Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
G Venkateswara Rao vs The State Of Ap on 9 January, 2025
APHC010126662019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3333]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY ,THE NINTH DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE V.SUJATHA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 2656/2019
Between:
G Venkateswara Rao and Others ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED(S)
AND
The State Of Ap ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused(S):
1. Y KOTESWARA RAO
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:
1. P.S.P.Suresh kumar,Spl.Public Prosecutor For C.B.I.
The Court made the following:
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ORDER:
This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 of Criminal
Procedure Code (for short “Cr.P.C.”) to quash the proceedings in
S.C.No.250 of 2017 on the file of the I Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Ongole, Prakasam District corresponding to Crime
No.140 of 1995 on the file of Ongole Town Police Station, Prakasam
District, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 147,
148, 307 and 302 read with 149 of Indian Penal Code (for short
“I.P.C.”) and Section 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. Petitioners herein
are accused Nos.3, 4 and 7.
2) The case of the prosecution is that crime No.140 of 1995 was
registered against 8 persons. Accused Nos.1 to 8 are known to each
other and very close associates. With avowed ideology of the
Peoples’ War Group, the members of P.W.G. and their associates
organised attacks on law abiding citizens whom they dub as class
enemies. Magunta Subbarama Reddy was a member of Parliament
and elected on the Congress-I Ticket in the year 1991 from Ongole
Constituency, Prakasam District and one of the leading industrialists
of South India. He was a sole distributor for the Mcdowell Brand
Liquor for South India. After he became a Member of Parliament in
the year 1991, he started taking keen interest in his constituency by
promoting several welfare schemes and was serving many poor
persons and the downtrodden. One V.Nagabhushanam, retired
Tahsildar was functioning as Assistant to him. During the year 1995,
the accused and others entered into criminal conspiracy to do away
the life of Magunta Subbarama Reddy and in pursuance of the
criminal conspiracy, Rayalaseema Reddeppa supplied money to
accused Nos.1 to 7 to accomplish the common object of murder and
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Vemu Rama Rao @ Prasad engaged car bearing No.AAG 8300
belonging to accused No.2 in the month of November, 1995 and all
the accused formed themselves into members of an unlawful
assembly, entered into the Office-cum-resience of Magunta
Subbarama Reddy on 01.12.1995 at 01.40 p.m. and committed the
alleged offences. While the accused were escaping, they committed
theft of the car bearing No.AEE 2999 belonging to Sri Yada Srinivasa
Rao and during the same transaction, they attempted to murder
Subba Reddy and Penchal Reddy having committed trespass. During
the course of same transaction, accused No.1 fired at the deceased
Magunta Subbarama Reddy, Chappidi Venkata Ratnam,
Chennareddy Penchal Reddy by using his unlicensed 0.45″ pistol and
thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 27 of the
Arms Act and that accused No.2 facilitated accused No.1 and others
to escape after commission of the offence and he was in possession
of four live 7.63 cartridges without valid licence and thereby accused
No.2 committed an offence punishable under Section 25 of Arms Act.
After completion of the investigation, police filed charge sheet against
the accused for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 307,
302 read with 149 of I.P.C. As the offences alleged against the
accused are triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, the case
was committed to the Court of Sessions, Prakasam Division.
Subsequently, the case was transferred to the Metropolitan Sessions
Division, Hyderabad, as per the orders of the High Court and the
case against accused Nos.1 and 2 was renumbered as S.C.No.315
of 1997. After full-fledged trial, Sessions Court found accused Nos.1
and 2 guilty and convicted and sentenced accused Nos.1 to suffer
imprisonment for life each for the offence punishable under Section
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302 of I.P.C., under Section 120-B, 449, 307 read with 149 of I.P.C.
and also sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year for
the offence punishable under Section 147 of I.P.C. and rigorous
imprisonment for two years each for the offence punishable under
Section 148 of I.P.c. and rigorous imprisonment for seven years for
the offence under Section 397 of I.P.C. and rigorous imprisonment for
five years for the offence under Section 25 (1-A) of the Arms Act and
also sentenced accused No.2 to suffer imprisonment for life each for
the offence under Section 120-B, 302 read with 149 of I.P.C. on two
counts, 307 read with 149 of I.P.C. on two counts, and further
sentenced to suffer Rigorous imprisonment for one year for the
offence punishable under Section 147 of I.P.C. and to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for 7 years for the offence punishable under Section
397 of I.P.C., to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years for the
offence under Section 506 of I.P.C. and to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for 5 years for the offence punishable under Section 25
(1-A) of the Arms Act. The present petition has been filed seeking to
quash the proceedings against accused Nos.3,4 and 7 in S.C.No.250
of 2017 on the file of the I Additional District and Sessions Judge,
Ongole.
3) On 24.04.2019, when the matter is listed for admission, this
Court passed the following interim order:
“In the meanwhile, there shall be stay of all further
proceedings.”
