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Delhi District Court
Gaurav Chhibber vs State on 15 July, 2025
Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
IN THE COURT OF SH. VIJAY SHANKAR,
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE - 04, (WEST DISTRICT)
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
CR NO.:- 615/2023
CNR NO.:- DLWT01-008920-2023
IN THE MATTER OF :-
Gaurav Chhibber
S/o Sh. S.K. Chhibber
R/o 16, Punjabi Bagh,
New Delhi-110026 .... Revisionist
VERSUS
1. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
(through SHO, PS Moti Nagar, New Delhi)
2. Saurabh Bhambi,
S/o Arvind Bhambi
R/o M5/D3, Jhulelal Apartments,
Pitampura, Delhi-110034 .... Respondents
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:11:03 -
0100
CR No. 615/2023 Page No.1 of 35
Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Date of institution of the revision petition : 02/11/2023
Date on which judgment was reserved : 11/07/2025
Date of judgment : 15/07/2025
JUDGMENT
1. By way of present judgment, this Court shall conscientiously
adjudicate upon criminal revision petition under section 397 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”) filed by the
revisionist against the order dated 24/11/2022 (‘hereinafter referred to as
‘impugned order’) passed by Ms. Shagun, Ld. MM-04, West District, Tis
Hazari Courts, Delhi, in complaint case No. 1029/2021 titled as ” Gaurav
Chhibber V. Saurabh Bhambi ” thereby application u/s. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. of
the complainant (revisionist herein) was dismissed.
In the present revision petition, the revisionist has prayed to
call the Trial Court record and to set-aside the impugned order dated
24/11/2022 passed by the Ld. Trial Court and to direct the SHO/IO, PS
Moti Nagar to register the FIR against the accused u/s. 420/468/471 IPC.
2. Brief facts necessary for just adjudication of the present
revision petition as stated in the present revision petition are that the
revisionist is the proprietor of M/s Ezee Flights Travel and he is in the
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
business of providing tours and travel services across the country.
Respondent no.2 was introduced to the revisionist by a common friend
Amitabh Kant in the year 2018. Respondent no.2 had introduced himself as
the owner/partner of various salons located throughout Delhi & NCR. In
the month of January 2019, respondent no.2 had requested the revisionist
for a friendly loan of Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakh only) in cash as he
urgently required it to renovate one of his salons in Delhi and he assured to
return the said loan within eleven months. On 18/01/2019, revisionist had
given Rs. 31,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty One Lakh Only) in cash to the
respondent no.2 at his office 20 A, II Floor, Najafgarh Road, Moti Nagar,
New Delhi-110015 in the presence of Amitabh Kant. After receiving the
said amount, respondent no.2 kept visiting the revisionist on regular basis
but since the beginning of December, 2019, respondent no.2 started
avoiding meetings, calls or texts from the revisionist. After a lot of
persuasions and discussions, respondent no.2 had agreed to return
Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakh only) within 90 days and issued
post-dated cheques for remaining amount of Rs.11,00,000/- (Rupees
Eleven Lakh only). Revisionist considered his request and executed a
Memorandum of understanding dated 20/12/2019 and it was agreed that in
case, the respondent no.2 fails to make the payment in time, respondent
no.2 would transfer his 50% partnership share of his salon namely Ash &
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:11:18 –
0100
CR No. 615/2023 Page No.3 of 35
Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Niel Unisex Salon at B-2/5, Jankapuri, New Delhi-110058. Revisionist
repeatedly requested the respondent no.2 to return his hard earned money,
however, respondent no.2 did not pay any heeds to return Rs. 20,00,000/-
(Rupees Twenty Lakh only) as per MOU/Agreement or transferred his 50%
share in Ash & Niel unisex salon. On enquiry with other partners of Ash &
Niel Unisex Saloon namely Yashasvi Talwar, revisionist came to know that
respondent no.2 was not even a partner of Ash & Niel unisex salon or any
salon. Respondent no.2 had shown forged partnership deed at the time of
taking loan from the revisionist. Revisionist also came to know that
respondent no.2 had defrauded several other persons by showing himself as
the owner/partner of various salons in Delhi and NCR. Since all the
cheques issued by the respondent no.2 were dishonoured, revisionist left
with no other option but to lodge a complaint dated 11/07/2021 with PS
Moti Nagar and thereafter, on 11/09/2021 before the DCP (West) for
commission of cognizable offences by respondent no.2 but till date, no
action has been taken against respondent no.2. Due to the inaction on the
part of the police, revisionist had filed the complaint u/s. 200 Cr. P.C along
with application u/s. 156(3) Cr.P.C. Ld. Trial Court had dismissed the
aforesaid application u/s. 156(3) Cr.P.C. vide impugned order dated
24/11/2022 passed by the Ld. Trial Court. Revisionist has not filed any such
or similar petition either before this Court or before Hon’ble High Court.
