Gujarat High Court
Hiralal Narsinhbhai Hadkia vs Yasmin Wd/O Faramroz Horamsaji … on 14 August, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/19617/2017 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 14/08/2025
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Reserved On : 31/07/2025
Pronounced On : 14/08/2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19617 of 2017
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT Sd/-
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
✓
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HIRALAL NARSINHBHAI HADKIA & ORS.
Versus
YASMIN WD/O FARAMROZ HORAMSAJI JASHABHAI PATEL & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR SP MAJMUDAR(3456) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2,3
NOTICE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent(s) No. 4,8
SERVED BY RPAD (N) for the Respondent(s) No. 5,6,7
TURMISH B KANIYA(9428) for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3
VIRAL K SHAH(5210) for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
CAV JUDGMENT
1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned advocate Mr. Viral K.
Shah waives service of notice of rule on behalf of respondent
nos. 1 to 3.
2. Heard learned senior Advocate Mr. Percy Kavina with
learned advocate Mr. Jamshed Kavina for learned advocate Mr.
S.P. Majmudar for the petitioners and learned advocate Mr.
Viral K. Shah for the respondent Nos.1 to 3. Though served,
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none appears for the rest of the respondents.
3. The present application is filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India seeking the following relief:-
“(A) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to issue a writ of
certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate
writ, order or directions quashing and setting aside the impugned
order dated 25.07.2017 passed by learned 5th Additional District
Judge, Surat, in Misc. Civil Appeal No.64 of 2014 (at ANNEXURE-
O hereto);
(B) During and pendency final disposal of the present petition,
YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to stay further operation,
implementation and execution of the impugned order dated passed
25.07.2017 by learned 5th Additional District Judge, Surat, in Misc.
No.64 of Appeal ANNEXURE-O hereto); 2014 Civil (at
(C) Such other and further reliefs as may be deemed just and
proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case may
kindly be granted;”
4. As far as possible, the parties will be referred to as per
their original position before the Trial Court.
5. THE SHORT FACTS OF THE CASE
5.1. The respondents nos. 1 to 3 herein are the original
plaintiffs, whereas the petitioners are the original defendants
nos. 2, 4 and 5, and the rest of the respondents are the
original defendants of Regular Civil Suit No. 390 of 2011,
currently pending before the Principal Senior Civil Judge,
Surat.
5.2. The suit is filed seeking declaration and injunction in
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relation to the suit property as prescribed in para 1 of the
plaint. The plaintiffs have questioned a registered sale deed
dated 19.10.2010 executed by defendant no. 1 in connivance
with defendant nos. 2 to 7, executed in favour of defendant
nos.2 to 5. The plaintiffs have only sought declaration that
such registered sale deed is not binding on them and be
declared as null and void. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs have not
sought cancellation of the sale deed.
5.3. As per the case of the plaintiffs, they are having an
undivided share in the suit property along with other co-
owners who are not joined in the suit, except joined defendant
no. 8 who happens to be the real sister of the plaintiffs. The
other co-owners are of a different branch of legal heirs than of
plaintiffs but having undivided share in the suit property.
5.4. It is the case of the plaintiffs that they have not
executed any power of attorney (hereinafter referred to as PoA)
in favour of defendant no. 1; thereby, he has no right to
execute the sale deed in favour of defendant nos. 2 to 5.
5.5. It is further stated that, in fact, under
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misrepresentation, defendant nos. 6 and 7 misguided the
plaintiffs and got registered a general power of attorney
executed by the plaintiffs in favour of defendant no. 1 on
28.05.2010 in relation to the suit property.
5.6. It is alleged that defendant nos. 6 and 7 were known
to the plaintiffs and, having reposed faith in them, signed
various documents, including the PoA executed in favour of
defendant no. 1, but it was never intended by the plaintiffs to
give such power.
