Bombay High Court
Gangaram Kalu Gavit And Anr vs The State Of Maharashtra on 22 April, 2025
2025:BHC-AS:17999
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL NO. 722 OF 1999
1. Mr. Gangaram Kalu Gavit, ]
Adult ]
2. Mr. Laxman Kalu Gavit, ]
Adult ]
(No. 1 for self and head of joint family for ]
Applicant No. 2) ]
Both are residents of : Amdar, Taluka : ]
Kalwan, District : Nashik ] ...Appellants
Versus
The State of Maharashtra ]
through The Special Land Acquisition Officer, ]
National Highway Project, Nashik ] ...Respondent
------------
Mr. Anil J. Ahuja, Ms. Bhavana Khemani for the Appellant.
Mr. A. R. Patil, AGP for Respondent-State.
------------
Coram : Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.
Reserved on : 28th March, 2025.
Pronounced on : 22nd April, 2025.
Judgment :
1. The First Appeal impugns the Judgment and Award dated 30 th
April, 1998 passed by Joint District Judge, Nashik in Land Acquisition
Reference No. 253 and 254 of 1990 dismissing both the land
references. The challenge in the present First Appeal is confined to
Land Acquisition Reference No. 253 of 1990.
2. The acquisition of the Appellant’s land i.e. Gat No 1 was from
Village – Amdar, Taluka – Kalwan, District – Nashik for construction of
Sairaj 1 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).docpercolation tank. The subject land came to be acquired pursuant to
publication of Section 4 Notification Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [for
short, “L. A. Act“] which was lastly published on 7th February, 1986.
Section 6 declaration was published on 10th July, 1986 and the Award
under Section 11 was passed on 8th July, 1988.
3. Being aggrieved by the compensation, the Claimant sought
Reference under Section 18 of the L. A. Act seeking enhanced
compensation of Rs 20,000/- per hectare and Rs 2,000/- per hectare for
Pot-Kharab Land.
4. In support of the claim, C.W.-1 deposed that the acquired land
was paddy field and possession was taken prior to 20 years. He further
deposed that there were no sale instances in Village Amdar and that
Villages Wadala, Lingama, Deoli Karad are adjoining villages having the
same quality of lands. In the cross-examination, C.W.-1 deposed that
there are no sale instances in the adjoining villages. He has admitted
that his village is surrounded by mountains.
5. C.W.-2 corroborated the deposition of C.W.-1 that there were no
sale instances in Village – Amdar at the time of acquisition or in the
adjoining villages i.e. Villages Wadala, Yelli Karad, Kosurde, Desgaon,
Daregaon, Lingama. He had further deposed that Kanashi is adjacent to
village Kosurde and Desgaon. He has deposed that percolation tanks
were constructed at Village Chankapur and Karmale and he knows
Sairaj 2 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
Chopade and Bhoi from village Karmale whose lands are located at
distance of 1 to 2 k.m. distance from the acquired land. He has further
deposed that some lands from village Abhona were acquired and
Kanashi and Karmale are nearer to their village than Abhona.
6. In the cross-examination, C.W.-2 was unable to tell the names of
Bhoi and Chopade or their Gat Numbers nor the crops raised in their
respective fields. C.W.-2 was unable to state how many villages were
situated between their village and village Karmale. He was unable to
give details of the acquired lands and date of acquisition. C.W.-2 was
unable to state the nature of produce in the lands of Village Karmale.
7. The Opponents did not file written statement and no evidence
was led.
8. The Reference Court framed the following issues :-
– Issues –
(1) Are the Claimants entitled to enhanced compensation? If
so, to what amount?
(2) What order?
9. During arguments, the Learned AGP raised the issue of limitation
which was opposed by the Advocate for the Claimants in the absence
of any specific issue framed and without granting opportunity to lead
evidence. The Reference Court opined that Issue No. (1) was wide
enough to consider issue of limitation and as documents were filed by
Claimants on date of evidence, they had adequate opportunity to
Sairaj 3 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
answer the issue of limitation.
10. The Reference Court noted the provisions of Section 18(2)(b) of
L.A. Act and held that Reference should have been filed within six
months form date of award and rejected the contention that limitation
would begin from date of payment. The Reference Court noted that
Section 12(2) notices under L.A. Act were served twice to receive
payment, i.e. on 18th October, 1988 and on 16th December, 1988 and the
case of the Claimant was that they had applied for certified copy of the
award on 16th October, 1988 but till 27th July, 1989, the same was not
received and the files were inspected and Reference came to be filed
on 28th July, 1989 is not supported by certified copy of Application. It
further held that no office bearer was examined on the point to show
that the said office did not provide copies on or before 27th July, 1989.
