Ganesh Lal vs State & Anr on 20 August, 2025

0
5

Jammu & Kashmir High Court

Ganesh Lal vs State & Anr on 20 August, 2025

Author: Vinod Chatterji Koul

Bench: Vinod Chatterji Koul

                                                       Sr. No. 23


     HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
                     AT JAMMU

Case: CRMC 417/2016


Ganesh Lal
                                      ...Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s)

               Through: Mr. Amarvir Manhas, Advocate

                          V/s
State & Anr.                                    ... Respondent(s)

               Through: Mr. Pawan Dev Singh, Dy.AG
                        Mr. Sandeep Gupta, CGSC

CORAM:
 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD CHATTERJI KOUL, JUDGE
                     ORDER

20.08.2025

1. The petitioner, Ganesh Lal, has invoked the inherent

jurisdiction of this Court under Section 561-A Cr.P.C (now

Section 482 Cr.P.C.) seeking quashment of FIR No. 104/2016

registered at Police Station Bishnah, District Jammu, under

Sections 353, 504, 506 RPC.

2. The FIR in question has been registered at the instance of

respondent No.2 Manohar Lal (Naib Tehsildar, Executive

Magistrate 1st Class, Bishnah).

3. It is alleged by the petitioner that the FIR in question is a

false document being a product of frustration that the

respondent No. 2 had developed due to the restraining order of

this Court and to wreak vengeance has got registered against

the petitioner and his brother. The allegations in the FIR are so

absurd, unsupported by independent witnesses or
corroborative material which amounts to sheer abuse of process

of law. Registration of such an FIR by the police, allegedly

acting on the instructions of respondent no.2 who is alleged to

have acted contrary to the directions of this Courts order.

4. The FIR No. 104/2016 is sought to be quashed by the

petitioner precisely, on the following grounds:-

(i) That admittedly the FIR in question is a false document being a
product of frustration that the respondent no.2 had
developed due to the restraining order of the High
Court and in order to wreak vengeance has got the same
registered against the petitioner and his brother who is
serving in BSF, a disciplined force and the respondent no.l has
mechanically registered the case without verifying the true facts;

(ii) That the allegations in the FIR are so absurd that no prudent
man can believe them and that is why the respondent no.l
should have kept his hands off from registering the case which
has landed the petitioner in an unwanted litigation;

(iii) That registration of FIR is a serious development which
jeopardizes the legal rights and social stature of the person
and the respondent no.l should have been on guards before
filing the same, but appears to have acted on the instructions
of the respondent no.2 without due application of mind;

(iv) That according to the petitioner no independent witness has
supported the complaint of the respondent no.2, who it
appears, has acted upon the instructions of his superiors as
can be made out from the enclosed documents and therefore,
the FIR so lodged is rendered untenable;

(v) That the filing of FIR is nothing but a sheer misuse of the
powers by the respondent no.2 and the intervention of the
Hon’ble Court is solicited to prevent the abuse of process of
law and also to secure the ends of Justice;

5. Per contra, respondents have filed their status report

asserting that the petition is not maintainable and has been

filed by concealing material facts.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the

allegations contained in the FIR in question disclose the

commission of cognizable offences. The respondent
/complainant, while performing his official duties, was

subjected to threats, and the accused created obstruction,

thereby hindering the complainant in the discharge of his

official functions. Consequently, the registration of the FIR

cannot be faulted. Furthermore, the investigation has been duly

completed and the challan has been perpared.

7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material on record.

8. Section 482 Cr.P.C. provides that nothing in the Code of

Criminal Procedure limits or affects inherent powers of the high

Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to

any order under the Code of Criminal Procedure, or to prevent

abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of

justice.

9. The Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Suraj Kumar

Sahoo, (2005) 13 SCC 540, has sounded a note of caution

about the powers of High Court to be exercised in terms

of Section 561-A Cr.P.C., corresponding to Section 482 of

Central Code. Their lordships enunciated that the High Court

being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from

giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are

incomplete and hazy, more so, when the evidence has not been

collected and produced before the Court and the issues

involved, whether factual or legal, being of magnitude and

cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient

material before the Court. While exercising inherent jurisdiction

as observed by their Lordships, it is not permissible for the
Court to act as if it was a Trial Court. It would be none of the

duties of the High Court to appreciate the evidence to conclude

whether the material produced are sufficient or not for holding

the accused guilty.

