and bona fide. It is, of-
course, subject to tenants’ right to rebut it but with strong and cogent
evidence. In our view, the proceeding taken up under Section 13-B by
the NRI landlords for the ejectment of the tenant, the Court shall
presume that landlord’s need pleaded in the petition is genuine and
bona fide. But this would not dis-entitle the tenant from proving that in
fact and in law the requirement of the landlord is not genuine. A heavy
burden would lie on the tenant to prove that the requirement of the
landlord is not genuine. To prove this fact the tenant will be called
upon to give all the necessary facts and particulars supported by
documentary evidence, if available, to support his plea in the affidavit
itself so that the Controller will be in a position to adjudicate and
decide the question of genuine or bona fide requirement of the
landlord. A mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be
sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlord’s favour that
his requirement of occupation of the premises is real and genuine.”
8
MANU/SC/1239/2005
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24. Moreover, it is a settled position of law that the landlord need not
show any substantive proof qua actual bona fide requirement, rather any
such assertion/ claim made by the landlord is itself sufficient for the Court
to proceed with the presumption that there is indeed a bona fide
requirement of the premises by the landlord. Reliance in this regard is
placed upon Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company9 and
Baldev Singh Bajwa (supra).
25. In view thereof, the learned ARC has rightly held that landlord “…
…has been able to establish her bona fide requirement for the tenanted
premises… …”. This Court also finds no infirmity in the conclusion
arrived at by the learned ARC.
26. Qua the third aspect of alternate accommodation, though there are
other properties owned by the landlord on the ground floor of the same
premises, however, admittedly, all of those are in the occupation of other
tenants and are not vacant and available to the landlord as an alternative
accommodation. The landlord simply having alternate accommodation is
not itself sufficient, much less, a relevant factor for consideration at the
time of dealing with an application for leave to defend, more so, if it is not
deemed fit, proper and/ or appropriate for the inhabitation of the landlord.
As per the well-settled position of law, it is the prerogative of the landlord
to decide which premises suits her requirement and which requires
eviction. In such a situation, the tenant cannot dictate the landlord that she
should seek eviction of other tenants instead. Reference in this regard can
be made to a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
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Kanahaiya Lal Arya v. Md. Ehshan & Ors.10.
27. Otherwise also, there exists a burden on the tenant to show how the
other accommodations are suitable to the landlord requirement and mere
assertion saying landlord has alternate accommodations is not enough. In
the case at hand, the tenant has been unable to discharge the said onus as
the leave to defend application filed by them vaguely pleaded that landlord
have alternate accommodations, but remained silent qua the the aspect of
its suitability, and even as recorded in the impugned judgment “… …no
photographs showing the area of the said ground floor purportedly in the
possession of the petitioner (present respondent) has been filed to show
even on prima facie basis its suitability for the projected need of the
petitioner for the residential purpose in comparison with the tenanted
premises.”
28. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is agreeable with the conclusion
arrived at by the learned ARC that the tenant “… …have failed to raise
any triable issue on the aspect of alternative accommodation… …”.
Therefore, there is no reason for this Court to not uphold the finding of the
learned ARC.
29. Lastly, the petitioners cannot be allowed to canvass the case as if it
is an appeal, and has to restrict their case confining to a revision petition
under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act. Undoubtedly, the ambit and scope
of interference in a revision petition before this Court is circumscribed
only to cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record or
where there is non-regard to following of any Act(s), Rule(s),
10
MANU/SC/0264/2025
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Notification(s), Guideline(s), Office Order(s) or such. Save in such
circumstances, this Court shall not disturb the findings of the learned ARC
so as to supplant/ substitute its own view. In any event, this Court is not a
fact finding authority and is not expected to undertake a roving inquiry,
since such an approach would, in effect, convert the power of
superintendence into that of regular first appeal which goes against the
scheme and intent of the enactment itself. Reference can be made to the
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain
Dua11, Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.12 and Mohd.
Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal13.
30. Lastly, the reliance placed by learned counsel for the tenant on
Charan Dass Duggal (supra), is misplaced, since the tenant, relying upon
that, is for the first time trying to draw a new analogy which was never the
case before the learned ARC. Be that as it may, in Charan Dass Duggal
(supra) it was the case of the tenant in the said leave to defend application
therein that the landlord was having a big house in Pathankot and is
residing at that place and is not residing in Delhi and therefore, the
landlord was not in need of the subject premises at Delhi, and therefore
the Hon’ble Supreme Court after observing in paragraph nos.5 and 7
thereof that “… … the landlord is staying at Pathankot, that a house is
purchased, may be in the name of his sons and daughters, but there may
not be an apparent need to return to Delhi in his old age, a triable issue
would come into existence… …” and “… …Undoubtedly wholly frivolous
11
(2022) 6 SCC 30
12
(1998) 8 SCC 119
13
(2020) 7 SCC 327
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defence may not entitle a person leave to defend. But equally a triable
issue raised, enjoins a duty to grant leave. May be in the end the defence
may fail. It is necessary to bear in mind that when leave to defend is
refused the party seeking leave is denied an opportunity to test the truth of
the averments of the opposite party by cross-examination and rival
affidavits may not furnish reliable evidence for concluding the point one
way or the other. It is not for a moment suggested that leave to defend
must be granted on mere asking but it is equally improper to refuse to
grant leave though triable issues are raised and the controversy can be
properly adjudicated after ascertainment of truth through cross-
examination of witnesses who have filed their affidavits… …” held that
leave to defend ought to have been granted in the aforesaid circumstances.
As such, the dicta in Charan Dass Duggal (supra) is not applicable to the
facts of the present case as the petitioner no.1 in the leave to defend
application before the learned ARC failed to raise any such argument and,
moreover, the landlord herein is an old lady of around 69 years residing
alone in Ghaziabad with support of her relatives in Delhi and she wants to
come and reside in the subject premises.
31. Therefore, as a sequitur, this Court finds no infirmity or illegality in
the impugned order dated 08.04.2025, which would call for any
interference from this Court.
32. Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid discussions, the facts of the
present case do not warrant any cause for interference with the impugned
order, and the present petition being devoid of merit, both factually and
legally, is hereby dismissed.
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33. However, considering that the tenant is running a School from the
subject premises, this Court taking a lenient view, deems it fit, proper and
appropriate if the said tenant, in addition of to six months benefit as
envisaged under Section 14(7) of the DRC Act and as granted by the
learned ARC vide the impugned order, is further granted time for evicting
the subject premises at any stage on or before 31.03.2026. The tenant
shall, however, pay user and occupation charges at the rate of
Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Only) per month with effect from April
2025 till March 2026. Therefore, the tenant being Education Department,
Government of NCT of Delhi and the Principal, Government Girls Senior
Secondary School shall hand over possession of subject premises being
first and second floor of property bearing nos.2376 to 2382, situated in
Municipal Ward No.VI, Ballimaran, Delhi to the landlord Ms. Asiya Jamil
on or before 31.03.2026.
34. Pending applications are also dismissed. The parties are left to bear
their respective costs.
SAURABH BANERJEE, J
AUGUST 21, 2025/So
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