4) Sri Y.Koteswara Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners
requested this Court to quash the proceedings against the petitioners
in S.C.No.250 of 2017 mainly on the ground that accused No.2 was
acquitted by this Court and the acquittal of accused No.2 was
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confirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, hence the chances for
conviction of the petitioners herien are bleak. He further contended
that the petitioners herein did not commit any offence as alleged by
the prosecution and no specific overt acts were attributed to the
petitioners herein. As the petitioners herein were falsely implicated in
the case, the proceedings against them are liable to be quashed.
5) Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor for
C.B.I. contended that merely because the co-accused was acquitted
for one reason or the other, based on appreciation of the evidence on
record, does not ipso facto constitute any issue estoppel barring a
trial as against the petitioners herein. The acquittal of co-accused is
not a ground to quash the proceedings against the petitioners herein
and every case has to be decided on the evidence adduced therein,
and requested to dismiss the present petition.
6) Having heard the submissions made by the learned counsel
representing both parties and on perusal of the material available on
record, the points that arise for consideration are as follows:
1) “Whether the acquittal of co-accused in the present crime is
a ground to quash the proceedings against the petitioners
herein ?
2) Whether the proceedings against the petitioner in
S.C.No.250 of 2017 on the file of the I Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Ongole, Prakasam District, are liable to be
quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C.?”
P O I N T No.1:
7) The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C.
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8) Section 482 of Cr.P.C saves the inherent powers of the High
Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any
order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court
or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is an obvious proposition
that when a Court has authority to make an order, it must have also
power to carry that order into effect. If an order can lawfully be made,
it must be carried out; otherwise it would be useless to make it. The
authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any
attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the
Court must have power to prevent that abuse. In the absence of such
power the administration of law would fail to serve the purpose for
which alone the Court exists, namely to promote justice and to
prevent injustice. Section 482 of Cr.P.C confers no new powers but
merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court.
Such power has to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and
this power is external in nature to meet the ends of justice.
9) Time and again, the scope of powers of this Court under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were highlighted by the Apex Court in long
line of perspective pronouncements, which are as follows:
10) Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the
High Court to exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the
process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of
the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in
cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is
frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the
complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken
by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in
exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however,
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Crlp_2656_2019necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case,
before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or
not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a
consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath
of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are
disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala
fide, frivolous or vexatious. In that event there would be no
justification for interference by the High Court as held by the Apex
Court in “Mrs.Dhanalakshmi v. R.Prasanna Kumar1“
11) Keeping in view the above principles, I would like to examine
the case on hand.
12) Admittedly, the case against the petitioners herein was split up
and numbered as S.C.No.250 of 2017. The trial against accused
Nos.1 and 2 was concluded and they were convicted as stated supra.
Thereafter, accused Nos.1 and 2 preferred criminal appeal No.1672
of 2000 against the conviction and sentence recorded against them
by order dated 04.08.2000 passed in S.C.No.315 of 1997 by the
Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, wherein High Court of
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad allowed the appeal filed by accused
No.2 vide order dated 31.03.2003 and acquitted him by giving benefit
of doubt while confirming the conviction and sentence recorded
against accused No.1. Thereafter, State preferred criminal appeal
No.173 of 2004 before the Hon’ble Apex Court against the acquittal
of accused No.2, and accused No.1 preferred criminal appeal No.174
of 2004 against his conviction. The Hon’ble Apex Court vide common
order dated 23.07.2009 dismissed both the appeals confirming the
conviction of accused No.1 and acquittal of accused No.2.
1
AIR 1990 SC 494
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13) In “Moosa Vs. Sub Inspector of Police2“, relied upon by the
learned Special Public Prosecutor for C.B.I., the High Court of Kerala
held as follows:
“In a trial against the co-accused the prosecution
is not called upon, nor is it expected to adduce evidence
against the absconding co-accused’. In such trial the
prosecution cannot be held to have the opportunity or
obligation to adduce all evidence against the absconding
co-accused. The fact that the testimony of a witness was
not accepted or acted upon in the trial against the co-
accused is no reason to assume that he shall not tender
incriminating evidence or that his evidence will not be
accepted in such later trial.
……
The judgment of acquittal of a co-accused in a
criminal trial is not admissible under Sections 40 to 43 of
the Evidence Act to bar the subsequent trial of the
absconding co-accused and cannot hence be reckoned
as a relevant document while considering the prayer to
quash the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Such
judgments will be admissible only to show as to who
were the parties in the earlier proceedings or the factum
of acquittal.”
14) In “Megh Singh Vs. State of Punjab3” the Apex Court held
that the acquittal of the co-accused does not by itself entitle the other
2
2006 CrLJ 1922
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accused in the same case to acquittal as a single significant detail
may alter the entire aspect. It may be noticed that the co-accused
was acquitted in the same trial still it was held that that by itself is not
a reason to acquit the other accused.