10. It would also be proper to refer to judgment of the

Supreme Court in Janta Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary, AIR 1993

SC 892, while summarizing the principles in the light of which

inherent powers can be exercised, has observed:

“132.The criminal Courts are clothed with inherent power
to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of
justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined
should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but
should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone the Courts exist. The
powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of
the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the
power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must
be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power
is based on sound principles.

133. The Judicial Committee in (1) Emperor v. Nazir
Ahmad
and (2) Lala Jai Ram Das v. Emperor has taken
the view that Section 561-A of the old Code gave no new
powers but only provided that those which the Court
already inherently possessed should be preserved. This
view holds the field till date.

134. This Court in Dr. Raghubir Sharon v. The State of
Bihar
had an occasion to examine the extent of inherent
power of the High Court and its jurisdiction when to be
exercised. Mudholkar, J speaking for himself and
Raghubar Dayal, J after referring a series of decisions of
the Privy Council and of the various High Courts held
thus:

…every High Court as the highest court exercising
criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to
make any order for the purpose of securing the ends of
justice…. Being an extraordinary power it will, however,
not be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant
abuse by a subordinate Court to is powers….

135. See Talab Hazi Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam
Mondkar and Anr.
[1958] SCR 1226 and Pampapathy v.

State of Mysore [1966] (Supp.) SCR 477.

136. Thus, the inherent power under this Section can be
exercised by the High Court (1) to give effect to any order
passed under theCode; or (2) to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court; or (3) otherwise to secure the ends
of justice. In relation to exercise of inherent powers of the
High Court, it has been observed in Madhu Limaye v.
State of Maharashtra
that the power in not to be resorted
to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the
redress of grievance of the aggrieved party and that it
should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of
process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice and that it should not be exercised as against the
express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the
Code.
Vide (1) Talab Hazi Hussain v. Madhukar
Purshottam
; (2) Khushi Ram v. Hashim and Ors. AIR
1959 SC 542; and (3) State of Orissa v. Ram Chander
Agarwala
.

137. This inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the
Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a
State should normally retrain from giving a premature
decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely
incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not
been collected and produced before the Court and the
issues involved whether factual or legal are of great
magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective
without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast
rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the
High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to
quashing the proceedings at any stage.
This Court
in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and
Ors.
[1990] 3 Supp. SCR 256 to which both of us were
parties have dealt with this question at length and
enunciated the law listing out the circumstances under
which the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction in
quashing proceedings. We do not, therefore, think it
necessary in the present case to extensively deal with the
import and intendment of the powers under Sections
397
, 401 and 482 of the Code.”

11. The Supreme Court in Satvinder Kaur v. State, AIR

1999 SC 3597, has held that appreciation of evidence is the

function of the Court when seized of the matter. At the stage of

investigation, the material collected by an investigating officer

cannot be judicially scrutinized for arriving at a conclusion (in

the said case about the jurisdiction of the police station). It was

also observed that for the purpose of exercising its power

under Section 482 Cr. PC, to quash an FIR or a complaint, the

High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the

allegation made in the complaint or the documents
accompanying the same per se, it has no jurisdiction to

examine the correctness of otherwise of the allegations.

12. In the present case, the First Information Report (FIR) has

been lodged by a public servant, alleging obstruction in the

discharge of official duties. The offences alleged are cognizable

in nature. The police have completed the investigation and

prepared the challan on 21.08.2016. Accordingly, the interim

order dated 26.08.2016 is hereby vacated. The respondents are

at liberty to file the challan before the competent court of law in

accordance with law.

13. Having regard to the observations made hereinabove and

in light of the legal principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the judgments referred to above, I find no merit in the

present petition. This is primarily because the offences alleged

against the petitioner/accused are cognizable offences as

disclosed in the report, which formed the basis for registration

of the FIR in question.

14. The petitioner shall be at liberty to raise all contentions

available to him before the Trial Court at the appropriate stage.

(VINOD CHATTERJI KOUL)
JUDGE
Jammu
20.08.2025
AKHILESH

[ad_1]

Source link

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here