Himachal Pradesh High Court
Hemant Kumar vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 7 July, 2025
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 878 of 2025
Reserved on: 01.07.2025
Date of Decision: 07.07.2025.
Hemant Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr. Ajay Kochhar, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Bhairav Gupta, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail. It has been asserted that the petitioner was
arrested vide FIR No. 77 of 2023, dated 11.7.2023, registered at
Police Station Dharampur, District Solan, H.P., for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 302, 323,
504, 147, 148, and 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
2. It is asserted that, as per the prosecution’s case,
Hassan Khan told Dikshant and Lalit @ Suraj that a boy working
in Pinky Dhaba was abusing them. Hassan Khan called the boy.
The boy abused Hassan Khan and others. The boy asked Hassan
Khan and others to come near the Kumarhatti Flyover. Dikshant,
Hassan and Lalit went to the spot and they found 7-8 boys
standing with rods in their hands. They stopped the motorcycle
and started giving beatings to the informant party. These
allegations are false, and no such incident took place. The
informant had specifically stated that 7-8 boys were not known
to him; however, no test identification parade was conducted.
The police have filed the charge sheet. One witness out of 27
witnesses has been examined. The petitioner was arrested on
11.07.2023 and has been in custody since then. The petitioner is a
permanent resident of Tehsil Karsog, and there is no chance of
his absconding. He would abide by all the terms and conditions
which the Court may impose; hence, the petition.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the informant told the police that he and Lalit alias
Suraj were consuming liquor and food on 11.7.2023 at 12.30 AM.
Hasan Khan came to the room and told them that a boy working
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
in the Pinky Dhaba was abusing them. Hasan Khan called that
person. The informant and Lalit alias Suraj also talked to him. He
abused them and called them near the Kumarhatti Flyover. The
informant, Hasan Khan and Lalit went to Kumarhatti flyover,
where 7-8 persons armed with iron rods were present. They
stopped the motorcycle and started beating the informant party.
The informant party sustained injuries. They were taken to the
hospital. Hasan and the informant were sent to a higher
institution for further treatment. The police arrested the
petitioner and other persons. They recovered iron rods and
sticks, which were used for the commission of the offence. The
police seized the weapons of offence. Lalit alias Suraj succumbed
to the injuries sustained by him. An orange angle iron was
recovered, which had blood stains on it. The orange colour was
also found on the motorcycle of the deceased Lalit alias Suraj.
The sample of paint was obtained, and it was sent to FSL along
with the angle iron. As per the report of analysis, the blood was
found on the angle iron, which was insufficient for serological
examination. The orange colour of the angle iron and the sample
was found to be similar. The petitioner had inflicted injury on the
head of Lalit alias Suraj. The police filed a charge sheet. One
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
witness has been examined out of 27 witnesses cited by the
prosecution. One witness has died. 25 witnesses are yet to be
examined. The matter was listed on 12.06.2025 for recording the
statement of the prosecution witnesses at Sr. no.5 and 6; hence,
the status report.
4. I have heard Mr. Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior
Counsel, assisted by Mr. Bhairav Gupta, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
5. Mr. Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was
falsely implicated. There is no evidence to connect the petitioner
with the commission of crime. The petitioner was not named in
the FIR, and the informant stated that he could identify the
assailant; however, no test identification parade was conducted.
There is a serious dispute regarding the presence of the
petitioner on the spot. There is a delay in the progress of the trial;
hence it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgments of
Rajeev Sharma vs. State of HP, Criminal Appeal No. 2801 of 2025,
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
decided on 21.05.2025, Robin Patrwal vs. State of HP in Cr.MP(M)
No. 1942 of 2023, decided on 21.08.2023, Mukesh Kumar vs. State of
Rajasthan, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl). No. 11714 of 2022 decided
on 15.02.2023, Zahur Haider Zaidi vs. CBI, 2019 (20) SCC 404 and
Pankaj Kumar vs. State of HP, 2023 SCC Online HP 394 in support of
his submission.
6. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner
was involved in the commission of a heinous offence. Releasing
the petitioner on bail would affect the fair trial, as the petitioner
can intimidate the witnesses; therefore, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783:
“Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be
granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence,
the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of
the accusations made against the accused, the manner in
6
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the
gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused,
the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of
tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if
the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the
accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the
possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the
courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing
the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of
U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004
SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of
U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta
Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC
(Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State
of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil
Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar
Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3
SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .]
9. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of
M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as
under:-
“12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the
accused’s presence during the investigation and trial. Any
conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly
related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin
Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77
observed that though the competent court is empowered
to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the
grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the
discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to
facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is
not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the
witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant
observations are extracted herein below:
“14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses
the expression “any condition … otherwise in the
interest of justice” has been construed in several
decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is
empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any
condition” for the grant of bail under
Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the
court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the
administration of justice, secure the presence of the
accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not
misused to impede the investigation, overawe the
witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several
decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the
conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in
the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis
supplied)
13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570,
this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the
Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and
observed in the following terms:–
“15. The words “any condition” used in the provision
should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on
a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to
impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a
reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in
the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and
should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the
view that the present facts and circumstances of the
case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be
imposed.” (Emphasis supplied)
14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into
8
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )consideration while deciding the bail application and
observed:
“4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this
Court that criminal proceedings are not for the
realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to
grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail,
depending on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration
while considering an application for bail are the nature of
the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the
case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied
upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of
tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to
the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable
possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the
time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character,
behaviour and standing of the accused; and the
circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger
interest of the public or the State and similar other
considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction
to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as
a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant,
and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied)
10. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus
State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479.
11. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
12. A review of the status report shows that the
petitioner-Hemant Kumar got recovered a stick which was seized
by the police. The post-mortem report shows that the cause of
death was Craniocerebral damage consequent to the blunt
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
trauma to the head, which was sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature. This report prima facie shows that the
deceased was murdered by hitting him on the head with an
object. The recovery of the stick at the instance of the petitioner
is a circumstance against him. Thus, there is, prima facie,
sufficient material to connect the petitioner with the commission
of crime.
13. It was submitted that the police have failed to conduct
a test identification parade, and the presence of the petitioner on
the spot is not established. This submission is not acceptable.
The status report shows that the CCTV footage was taken into
possession, in which all the accused were seen coming out of
Pinky Da Dhaba and going towards the spot, therefore, the
identification of the petitioner is established by CCTV footage
and the absence of test identification parade will not make the
prosecution case suspect.
14. The allegations against the petitioner, prima facie,
show his involvement in the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The
offence is heinous and punishable with capital punishment.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
Therefore, the petitioner cannot be released on bail, keeping in
view the nature of the offence alleged against the petitioner.
15. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress
of the trial, the prosecution has only examined one witness, and
there is no likelihood of an early conclusion of the trial. A perusal
of the order sheets shows that the charges were framed on
29.02.2024, and the matter was listed on 13.05.2024. Learned
Public Prosecutor requested to call PWs at Sr. No. 1 to 4 before
calling other witnesses; therefore, the Court summoned only
four witnesses. The statement of only one witness was recorded.
One was found to be dead, and the matter was listed on
12.06.2025 for recording the statements of PWs at Sr. No. 5 and 6.
16. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress
of the trial. This submission has to be accepted as correct. The
order sheets show that the learned Prosecutor had requested to
call the Pws at Sr. Nos. 1 to 4 and only one witness was examined
within one and a half years. This justified the grievance of the
petitioner regarding the delay in the progress of the trial.
17. It was held in Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra,
(2008) 16 SCC 117: (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 217: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1055
11
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
that the right of speedy trial in every criminal proceeding is an
unalienable right of the accused. It was observed on page 126:
“22. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to a speedy
trial in all criminal prosecutions is an inalienable right
under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right applies not
only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes
within its sweep the preceding police investigations as
well. The right to a speedy trial extends equally to all
criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any particular
category of cases.
18. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127
that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the
accused. It was observed on page 298:
“13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948, assures that:
“12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks.”
14. More recently, the European Convention on Human
Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:
“6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time….”
and in its second sub-article, that:
“6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence
shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law.”
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down
the use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and
omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal
prosecution in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386
US 213 (1967)].
16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994
SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp.