5.7. The plaintiffs averred in the plaint that some conflict
arose with defendant nos. 5 and 6 and, having come to know
that the general power of attorney was executed in favour of
defendant no. 1, they decided to cancel such PoA. The
advocate concerned for the plaintiff had prepared a notice
dated 07.08.2010, which was sent to defendant no. 1 by
registered post on 09.08.2010. Such cancellation letter in fact,
was received by defendant no. 1 on 12.08.2010. Thus,
according to the case of the plaintiffs, once, they had
cancelled the PoA, no right was available with defendant no. 1
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to execute the sale deed on 19.10.2010 in favour of defendant
nos. 2 to 5. Furthermore, it has been specifically pleaded that
the plaintiffs have not received any sale consideration from
defendant nos. 2 to 5, who are the purchasers of the suit
property.
5.8. When the defendants entered their appearance,
defendant no. 1 filed his written statement disputing the
allegations levelled against him in the plaint. Likewise,
defendant nos. 4 and 5 have also filed a joint written
statement denying all the allegations made in the plaint.
5.9. It is the case of the defendants that there was no valid
cancellation of the PoA by the plaintiffs, inasmuch as there is
nothing on record to substantiate that the cancellation notice
issued by the plaintiffs on 09.08.2010 through registered post
was, in fact, received by defendant no.1 on 12.08.2010. It is
alleged that the acknowledgement received on record would
indicate that one “Hiral” has received such notice/letter issued
by the plaintiffs, and it is not proved on record how she is
connected with defendant no. 1.
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5.10. It also remains undisputed that neither any intimation
letter was sent by the plaintiffs to the Sub-Registrar concerned
with whom the PoA was registered about its cancellation nor
any public notice issued in news paper about such
cancellation, and thereby it was not made known to the public
that the said PoA was cancelled by the plaintiffs vide the
alleged notice dated 09.08.2010.
5.11. Further, it has been specifically pleaded by defendant
nos. 4 and 5 in their written statement that the plaintiffs had
executed an agreement to sell (herein after referred as ‘ATS’)
in favour of one “Arvindbhai Dahyabhai Bhandari” (herein
after referred as ‘Mr. Bhandari’)on 13.03.2008 in relation to
the suit property, whereby Mr. Bhandari paid Rs.15,00,000/- in
cash to the plaintiffs. It is further stated that as per the
aforesaid ATS, the plaintiffs had put Mr. Bhandari in
possession of the suit property. Mr. Bhandari removed the
obstruction of different persons over the suit land by getting
an execution receipt from those persons by paying
Rs.10,00,000/-.
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5.12. As the suit land was a restricted tenure land, to get it
converted into old tenure land whereby it can be saleable, a
power of attorney was executed in favour of defendant no. 1,
and on completion of all legal formalities, he converted the
land into old tenure land; defendant no. 1, being the power of
attorney of the plaintiffs, has executed the sale deed along
with the power of attorney holders of other co-owners in
favour of defendant nos. 2 to 5.
5.13. It is specifically pleaded by defendant nos. 4 and 5 in
their written statement that they have also executed an
agreement with Mr. Bhandari, who happens to be the ATS
holder having been executed it by the plaintiffs in favour of
Mr. Bhandari, thereby having paid part of the sale
consideration, i.e., Rs.15,00,000/- by cash and Rs.15,00,000/-
by bank transfer through the Sutex Bank Ltd, and on that
basis, pursuant to instructions received from Mr. Bhandari,
defendant no. 1 has executed the sale deed in question in their
favour.
5.14. The defendants have also contended that the other co-
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owners of the suit property have not been joined in the suit
and, as such, defendant nos. 2 to 5 have purchased the entire
suit land wherein, undisputedly, the plaintiffs have no
exclusive right, title, and interest over the entire suit land; an
injunction, as prayed for, cannot be granted.
6. The Trial Court, after taking into account the respective
pleadings of the parties and after going through the
documentary evidence made available on record, rejected the
injunction application vide its order dated 30.07.2013.
