Himachal Pradesh High Court
Harjot Singh vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 16 June, 2025
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 598 of 2025
Reserved on: 02.06.2025
Date of Decision: 16.06.2025
Harjot Singh …Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr. K.S. Gill, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail. It has been asserted that the petitioner was
arrested for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act (in short ‘NDPS Act‘) registered vide FIR no. 240
of 2023 dated 18.11.2023 at Police Station Sadar, Solan, District
Solan, H.P. The petitioner is in custody since 12.02.2024. His
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )
conduct during the custody remained satisfactory. He was falsely
implicated, and there is no truth in the allegations made in the
FIR against the petitioner. The petitioner was arrested based on
the disclosure statement made by the co-accused, who has been
released on bail. The petitioner belongs to a respectable family,
and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the
petitioner in custody. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail
petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1977 of 2024, and
the same was dismissed on 27.12.2024. The petitioner would
abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may
impose; hence, the petition.
2. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on
18.11.2023. HC-Dinesh received secret information at 11:35 am
that Vijay Kumar and Rahul were staying in Room No.104 of Sona
Guest House, and they were involved in the sale and purchase of
heroin. The police completed the formalities and reached Room
No.104 with Abhishek Thakur. Rahul and Vijay Kumar were found
in the room. The police searched the room and found 7.34 grams
of heroin. The police seized the heroin and arrested Vijay Kumar
and Rahul. The police interrogated them, and Vijay Kumar
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )
revealed on inquiry that he had purchased the heroin from
Punjab. He paid ₹ 10,000/- to Shubhankar Thakur with the help
of the mobile phone of his friend Narender. Subsequently, the
police arrested Mohit Lakhanpal as the person who had supplied
the heroin to Vijay. Mohit Lakhanpal was interrogated, and he
revealed on inquiry that he had purchased the heroin from Sahib
Singh Garcha. The transaction details were obtained, and the
money trail led the police to Harsaran Kaur. Her account was
being used by Sahib Singh Garcha. The police arrested Sahib
Singh Garcha, who revealed his name as Harjot Singh (the
present petitioner). The petitioner revealed on inquiry that he
and Mohit Lakhanpal had purchased 12 grams of heroin, out of
which 02 grams were consumed, and some of the heroin was
supplied to Vijay. The money transaction was found between
Harjot Singh and Mohit Lakhanpal. The police arrested the
petitioner and found that FIR No. 148/2022 dated 29.07.2022 for
the commission of offence punishable under Section 21 of NDPS
Act was registered against him in Police Station City Kharar, FIR
No. 37/2019 dated 12.02.2019 for the commission of offence
punishable under Section 21 of NDPS Act was registered against
him at police station Zirakpur and FIR no. 134/2022 dated
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )
31.07.2022 for the commission of offence punishable under
Section 52A of the Prisons Act was registered at Police Station
Rupnagar against the petitioner. The police filed the charge
sheet. The matter was listed before the learned Trial Court on
06.06.2025 for recording the statements of the prosecution’s
witnesses. The prosecution has cited 24 witnesses out of whom
05 witnesses have been examined; hence, the status report.
3. I have heard Mr. K.S. Gill, learned Counsel for the
petitioner, and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent-State.
4. Mr K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely
implicated. The prosecution has cited 24 witnesses but has only
examined 05 witnesses so far. The petitioner has been in custody
for more than one year, and his right to a speedy trial is being
violated. The co-accused has already been released on bail by
this Court, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of
parity, therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed
and the petitioner be released on bail.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )
5. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent State, submitted that the petitioner
has criminal antecedents and is likely to commit an offence in
case of his release on bail, therefore, he prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
7. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed as under at page
783: –
“Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be
granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence,
the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of
the accusations made against the accused, the manner in
which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the
gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused,
the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of
tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if
the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the
accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the
possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the
courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing
the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of
U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004
6
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of
U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta
Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC
(Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State
of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil
Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar
Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3
SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .]
8. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of
M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as
under:-
“12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the
accused’s presence during the investigation and trial. Any
conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly
related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin
Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77
observed that though the competent court is empowered
to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for
the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC,
the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to
facilitate the administration of justice, secure the
presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the
accused is not misused to impede the investigation,
overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice.
The relevant observations are extracted herein below:
“14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses
the expression “any condition … otherwise in the
interest of justice” has been construed in several
decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is
empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any
condition” for the grant of bail under
Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the
court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the
7
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )administration of justice, secure the presence of the
accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not
misused to impede the investigation, overawe the
witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several
decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the
conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in
the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis
supplied)
13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570,
this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the
Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and
observed in the following terms: —
“15. The words “any condition” used in the provision
should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on
a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses
to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a
reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in
the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and
should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the
view that the present facts and circumstances of the
case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be
imposed.” (Emphasis supplied)
14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into
consideration while deciding the bail application and
observed:
“4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this
Court that criminal proceedings are not for the
realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to
grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail,
depending on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration
while considering an application for bail are the nature of
the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the
case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied
upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of
tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to
8
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable
possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the
time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character,
behaviour and standing of the accused; and the
circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger
interest of the public or the State and similar other
considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction
to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as
a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant,
and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied)
9. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus
State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479.
10. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a
bail petition bearing Cr.MP(M) No. 1977 of 2024, which was
dismissed on 27.12.2024. It was held in State of Maharashtra Vs.
Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a
bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail
application can only be considered if there is a change of
circumstances. It was observed:
“Once that application was rejected, there was no question
of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling
the earlier decision without there being a change in the
fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a
substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier
decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of
little or no consequence. ‘Between the two orders, there
9
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody’s case that
during these two days, drastic changes had taken place
necessitating the release of the respondent on bail.
Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that
the impugned order should not have been passed,
reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by
Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of
any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases,
it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so
that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and
an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has
either successfully avoided one judge or selected another
to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.
12. Similar is the judgment delivered in State of M.P. v.
Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673, wherein it was observed: –
8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the
rejection of his earlier bail application bearing
Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not
been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive
bail applications are permissible under the changed
circumstances. But without the change in the
circumstances, the second application would be deemed to
be seeking a review of the earlier judgment, which is not
permissible under criminal law as has been held by this
Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001)
1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments.
13. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528, that where an
earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to
consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then
10
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )
consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed.
It was held:
“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to
consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by
noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications
have been rejected and after such consideration, if the
court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the
said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of
such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application
should be granted.”
14. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,
(2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had
denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that
order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate
forum, without there being any major change of
circumstances, another fresh application should not have
been dealt with within a short span of time unless there
were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of
course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to
bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail
applications without there being any change of
circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”
15. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit
v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was
observed:
“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an
accused has a right to make successive applications for the
grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail
applications has a duty to consider the reasons and
11
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )grounds on which the earlier bail applications were
rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record
the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view
different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”
16. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of
Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail
application can be filed if there is a material change in the
circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It
was observed:
“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail
applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence
of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non
for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change
in circumstance. A material change in circumstances
settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which
requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the
earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in
circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of
judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to
be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at
the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the
power of a judge to consider the application and a person’s
right based on a material change in circumstances. A
material change in circumstance creates in a person
accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail
application. But the power to decide such subsequent
application operates in a completely different sphere,
unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based
on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle
that if successive bail applications on the same subject are
permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there
would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be
pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking
resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence
12
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )of the other side being put in issue and there would be
wastage of Court’s time and that judicial discipline
requires that such matter must be placed before the same
Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of
material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated
by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application.
Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether
there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the
applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail
application.”
17. Therefore, the present bail petitions can only be
considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and
it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.
18. The petitioner asserted that there is a delay in the
progress of the trial, which is not attributable to him. The
petitioner was arrested on 08.02.2024, and the prosecution has
failed to complete the evidence within more than one year.
