Calcutta High Court
Glen Industries Private Limited vs Oriental Insurance Company Limited on 12 August, 2025
Author: Shampa Sarkar
Bench: Shampa Sarkar
OCD-13
ORDER SHEET
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
ORIGINAL SIDE
COMMERCIAL DIVISION
AP-COM/540/2025
GLEN INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED
VS
ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
BEFORE:
The Hon'ble JUSTICE SHAMPA SARKAR
Date: 12th August, 2025.
Appearance:
Mr. Subhasish Sengupta, Adv.
Mr. Biswajib Ghosh, Adv.
Mr. Sayak Mitra, Adv.
Mr. Avirup Chatterjee, Adv.
Mr. Rishov Das, Adv.
...for the petitioner.
Mr. Sanjay Paul, Adv.
...for the respondent.
The Court:-
1. This is an application for extension of the mandate of the learned
Arbitrator. On the last occasion the learned Advocate for the respondent
raised an objection to the prayer for extension on the ground that the
learned Arbitrator had proceeded with the matter even after the mandate
terminated.
2. I had already held in my earlier order that as the petitioner
participated wholeheartedly in the proceedings and called their respective
witnesses, such action would amount to extension of time by agreement
between the parties by a further period of six months. The statute permits
such extension.
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3. By applying Section 4 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(hereinafter referred to as the said Act), this Court held that, as objection
was not raised when the mandate terminated after one year from
completion of pleadings and parties willingly participated, the same
amounted to extension by agreement for six months and the respondent
waived the right to object to the continuation of the proceeding after expiry
of the initial period of one year. The relevant sections are quoted below:
“4. Waiver of right to object.
– A party who knows that
(a) any provision of this Part from which the parties may derogate, or
(b) any requirement under the arbitration agreement,
has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration
without stating his objection to such non-compliance without undue
delay or, if a time limit is provided for stating that objection, within
that period of time shall be deemed to have waived his right to so
object.
29-A. Time limit for arbitral award.—
(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified in sub-
section (1) for making award for a further period not exceeding six
months.”
4. The next argument of the learned Advocate for the respondent was
that unless this Court decides the fate of the proceedings which took place
after 18 months, and till the filing of the application before this Court, the
mandate should not be extended. The learned Arbitrator was functus officio
and the proceedings were a nullity.
5. Considered the submissions. Section 29A(4) of the said Act, provides
that if an award is not made within the period specified in Sub-section (1)
or the extended period specified under Sub-section (3), the mandate of the
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arbitrator shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the
expiry of the period so specified, extended the period. Thus, the law
empowers the Court to extend the mandate both, prior to and after expiry
of the mandate or even after expiry of the period so specified. The second
proviso to section 29A (4) states that the mandate continues if an
application for extension is pending. It has already been held by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited Vs. Berger Paints
India Limited reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494 that the application
for extension can be filed even after expiry of the mandate and upon
extension by court, the mandate revives.
6. In this case, however, the application was filed on July 2, 2025 and
the mandate i.e. 18 months (one year + six months) expired on March 12,
2025. The records indicate that approximately three sittings were held
during the intervening period which the respondent submits had vitiated
the entire proceeding and as such, the prayer for extension should not be
considered.
7. The next contention of the learned Advocate for the respondent is
that, sufficient cause has not been shown for the delay in filing the
application.
8. In my view, extension of the mandate of the learned Arbitrator, by
order of court, relates back to the date of termination, irrespective of the
fact that the application was filed after the mandate terminated.
9. Sub-section (4) of Section 29-A provides that if an award is not made
within the period specified in Sub-section (1) or the extended period
specified under Sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator shall
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terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the
period so specified, extended the period.
10. Section 29-A(4) is quoted below:-
“29-A. Time limit for arbitral award.–
(4) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or
the extended period specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the
arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the court has, either prior to or after the
expiry of the period so specified, extended the period:”
11. The phrase “either prior to or after” indicates that the Court can
revive the arbitrator’s mandate even if it has already expired. The order of
Court, in effect, validates the proceeding. The provision ensures that there
is no legal vacuum or break in the arbitrator’s jurisdiction between expiry
and extension. Thus, in my view the arbitral proceedings between the date
of termination and the order of Court are not void.
12. The second proviso to Section 29A (4) states as follows :-
“29-A. Time limit for arbitral award.–
[Provided further that where an application under sub-section (5) is pending,
the mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till the disposal of the said
application:
Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an opportunity of being heard
before the fees is reduced.]”
13. The legislative intent was that an arbitral proceeding should continue
even if the mandate terminates and an application for extension is pending
before a Court. This is in consonance with the object behind the said Act,
i.e., to ensure speedy disposal of disputes. Further, legislative intent was to
validate the proceedings before the arbitrator by order of court, on an
application for extension. The legislature intended that no legal vacuum or
break in the arbitrator’s jurisdiction between expiry and extension should
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exist and the mandate should be revived from the date of expiry. The
proceeding would be deemed to be within jurisdiction.
14. The law does not make it compulsory that an application must be
filed pre-expiry or that the mandate should be extended pre-expiry. The law
allows flexibility, so that, legitimate delays do not frustrate arbitration.
However, the mandate would not revive automatically and the proceedings
become valid only upon Court’s order of extension. Thus, any proceeding
after the expiry of the mandate would be without jurisdiction, till such time
the Court formally extends the mandate by an order. Once the order is
passed, the proceedings get validated. Thus, an order of extension of the
mandate by Court, grants retrospective continuity to the mandate of the
arbitrator.
15. The legislature has consciously not used a ‘fullstop’ after the
expression terminate, in sub-section 4, but framed the provision in such a
way, so as to give a retrospective effect to the extension by granting
continuity. The expression used is that, the mandate terminates unless the
court extends the same, before or after expiry. Thus, in this case, there is
no legal bar for this court to extend the mandate. While extending the
mandate, the court is only required to decide whether there are sufficient
reasons to extend the same. The contention of Mr. Paul that this court,
shall in effect, shall validate an aborted or abandoned proceeding, is not
accepted.
16. Records reveal that both parties adduced evidence and produced
their witnesses. The respondent has not been able to point out any
intentional delay either on the part of the petitioner or on the part of the
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arbitrator. Under such circumstances, when substantial progress has been
made in the proceedings, this Court does not find that there is any reason
not to extend the mandate. The extension will enure to the benefit of the
parties who have invested sufficient time and resources in the arbitral
proceeding.
17. Under such circumstances, the mandate of the learned arbitrator is
extended by a further period of one year. This order is restricted to the
disposal of this application. The contention of Mr Paul that the proceedings
held after expiry and before the order should be expunged from the records
is not further deliberated upon, leaving it open to be agitated at the
appropriate stage.
18. AP-COM/540/2025 is, accordingly, disposed of.
(SHAMPA SARKAR, J.)
S.Mandi/pa