Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Guthikonda Raghava Reddy, vs State Of Andhra Pradesh, on 10 January, 2025
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*HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI
+WRIT PETITION No.31123 of 2016
Between:
#Guthikonda Raghava Reddy, ...PETITIONER
AND
$State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON 10.01.2025
THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
- Yes -
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked to Law
Reporters/Journals
- Yes -
3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to see the fair
copy of the Judgment?
- Yes -
___________________________________
DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
2
* THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
+WRIT PETITION No.31123 of 2016
% 10.01.2025
# Between:
#Momin Mahaboob Liyakath Ali ...PETITIONER
AND
$ Momin Mohammad Rafiq and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri N. Subba Rao
! Counsel for Respondents: GP for Endowments
Sri G. Ramana Rao, Standing C ounsel
<Gist :
>Head Note:
? Cases referred: 1. (2019) 5 Supreme Court Cases 480
2. Civil Appeal Nos.4458-4459 of 2015 Cases 401
3. (2002) 2 SCC 188
4. (1981) 1 SCC 722
5. (2017) 9 SCC 1
6. (2017) 10 SCC 1
3
APHC010709252016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3310]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY ,THE TENTH DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE K MANMADHA RAO
WRIT PETITION NO: 31123/2016
Between:
Guthikonda Raghava Reddy, ...PETITIONER
AND
State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. N SUBBA RAO
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. G RAMANA RAO (SC FOR ENDOWMENTS RAYALASEEMAREGION)
2. GP FOR ENDOWMENTS (AP)
The Court made the following:
ORDER :
This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the constitution of India for
the following relief:
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“…..to issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction (1) declaring
G.O.Ms.No.425 Revenue Endowments I Department dated 9.11.2015 making amendments to
Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious and Endowments Lease of Agricultural Lands
Rules 2003, as illegal and is in contravention of Section 82 of Andhra Pradesh Charitable and
Hindu Religious and Endowments 1987 and also violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India and struck down the said Rules and also 2 declare the proceedings of the 5th
respondent dated 30.4.2016 rejecting his claim as small farmer as illegal and arbitrary during
the subsistence of the Appeal No 6 of 2009 is pending before the 3rd respondent and set
aside the same and consequently direct the respondents to continue him as lessee of the land
situated in Sy No 605/7 admeasuring Ac 4 20 cents of Gangavaram inkollu Mandal Prakasam
district as he being a small farmer, and pass such other order….”
2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner being a landless poor
persons in cultivation of the land belongs to the 5th respondent institution for
over several decades. The land which was taken by the petitioner on lease
for Rs.5400/- per annum payable to an extent of Ac 4.20 cents and he was
declared as ‘small farmer’ by the 4th respondent by conducting enquiry as
contemplated under Rule 3 of un-amended Rules 2003. Later, the 4th
respondent has declared the petitioner as landless poor person vide
Rc.No.B4/4570/2003, dated 27.7.2003. While the matter stood thus, the 4th
respondent rejected the petitioner’s claim to declare the petitioner as ‘small
farmer’ by order dated 13.4.2009. Assailing the same, the petitioner preferred
an appeal before the 3rd respondent vide Appeal No.6/2009 and the 3rd
respondent vide order dated 12.6.2009 has granted interim suspension by
suspending the order passed by the 4th respondent dated 13.4.2009, and held
that the petitioner is an existing lessee and not in arrears of lease amount and
agreed for enhancement of existing lease amount by 10%. The said appeal is
pending consideration. Pursuant to the same, the lease amount is being
enhanced from time to time. As on date, the petitioner is paying Rs.49,900/-
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p.a. to the total extent of land i.e., Ac 4.20 cents which is under lease. It is
further stated that, when the petitioner ploughed and made the land ready for
cultivation, without publication of notice, as per the amended rules, the auction
was conducted by the respondents. Further, no tender-cum-Public auction
was conducted three months before expiry of existing lease period. Further,
the 5th respondent has also not issued public notice of ten days. Without any
notice and without cancellation of lease, which is in favour of the petitioner,
the auction was conducted. Further, the petitioner was never dispossessed
by the respondents by following the procedure contemplated under law. On
enquiry, it came to know that the person, who participated in the auction, did
not pay the bid amount. As such the 5th respondent proceeded to conduct
auction once again on 16.09.2016. So, immediately, the petitioner made a
detailed representation to the 4th respondent on 20.06.2016 stating that he do
not possess any agricultural land, other than the land which is under lease
belongs to the 5th respondent institution. It is stated that the petitioner was
also recognized as ‘small farmer’ by the 3rd respondent and there are no dues
of lease amount and the petitioner did not possess any other land. In the
event of his dispossession, the petitioner will be put to irreparable loss, as it
would affect his livelihood. Hence, the present writ petition.