11. Despite holding that the References were time-barred, the
Reference Court examined the claim on merits. The Reference Court
held that there is no evidence produced to show absence of sale
instances in the adjoining villages. The Reference Court did not accept
the judgment in Reference proceedings in respect of lands at Village
Karmale in absence of any map produced to show proximity of location.
12. Mr. Ahuja, Learned Counsel for Appellants submits that there
was no Written Statement filed and no issue of limitation was framed.
He submits that it is undisputed that Section 12(2) notice issued on 4 th
Sairaj 4 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
October, 1988 was served on 15 th October, 1988 and second notice
issued on 9th December, 1988 was served on 16th December, 1988 and
the copy of the Award was not annexed to the notices. He submits that
though the notices called upon the Claimants to accept compensation,
the date of actual payment is admittedly on 21 st June, 1989 and
reference filed within four weeks is within limitation. He relies upon
the decision of Vijay Mahadeorao Kubade vs. State of Maharashtra
through Collector1 to contend that certified copy of Award was
essential for effective exercise of right to seek Reference under
Section 18 of L.A. Act. He would further point out the decision in the
case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. Deputy Land Acquisition
Officer2 and would submit that what is required is actual or
constructive knowledge of passing of the Award.
13. On the merits, he would submit that the relevant date for the
purpose of determination of market value is date of publication of
Section 4 Notification on 7th February, 1986. He draws attention of map
produced with compilation of documents to demonstrate that village
Amdar is near to Villages Kanashi and Karmale. He submits that it is a
specific deposition of C.W.-2 that village Karmale is at the distance of
one to two kilometre. He would submit that there was evidence on
record to enable application of the same rates of compensation to the
1 (2018) 8 SCC 266.
2 1961 SCC OnLine SC 140.
Sairaj 5 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
acquired lands as that of Village Karmale. He submits that the Award
passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer shows that proximity of
the acquired lands to the Taluka headquarter. He submits that L. A. Act
being social welfare legislation, even in absence of cogent evidence, it
needs to be considered that in respect of village Karmale, the rate
awarded was Rs. 31,000/- per hectare whereas the Claimants have got
about Rs. 4,312/- per hectare.
14. Per contra, Mr. Patil, learned AGP submits that the second part of
the proviso (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the L. A. Act is applied
in the present case which requires reference to be filed within a period
of six months from the date of Award. He submits that stand of
Claimants was that they were called upon to take the payment on 16 th
December, 1988 and they were paid only on 21 st June, 1989. He
submits therefore, on 16th December, 1988, the Claimants had
constructive knowledge of the Award. He draws attention of this Court
to the decision in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs.
Deputy Land Acquisition Officer (supra), Bhagwan Das vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh3, and State of Punjab vs. Qaisar Jehan Begum 4,to
contend that even constructive knowledge is sufficient to commence
period of limitation.
15. On merits, Learned AGP submits that this is case of ‘no evidence’.
3 (2010) 3 SCC 545.
4 AIR 1963 SC 1604.
Sairaj 6 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
Pointing out to the deposition of C.W.-1, he submits that the
deposition that there were no sale instances in the adjoining village
has not been substantiated by producing any certificate, which was in
fact produced in respect of village Amdar. He submits that Exhibit-3e
which judgment is in the case of acquisition from village Karmale and
Kanashi cannot be considered for the purpose of determining the
market value of village Amdar as it is not shown that the lands were
identically situated.
16. In rejoinder, Mr. Ahuja would rely on Premji Nathu vs. State of
Gujarat5, to contend that mere knowledge of passing of Award will not
imply knowledge of relevant particulars of Award. He would further
submit that in the case of Parsottambhai Maganbhai Patel vs. State
of Gujarat6, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that limitation prescribed
under the latter part of Section 18 (2) (b) is to be computed having
regard to the date when the knowledge has been acquired. He would
submit that there was no valid notice and the same was not
accompanied by the Award. He would further submit that in the case of
New Okhla Industrial Development Authority vs. Harnand Singh
(deceased) through LRs7, the Hon’ble Apex Court has applied the
principle of guesstimation and therefore, the same principle should
5 (2012) 5 SCC 250.
6 (2005) 7 SCC 431.
7 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1691.
Sairaj 7 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
apply in the present case and the meagre compensation should be
enhanced.
17. The facts of the case would give rise to the following points for
determination:
(i) Whether the Reference Court was justified in holding that the
Reference was barred by limitation without framing a specific issue of
limitation and without granting an opportunity to lead evidence on the
said issue?