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:11:24 -
0100
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
3. Revisionist has challenged the impugned order on the
grounds, as mentioned in the present revision petition.
Grounds of revision- Impugned order is bad in law and against the
principles of natural justice. Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate the
averments made by the revisionist against the respondent no.2 regarding
not returning the amount of Rs.31,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty One Lakh only).
Ld. Trial Court has not appreciated the fact that the police investigation is
required for the purpose of ascertaining the fact that the respondent no.2
had misrepresented himself as the owner/partner of Ash & Niel Unisex
Salon and produced a forged partnership deed in an attempt to deceive the
revisionist. Ld. Trial Court has not recognized the fact that the investigating
officer failed to investigate Yashasvi Talwar, with whom the respondent
no. 2 entered into a partnership to start a salon business. Therefore, the
investigation of Yashasvi Talwar is crucial as he is a key witness regarding
the alleged funds transferred from the revisionist. Ld. Trial Court has not
appreciated the fact that the revisionist has made a complaint with respect
to the cognizable offence and accordingly, the Ld. Trial Court ought to have
issued necessary direction u/s. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. for registration of FIR
against the accused/respondent no.2 for thorough and proper investigation
of the case.
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:11:30 -
0100
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
4. This Court heard the arguments on the present revision
petition advanced by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist, Ld. Substitute Addl.
PP for the State/ respondent no.1 and Ld. Counsel for the respondent no.2.
Perused the material available on record.
During the course of arguments, it was submitted by Ld.
Counsel for the revisionist that the impugned order is not an interlocutory
order and the present revision petition against the impugned order is
maintainable and impugned order is liable to be set-aside on the grounds, as
mentioned in the present revision petition. On the other hand, it was
submitted by Ld. Counsel for the respondent no.2 that the present revision
petition is not maintainable as the Ld. Trial Court has passed the impugned
order in accordance with law and there is no merits in the present revision
petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.
5. By way of present revision petition, the revisionist has
challenged the order dated 24/11/2022 passed by the Ld. Trial Court. The
impugned order is reproduced as under:-
“24.11.2022
Present: None.
1. Vide this order, the application of complainant
u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. is being disposed of. The complainant
filed a complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C. alongwith the present
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:11:34 -0100CR No. 615/2023 Page No.6 of 35
Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. stating that accused person
has cheated the complainant to the tune of Rs.31,00,000/-.
It is alleged by the complainant thta accused name,
Saurabh Bhambi introduced himself as a person working
in helath and wellness industry running salon in different
parts of Delhi in the capacity of owner/ partner. It is
further alleged by the complainat that on request of
accused person in January, 2019, he extened the friendly
loan to the sum of Rs.31,00,000/- for the purpose of
renovation of one of his salon. Thereafter, the
complainant has made repeated requests to the accused to
return his money, however, the acucsed has made excused
and finally told the complainant that he will return
Rs.20,00,000/- within 19 days from the date of execution
of MOU and in case of failure, he will transfer parternship
share of 50 % in one salon and further issued certain post
dated cheques, the said agreement is dated 20.12.2019.
2. It is further alleged by the complainant that at the
time of disbursement of friendly loan amount accused
projected himself to be the owner and partner of different
salon across Delhi having high fixed earning by showing
serveral documents. It is further alleged by the
complainant that at the time of execution of
MOU/agreement accused had shown his parternship deed
in his name of B2/35, Janakpuri Salon and said salon run
under hte name and style of Ash & Niell Unisex Salon. It
is further alleged by the complainant that after execution
of MOU, complainant requested the accused to make the
payment of Rs.20,00,000/- or transfer parternship. It is
further alleged by the complainant that when he made
written complaint to PS Moti Nagar, the accused
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
contacted the complainant over phone that he will pay
monthly installment of Rs.15,000/- which was declined
by the complainnt as it would have taken years to settle
the loan amount.
3. Status report was called from the SHO of PS
concerned. As per the status report, the IO has submitted
that one Amitabh Kant before whom the money is stated
to have been paid has stated that no money was paid by
the complainant to the accused. It is further submitted by
the IO that the accused and complainant have started the
business of salon and executed an agreement between
themselves and the complainnat has made payment of
Rs.47,00,000/-, out of which Rs.34,00,000/- was made
through account transfer, Rs. 12,00,000/- through cheques
and remaining amount were paid in cash. It is furhter
submitted by the IO that the alleged persons denied the
allegations of complainant and stated that some
transactions were pending between the complainant and
accused. It is further submitted by the IO that accused is
ready to pay an amount of Rs 12,00,000/- to the
complainant.