3. This Court vide order dated 15.09.2016 has directed the respondents
not to confirm the bid in favour of the highest bidder in case if the respondents
conduct auction, in view of the orders of the Regional Joint Commissioner,
Endowments Department, Multi Zone-II, Tirupati, dated 12.06.2009.
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4. Heard Sri N. Subba Rao, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Endowments appearing for the
official respondents and Sri G. Ramana Rao, learned Standing Counsel
appearing for the 5th respondent.
5. On hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the
averments made in the petition, submits that the 5 th respondent is disentitle to
insist the petitioner to submit Income Certificate though he earlier issued a
certificate stating that the petitioner did not possess any other land, except the
land belongs to the 5th respondent institution. He submits that the un-amended
Rule clearly indicates that without giving an opportunity of personal hearing to
the affected person and the person in management of the temple. Ignoring
that, the 5th respondent has conducted auction, which is not entitled to
conduct any action during the subsistence of order passed by the 3rd
respondent. He further submits that the notice issued by the 5 th respondent
dated 30.04.2016 cancelling the ‘small farmer’ certificate of petitioner is
without giving any opportunity to him. As the petitioner is a landless poor as
declared by the authorities, the question of submitting ‘Income Certificate’
from the Tahsildar once again does not arise. Therefore the order passed by
the 5th respondent is illegal and is in contravention of Section 82 of
Endowments Act. So far as the G.O.Ms.No.425, Revenue (Endowments.I)
Department, dated 9.11.2015 issued by the 1st respondent, making
amendments to A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious and Endowments Lease
of Agricultural Lands Rules 2003 is concerned, it is illegal and is in conflict
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with the provisions of Endowments Act in particular Section 82 of the Act. He
further submits that the amended Rules do not contemplate such protection to
the small farmers. As such, G.O.Ms.No.425, Revenue (Endowments. I)
Department, dated 9.11.2015 making amendments to Andhra Pradesh
Charitable and Hindu Religious and Endowments Lease of Agricultural Lands
Rules, 2003, is liable to be struck down.
6. To support his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has
placed reliance on a catena of decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in
(i) Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Limited versus Union of India and
others1, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that :
“This Court, in Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 has made it clear that Article 14 may be
infracted by legislation on the ground of such legislation being manifestly arbitrary.
This Court has said in this behalf:
“101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay)
(P) Ltd. v. Union of India [Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC
641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121] stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged
on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. This being the case, there is no
rational distinction between the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground of challenge
under Article 14. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments
would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest
arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or
without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and
disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that
arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate
legislation as well under Article 14.” Short of throwing the mantra of manifest arbitrariness at us, none of
the petitioners have been able to point out as to how either of these provisions is manifestly arbitrary.
They are not excessive in any way nor do they suffer from want of any guiding principle. As a matter of
fact, these amendments are in the nature of amendments which confer regulatory powers upon the RBI
to carry out its functions under the Banking Regulation Act, and are not different in quality from any of
the Sections which have already conferred such power. Thus, Section 21 makes it clear that the RBI
may control advances made by banking companies in public interest, and in so doing, may not only lay
down policy but may also give directions to banking companies either generally or in particular. Similarly,
under Section 35A, vast powers are given to issue necessary directions to banking companies in public
interest, in the interest of banking policy, to prevent the affairs of any banking company being conducted
in a manner detrimental to the interest of the depositors or in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the
banking company, or to secure the proper management of any banking company. It is clear, therefore,
that these provisions which give the RBI certain regulatory powers cannot be said to be manifestly
arbitrary.