19. This submission has to be accepted as correct. The
copies of the order sheets show that the Court had summoned
witnesses at Sr. Nos . 1 to 3 and thereafter witnesses at Sr. Nos. 4
to 6 instead of summoning all the witnesses. The piecemeal
summoning of the witnesses corroborates the submission of the
petitioner that the trial is not likely to conclude soon.
20. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of
Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a speedy trial is a
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )
constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail is curtailed
on the premise that the trial would be concluded expeditiously. It
was observed: –
“13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused
to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial
discretion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present
case), this court has upheld them for conflating two
competing values, i.e., the right of the accused to enjoy
freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and
societal interest – as observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v.
State of Rajasthan, [2008] 17 SCR 369: (2009) 2 SCC 281
(‘the concept of bail emerges from the conflict between
the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged
to have committed a crime, and presumption of innocence
in favour of the alleged criminal….’). They are, at the same
time, upheld on the condition that the trial is concluded
expeditiously. The Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v.
State of Punjab, [1994] 2 SCR 375: (1994) 3 SCC 569 made
observations to this effect. In Shaheen Welfare Association
v. Union of India, [1996] 2 SCR 1123: (1996) 2 SCC 616 again,
this court expressed the same sentiment, namely that
when stringent provisions are enacted, curtailing the
provisions of bail, and restricting judicial discretion, it is
on the basis that investigation and trials would be
concluded swiftly. The court said that Parliamentary
intervention is based on:
A conscious decision has been taken by the
legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal
liberty of an under-trial accused for the sake of
protecting the community and the nation against
terrorist and disruptive activities or other activities
harmful to society, it is all the more necessary that
investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and
an adequate number of Designated Courts are set up
to bring to book persons accused of such serious
14
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )crimes. This is the only way in which society can be
protected against harmful activities. This would also
ensure that persons ultimately found innocent are
not unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.”
21. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial
detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under:
“22. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that
laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of
bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials
are not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the
individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and
their living conditions, more often than not, are appalling.
According to the Union Home Ministry’s response to
Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had
recorded that as of 31st December 2021, over 5,54,034
prisoners were lodged in jails against a total capacity of
4,25,069 lakhs in the country[National Crime Records
Bureau, Prison Statistics in India https://ncrb.gov.
in/sites/default/files/P SI-202 1/Executive ncrb Summary-
2021.pdf]. Of these 122,852 were convicts; the rest,
4,27,165, were undertrials.
23. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates are
at risk of ‘prisonisation’, a term described by the Kerala
High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State, 1993 Cri LJ 3242 as
a radical transformation ‘ whereby the prisoner:
‘loses his identity. He is known by a number. He
loses personal possessions. He has no personal
relationships. Psychological problems result from
loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity, and
autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of
prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner
becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-
perception changes. ‘
24. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to
crime, ‘as crime not only turns admirable but the more
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )
professional the crime, more honour is paid to the
criminal'[Working Papers – Group on Prisons & Borstals –
1966 U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer’s ‘The Prison
Community’ published in 1940[Donald Clemmer, The
Prison Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is
referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, ‘Donald Clemmer’s Concept of
Prisonisation’, available at: https://www.tkp.edu.pl/
wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/Sobecki_sklad.pdf (accessed on
23rd March 2023).]). Incarceration has further deleterious
effects, where the accused belongs to the weakest
economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in
several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of
family bonds and alienation from society. The courts,
therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in
the event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is
irreparable), and ensure that trials – especially in cases
where special laws enact stringent provisions- are taken
up and concluded speedily.”
22. It was held in Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of
India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot be
kept behind the bars when there is no prospect of trial being
concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
“8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to
grant some relief to those persons who have been deprived
of their personal liberty for a considerable length of time
without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the
near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of the community
and the nation needs to be safeguarded looking to the
nature of the offences these undertrials have been charged
with. But the ultimate justification for such deprivation of
liberty pending trial can only be their being found guilty of
the offences for which they have been charged. If such a
finding is not likely to be arrived at within a reasonable
time, some relief becomes necessary.”