7. The plaintiffs, being aggrieved by the rejection of their
injunction application by the Trial Court, preferred Civil
Miscellaneous Appeal No. 64 of 2014 before the Appellate
Court, which came to be allowed by the Appellate Court vide
its order dated 25.07.2017. The Appellate Court has set aside
the order passed by the Trial Court and, consequently, directed
the parties to the suit to maintain the status quo as to the title
and possession of the suit property till the final disposal of the
suit. It was further directed that the Trial Court expedite the
suit and the parties were directed to extend their cooperation
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to the Trial Court in this regard.
8. Having been aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid
impugned order passed by the Appellate Court, the present
writ application has been filed by the original defendant nos.
2, 4 and 5.
9. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONERS – DEFENDANTS
NOS. 2, 4 AND 5.
9.1. Learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Percy Kavina, would
submit that the Appellate Court has exceeded its jurisdiction by
upsetting the discretionary order passed by the Trial Court
while rejecting the injunction application, thereby, committed a
gross illegality which requires to be corrected by this Court.
9.2. It is submitted that the Appellate Court, having limited
jurisdiction under Order 43, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC“) could not have
substituted the view taken by the Trial Court while rejecting
the injunction application without holding that such view taken
by the Trial Court is erroneous, perverse, and/or contrary to
the settled legal position of law.
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9.3. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Kavina would further
submit that there is a basic defect that remains in the suit,
inasmuch as all co-owners of the suit property were not joined
in the suit. It is submitted that, undisputedly, the plaintiffs and
defendant no. 8 were not the only owners of the suit property,
but there are other co-owners of the suit property. Having not
been joined in the suit, the relief as prayed for in the suit
cannot be granted.
9.4. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Kavina would further
submit that the prayer made in the suit, whereby the plaintiffs
sought only a declaration that the sale deed in question be
declared null and void, but there is no declaration sought for
to cancel the sale deed. It is respectfully submitted that in the
absence of seeking cancellation of the sale deed, a mere
declaration to declare it null and void cannot be granted. It is
further submitted that as per the proviso to Section 34 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963, in the absence of seeking cancellation
of the sale deed, which could have been sought for by the
plaintiffs, the Court cannot grant mere declaration that the sale
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deed is null and void.
9.5. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Kavina would submit that
the execution of the sale deed in question was through power
of attorney appointed by the plaintiffs as well as the co-
owners, wherein payment details through cheques were
mentioned, and as such, the sale deed in question was neither
null and void nor invalid in law. It is submitted that the
power of attorney executed by the plaintiffs in favour of
defendant no. 1, which was a registered power of attorney,
was not validly cancelled; thereby, the sale deed cannot be
questioned by the plaintiffs.
9.6. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Kavina would further
submit that as regards the payment of the plaintiffs’ share, it is
clearly pleaded in the written statement that the plaintiffs have
executed ATS with Mr. Bhandari, having received
Rs.15,00,000/-, and have not paid back such amounts to Mr.
Bhandari; by the petitioners, and as such, amount paid by Mr.
Bhandari to plaintiffs were in fact in turn paid by petitioners
to Mr. Bhandari with other amounts as mentioned in the
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written statement, and thereby, the sale consideration was
accordingly paid by the petitioners.
9.7. It is submitted that Mr. Bhandari having executed ATS
with the plaintiffs and getting the obstruction on the suit land
cleared, and such agreement having never been cancelled by
the plaintiffs, latter on, they cannot plead ignorance about the
non-receipt of the sale consideration.
9.8. It is submitted that even if the plaintiffs ultimately
prove that they have not received the sale consideration of
their share in relation to the suit property, at best, it would be
considered a case of an unpaid seller who would only have a
right to receive the balance sale consideration.
