Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Gunji Dhanamma vs Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport … on 7 March, 2025
*HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI
+WRIT PETITION No.12443 of 2020
Between:
#Gunji Dhanamma, ...PETITIONER
AND
$Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation ...RESPONDENT(S)
APSRTC and Others
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON 07.03.2025
THE HON’BLE DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
– Yes –
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked to Law
Reporters/Journals
– Yes –
3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to see the fair
copy of the Judgment?
– Yes –
___________________________________
DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
2
* THE HON’BLE DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
+WRIT PETITION No.12443 of 2020
% 07.03.2025
# Between:
#Gunji Dhanamma ...PETITIONER
AND
$ Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation ...RESPONDENT(S)
APSRTC and Others
! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri M.Pitchaiah
! Counsel for Respondents: Sri Sanisetty Venkateswarlu
<Gist :
>Head Note:
? Cases referred: 1. 1985 LAB I.C. 729
2. 1983 LAB I.C. 1909
3. AIR 1963 SC 1723
4. (2015) 2 SCC 610
3
APHC010192792020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3310]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY ,THE SEVENTH DAY OF MARCH
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE K MANMADHA RAO
WRIT PETITION NO: 12443/2020
Between:
Gunji Dhanamma ...PETITIONER
AND
Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation ...RESPONDENT(S)
Apsrtc and Others
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. M PITCHAIAH
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. SOLOMON RAJU MANCHALAFOR (APSRTC)
The Court made the following Order:
The Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
seeking the following relief:
“….. to issue a writ order or direction more
particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus
rd
declaring the Order, dt.26.04.2012 of the 3 respondent as
nd
confirmed in 2 respondent order, dt.15.07.2012 imposing
the punishment of postponement of 2 Annual Grade
Increments with cumulative effect besides treating the
period from the date of removal till the date of
reinstatement as Not on Duty, as arbitrary, violative of
4Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and
APSRTC Employees CCA Regulations, 1967 to the extent
the impugned order is against me by modifying the same
and consequently direct the respondents to pay back
salary, incremental arrears with interest @ 12% p.a. and
grant costs of the proceedings….”
2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as
Conductor in APSRTC on 01.01.2010 and worked at the Addanki Depot for
some time. Thereafter, the petitioner was transferred to Chirala Depot, where
she worked up to 20.10.2010, on which date she was placed under
suspension. The 4th respondent issued a charge sheet, dated 20.10.2010
alleging that the petitioner failed to observe the rule issue correct tickets to the
passengers and close the S.R. with correct denomination tickets and having
collected an amount of Rs.70/- from two passengers, who boarded the bus at
Narsaraopet and bound for Chirala and issued less tickets worth of Rs.62/-
instead of Rs.70/- and closed all denomination tickets, which in the opinion of
the 4th respondent, constituted misconduct under Regulation-28, Clauses
(xxxi) and (xxv) of APSRTC Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1963. The
petitioner has submitted his explanation denying the charged levelled against
her. Without considering the same, a domestic enquiry was conducted and the
enquiry officer gave his findings. Based on the findings, the 4th respondent
issued a Show-Cause Notice dated 03.11.2011, asking the petitioner to show
cause as to why she should not be removed from service as the charges
levelled against her are proved. The petitioner submitted his explanation
5
denying the charges levelled against him. Without considering the same, the
4th respondent issued proceedings vide proceedings No.O2/95(53)/2010,
dated 14.11.2011, removing the petitioner from service. Aggrieved by the
same, the petitioner preferred appeal to the 3rd respondent on 21.12.2011.
The 3rd respondent issued proceedings vide No.St.19(92)/2012-Dy.CTM,
dated 26.04.2012 setting aside the order of removal and reinstating the
petitioner into service, but, however, postponed two increments on permanent
basis and treating the interregnum period as ‘Not on Duty’. Aggrieved by the
same, the petitioner filed Review Petition before the 2 nd respondent on
28.11.2016 and the same was rejected mechanically vide proceedings
No.PA/675(99)/2016, dated 15.07.2017. Thereafter, the petitioner moved an
application before the Conciliation Officer-cum-Assistant Commissioner of
Labour, Ongole through APSRTC Employees Union and the same was
returned by the said authority on 13.02.2020, stating that the petitioner’s
application filed is not covered under the provisions of I.D.Act, 1947.