4. The judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita
Kumari case is a mandate only for the police who are
bound to register FIR on facts disclosing thecommission
of a cognizable offence. The said judgment is not a
mandate upon the Court to necessarily direct register of
FIR in every such matter. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. uses the
word “may” and therefore, gives a discretionary power to
the Court. From the facts of the case, the undersigned is of
the opinion that the assistance of investigating agency is
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:11:45 -0100CR No. 615/2023 Page No.8 of 35
Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
not required in the present case for the collection of
evidence. The facts and circumstances of the present case
are such that the complainant is in possession of entire
evidence as he knows the accused persons, further the
complainant can produce the witnesses, by himself, or
through the Court. Thus, it does not appear to be a case
where the police assistance is required for the purpose of
collection of evidence. Further, if in future, any need
would arise, police assistance can be taken U/s 202
Cr.P.C. None of the evidence in the present case is beyond
the reach of the complainant. Accordingly, the present
application u/s 156 (3) of Code of Criminal Procedure is
dismissed.
5. However, on the facts alleged in the complaint, I
take cognizance and give an opportunity to complainant
to prove his allegations. The complainant is called upon to
bring pre-summoning evidence on 07.04.2023.
(SHAGUN)
MM-04: West: THC: Delhi
24.11.2022″
6. For the sake of ready reference, section 397 Cr.P.C. is
reproduced as under:-
Section 397:- Calling for records to exercise powers
of revision: (1) The High Court or any Sessions
Judge may call for and examine the record of any
proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:11:50 -0100CR No. 615/2023 Page No.9 of 35
Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of
satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order,
recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any
proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when
calling for such record, direct that the execution of any
sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is
in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his
own bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation- All Magistrates, whether Executive or
Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate
jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the
Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section
and of section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial
or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been
made by any person either to the High Court or to the
Sessions Judge, no further application by the same
person shall be entertained by the other of them.
7. A plain reading of Section 397 Cr.P.C. makes it manifest that
Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. enables the aggrieved parties to question the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:11:56 –
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
or passed by the inferior court before the revisional court i.e. the High
Court or the Sessions Judge as concurrent jurisdiction is conferred on the
High Court and the Sessions Judge by the Section. Now, it is significant to
note that Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. mandates that the power of revision
conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. shall not be exercised in
relation to any interlocutory order in any appeal, enquiry, trial or other
proceeding. Therefore, express bar is created by the legislation under
section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. to entertain revision against an interlocutory order.
The term “interlocutory order” as mentioned in section 397 (2)
Cr.P.C. denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not
decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties. An order
which is pure and simple interlocutory order, which do not decide anything
finally is to be considered as interlocutory order and no revision against
that interlocutory order is maintainable under section 397(1) Cr.P.C. in
view of the express bar imposed under section 397(2) Cr.P.C.
There are three categories of orders that a Court can pass-
final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a
final order, a Court can exercise its revision jurisdiction- that is in respect of
a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in
respect of an interlocutory order, the Court cannot exercise its revision
jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the Court can
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:12:01 -0100CR No. 615/2023 Page No.11 of 35
Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order. An
intermediate order is one which is interlocutory order in nature but when
reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby
resulting in a final order.
8. It was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as
” Amar Nath & Ors. V. State of Haryana & Anr.” {(1977) 4 SCC 137} that:-
“The main question which falls for determination in this
appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term
“interlocutory order” as appearing in sub-section (2) of
Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the
High Court. The term “interlocutory order” is a term of
well-known legal significance and does not present any
serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes
including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the
High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster’s New
World Dictionary “interlocutory” has been defined as an
order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid
down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be
those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties
concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term
“interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code
has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or
artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim
or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the
important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order
which substantially affects the right of the accused, or
decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:12:07 –
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court
against that order, because that would be against the very
object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular
provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for
instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases,
passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other
steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt
amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision
would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But
orders which are matters of moment and which affect or
adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect
of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to
be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the
High Court”.