1
(2019) 5 Supreme Court Cases 480
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17. When it comes to lack of any guidelines by which the power given to the RBI is to be exercised, it is
clear from a catena of judgments that such guidance can be obtained not only from the Statement of
Objects and Reasons and the Preamble to the Act, but also from its provisions.
(ii) In M/s Dharampal Satyapal Ltd., versus Deputy Commissioner of
Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors.2 , wherein the Apex Court held that :
From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that the opportunity to provide hearing before making
any decision was considered to be a basic requirement in the Court proceeding. Later on, this principle
was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid
down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil
consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was, thus, observed in A.K. Kraipak’s
case (supra) that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to
see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries. In the case of Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr.[13] also the application of principle of natural justice was extended to the
administrative action of the State and its authorities. It is, thus, clear that before taking an action, service
of notice and giving of hearing to the noticee is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v.
M/s. Suvarna Board Mills & Anr.[14], this aspect was explained in the following manner:
“3. It has been contended before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that principles of natural
justice were satisfied before taking action under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let
it be seen whether it was so. It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straight-jacket; its
rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another. All
that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is put on
notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the
action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand of law: All will depend
on facts and circumstances of the case.” In the case of East India Commercial Company Ltd., Calcutta &
Anr. v. The Collector of Customs, Calcutta[15], this Court held that whether the statute provides for
notice or not, it is incumbent upon the quasi-judicial authority to issue a notice to the concerned persons
disclosing the circumstances under which proceedings are sought to be initiated against them, failing
which the conclusion would be that principle of natural justice are violated. To the same effect are the
following judgments:
b) Morarji Goculdas B&W Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. U.O.I. & Ors.[17]
d) U.O.I. & Ors. v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. & Anr.[19] Therefore, we are inclined to hold that there was a
requirement of issuance of show-cause notice by the Deputy Commissioner before passing the order of
recovery, irrespective of the fact whether Section 11A of the Act is attracted in the instant case or not.
But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on the principle of audi alteram partem has
progressed in the manner mentioned above, at the same time, the Courts have also repeatedly
remarked that the principles of natural justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any
straight-jacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and to the extent to which a
person is likely to be affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been
invoked under certain circumstances. For example, the Courts have held that it would be sufficient to
allow a person to make a representation and oral hearing may not be necessary in all cases, though in
some matters, depending upon the nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing but even cross-
examination of witnesses is treated as necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice.
Likewise, in service matters relating to major punishment by way of disciplinary action, the requirement
is very strict and full-fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules as well. On the other
hand, in those cases where there is an admission of charge, even when no such formal inquiry is held,
the punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even
post-decisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the Courts have held that under certain
circumstances principles of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time,
place, the apprehended danger and so on.
2
Civil Appeal Nos.4458-4459 of 2015
9
7. Learned counsel has also placed reliance on decisions of Hon’ble
Supreme Court reported in Sharma Transport v. Govt of A.P.3, wherein the
Apex Court held that “In order to be described as arbitrary, it must be shown
that it was not reasonable and manifestly arbitrary. The expression arbitrarily
means: in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at
pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in the nature of
things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment,
depending on the will alone.”
(ii) In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi4, wherein it was held
that “The legislation can be struck down on the ground that it is arbitrary under
Article 14. Arbitrariness when applied to legislation cannot be used loosely.
Instead, it is a broad based test, stating that if a constitutional infirmity is
found, Article 14 will interdict such infirmity. And a constitutional infirmity is
found in Article 14 itself whenever legislation is manifestly arbitrary, i.e. when
it is not fair, not reasonable, discriminatory, not transparent, capricious,
biased, with favoritism or nepotism and not in pursuit of promotion of healthy
competition and equitable treatment.
Positively speaking, it should conform to norms which are rational,
informed with reason and guided by public interest, etc.”
