Himachal Pradesh High Court
Gurwinder Pal Singh vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 29 July, 2025
( 2025:HHC:24721 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1659 of 2025
Reserved on: 23.07.2025
Date of Decision: 29.07.2025.
Gurwinder Pal Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Yashveer Singh Rathore,
Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate
General, with ASI Jagpal Singh, I/o
PS Kangra, H.P., present with the
police record.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 213 of 2024, dated 08.12.2024, registered for
the commission of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short ‘the
ND&PS Act‘), at Police Station Kangra, District Kangra, H.P.
2. It has been asserted that the allegations against the
petitioner are false. As per the prosecution, 23.27 grams of heroin
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2
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was recovered by the police, which is not correct. The case of the
prosecution is highly improbable. The petitioner has no role in the
commission of the crime, and there is nothing to show his
involvement. He would abide by the terms and conditions which
the Court may impose. Hence, the petition.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on
08.12.2024. They found the petitioner coming from Dunga Bazar
at 06:00 am. The police signalled him to stop. He got frightened
and took something out of his pocket and threw it towards the
bushes. The police called Arun Chaudhary, Pradhan and Ajay
Kumar, Ward Member of Gram Panchayat Halerkalan and checked
the substance thrown by the petitioner. The police found a
polythene pouch containing 23.27 grams of heroin. The petitioner
identified himself as Gurvinder Pal. The police seized the heroin
and arrested the petitioner. The sample was sent to SFSL, Junga
and as per the report of the analysis, it was confirmed to be a
sample of Diacetylmorphine (heroin). A charge sheet was filed
before the learned Trial Court on 04.02.2025. The matter is now
listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses on
22.09.2025, 23.09.2025 and 24.09.2025. An FIR No.103/2023, dated
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15.06.2023 was registered against the petitioner. Hence, the status
report.
4. I have heard Mr. Yashveer Singh Rathore, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy
Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
5. Mr. Yashveer Singh Rathore, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was
falsely implicated. The petitioner has remained inside the jail for
about 09 months. The prosecution evidence has not started. The
police have filed the charge-sheet, and no fruitful purpose would
be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner
will abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may
impose. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed
and the petitioner be released on bail.
6. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General,
for the respondent-State, submitted that the quantity of heroin
found in possession of the petitioner was huge and could not have
been meant for self-consumption. Heroin is adversely affecting
the young generation and should not be taken lightly. Hence, he
prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
4
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7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: –
“Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be
granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the
Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the
accusations made against the accused, the manner in which
the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of
the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of
the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are
released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being
unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of
obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of
justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused
on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman
Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri)
1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P.,
(2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru
Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16
SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State
(NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1
SCC (Cri) 558] .]
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9. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of
M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under: –
“12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the
accused’s presence during the investigation and trial. Any
conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related
to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin
Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77
observed that though the competent court is empowered to
exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the
grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the
discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to
facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence
of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is
not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the
witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant
observations are extracted herein below:
“14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses
the expression “any condition … otherwise in the
interest of justice” has been construed in several
decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is
empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any
condition” for the grant of bail under
Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the
court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the
administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused
and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to
impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct
the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have
dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can
legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and
anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied)
13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570,
this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court
to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed
in the following terms: —
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“15. The words “any condition” used in the provision
should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on
a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to
impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable
condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the
circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and
should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the
view that the present facts and circumstances of the case
do not warrant such an extreme condition to be
imposed.” (Emphasis supplied)
14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into
consideration while deciding the bail application and
observed:
“4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this
Court that criminal proceedings are not for the
realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant
or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on
the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The
factors to be taken into consideration while considering an
application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the
severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the
nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution;
reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or
apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses;
the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the
accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his
abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the
accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the
accused and larger interest of the public or the State and
similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising
jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not
expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of
the complainant, and that too, without any trial.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus
State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479.
7
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11. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
12. As per the status report, the petitioner was stopped by
the police, and he threw something into the bushes after seeing
the police. The police checked the bushes in the presence of
independent witnesses and recovered 23.27 grams of heroin. These
allegations, prima facie, show the involvement of the petitioner in
the commission of the crime.