It was also held by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case
titled as ” V.C. Shukla V. State through C.B.I.” (AIR 1980 SC 962] that:-
(1) that an order which does not determine the rights of
the parties but only one aspect of the suit or the trial is an
interlocutory order;
(2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to be
explained, in contradistinction to a final order. In other
words, if an order is not a final order, it would be an
interlocutory order;
(3) that one of the tests generally accepted by the English
Courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided
in one way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided
in another way, then the proceedings would continue; Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:12:12 –
0100
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
because, in our opinion, the term ‘interlocutory order’ in the
Criminal Procedure Code has been used in a much wider
sense so as to include even intermediate or quasi final
orders;
(4) that an order passed by the Special Court discharging
the accused would undoubtedly be a final order inasmuch
as it finally decides the rights of the parties and puts an end
to the controversy and thereby terminates the entire
proceedings before the court so that nothing is left to be
done by the court thereafter;
(5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal against
an interlocutory order the accused is not left without any
remedy because in suitable cases, the accused can always
move this Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the
Constitution even against an order framing charges against
the accused. Thus, it cannot be said that by not allowing an
appeal against an order framing charges, the Act works
serious injustice to the accused.
It was also held by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case
titled as “Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. V. Fazru” {(2004) 13 SCC 269} that:-
“Wharton’s Law Lexicon (14th Edn. p. 529) defines
interlocutory order thus:
“An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given
during the progress of an action, but which does not finally
dispose of the rights of the parties.”
“Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an
interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally
decides the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory
order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an
interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular
aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a
proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however
conclude the trial at all.”
The principles/guidelines regarding the scope of criminal
revision petition have also been laid-down by Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in case titled as “Girish Kumar Suneja V. Central Bureau of
Investigation” {(2017) 14 SCC 809} and it was held that :-
“15. While the text of sub-section (1) of Section 397 Cr.P.C.
appears to confer very wide powers on the court in the
exercise of its revision jurisdiction, this power is equally
severely curtailed by sub-section (2) thereof. There is a
complete prohibition on a court exercising its revision
jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders. Therefore,
what is the nature of orders in respect of which a court can
exercise its revision jurisdiction?
16. There are three categories of orders that a court can pass
final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that
in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision
jurisdiction – that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or
conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an
interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision
jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:12:22 –
0100
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not
an interlocutory order.
21. The concept of an intermediate order was
further elucidated in Madhu Limaye Vs. State of
Maharashtra by contradistinguishing a final order and an
interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle
that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in
nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the
proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such
intermediate orders immediately come to mind – an order
taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an
accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie
these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order
taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed,
it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that
person resulting in a final order in his or her favour.
Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has
the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in
a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate
order is one which if passed in a certain way, the
proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way,
the proceeding would continue.
22. The view expressed in Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye
was followed in K.K. Patel V. State of Gujarat wherein a
revision petition was filed challenging the taking of
cognizance and issuance of a process. It was said:
(K.K.Patel case, SCC p.201, para11)
“11. ….. It is now well-nigh settled that in
deciding whether an order challenged is Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
interlocutory or not as for Section 397 (2)
of the Code, the sole test is not whether such
order was passed during the interim stage
(vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, Madhu
Limaye v. State of Maharastra, V.C. Shukla
v. State and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande
v. Uttam). The feasible test is whether by
upholding the objections raised by a party, it
would result in culminating the proceedings,
if so any order passed on such objections
would not be merely interlocutory in nature
as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code.
In the present case, if the objection raised by
the appellants were upheld by the Court the
entire prosecution proceedings would have
been terminated. Hence, as per the said
standard, the order was revisable.”
27. Our conclusion on this subject is that while the
appellants might have an entitlement (not a right) to file a
revision petition in the High Court but that entitlement can
be taken away and in any event, the High Court is under no
obligation to entertain a revision petition – such a petition
can be rejected at the threshold. If the High Court is
inclined to accept the revision petition it can do so only
against a final order or an intermediate order, namely, an
order which if set aside would result in the culmination of
the proceedings. As we see it, there appear to be only
two such eventualities of a revisable order and in any case
only one such eventuality is before us. Consequently the
result of para 10 of the order passed by this Court is that the
entitlement of the appellants to file a revision petition in
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
the High Court is taken away and thereby the High Court
is deprived of exercising the extraordinary discretionary
power available under Section 397 Cr.P.C.”
It was held by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as
“Neelam Mahajan & Anr. V. The State & Ors.” {(2016) 229 DLT (CN) 29}
that:-
“…….. In this regard catena of judgments of Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India has settled the legal principle while
holding that the meaning of the two words “final” and
“interlocutory” has to be considered separately in
relation to the particular purpose for which it is required.
However, generally speaking, a judgment or order which
determines the principal matter in question is termed final
and simultaneously, an interlocutory order, though not
conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the
subordinate matter with which it deals. Therefore, in the
considered opinion of this Court, if the decision on an issue
puts an end to the suit, the order is undoubtedly a final one
but if the suit is still left alive and has yet to be tried in the
ordinary way, no finality could be attached to the order.”