3
(2002) 2 SCC 188
4
(1981) 1 SCC 722
10
(iii) Shayara Bano v. Union of India5, wherein the Apex Court held that
“Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature
capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also,
when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such
legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that
arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above
would apply to negate legislation as well as under Article 14.”
(iv) K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy 9-J) v. Union Of India 6, wherein the Apex
Court held that “310. The pursuit of a legitimate State aim ensures that the law
does not suffer from manifest arbitrariness. Legitimacy, as a postulate,
involves a value judgment. Judicial review does not reappreciate or second
guess the value judgment of the legislature but is for deciding whether the aim
which is sought to be pursued suffers from palpable or manifest arbitrariness.
The third requirement ensures that the means which are adopted by the
legislature are proportional to the object and needs sought to be fulfilled by the
law. Proportionality is an essential facet of the guarantee against arbitrary
State action because it ensures that the nature and quality of the
encroachment on the right is not disproportionate to the purpose of the law,”
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on a
decision of a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Telangana passed in
WP Nos.4636 of 2018 & batch, dated 25.01.2022, wherein it was held that:
5
(2017) 9 SCC 1
6
(2017) 10 sCC 1
11“……21. In the aforesaid case, the Rule to the extent it was made to operate
retrospectively was held to be unreasonable and arbitrary, and as such, violative of Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution of India as it was 36 taking away the vested right accrued in favour
of the employee therein and the restrospective operation of the Rule was struck down. In the
present case, the Rules do not provide for their applicability with retrospective effect, and
therefore, by no stretch of imagination, the Rules can be made applicable with retrospective
effect. However, for new entrants, who are coming on transfer after the Amendment will be
governed by the amendment only.
22. The apex Court in the case of A.A.Calton v Director of Education19, in paragraph 5
has held as under:-
“5. It is no doubt true that the Act was amended by U.P. Act 26 of 1975 which came into
force on August 18, 1975 taking away the power of the Director to make an appointment
under Section 16-F(4) of the Act in the case of minority institutions. The amending Act did not.
however, provide expressly that the amendment in question would apply to pending
proceedings under Section 16-F of the Act. Nor do we find any words in it which by necessary
intendment would affect such pending proceedings. The process of selection under Section
16-F of the Act commencing from the stage of calling for applications for a post up to the date
on which the Director becomes entitled to make a selection under Section 16-F(4) (as it stood
then) is an integrated one. At every stage in that process certain rights are created in favour of
one or the other of the candidates. Section 16-F of the Act cannot, therefore, be construed as
merely a procedural provision. It is true that the legislature may pass laws with retrospective
effect subject to the recognised constitutional limitations. But it is equally well settled that no
retrospective effect should be given to any statutory provision so as to impair or take away an
existing right, unless the statute either expressly or by necessary implication directs that it
should have such retrospective effect. In the instant case admittedly the proceedings for the
selection had commenced in the year 1973 and after the Deputy Director had disapproved the
recommendations made by the Selection Committee twice the Director acquired the
jurisdiction to make an appointment from amongst the qualified candidates who had applied
for the vacancy in question. At the instance of the appellant himself in the earlier writ petition
filed by him the High Court had directed the Director to exercise that power. Although the
Director in the present case exercised that power subsequent to August 18, 1975 on which
date the amendment came into force, it cannot be said that the selection made by him was
illegal since the amending law had no retrospective effect. It did not have any effect on the
proceedings which had commenced prior to August 18, 1975. Such proceedings had to be
continued in accordance with the law as it stood at the commencement of the said
proceedings. We do not, therefore, find any substance in the contention of the learned
counsel for the appellant that the law as amended by the U.P. Act 26 of 1975 should have
been followed in the present case.
23. In the aforesaid case also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the existing rights
cannot be taken away by giving retrospective effect to a statutory provision unless it expressly
or by necessary implication provide so. Therefore, the Amendment cannot be given effect to
retrospectively to wipe out the right accrued in favour of the petitioners.”
9. While relying on the above decisions, learned counsel for the petitioner
requests this Court to allow the present writ petition.