13. The status report shows that the petitioner was
arrested on 08.12.2024, and the matter is now listed for recording
the statements of prosecution witnesses on 22.09.2025 to
24.09.2025. The petitioner was found in possession of 23.27 grams
of heroin, and applying the principle of proportionality, the failure
to commence the trial within 07 months is unjustified and
supports the plea taken by the petitioner that his right to a speedy
trial is being violated.
14. It was held in Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra,
(2008) 16 SCC 117: (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 217: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1055
that the right of speedy trial in every criminal proceeding is an
unalienable right of the accused. It was observed at page 126:
8
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“22. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to a speedy
trial in all criminal prosecutions is an inalienable right
under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right applies not
only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes
within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well.
The right to a speedy trial extends equally to all criminal
prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category
of cases.
15. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127
that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the
accused. It was observed at page 298:
“13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948, assures that:
“12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks.”
14. More recently, the European Convention on Human
Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:
“6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
a reasonable time….”
and in its second sub-article, that:
“6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall
be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to law.”
15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the
use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and
9
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omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution
in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386 US 213 (1967)].
16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994
SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp.
638-39, paras 86-87)
“86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right
to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by
arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of the investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may
result from the impermissible and avoidable delay from the
time of the commission of the offence till it consummates
into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be
noted that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is
properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while
dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
has observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul
of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt
that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life
and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question
which would, however, arise is as to what
would be the consequence if a person accused
of an offence is denied a speedy trial and is
sought to be deprived of his liberty by
10
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imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial
in violation of his fundamental right under
Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released
unconditionally, freed from the charge levelled
against him on the ground that trying him after
an unduly long period of time and convicting
him after such trial would constitute a violation
of his fundamental right under Article 21.”
17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being
present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in
departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court
on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC
(Cri) 93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is
implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected
in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; that
it encompasses all stages viz. investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden lies on the
prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court
must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this
right had been denied in the particular case before it.”
16. It was held in Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of
India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot be
kept behind the bars when there is no prospect of trial being
concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
“8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant
some relief to those persons who have been deprived of
their personal liberty for a considerable length of time
without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the
near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and
the nation needs to be safeguarded looking to the nature of
the offences these undertrials have been charged with. But
the ultimate justification for such deprivation of liberty
pending trial can only be their being found guilty of the
11
( 2025:HHC:24721 )offences for which they have been charged. If such a finding
is not likely to be arrived at within a reasonable time, some
relief becomes necessary.”
17. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3
SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be
subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at
page 335:
“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has
been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that
cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed as
an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is not
necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which,
regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or the
gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised the
legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it
differently, no accused can be subjected to unending
detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes
him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where
statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such as
in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably
long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason,
such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be
measured over and above the right of liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution (see Union of
India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3
SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).”
18. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a
speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail
12
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is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded
expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: –
13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to
secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discretion
(like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case), this
Court has upheld them for conflating two competing values
i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy freedom, based on the
presumption of innocence, and societal interest — as
observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [Va-
man Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281 :
(2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745 : (2008) 17 SCR 369] (“the concept of
bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to
restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a
crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged
criminal….”). They are, at the same time, upheld on the
condition that the trial is concluded expeditiously. The
Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar
Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899:
(1994) 2 SCR 375] made observations to this effect. In Sha-
heen Welfare Association. v. Union of India [Shaheen Welfare
Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366:
(1996) 2 SCR 1123] again, this Court expressed the same
sentiment, namely, that when stringent provisions are
enacted, curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting
judicial discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and
trials would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that
parliamentary intervention is based on : (Shaheen Welfare
case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. . v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC
616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 : (1996) 2 SCR 1123], SCC p. 624, para
17)
“17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the
legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal
liberty of an undertrial accused for the sake of protecting
the community and the nation against terrorist and
disruptive activities or other activities harmful to
society, it is all the more necessary that investigation of
such crimes is done efficiently and an adequate number
13
( 2025:HHC:24721 )of Designated Courts are set up to bring to book persons
accused of such serious crimes. This is the only way in
which society can be protected against harmful
activities. This would also ensure that persons ultimately
found innocent are not unnecessarily kept in jail for long
periods.”
19. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial detention
and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page 178:
“23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that
laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of bail
may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials are not
concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the individual is
immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and their living
conditions, more often than not, are appalling. According to
the Union Home Ministry’s response to Parliament, the
National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31-
12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails
against a total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country
[ National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India
<https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI-2021/Executive
_ncrb_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these, 1,22,852 were
convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials.
24. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are
at risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the Kerala
High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict Pris-
oner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242] as “a
radical transformation” whereby the prisoner : (SCC OnLine
Ker para 13)
“13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He
loses personal possessions. He has no personal
relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of
freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of
personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to
be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary
standards. Self-perception changes.”
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25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to
crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more
professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal”
[ Working Papers – Group on Prisons & Borstals – 1966
U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer’s “The Prison Community”
published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison
Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is
referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer’s Concept
of Prisonisation”, available
at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/So
becki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ).
Incarceration has further deleterious effects, where the
accused belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate
loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of
families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from
society. The courts, therefore, have to be sensitive to these
aspects (because in the event of an acquittal, the loss to the
accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials–especially in
cases where special laws enact stringent provisions- are
taken up and concluded speedily.”
20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
recently in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024)
9 SCC 813: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that the right to speedy trial of
the offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India and inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to grant of bail, it was
observed at page 817: –
“10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC
81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the right
to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is
“implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as
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interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid
procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a
procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held
that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
“5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair
or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for
determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure
which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be
regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall
foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article
21. The question which would, however, arise is as to
what would be the consequence if a person accused of an
offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be
deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a
long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21.”
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and
again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya v. State
of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671:
1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225:
1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court re-emphasised the
right to a speedy trial and further held that an accused,
facing a prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul Rehman
Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1
SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para 84)
“84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is,
thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as
the case may be, to proceed with the case with
reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country,
where the large majority of accused come from poorer
and weaker sections of society, not versed in the ways of
law, where they do not often get competent legal advice,
the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of
16
( 2025:HHC:24721 )course, in a given case, if an accused demands a speedy
trial and yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant
factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused
from complaining of infringement of his right to a
speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or
insist upon a speedy trial.”
21. It was further held that if the State or any prosecuting
agency, including the Court concerned, has no wherewithal to
provide the right of speedy trial to the accused, then the bail
should not be opposed on the ground that the crime is serious. It
was observed at page 820:
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the
court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect
the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial
as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose
the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is
serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of
the nature of the crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused, not a convict. The over-arching postulate of
criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be
innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside
lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded,
the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said
to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the
Constitution.
22. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v. State
of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was observed:
17
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7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried
trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to
prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an
accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in “The
Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following poignant lines
while being incarcerated:
“I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;
All that we know who be in jail
Is that the wall is strong;
And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long.”
23. It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents. He is not entitled to bail on this consideration. This
submission will not help the State. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 3763: 2024: INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents may not be a
reason to deny bail to the accused in case of his long incarceration.
It was observed:
“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only
one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer for
bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a
strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact situation
and period of incarceration, the presence of antecedents
may not be a ground to deny bail. There may be a case where
a Court can grant bail only on the grounds of long
incarceration. The presence of antecedents may not be
18
( 2025:HHC:24721 )relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may grant
default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused are
irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending upon the peculiar
facts, the Court can grant bail notwithstanding the
existence of the antecedents.”
24. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and the
petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his furnishing
bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like
amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on
bail, the petitioner will abide by the following terms and
conditions: –
(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor
will he influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever.
(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every
hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing
the address of the intended visit to the SHO
concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial
Court.
(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to
the Court; and
(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from the
Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media
Account. In case of any change in the mobile number
or social media accounts, the same will be intimated
to the Police/Court within five days from the date of
the change.
19
( 2025:HHC:24721 )
25. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a
petition for cancellation of the bail.
26. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Superintendent of Lala Lajpat Rai District
Air Correctional Home, Dharamshala, H.P. and the learned Trial
Court by FASTER.
27. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on
the case’s merits.
28. A downloaded copy of this order shall be accepted by
the learned Trial Court while accepting the bail bonds from the
petitioner, and in case said Court intends to ascertain the veracity
of the downloaded copy of the order presented to it, the same may
be ascertained from the official website of this Court.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
29th July 2025
(Shamsh Tabrez)
Digitally signed by KARAN SINGH GULERIA
Date: 2025.07.29 16:00:42 IST