638-39, paras 86-87)
“86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The
right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint
imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and
continues at all stages, namely, the stage of the
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that
any possible prejudice that may result from the
impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the
commission of the offence till it consummates into a
finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted
that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is
properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] while
dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India
has observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul
of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt
that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we
mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an
integral and essential part of the fundamental
right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
The question which would, however, arise is
as to what would be the consequence if a
person accused of an offence is denied a
speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his
liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-
delayed trial in violation of his fundamental
right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to
be released unconditionally, freed from the
charge levelled against him on the ground that
trying him after an unduly long period of time
and convicting him after such trial would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21.”
17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being
present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in
departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court
on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC
(Cri) 93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is
implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also
reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973; that it encompasses all stages viz. investigation,
inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden
lies on the prosecution to justify and explain the delay;
that the Court must engage in a balancing test to
determine whether this right had been denied in the
particular case before it.”
19. It was held in Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of
India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot be
kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial being
concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
“8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to
grant some relief to those persons who have been deprived
of their personal liberty for a considerable length of time
14
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the
near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and
the nation needs to be safeguarded looking to the nature of
the offences these undertrials have been charged with. But
the ultimate justification for such deprivation of liberty
pending trial can only be their being found guilty of the
offences for which they have been charged. If such a
finding is not likely to be arrived at within a reasonable
time, some relief becomes necessary.”
20. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3
SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be
subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at
page 335:
“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has
been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that
cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed
as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is
not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which,
regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or the
gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised the
legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it
differently, no accused can be subjected to unending
detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes
him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where
statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such
as in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably
long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason,
such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be
measured over and above the right of liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution (see Union of
India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3
SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).”
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
21. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of
Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352 that the right to a speedy trial is a
constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail is curtailed on
the premise that the trial would be concluded expeditiously. It
was observed: –
“13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused
to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial
discretion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present
case), this court has upheld them for conflating two
competing values, i.e., the right of the accused to enjoy
freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and
societal interest – as observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v.
State of Rajasthan, [2008] 17 SCR 369: (2009) 2 SCC 281 (‘the
concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the
police power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to
have committed a crime, and presumption of innocence in
favour of the alleged criminal….’). They are, at the same
time, upheld on the condition that the trial is concluded
expeditiously. The Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v.
State of Punjab, [1994] 2 SCR 375: (1994) 3 SCC 569 made
observations to this effect. In Shaheen Welfare Association
v. Union of India, [1996] 2 SCR 1123: (1996) 2 SCC 616 again,
this court expressed the same sentiment, namely that
when stringent provisions are enacted, curtailing the
provisions of bail, and restricting judicial discretion, it is
on the basis that investigation and trials would be
concluded swiftly. The court said that Parliamentary
intervention is based on:
A conscious decision has been taken by the legislature to
sacrifice to some extent, the personal liberty of an under-
trial accused for the sake of protecting the community and
the nation against terrorist and disruptive activities or
other activities harmful to society, it is all the more
necessary that investigation of such crimes is done
16
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )efficiently and an adequate number of Designated Courts
are set up to bring to book persons accused of such serious
crimes. This is the only way in which society can be
protected against harmful activities. This would also
ensure that persons ultimately found innocent are not
unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.”
22. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial
detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under:
“22. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that
laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of
bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials
are not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the
individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and
their living conditions, more often than not, are appalling.
According to the Union Home Ministry’s response to
Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had
recorded that as of 31st December 2021, over 5,54,034
prisoners were lodged in jails against a total capacity of
4,25,069 lakhs in the country[National Crime Records
Bureau, Prison Statistics in India https://ncrb.gov.
in/sites/default/files/P SI-202 1/Executive ncrb Summary-
2021.pdf]. Of these 122,852 were convicts; the rest,
4,27,165 were undertrials.
23. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates are
at risk of ‘prisonisation’, a term described by the Kerala
High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State, 1993 Cri LJ 3242 as
a radical transformation ‘ whereby the prisoner:
‘loses his identity. He is known by a number. He
loses personal possessions. He has no personal
relationships. Psychological problems result from
loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity, and
autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of
prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner
becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-
perception changes. ‘
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
24. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to
crime, ‘as crime not only turns admirable but the more
professional the crime, more honour is paid to the
criminal'[Working Papers – Group on Prisons & Borstals –
1966 U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer’s ‘The Prison
Community’ published in 1940[Donald Clemmer, The Prison
Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is
referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, ‘Donald Clemmer’s Concept of
Prisonisation’, available at:
https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/Sobecki
_sklad.pdf (accessed on 23rd March 2023).]). Incarceration
has further deleterious effects, where the accused belongs
to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of
livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as
well as loss of family bonds and alienation from society.