10. Per contra, learned Government Pleader for Endowments opposed
for allowing the writ petition and prayed to dismiss the same.
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11. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel appearing for 5th
respondent submits that the 5th respondent has filed counter in this matter
denying the allegations made in the petition. He submits that the petitioner
was declared as landless poor person by the 4th respondent vide
Rc.No.B4/4570/2003 dated 27-7-2003 and he was the lessee of the 5th
respondent for an extent of Ac.4.20 cents in Sy.No.605/ 7 of Gangavaram. He
further submits that the 4th respondent passed order dated 13-04-2009
rejected the claim for land less poor person declaration. Thereafter, the
petitioner filed an Appeal No.6 of 2009 before the 3rd respondent against the
4th respondent and the same was rejected vide order dated 13-4-2009. He
further submits that the 3rd respondent has passed order on 12-06-2009,
suspending the 4th respondent order dated 13-4-2009 and that the appeal was
also disposed of remanding the matter back to the 4 th respondent. He further
submits that the 5th respondent has issued auction notification scheduled to be
held on 16.09.2016. Meanwhile the present writ petition was filed. The 5th
respondent conducted auction was for a period of three years i.e., 2016-17 to
2018-2019 and the same was approved by the 4th respondent vide
proceedings D.Dis.No… dated 7.11.2016. He further submits that, from 2016
onwards the 5th respondent conducting the auction process to give leaseholds
right of the subject landed property by public auction. Therefore, there are no
merits in the present writ petition and the same may be dismissed
12. Perused the material on record.
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13. It is the contention of the petitioner’s counsel that the 5th
respondent is disentitled to conduct auction, during the subsistence of order
passed by the 3rd respondent and that the impugned G.O amending the Rules
is in contravention of Section 82 of Endowments Act, wherein the rights of
landless poor persons are protected.
14. As seen from the Amendment to the Andhra Pradesh Charitable
and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Lease of Agricultural Lands
Rules 2003 under G.O.Ms.No.425 Revenue (Endowments.I), 9th November
2015, wherein it was mentioned that “In Rule 3 of the said Rules immediately
after completion of sub Rule 3, the following proviso shall be added to Rule 3
namely:
Provided the status of every Land Less Poor tenant shall be re-examined once every
three years and appropriate orders shall be passed by the Assistant Commissioner having
territorial jurisdiction as the economic status of any person is not a constant. It is equally
applicable to cases where persons already declared as Landless poor tenants shall also be
reviewed once every three year henceforth.
15. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, in view of
the above amendment, the petitioner shall be re-examined once every three
years. But, without giving any opportunity or without giving any notice, the 5th
respondent has issued proceedings and rejected the claim of the petitioner,
which is highly illegal.
16. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and on
considering the submissions of both the learned counsels, this Court is of the
view that, the existing rights cannot be taken away by giving retrospective
14
effect to a statutory provision unless it expressly or by necessary implication
provide so. Therefore, the amendment cannot be given effect to
retrospectively to wipe out the right accrued in favour of the petitioner.
Therefore, this Court is inclined to allow the writ petition while declaring the
G.O.Ns.No.425, dated 9.11.2015 and also declaring the action of the 5 th
respondent in issuing the proceedings rejecting the claim of the petitioner, as
illegal and arbitrary.
17. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned
G.O.Ms.no.425 dated 9.11.2015 is hereby set aside. Consequently, the
impugned proceedings of the 5th respondent dated 30.04.2016 are hereby set
aside. Further the respondents are directed to re-examine the issue and pass
appropriate orders in accordance with law, within a period of eight (08) weeks
from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Till then, the respondents are
directed not to dispossess the petitioner from the land situated in St No.605/7
admeasuring Ac 4.20 cents of Gangavaram, Inkollu Mandal, Prakasam
District. No costs.
18. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand
closed.
______________________________
DR. K. MANMADHA RAO, J.
Date: 10 -01-2025 15 Gvl HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO WRIT PETITION No.31123 of 2016 16 Date : 10 .01.2025 Gvl