(ii) Whether the Reference in question was barred by limitation?
(iii) Whether the Claimants have proved that compensation awarded by
Special Land Acquisition Officer is inadequate and is required to be
enhanced?
18. Dealing first with the aspect of limitation, the admitted position
is that no written statement was filed and it was during final
arguments that the Learned AGP raised the issue of limitation. Section
18 of L.A. Act provides for Reference to the Court and the proviso to
sub-section (2) of Section 18 prescribe different period of limitation
depending on whether the person seeking Reference was present or
represented at the time of the making of Award, in which case it is six
weeks. In the other case within six weeks of receipt of notice from
Collector under Section 12(2) or within six months from date of
Collector’s Award, whichever period shall first expire.
Sairaj 8 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
19. The above provision sets out (a) limitation of six weeks from
date of award if the person was present/represented at time of making
of award and (b) in other cases, limitation of six weeks from Section
12(2) notice or six months from date of Collectors’ Award, whichever
expires earlier.
20. In the present case, we are concerned with clause (b) to the
proviso. The Reference Application pleads that Section 12(2) notice is
received on 15th October, 1988, however notice did not contain
particulars of contents of the Award. It was argued that date of
payment of compensation is 21st June, 1989 which has not been shown
to be disputed. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Vijay
Kubade vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) that as the notice was not
accompanied with the Award, there could not have been a valid notice
of the Award under Section 12(2) until the Appellant received certified
copy of the Award.
21. In State of Punjab vs Qaisar Jehan Begum (supra), the Hon’ble
Apex Court while interpreting clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section
(2) of Section 18 held that the knowledge of award must mean
knowledge of essential contents of the Award in paragraph 5 as under:
“5. As to the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso, the true
scope and effect thereof was considered by this court in
Harish Chandra‘s Case, 1962-1 SCR 676: (AIR 1961 SC 1500)
(supra). It was there observed that a literal and mechanical
construction of the words “six months from the date of the
Collector’s award” occurring in the second part of cl. (b) of theSairaj 9 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).docproviso would not be appropriate and “the knowledge of the
party affected by the award, either actual or constructive,
being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice,
the expression used in the proviso must mean the date when
the award is either communicated to the party or is known by
him either actually or constructively.” Admittedly the award
was never communicated to the respondents. Therefore the
question before us boils down to this. When did the
respondents know the award either actually or constructively?
Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very strong
reliance on the petition which the respondents made for
interim payment of compensation on December 24, 1954. He
has pointed out that the learned Subordinate Judge relied on
this petition as showing the respondents date of knowledge
and there are no reasons why we should take a different view.
It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish
Chandra‘s case, 1962-1 SCR 676: (AIR 1961 SC 1500) (supra) is
that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or
constructively, and the period of six months will run from the
date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does
not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has
been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential
contents of the award. These contents may be known either
actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a
party under S. 12 (2) of the Act, the party must be obviously
fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether
he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in court
either personally or through his representative when the
award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he
knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the
scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must
mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award.
Looked at from that point of view, we do not think that it can
be inferred from the petition dated December 24, 1954 that
the respondents had knowledge of the award one of the
respondents gave evidence before the learned Subordinate
Judge and she said :
“The application marked as Ex. D-1 was given by me but the
amount of compensation was not known to me, nor did I know
about acquisition of the land. Chaudhari Mohd. Sadiq, my
karinda had told me on the day I filed the said application that
the land had been acquired by the Government.”
This evidence was not seriously contradicted on behalf of the
appellant and the learned Subordinate Judge did not reject it.
It is worthy of the note that before the Collector also the
appellant did not seriously challenge the statement of the
respondents that they came to know of the award on July 22,
1955 the date on which the compensation was paid. On the
reply which the appellant filed before the learned Subordinate
Sairaj 10 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
judge there was no contradiction of the averment that the
respondents had come to know of the award on July 22, 1955.
That being the position we have come to the conclusion that
the date of knowledge in this case was July 22, 1955. The
application for a reference was clearly made within six months
from that date and was not therefore barred by time within
the meaning of the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso to S. 18
of the Act.”