9. By way of present revision petition, the revisionist has
challenged the impugned order dated 24/11/2022 passed by the Ld. Trial
Court thereby application u/s. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. of the revisionist/
complainant was dismissed.
Now this Court has to see as to whether the impugned order is
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VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
interlocutory, intermediate or final order.
It was held by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as
“Nishu Wadhwa V. Siddharth Wadhwa & Anr.” {WP (CRL 1253/2016 and
Crl. MA No.6591/2016 decided on 10/01/2017} that “therefore, an order
dismissing or allowing an application u/s. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. is not an
interlocutory order and a revision petition against the same is
maintainable”.
Hence, the present revision petition qua the dismissal of the
application u/s. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. is maintainable.
10. Now this Court shall proceed to decide the present revision
petition on merits.
By way of present revision petition, the revisionist has
challenged the impugned order dated 24/11/2022 passed by the Ld. Trial
Court thereby application u/s. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. of the revisionist/ complainant
was dismissed.
Before proceeding further, it is relevant to discuss law relating
to Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C.
The scheme of Cr.P.C. is such that an Officer In-charge of a
Police Station has to initiate investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157
Cr.P.C. on the basis of entry of the first information report, on receiving the
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VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
information of the commission of a cognizable offence. From the plain
reading of Section 154 (1) Cr.P.C., it is manifestly clear that if any
information disclosing a cognizable offence is made before an officer
incharge of a police station satisfying the requirements of section 154(1) of
the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the
substance thereof in the prescribed form to register a case on the basis of
information pertaining to cognizable offence. But when the police officers
do not register a case disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and
complaint in this regard is made to the Magistrate, then under Section 156
(3) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate empowered under Section 190 Cr.P.C. ‘ may ‘
order investigation. The expression used herein is ‘ may ‘ and not ‘ shall ‘ or ‘
must ‘. The expression ‘ shall ‘ or ‘ must’ implies that the provision is
mandatory and expression ‘ may ‘ gives discretion to the Magistrate.
It was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled as
“Devarapalli Lakshinarayana Reddy V. V. Narayana Reddy & Ors.” {AIR
1976 SC 1672} that:-
“It is well settled that when a Magistrate
receives a complaint, he is not bound to take
cognizance if the facts alleged in the
complaint, disclose the commission of an
offence. This is clear from the use of the words
” may take cognizance” which in the context in
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VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
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which they occur cannot be equated with “must
take cognizance”. The word ” may ” gives a
discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. If on
a reading of the complaint he finds that the
allegations therein disclose a cognizable
offence and the forwarding of the complaint to
the police for investigation under Section
156(3) will be conducive to justice and save
the valuable time of the Magistrate from being
wasted in enquiring into a matter which was
primarily the duty of the police to investigate,
he will be justified in adopting that course as an
alternative to taking cognizance of the offence,
himself.
This raises the incidental question: What is
meant by “taking cognizance of an offence” by
a Magistrate within the contemplation of
Section 190? This expression has not been
defined in the Code. But from the scheme of
the Code, the content and marginal heading of
Section 190 and the caption of Chapter XIV
under which Sections 190 to 199 occur, it is
clear that a case can be said to be instituted in a
Court only when the Court takes cognizance of
the offence alleged therein. The ways in which
such cognizance can be taken are set out in
clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1).
Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken
cognizance of the offence will depend on the
circumstances of the particular case including
the mode in which the case is sought to be
instituted and the nature of the preliminary VIJAY
SHANKAR
Digitally signed by
VIJAY SHANKAR
Date: 2025.07.15
17:12:54 -0100CR No. 615/2023 Page No.21 of 35
Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
action, if any, taken by the Magistrate. Broadly
speaking, when on receiving a complaint, the
Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of
proceeding under Section 200 and the
succeeding sections in Chapter XV of the Code
of 1973, he is said to have taken cognizance of
the offence within the meaning of Section
190(1)(a). If, instead of proceeding under
Chapter XV, he has in the judicial exercise of
his discretion, taken action of some other kind,
such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose
of investigation, or ordering investigation by
the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be
said to have taken cognizance of any offence”.
It was held by Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case titled as “M/s.
Skipper Beverages Pvt. Ltd. V. State” {2001 IV AD (DELHI) 625} that :-
“A Magistrate must apply his mind before
passing an order under Section 156(3) of the
Code and must not pass these orders
mechanically on the mere asking by the
complainant. These powers ought to be
exercised primarily in those cases where the
allegations are quite serious or evidence is
beyond the reach of complainant or custodial
interrogation appears to be necessary for some
recovery of article or discovery of fact.”