9.9. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Kavina would submit that
the plaintiffs, having executed a power of attorney in favour of
defendant no. 1, which was a registered document, could not
have cancelled such an instrument by simply issuing the
alleged notice dated 09.08.2010. It is respectfully submitted
that as per Section 201 read with Sections 206 to 208 of the
Contract Act, which deal with the termination of an agency,
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and as per the settled legal position of law, the plaintiffs were
supposed not only issued a notice of cancellation of the PoA to
defendant no. 1 but, it being a registered PoA, such intention
of the plaintiffs was required to be made known to a third
party i.e., the public, whereby the plaintiffs were supposed to
either intimate such cancellation of the PoA to the registering
authority and/or to make it known to the public by way of a
public notice in newspaper. It is respectfully submitted that
nothing has been done by the plaintiffs whereby third party
can reasonably made aware of such factum of cancellation of
the PoA.
9.10. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Kavina would further
submit that prior to the execution of the sale deed, a public
notice was published by the petitioners, and as such, a
clearance certificate was also obtained from the Airport
Authority of India. It is submitted that at no point of time did
the plaintiffs object to such a public notice and/or made any
objection before the Airport Authority of India when it issued
the clearance certificate.
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9.11. Learned Advocate Mr. Kavina would further submit
that the Appellate Court, having not appreciated all these legal
aspects of the case and not having arrived at a conclusion that
the plaintiffs have a prima facie case, the balance of
convenience, and would suffer irreparable loss, could not have
disturbed the discretionary order passed by the Trial Court.
9.12. Lastly, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Kavina would
ultimately submit that the suit was instituted in the year 2011.
Until the passing of the impugned order by the Appellate Court
in the year 2017, there was no stay granted in favour of the
plaintiffs. Merely because the Appellate Court, vide its
impugned order dated 25.07.2017, directed the parties to
maintain the status quo qua title, and possession of the suit
property till the disposal of the suit, and which has continued
so far, would not be a ground not to disturb such an
erroneous, perverse, and arbitrary order. It is submitted that
the trial of the suit takes a long time, as there are multiple
issues involved in the matter, and to prove such issues, a
sufficiently long time would be required by the Trial Court to
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finally adjudicate the suit. So, Senior Advocate Mr. Kavina
would request that when the petitioners have questioned the
impugned order passed by the Appellate Court in the year
2017 itself, the same may not be continued further till the
disposal of the suit.
9.13. To buttress his argument, learned advocate Mr. Kavina
would rely upon the following decisions:
(i) Wonder Ltd. And another vs. Antox India Pvt. Ltd.,
1990 Supp1 SCC 727,
(ii)Ramakant Ambalal Choksi V/s Harish Ambalal
Choksi, 2024 SCCOnline SC 3538.
(iii) Amarnath Vs. Gian Chand reproted in 2022
(11) SCC 460; 2022 (0) AIJEL SC 68284.
9.14. Making the above submission, learned Senior Advocate
Mr. Kavina would request this Court to allow the present
application.
10. SUBMISSION OF RESPONDENTS – PLAINTIFFS
10.1. Per contra, at the outset, learned advocate Mr. Shah
would submit that the order of status quo was granted by the
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Appellate Court in the year 2017 and has so far continued till
date; in that view of the matter, such order may not be
disturbed by this Court while exercising its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
10.2. It is submitted that the plaintiff has already tendered
his oral evidence below Exhibit 61 on 27.03.2019, but due to
the pendency of this matter, there has been no cross-
examination by the defendants. In support of his submission,
learned advocate Mr. Shah would rely upon the decision of the
Honourable Supreme Court in the case Govt. of National
Capital Territory of Delhi v. Raj Kumar , reported in (2004) 13
SCC 88.
10.3. Learned advocate Mr. Shah would submit that the
plaintiffs have never received any amount in pursuance of the
execution of the sale deed in question, either from the
petitioners or defendant no. 1, and/or Mr. Bhandari, as the
case may be. It is submitted that the sale deed does not reflect
any payment made to the plaintiffs in any manner whatsoever.