22. In Bhagwan Das vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), the Hon’ble
Apex Court has held in paragraph 30 and 31 as under:
“30. When a person interested makes an application for
reference seeking the benefit of six months’ period from the
date of knowledge, the initial onus is on him to prove that he
(or his representative) was not present when the award was
made, that he did not receive any notice under Section 12(2)
of the Act, and that he did not have the knowledge of the
contents of the award during a period of six months prior to
the filing the application for reference. This onus is discharged
by asserting these facts on oath. He is not expected to prove
the negative. Once the initial onus is discharged by the
claimant/person interested, it is for the Land Acquisition
Collector to establish that the person interested was present
either in person or through his representative when the award
was made, or that he had received a notice under Section
12(2) of the Act, or that he had knowledge of the contents of
the award.
31. Actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the
award can be established by the Collector by proving that the
person interested had received or drawn the compensation
amount for the acquired land, or had attested the
mahazar/panchnama/proceedings delivering possession of the
acquired land in pursuance of the acquisition, or had filed a
case challenging the award or had acknowledged the making
of the award in any document or in statement on oath or
evidence. The person interested, not being in possession of
the acquired land and the name of the State or its transferee
being entered in the revenue municipal records coupled with
delay, can also lead to an inference of constructive knowledge.
In the absence of any such evidence by the Collector, the claim
of the person interested that he did not have knowledge
earlier will be accepted, unless there are compelling
circumstances not to do so.”
23. It was argued on behalf of Claimants that they had applied for
Sairaj 11 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
certified copy of the Award which was not received and the file was
inspected and reference filed. The Reference Court rejected the
contention by holding that no officer was examined to corroborate the
said contention. The Reference Court clearly fell in error by failing to
appreciate that as no specific issue of limitation was framed, there was
no occasion for the Claimants to lead evidence. The case of the
Claimant was that of absence of actual or constructive knowledge of
the contents of the Award. The issue therefore revolved upon the date
of acquisition of knowledge of the essentials elements of Award
sufficient to enable the Claimants to challenge the same. The issue of
limitation was thus mixed question of fact and law mandating framing
of specific issue and requiring evidence to be led. It is only if the
question of limitation is pure question of law that the same could have
been argued, say, for example where the notice under Section 12(2) of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was accompanied with a copy of Award
and the Reference was not filed within the period of six weeks of
receipt of notice under Section 12(2). In such case, it could be argued
that the limitation did not require any evidence to be led and is pure
question of law, which can be raised at the time of final argument. As
what is sought to be emphasized is constructive knowledge on part of
the Claimants, which in turn is dependent on the issue as to whether
the Claimants had attended the office for the purpose of collecting the
Sairaj 12 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
payment and could thus be said to amount to acquisition of
constructive knowledge of the same, evidence was required to be led.
There is specific pleading in the application that the notice under
Section 12(2) did not contain particulars or essential elements of
Award which could have been tested in evidence upon specific issue
being framed.
24. As the issue of limitation was mixed question of law and fact
without evidence being led, there cannot be inference of actual or
constructive knowledge of Claimant for deciding the said issue. In usual
course, the matter would have been remanded for consideration afresh
for framing necessary issue of limitation and permitting evidence to
be led. However, the Reference Court has not only rejected the
Reference on ground of limitation but also on merits, which will have
to be tested.
25. Coming to the merits of the claim, it is well-settled that the
burden is upon the Claimants to prove that the compensation awarded
is inadequate. The burden is sought to be discharged by the Claimants
by examining two witnesses. Both the witnesses deposed about
absence of any sale instance of Village Amdar or of adjoining villages
which were described by C.W.-1 as Villages Wadala, Lingama, Divali
Karad and supplemented by C.W.-2 with Villages Kosurde and Dasgaon.
CW-2 has deposed that Village Kanashi is adjacent to Villages Kosurde
Sairaj 13 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
and Desgaon. The Claimants seek to place reliance on the
compensation awarded to the acquired lands from Village Karmale.
There is no evidence to show that the Claimant’s land the acquired
lands from Village Karmale are identical lands. On the contrary, C.W.-2
has admitted in cross examination that he is unaware of the number of
villages located between Village Amdar and Village Karmale. To
establish parity in compensation, not only proximity of location but
similarities of characteristics, potentiality, advantages, etc. is also
required to be proved, which is not established in the present case.
26. Exhibits 32 and 33 which are the judgments in the Land
References arising out of acquisition of lands of villages Kanashi and
Karmale respectively were sought to be relied upon by the Claimants.
CW-2’s deposition that village Karmale was only at the distance of one
to two kilometre has been demolished in the cross-examination.