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:12:59 –
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It was held by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in case titled as
“Gulab Chand Upadhyaya V. State of U.P.” {2002 (3) RCR (Crl.) 514}
that :-
“The scheme of Cr. P. C. and the prevailing
circumstances require that the option to direct
the registration of the case and its investigation
by the police should be exercised. Where some
“investigation” is required which is of a nature
that is not possible for the private complainant,
and which can only be done by the police upon
whom statute has conferred the powers
essential for investigation, for example:-
1 Where the full details of the accused are not
known to the complainant and the same can
be determined only as a result of
investigation, or
2 Where recovery of abducted person or stolen
property is required to be made by conducting
raids or searches of suspected places or
persons, or
3 Where for the purpose of launching a
successful prosecution of the accused,
evidence is required to be collected and
preserved. To illustrate by example, cases
may be visualized where for production
before court at the trial (a) Sample of blood
soaked soil is to be taken and kept sealed for
fixing the place of incident, or (b) recovery of
case property is to be made and kept sealed,
Digitally
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VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
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or (c) recovery under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act, or (d) preparation of inquest
report, or (e) witnesses are not known and
have to be found out or discovered through
the process of investigation”.
It was held by Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case titled as
“Pawan Verma V. SHO, PS Model Town & Ors.” {2009(2) JCC 1000
Delhi}, that:-
“It is not that in every case merely on the
asking of the petitioner the Court must direct
registration of an FIR unless the Court is
satisfied with the preliminary evidence
which is to be submitted by the complainant
with an FIR must be registered……….”.
It was held by Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case titled as
“Mohd Salim V. State” {175(2010) DLT 473} that :-
“The use of the expression may in Sub-
section (3) of Section 156 of the Code leaves
no doubt that the power conferred upon the
Magistrate is discretionary and he is not
bound to direct investigation by the police
even if the allegations made in the complaint
disclose commission of a cognizable offence.
In the facts and circumstances of a given case,
the Magistrate may feel that the matter does Digitally
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VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
not require investigation by the Police and
can be proved by the complainant himself,
without any assistance from the Police. In
that case, he may, instead of directing
investigation by the Police, straightaway
take cognizance of the alleged offence and
proceed under Section 200 of the Code by
examining the complainant and his witnesses,
if any. In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct
investigation by the Police only where the
assistance of the Investigating Agency is
necessary and the Court feels that the cause of
justice is likely to suffer in the absence of
investigation by the Police. The Magistrate is
not expected to mechanically direct
investigation by the Police without first
examining whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case, investigation by
the State machinery is actually required or
not. If the allegations made in the complaint
are simple, where the Court can straightaway
proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is
expected to record evidence and proceed
further in the matter, instead of passing the
buck to the police under section 156(3) of the
Code. Of course, if the allegations made in
the complaint require complex and
complicated investigation of which cannot be
undertaken without active assistance and
expertise of the State machinery, it would
only be appropriate for the Magistrate to
direct investigation by the Police. The Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act
merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a
judicial approach while considering an
application seeking investigation by the
Police”.
It was held by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as
“Mohd. Yusuf Khan V. State & Anr.” {2014 (3) JCC 1665} that :-
“The Magistrate is not supposed to act
mechanically and direct registration of FIR in
each and every case in a routine and casual
manner. Criminal law is not expected to be set
into motion on the mere asking of a party…..”It was held by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as
“Kusum Lata V. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors.” {Crl. MC No.1880/2020
decided on 19/04/2021 by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi} that :-
“it is clear from the scheme of section 156, where
the police fail in its duty to register and
investigate a cognizable offence, the aggrieved
person may file a complaint before the concerned
Magistrate. Where the Magistrate receives a
complaint the word ‘may’ give a discretion to the
Magistrate in the matter. Two courses are open to
the Court; either take cognizance under Section
190 or may forward the complaint to the police
under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. for investigation.
Likewise, in the facts and circumstances of a
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
particular case, Magistrate may take cognizance
on the basis of the complaint instituted before
him and may adopt the procedure provided under
sections 200, 202 of Cr.P.C. and if there is no
substance in the prima facie evidence adduced by
the complainant, the complaint may be dismissed
under section 203 Cr.P.C.
In view of above facts, observation made by the
courts below and the law discussed, the material
facts of the present case are well within the
knowledge of the petitioner including the
identity of the accused persons. Hence, she can
establish her case while leading evidence before
the trial court under section 200 of Cr.P.C.