Aggrieved by the order of the 3rd respondent dated 26.04.2012, the present
writ petition has been filed.
3. The respondents filed counter affidavit denying the allegations
made in the writ petition and stated that, on 08.10.2010, the checking officials
of Regional Enforcement Squad, APSRTC, Guntur have exercised a check on
Bus No.AP27X7049 of Chirala Depot at Parchur, it was detected that the
6
petitioner had collected an amount of Rs.70/- from a batch of two passengers
who boarded at Narasaraopet and bound for Chirala and issued tickets worth
Rs.62/- only @ Rs.31/- each. The petitioner has closed the SR of all
denominations without issuing correct denomination of tickets to the above
said passengers even after collecting the requisite fare and hence the
checking officials made the petitioner to issue tickets worth Rs.8/- each worth
Rs.4/- denomination from the hand tray of the petitioner. It is further stated
that the checking officials have collected spot explanation of the petitioner and
spot statement of the concerned passengers. The petitioner in her spot
explanation accepted as having collected the requisite fare of Rs.70/- @
Rs.35/- each from a batch of two passengers for their journey from
Narasaraopeta to Chirala and issued tickets worth of Rs.62/- @ Rs.31/- each.
The concerned passengers have given their spot statement that they gave
Rs.70/- to the petitioner towards their ticket fare and the TTIs detected at the
time of check only tickets worth Rs.62/- were issued by the Conductor. Hence,
a charge Memo dated 08.10.2010 was issued to the petitioner. Based on the
charge sheet, as the irregularities committed by the petitioner is serious in
nature, the petitioner was placed under suspension with effect from
20.10.2010 vide order No.O2/95(33)/2010-CRL, dated 20.10.2020 since prima
facie is established. After a decade, the petitioner has filed this writ petition,
which is liable to be dismissed. Therefore, prays to dismiss the writ petition.
7
4. Heard Mr.M.Pitchaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner and
Mr.Sanisetty Venkateswarlu, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents.
5. On hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the
contents urged in the writ petition, submits that, the alleged misconduct
attributed against the petitioner is not a codified misconduct under any of the
Regulations of APSRTC Employees (Conduct) Rules, 1963. He further
submits that once it is shown that it is not an enumerated misconduct, it is well
settled law that the employer has no power to initiate disciplinary action
against an employer for an un-enumerated misconduct in his Service Rules or
Regulations or Standing orders or Bye-Laws, as the case may be of the
employer. As such, the whole disciplinary action taken by the respondents
against the petitioner is without any authority of law. He further submits that
the 3rd respondent did not supply the copies of petitioner’s spot explanation,
spot statements of passengers, copy of S.R. and 43R, TTI Special Reports
and other material documents which formed the basis for initiating disciplinary
action against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer did not give any reason as to
why he agreed with the version of Checking Official and did not agree with the
petitioner. He further submits that the respondents 2 and 3 ought to have seen
that when the petitioner was issuing tickets on 08.10.2010, a woman CAT
Card holder picked-up an argument with the petitioner and when this was
going on, the passengers in question intervened and asked the petitioner to
8
give those two tickets and the petitioner while thinking that they were also
CAT Card holders, issued ticket worth of Rs.31/- each and remaining change
was to be given to them at the time of alighting and as such, there was no
misconduct in the whole transaction. He further submits that the punishment is
shockingly disproportionate the charges levelled against the petitioner having
regard to the fact that the petitioner having 25 years of remaining service and
loss of two increments would mean thousands of rupees will be lost in
remaining years of service. He further submits that the respondents 2 and 3
have no power to impose punishment for a single set of charge.