Though before this Court, a map has been produced to show the
proximity of Village Amdar to Village Karmale, perusal of the original
R& P does not indicate that the said map was produced before the
Reference Court. Before the Reference Court, the map of Village
Amdar was produced which was not sufficient to establish the
proximity in location with the acquired lands under Exhibit 32 and
Exhibit 33. Leaving that aside, even if the map produced before this
Court is perused, it shows that Village Amdar is separated from the
Sairaj 14 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
Village Karmale by various villages and it cannot be said that the
villages are located at distance of one to two kilometre from the
village Amdar. Thus, the Reference Court has rightly held that the
judgment in the case of acquisition from villages Karmale and Kanashi
cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of determination of
market value in instant case.
27. In the Award passed under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, the situation and description of the acquired land is stated in
clause 3 (c) as under:-
(c) … Situation and description
The village Amdar is situated at the western side of the Taluka
Head Quarter Kalwan at a distance of 1 K.M.s. The nearest
weekly bazar place is communication are S.T. bused playing up
to Abhona. There is no S.T. Bus stop at the village. There is no
S. T. Bus stop at the village. There are no industrial or
Development or Non Agricultural activities the village. The
nearest village are Abhona at a distance of 15 K.M. The lands
under acquisition are located to the Eastern side distance of 1
K.ms. from the village gaothan. The lands have no N.A.
potentiality. There is no Railway station. The main crops grown
at the village are paddy, nagli, Dadar, groundnut etc. Kharif
crops. The Rabi Crops viz. wheat, gram, Onions, chillis etc.
bagait crops are grown on well water in the village. The total
cultivable area of the village is 127-57. Hecters out of which
68-00 is Jirait and 10.90 is bagait. The village is in Survey group
No. 4 and the maximum rate of assessment is Rs. 2.47 Per
Hectare. There is no canal irrigation at the village. There are
no buildings, cartracks, telegraph and transmission lines etc. in
the land acquisition. The lands under acquisition. The lands
under acquisition are mainly jirait lands.
In order to arrive at reasonable valuation of the lands under
acquisition, it will be proper to from groups of lands on
assessment basis. The maximum rate of assessment of the
village is Rs. (2.47) Per Hectare. The lands can be divided in
groups as under:-
Sairaj 15 of 17
::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
Group Range of Asset
I Rs. 0.01 to Rs. 1.25
II Rs. 1.26 to Rs. 2.50
The lands under acquisition fall under the following groups.
Groups Gat No.
I 1p., 4Ap, 4 Cp, 2p.
II B p.
28. From the description in the Award, it is clear that there is no N.A.
potentiality, the lands do not have the advantage of rail and bus
connectivity, there is no industrial development or development of
non-agricultural activities in the village and the nearest village is
Abhona which is at the distance of 15 kilometres. The proximity to the
Taluka headquarters when viewed with the above characteristics would
not enhance the market value of the acquired lands.
29. The Reference Court had noted that Exhibit-32 which was in
respect of acquired land from village Abhona had good N.A.
potentiality, which is not so in case of Village Amdar. The evidence
does not prove any similarities between the acquired lands and the
lands from Villages Karmale or Kanashi and therefore, no reliance can
be placed on Exhibit-33 judgment. The Claimants have not produced
any evidence to substantiate their claim for enhanced compensation.
As Mr. Patil, learned AGP rightly pointed out this is a case of “no
evidence”.
30. It is sought to be contended by Mr. Ahuja that the lands at
Sairaj 16 of 17
::: Uploaded on – 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::
First Appeal No. 722 of 1999 (final).doc
villages Karmale and Kanashi were granted compensation of Rs.
31,000/- per hectare whereas the acquired land from the village Amdar
was granted only Rs. 4,312/- per hectare and by applying the principle
of Guesstimation, the compensation is required to be enhanced. Firstly,
it needs to be noted that in the case of New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority vs. Harnand Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Apex
Court had held that while the Court can use the principle of
guesstimation in reasonably estimating the value of land in absence of
direct evidence, the exercise ought not to be purely hypothetical. In
the present case, the enhancement of compensation would be purely
hypothetical as there is absolutely no evidence which is brought on
record on the basis of which there could be enhancement of
compensation. There is no deposition as regards the potentiality or
characteristics or advantages based on which the claim could be
considered. All that is relied upon are the two judgments below
Exhibits 32 and 33 which are not shown to be identical to the
Claimant’s land. This being a case of ‘no evidence’, there cannot be any
applicability of principles of Guesstimation.
31. In light of above discussion, the First Appeal fails and stands
dismissed.
32. In view of dismissal of First Appeal, nothing survives for
consideration in pending Interim/Civil Applications, if any and the same
stand disposed of.
[Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.]
Sairaj 17 of 17
::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 22/04/2025 22:39:17 :::