Therefore, I find no illegality or perversity in the
orders passed by the Trial Court and Appellant
Court”.
It was held by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as
“Anjuri Kumari V. The State Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.” {WP (CRL)
1210/2023 and CRL. M.A.11298/2023 decided on 29/11/2023 by the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi} that :-
“In view of the discussions mentioned
hereinabove, I am of the view that the directions
for investigation under section 156 (3) of the
Code cannot be given by the Magistrate
mechanically. Such a direction can be given only
on application of mind by the Magistrate. The
Magistrate is not bound to direct investigation by Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:13:23 –
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
the police even if all allegations made in the
complaint disclose ingredients of a cognizable
offence. Each case has to be viewed depending
upon the facts and circumstances involved
therein. In the facts and circumstances of a given
case, the Magistrate may take a decision that the
complainant can prove the facts alleged in the
complaint without the assistance of the police. In
such cases, the Magistrate may proceed with the
complaint under Section 200 of the Code and
examine witnesses produced by the complainant.
The Magistrate ought to direct investigation by
the police if the evidence is required to be
collected with the assistance of the police. In the
present case, all the facts and evidence are within
the knowledge of the petitioner, which he can
adduce during the inquiry conducted by the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate under Section
200 of the Code.”
11. After referring the Lalita Kumari case (supra), it was held by
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as “Ramdev Food Products
Private Limited V. State of Gujarat” { AIR 2015 SC 1742} that :-
“20 It has been held, for the same reasons, that
direction by the Magistrate for investigation
Under Section 156(3) cannot be given
mechanically. In Anil Kumar v. M.K.Aiyappa :
(2013) 10 SCC 705, it was observed:
11. The scope of Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Digitally
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VIJAY SHANKAR
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Procedure came up for consideration before this
Court in several cases. This Court in Maksud
Saiyed case : (2008) 5 SCC 668] examined the
requirement of the application of mind by the
Magistrate before exercising jurisdiction Under
Section 156(3) and held that where jurisdiction is
exercised on a complaint filed in terms of Section
156(3) or Section 200 Code of Criminal
Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his
mind, in such a case, the Special
Judge/Magistrate cannot refer the matter Under
Section 156(3) against a public servant without a
valid sanction order. The application of mind by
the Magistrate should be reflected in the order.
The mere statement that he has gone through the
complaint, documents and heard the complainant,
as such, as reflected in the order, will not be
sufficient. After going through the complaint,
documents and hearing the complainant, what
weighed with the Magistrate to order
investigation Under Section 156(3) Code of
Criminal Procedure, should be reflected in the
order, though a detailed expression of his views is
neither required nor warranted. We have already
extracted the order passed by the learned Special
Judge which, in our view, has stated no reasons
for ordering investigation.”
The above observations apply to category
of cases mentioned in para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari
(supra). Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:13:35 –
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding
that the direction Under Section 156(3) is to be
issued, only after application of mind by the
Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take
cognizance and does not find it necessary to
postpone issuance of process and finds a case
made out to proceed forthwith, direction under
the said provision is issued. In other words, where
on account of credibility of information available,
or weighing the interest of justice it is considered
appropriate to straightaway direct investigation,
such a direction is issued. Cases where Magistrate
takes cognizance and postpones issuance of
process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to
determine “existence of sufficient ground to
proceed”. Category of cases falling under Para
120.6 in Lalita Kumari (supra) may fall Under
Section 202. Subject to these broad guidelines
available from the scheme of the Code, exercise
of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by
interest of justice from case to case.”
12. The criminal complaint of the complainant/ revisionist u/s. 200
Cr.P.C. is pending before the Ld. Trial Court for pre-summoning evidence.
In the ATR/status report filed by SI Manjeet Singh before the
Ld. Trial Court, it is mentioned that:-
“It is further submitted that enquiries have been made in this
regard and it is found:-
Digitally
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VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
(a) That Yashasvi Talwar and Saurabh Bhambi were known
to each other as they were residing in the same locality i.e. Rani
Bagh, Delhi.
(b) Ambitabh Kant was known to Yashasvi Talwar.
Therefore Yashasvi Talwar introduced Amitabh Kant to
Saurabh Bhambi.
(c) That Gaurav Chibber was also known to Yashasvi and
used to visit him. Yashasvi Talwar also introduced Gaurav
Chhibber to Saurabh Bhambi and Amitabh Kant. Therefore, all
the four i.e. Yashasvi Talwar, Amitabh Kant, Saurabh Bhambi
and Gaurav Chibber became known to each other/common
friends.