6. To support his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has
placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in
Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and
another1, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:
“4. The High Court while dismissing the petition held that even if A
the allegation of misconduct does not constitute misconduct amongst those
enumerated in the relevant service regulations yet the employer can attribute
what would otherwise per se be a misconduct though not enumerated and
punish him for the same. This proposition appears to us to be startling
because even though either under the Certified Standing Orders or service
regulations, it is necessary for the employer to prescribe what would be the
misconduct so that the workman/employee knows the pitfall he should guard
against. If after undergoing the elaborate exercise of enumerating
misconduct, it is left to the unbridled discretion of the employer to dub any
conduct as misconduct, the workman will be on tenterhooks and he will be
punished by ex post facto determination by the employer. It is a well- settled
canon of penal jurisprudence-removal or dismissal from service on account
of the misconduct constitutes penalty in law-that the workmen sought to be
charged for misconduct must have adequate advance notice of what section
or what conduct would constitute misconduct. The legal proposition as stated
by the High Court would have necessitated in depth examination, but for a1
1985 LAB I.C. 729
9recent decision of this Court in Glaxo Laboratories vs. The Presiding Officer,
Labour Court Meerut & Ors.(1) in which this Court specifically repelled an
identical contention advanced by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel who
appeared for the employer in that case observing as under:
“Relying on these observations, Mr. Shanti Bhushan urged that
this Court has in terms held that there can be some other
misconduct not enumerated in the standing order and for which
the employer may take appropriate action. This observation
cannot be viewed divorced from the facts of the case. What
started in the face of the court in that case was that the employer
had raised a technical objection ignoring the past history of
litigation between the parties that application under Sec. 33A was
not maintain able. It is in this context that this Court observed that
the previous action might have been the outcome of some
misconduct not enumerated in the standing order. But the
extracted observation cannot be elevated to a proposition of law
that some misconduct neither defined nor enumerated and which
may be believed by the employer to be misconduct ex post facto
would expose the workman to a penalty. The law will have to
move two centuries back ward to accept such a construction. But
it is not necessary to go so far because in Salem Erode Electricity
Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co.
Ltd. Employees Union, this Court in terms held that the object
underlying the Act was to introduce uniformity of terms and
conditions of employment in respect of workmen belonging to the
same category and discharging the same or similar work under
an industrial establishment, and that these terms and conditions
of industrial employment should be well-established and should
be known to employees before they accept the employment. If
such is the object, no vague undefined notion about any act, may
be innocuous, which from the employer’s point of view may be
misconduct but not provided for in the standing order for which a
penalty can be imposed, cannot be incorporated in the standing
orders. From certainty of conditions of employment, we would
have to return to the days of hire and fire which reverse
movement is hardly justified. In this connection. we may also
refer to Western India Match Company Ltd v.Workmen in which
this Court held that any condition of service if inconsistent with
certified standing orders, the same could not prevail and the
certified standing orders would have precedence over all such
agreements. There is really one interesting observation in this
which deserves noticing Says the Court:
“In the sunny days of the market economy theory people
sincerely believed that the economy law of demand and supply in
the labour market would settle a mutually beneficial bargain
between the employer and the workman Such a bargain, they
took it for granted, would secure fair terms and conditions of
employment to the workman. This law they venerated as natural
law. They had an abiding faith in the verity of this law. But the
experience of the working of this law over a long period has belief
their faith.”
10
Lastly we may refer to Workmen of Lakheri Cement Works Ltd. Associated
Cement Companies Ltd This Court repelled the contention that the Act must
prescribe the minimum which has to be prescribed in an industrial
establishment, but it does not exclude the extension other wise. Relying
upon the earlier decision of this Court in Rohak Hissar District Electricity
Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, the Court held that
everything which is required to be prescribed with precision and no argument
can be entertained that something not prescribed can yet be taken into
account as varying what is prescribed. In short it cannot be left to the
vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or
commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order
is none-the-less a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated
misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for the
purpose of imposing a penalty. Accordingly, the contention of Mr.Shanti
Bhusan that some other act of misconduct which would per se be an act of
misconduct though not enumerated in S.O. 22 can be punished under S.O.
23 must be rejected. It is thus well-settled that unless either in the Certified
Standing Order or in the service regulations an act or omission is prescribed
as misconduct, it is not open to the employer to fish out some conduct as
misconduct and punish the workman even though the alleged misconduct
would not be comprehended in any of the enumerated misconduct.”
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance
upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in M/s.Glaxo
Laboratories Limited vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut and
others2, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:
“23(a)……….. The statutory obligation is to prescribe with precision in the
standing order all those acts of omission or commission which would constitute
misconduct. In the fact of the statutory provision it would be difficult to entertain
the submission that some other act or omission which may be misconduct though
not provided for in the standing order would be punishable understanding order.