15) In “Gorle Section Naidu Vs. State of A.P. 4 ” referring to
Section 3 of the Evidence Act and credibility of evidence, it was held
that mere acquittal of large number of co-accused does not per se
entitle others to acquittal. The court has duty in suit cases to separate
grain from chaff.
16) In “Raju Rai Vs. State of Bihar5” the Apex Court held that the
judgment of acquittal in the trial of the co-accused tried separately is
wholly irrelevant in the subsequent trial of the other accused who was
not tried earlier: but separated and that the judgment in their case is
not admissible within the meaning of Sections 40 to 44 of the
Evidence Act.
17) In “Karan Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 6″, there
were 8 accused persons out of whom accused Ram Hans
absconded, as such trial of seven accused persons, including
accused Karan Singh, who was appellant before the Apex Court,
proceeded and the trial court although acquitted other six accused
persons, convicted the seventh accused, i.e., Karan Singh under
Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. Against his conviction, Karan
Singh preferred an appeal before the High Court. During the
3
2004 SCC (Crl.) 58
4
AIR 2004 SC 1169
5
2006 (1) KLT (SC) 8 : 2005 (7) Sup 459
6
[1965]2SCR1
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pendency of his appeal, accused Ram Hans was apprehended and
put on trial and upon its conclusion, the trial court recorded order of
his acquittal, which attained finality, no appeal having been preferred
against the same. Thereafter, when the appeal of accused Karan
Singh was taken up for hearing, it was submitted that in view of the
judgment of acquittal rendered in the trial of accused Ram Hans, the
conviction of accused Karan Singh under Section 302 read with
Section 149 IPC could not be sustained, more so when other six
accused persons, who were tried with Karan Singh, were acquitted
by the trial court and the judgment of acquittal attained finality.
Repelling the contention, the High Court after considering the
evidence adduced came to the conclusion that murder was
committed by Ram Hans in furtherance of the common intention of
both himself and accused Karan Singh and, accordingly, altered the
conviction of Karan Singh from Section 302/149 to one under Section
302/34 IPC. Against the said judgment, when an appeal by special
leave was preferred before the Supreme Court, it was contended that
in view of the verdict of acquittal of accused Ram Hans, it was not
permissible in law for the High Court to uphold conviction of accused
Karan Singh. This Court, repelling the contention, held that decision
in each case had to turn on the evidence led in it. Case of accused
Ram Hans depended upon evidence led there while the case of
accused Karan Singh, who had appealed before this Court, had to be
decided only on the basis of evidence led during the course of his
trial and the evidence led in the case of Ram Hans and the decision
there arrived at would be wholly irrelevant in considering merits of the
case of Karan Singh, who was appellant before this Court. The
Supreme Court observed at page 1038 thus:-
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Crlp_2656_2019“As the High Court pointed out, that observation has no
application to the present case as here the acquittal of Ramhans
was not in any proceeding to which the appellant was a party.
Clearly, the decision in each case has to turn on the evidence led
in it; Ramhans’s case depended on the evidence led there while
the appellant’s case had to be decided only on the evidence led in
it. The evidence led in Ramhans’s case and the decision there
arrived at on that evidence would be wholly irrelevant in
considering the merits of the appellant’s case.”
18) In the present case, as the case against the present petitioners
was split up, they did not face any trial. Acquittal of the other accused
has nothing to do with the merits and demerits of the case pending
against the petitioners herein. There is no justification on the part of
the petitioners herein to seek quashment of proceedings to avoid trial
in the split up case pending against him.
19) From the above discussion, it can thus be seen that the
judgment rendered in the case of a co-accused and the reasoning of
the judgment contained therein or appreciation of the evidence
therein are not matters to be taken into account for the purpose of
granting any relief to quash the proceedings and even when a
co-accused is acquitted in the very same trial, the other accused can
be convicted if there are good reasons to do so. In other words, the
acquittal of some of the accused by itself is not a reason to quash the
proceedings against the petitioners herein. Merely on the ground that
the co-accused was acquitted, the proceedings against the
petitioners herein cannot be quashed as the truth or otherwise can be
decided after full-fledged trial. Accordingly, the point is answered
against the petitioners.
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P O I N T No.2:
20) The offences alleged to have been committed by the
petitioners are punishable under Sections 147, 148, 307, 302 read
with 149 of I.P.C.
21) On the perusal of the complaint, it is clear that the allegations
made against the petitioners are serious in nature as the offence
under Section 302 of I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment for life or
capital punishment of death. As the serious allegations are made
against the petitioners herein, the truth or otherwise will be decided
only after full-fledged trial.
22) Viewed from any angle, it is not a fit case to quash the
proceedings against the petitioners herein. Accordingly, the point is
answered against the petitioners.
23) Accordingly, the criminal petition is dismissed.
24) The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.
________________________
JUSTICE V.SUJATHA
09.01.2025
Ksp
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