(d) That Amitabh Kant, before whom the money is stated to
have been paid by the complainant, has stated that in his
presence no money was paid by Gaurav Chibber to Saurab
Bhambi.
(e) Yashasvi Talwar could not be examined as he has gone
abroad (Canada).
(f) That Saurabh Bhambi and Yashasvi Talwar had joined
hands to start business of saloon. Therefore, they had executed
an agreement between themselves to start/run a saloon for
which Saurabh Bhambi paid Rs.47 lac to Yashasvi Talwar Pro
M/S Star Saloon Pvt Ltd (34 lac through account transfer, Rs.12
lac through cheque and remaining was paid in cash).
(g) The alleged, upon interrogation, has denied having taken
any friendly loan from the complainant and had never issud any
cheque to Gaurav Chibber.
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:13:45 -0100
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
(h) That upon interrogation the alleged person has further
statd that Yashasvi Talwar had some transactions pending with
Gaurav Chibber so the cheques given by him to Yashasvi
Talwar were given by him to Gaurav Chibber.
(i) That the alleged has further stated that he has discussed
the matter of Rs.12 lac with the complainant and he is ready to
pay the same in instalments.
(j) That the complainant has provided a pen drive conaining
some discussion with the alleged person. It is found that in the
said Pen Drive there is conversation between complainant and
alleged Saurabh Bhambi wherein the alleged is hard offering
payment of loan in instalments of Rs.20 -25,000/- per month,
which is declined by the complainant.
It is further submitted :-
(a) That the person in whose presence the loan is stated to have
been given has stated that no money was given in his presence.
(b) The complainant has not provide any written/documentary
proof of regarding payment of friendly loan.
(c) That as per rule payment of friendly loan of Rs.31 lac cannot
be made in cash.
(d) That if the version of the complainant is taken to be true he
had given a friendly loan to the alleged person and by not
paying the friendly loan no offence is made out.
It is further submitted that from the contents and
enquiries made in this matter version of the complainant could
not be substantiated. In any case if some transaction had taken Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:13:50 –
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
place it is related to money transaction between two parties, for
which the complainant is at liberty to file a Recovery Suit. For
dishonour of the cheques the complainant has already filed a
case U/s 138 NI Act. No cognizable offence is made out.
However, directions/orders of this Hon’ble Court Shall be abide
by.”
In the complaint case before the Ld. Trial Court, the
revisionist/complainant has filed the photocopy of bank statement,
photocopies of cheques, photocopy of return memos, photocopy of
MOU/agreement, photocopies of whatsapp chats and one CD stated to be
containing voice recording.
Filing of the photocopies of the aforesaid documents and CD
shows that all the documentary evidence are within the reach and
knowledge of the revisionist/complainant and nothing is to be collected for
which the assistance of the police is required.
Complaint case u/s 138 NI Act for the dishonour of cheques
already stated to be filed by the complainant/revisionist against the
accused/respondent no.2.
In view of the above, it is clear that the parties are ascertained.
The facts are within the exclusive knowledge of the
revisionist/complainant. There is nothing for which the police assistance is
additionally necessary to be called for. The revisionist/ complainant is in a
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:13:55 –
0100
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
position to lead evidence in the matter. The evidence is within the reach of
revisionist/complainant and no custodial interrogation of accused is
necessary for recovery of article or discovery of fact.
13. It is well settled law that scope of revisional jurisdiction is very
limited and same cannot be exercised in a routine manner.
It was held by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as
“Taron Mohan Vs. State & Anr.” {AIRONLINE 2021 DEL 687} that :-
“The scope of interference in a revision
petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled
that Section 397 Cr.P.C. gives the High Courts
or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider
the correctness, legality or propriety of any
finding inter se an order and as to the regularity
of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is
also well settled that while considering the
legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or
a conclusion, normally the revising court does
not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence
of the case. A court in revision considers the
material only to satisfy itself about the legality
and propriety of the findings, sentence and
order and refrains from substituting its own
conclusion on an elaborate consideration of
evidence.”
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:13:59 –
0100
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Gaurav Chhibber Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
14. Applying priori and posteriori reasonings and the case laws
referred by this Court, this Court is held that there is no illegality,
impropriety and infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Ld. Trial
Court. Accordingly, the present revision petition of the revisionist is
dismissed. No order as to costs. Nothing stated herein shall tantamount to be
an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
Trial Court Record be sent back alongwith the copy of this
judgment. Revision file be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.07.15
17:14:04 -
Announced in the open Court 0100
on 15/07/2025 (VIJAY SHANKAR)
ASJ-04 (West)
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
CR No. 615/2023 Page No.35 of 35
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