The courts, therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects
(because in the event of an acquittal, the loss to the
accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials – especially
in cases where special laws enact stringent provisions- are
taken up and concluded speedily.”
23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. in
Criminal Appeal No. 2787 of 2024 decided on 03.07.2024 that the
right to speedy trial of the offenders facing criminal charges is an
important facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and
inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial entitles the accused
to grant of bail, it was observed: –
“12 Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secy., the
State of Bihar reported in (1980) 1 SCC 81, this court had
declared that the right to speedy trial of offenders facing
criminal charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and
content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
Remarking that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one
which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and
just” it was held that:
“Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable,
fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy
trial for determination of the guilt of such person.
No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably
quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or
just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can,
therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by
speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is
an integral and essential part of the fundamental
right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The
question which would, however, arise is as to what
would be the consequence if a person accused of an
offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be
deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result
of a long-delayed trial in violation of his
fundamental right under Article 21.”
13 The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and
again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya & Ors.
v. State of Bihar reported in (1981) 3 SCC 671 and Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225.
In the latter, the court re-emphasised the right to a speedy
trial and further held that an accused, facing a prolonged
trial, has no option: “The State or complainant prosecutes
him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the
complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case
with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country,
where the large majority of accused come from poorer and
weaker sections of the society, not versed in the ways of
law, where they do not often get competent legal advice,
the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of
course, in a given case, if an accused demands a speedy
trial and yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant factor
in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from
complaining of infringement of his right to a speedy trial
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a
speedy trial.”
24. It was further held that if the State or any prosecuting
agency, including the Court concerned, has no wherewithal to
provide the right of speedy trial to the accused, then the bail
should not be opposed on the ground that the crime is serious. It
was observed:-
“19 If the State or any prosecuting agency including the
court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect
the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial
as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose
the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is
serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective
of the nature of the crime.”
25. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh vs.
State of Punjab SLP (Cr) 8523 of 2024 decided on 09.09.2024
wherein it was observed:
“7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a
hurried trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient
time to prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an
accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde in “The
Ballad of Reading Gaol” wrote the following poignant lines
while being incarcerated:
“I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;
All that we know who be in jail
20
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )Is that the wall is strong;
And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long.”
26. Thus, the petitioner is entitled to bail because of a
violation of his right to a speedy trial.
27. Deleted vide order dated 7.7.2025. 2
28. It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763: 2024:
INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents may not be a reason to
deny bail to the accused in case of his long incarceration. It was
observed:
“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only
one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer
for bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes
out a strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact
situation and period of incarceration, the presence of
antecedents may not be a ground to deny bail. There may
be a case where a Court can grant bail only on the grounds
of long incarceration. The presence of antecedents may
not be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court
may grant default bail. Again, the antecedents of the
accused are irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending
upon the peculiar facts, the Court can grant bail
notwithstanding the existence of the antecedents.”
2
In compliance to order dated 7.7.2025, para 27 of the judgment stands deleted.
21
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
29. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and the
petitioner is ordered to be released on bail in the sum of
₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction
of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide
by the following terms and conditions: –
(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor
will he influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever;
(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and
every hearing and will not seek unnecessary
adjournments;
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for
a continuous period of seven days without
furnishing the address of the intended visit to the
SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and
the Trial Court;
(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to
the Court; and
(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from
the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social
Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile
number or social media accounts, the same will be
intimated to the Police/Court within five days from
the date of the change.
30. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file
a petition for cancellation of the bail.
22
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:21396 )
31. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Sub Jail, Solan,
District Solan, H.P. , and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
32. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on
the case’s merits.
33. A downloaded copy of this order shall be accepted by
the learned Trial Court while accepting the bail bonds from the
petitioner, and in case said Court intends to ascertain the veracity
of the downloaded copy of the order presented to it, the same
may be ascertained from the official website of this Court.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
7th July, 2025
(Saurav pathania)
Digitally signed by KARAN SINGH GULERIA
Date: 2025.07.07 17:47:16 NPT
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