…….In short it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post
facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated
in the relevant standing order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within
the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for
the purpose of imposing a penalty. Accordingly, the contention of Mr. Shanti
Bushan that some other act of misconduct which would per se be an act of
misconduct though not enumerated in S.O. 22 can be punished under S.O. 23 must
be rejected.”
Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner while relying upon the
above judgments, prays to pass appropriate orders.
2
1983 LAB I.C. 1909
11
8. Per Contra, learned Standing Counsel while reiterating the
contents made in the counter affidavit, submits that, it is the bounden
responsibility of the petitioner being the service conductor to issue appropriate
tickets to the passenger duly collecting the requisite fare and tallying the ticket
issues with the SR of service. The petitioner did not produced any valid record
or evidence to substantiate to the petitioner’s version as stated in the enquiry
and it is nothing but an afterthought to cover the petitioner’s lapse by taking
shelter on a false plea by fabricating concoct able stories. The petitioner had
failed to endorse on tickets the change due of Rs.8/- to the two passengers
which shows that the petitioner had no intention to give the change due. Thus,
the charges levelled against the petitioner were held proved. In the enquiry,
the petitioner was provided with all opportunities but the petitioner failed to put
forth any valid reasons in support of petitioner’s statement. He further submits
that there are no justifiable grounds in the writ petition and prays to dismiss
the writ petition.
9. Learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance upon the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in State of A.P. vs. S.Sree Rama
Rao3, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with powers of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in respect of departmental
enquiries and held as follows:
3
AIR 1963 SC 1723
12“21. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Art.226
of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: iris concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that
behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some
evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has
accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that
the delinquent Officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High
Court in a petition for a writ under Art.226 to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may
undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the
proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of
enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a
fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the
merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or ;where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived
at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities
are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if
there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be
permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ
under Art.226 of the Constitution.”
10. Learned Standing Counsel has further placed reliance upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Union of India vs.
P.Gunasekaran 4 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex after enunciating the relevant
legal position, codified the powers of the Hon’ble High Courts under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India pertaining to Labour Court awards and
held as follows:
“13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
shall not:
i. reappreciate the evidence;
ii. interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has
been conducted in accordance with law;
iii. go into the adequacy of the evidence;
iv. go into the reliability of the evidence;
v. interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be
based.
4
(2015) 2 SCC 610
13
vi. correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
vii. go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its
conscience.”
Therefore, learned Standing Counsel while relying upon the above
judgments, prays to dismiss the writ petition.
11. Perused the record.
12. On a perusal of the material on record, this Court observed that,
the 3rd respondent has passed the impugned order dated 26.04.2012 after
following the due procedure in accordance with law and that there has been
no violation of principles of natural justice or any other statutory provision in
vogue. In fact, the petitioner was given full opportunity to defend herself. It is
the responsibility of the petitioner to collect the correct fare from the
passengers, issue the ticket and remit the same to the respondent corporation
credit. But in the present case, the petitioner failed in discharging her duties.
Not issuing correct fare of ticket, after collecting the amount from the petitioner
constitutes serious misconduct and the petitioner was found guilty of
breaching the trust of the respondent corporation.
13. It is relevant to mention that, the mandatory rules stipulate that,
the petitioner should complete the issuance of tickets correctly at the boarding
point itself, then move the bus for further journey and close the S.R. before the
arrival of next fare stage. However, the petitioner has closed the S.R. of all
denominations without issuing correct denomination of tickets to the
14
passengers even after collecting the requisite fee. Thus, the petitioner has
violated the rules of the respondent corporation.
14. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and on
considering the submissions of both the learned counsels and upon perusing
the entire material on record, this Court is of the opinion that, the action of the
petitioner in not issuing correct denomination of tickets even after collecting
the requisite fare is not proper on the part of the petitioner. Further, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the Labour Court Awards more
particularly, regarding the irregularities committed by the conductor in not
issuing the tickets even after receiving the amount, has taken a serious note
and held that showing sympathy in the cases of corruption/misappropriation is
uncalled and opposed to public interest, regardless of the amount of money
involved.
15. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court found no merit in
the instant writ petition and devoid of merit and the same is liable to be
dismissed.
16. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.
15
17. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall
stand closed.
__________________________
Dr. K. MANMADHA RAO, J
Date : 07-03-2025
BMS