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )
23. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3
SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be
subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at
page 335:
“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has
been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that
cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed
as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is
not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which,
regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or the
gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised the
legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it
differently, no accused can be subjected to unending
detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes
him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where
statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such
as in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably
long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason,
such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be
measured over and above the right of liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution (see Union of
India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3
SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).”
24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
recently in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024)
9 SCC 813: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that the right to speedy trial
of the offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India and inordinate delay in the
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )
conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to grant of bail, it was
observed at page 817: –
“10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC
81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the
right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is
“implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as
interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid
procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a
procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held
that : (SCC p. 89, para 5)
“5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable,
fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy
trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No
procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick
trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it
would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no
doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which
would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied
a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty
by imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in
violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.”
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time
and again, in several judgments, such as Kadra
Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar,
(1981) 3 SCC 671: 1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,
(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court
re-emphasised the right to a speedy trial and further held
that an accused, facing a prolonged trial, has no option:
(Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
18
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269,
para 84)
“84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It
is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant,
as the case may be, to proceed with the case with
reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country,
where the large majority of accused come from poorer
and weaker sections of the society, not versed in the
ways of law, where they do not often get competent
legal advice, the application of the said rule is wholly
inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused
demands a speedy trial and yet he is not given one, it
may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot
disentitle an accused from complaining of
infringement of his right to a speedy trial on the
ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy
trial.”
25. It was further held that if the State or any
prosecuting agency, including the Court concerned, has no
wherewithal to provide the right of speedy trial to the accused,
then the bail should not be opposed on the ground that the crime
is serious. It was observed at page 820:
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the
court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect
the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial
as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose
the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is
serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective
of the nature of the crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused, not a convict. The over-arching postulate of
criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be
19
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside
lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency as well as the Court have proceeded,
the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said
to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the
Constitution.
26. In the present case, the fact that the prosecution has
failed to produce witnesses and the Court has also not
summoned all the witnesses shows that the right of speedy trial
of the petitioner is being violated, and he is entitled to be
released on bail on this ground.
27. The petitioner was found in possession of 7.34 grams
of heroin, which is slightly more than the small quantity.
Keeping in view the quantity of the heroin recovered from the
possession of the petitioner, his pre-trial detention is not
justified.
28. It was submitted that many FIRs are pending against
the petitioner, and he should not be released on bail. This
submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 3763: 2024: INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents
20
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )
may not be a reason to deny bail to the accused in case of his long
incarceration. It was observed:
“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only
one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer
for bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes
out a strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact
situation and period of incarceration, the presence of
antecedents may not be a ground to deny bail. There may
be a case where a Court can grant bail only on the grounds
of long incarceration. The presence of antecedents may
not be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court
may grant default bail. Again, the antecedents of the
accused are irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending
upon the peculiar facts, the Court can grant bail
notwithstanding the existence of the antecedents.”
29. Since, in the present case, the petitioner has
undergone long incarceration, therefore, his criminal
antecedents are not sufficient to deny him bail.
30. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,
and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his
furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following
conditions:
(i) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will
he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )
(ii) The petitioner shall attend the trial and will not seek
unnecessary adjournments.
(iii) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing the
address of the intended visit to the concerned Police
Station and the Court.
(iv) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social
media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by
the summons/notices received from the Police/Court
through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of
any change in the mobile number or social media
accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court
within five days from the date of the change.
31. It is clarified that if the petitioner misuses the liberty
or violates any of the conditions imposed upon him, the
investigating agency shall be free to move the Court for
cancellation of the bail.
32. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on
the case’s merits.
33. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, District Jail Solan
H.P., and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:18168 )
34. A downloaded copy of this order shall be accepted by
the learned Trial Court while accepting the bail bonds from the
petitioner, and in case said Court intends to ascertain the
veracity of the downloaded copy of the order presented to it, the
same may be ascertained from the official website of this Court.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
16th June, 2025
(saurav pathania)
Digitally signed by
KARAN SINGH
GULERIA
Date: 2025.06.16
14:16:55 NPT