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It is further submitted that the reference of payment through a
cheque of Sutex Bank is paid to whom is not made clear from
a bare reading of the sale deed, as the date of payment is not
mentioned in the sale deed.
10.4. Learned advocate Mr. Shah would further submit that
if the plaintiffs have not received any sale consideration, the
execution of a sale deed would be null and void since its
inception. It is submitted that as such, no right, title, and
interest would passed on in favour of petitioners being an
alleged purchaser of the suit land.
10.5. Learned advocate Mr. Shah would further submit that
neither the plaintiffs nor defendant no. 1 has put the
petitioners in possession of the suit property, and as such,
there is nothing on record, except the sale deed, to show that
the petitioners are in actual possession of the suit property. It
is submitted that defendant no. 1 in his written statement has
categorically admitted that he has not put the petitioners into
possession of the suit land.
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10.6. Learned advocate Mr. Shah would further submit that
it is the specific case of the plaintiffs that they have never
executed a power of attorney in favour of defendant no. 1 so
far as the suit land is concerned, and as such, due to
misrepresentation and misleading the plaintiffs, for doing some
other work as regards the conversion of the status of the suit
land from new tenure land to old tenure land and to remove
the restriction over the suit land, the power of attorney was
executed. It is submitted that the registered PoA executed by
the plaintiffs in favour of defendant no. 1 was cancelled prior
to the execution of the sale deed.
10.7. Learned advocate Mr. Shah would further submit that
when the plaintiffs had cancelled the PoA vide their
cancellation letter dated 09.08.2010, which was duly received
by defendant no. 1 on 12.08.2010, he could not have executed
a sale deed in favour of the petitioners on 19.10.2010. It is
submitted that when the PoA was already cancelled, the
subsequent execution of the sale deed by defendant no. 1,
without any authority, would not bind the plaintiffs. It is
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submitted that the aforesaid cancellation letter was served
upon defendant no. 1 through RPAD and its acknowledgement
is already submitted on the record of the suit. It is submitted
that as per Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, a legal
presumption can be drawn about the service of such letter
upon defendant no. 1.
10.8. Learned advocate Mr. Shah would further submit that
the Trial Court has erroneously observed that such cancellation
letter cancelling the PoA was not received by defendant no. 1,
as the signature on the acknowledgement received is other
than that of defendant no. 1. It is submitted that the burden
of proof would be upon defendant no. 1 to prove that he has
not received the cancellation letter once it has been sent
through RPAD. It is further submitted that this aspect has been
noticed by the Appellate Court, whereby it is correctly
observed that the power of attorney (PoA) was cancelled by
the plaintiffs prior to the execution of the sale deed. It is
further submitted that it is not required under the law to
prove such fact about the cancellation of the power of attorney
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and, so also, not required to issue any public notice regarding
its cancellation, as alleged. When the agent, i.e., defendant no.
1, knew about the cancellation of his authority by the serving
of a written notice upon him, which was duly received, he lost
his authority to act as per the PoA. Thereafter, any act done
by the unauthorized defendant no. 1 by impressing the PoA
would not bind the plaintiffs.
10.9. Learned advocate Mr. Shah would further submit that
the Trial Court has also erroneously observed that the sale
consideration was received by the plaintiffs, which is factually
incorrect, and without recording such evidence, the finding of
fact recorded by the Trial Court is not only perverse but
arbitrary in nature, and thereby, was correctly interfered with
by the Appellate Court while exercising its power under Order
43, Rule 1 of the CPC.
10.10. Lastly, learned advocate Mr. Shah would humbly
submit that this Court, having supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, may not disturb the
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impugned order, which is otherwise neither erroneous,
perverse, nor arbitrary, nor against the settled principles of
law.
10.11. To buttress his argument, learned advocate Mr. Shah
would rely upon the following decisions:-
(i) Sameer Suresh Gupta TR PA Holder vs.Rahul Kumar
Agarwal, reported in 2013 (9) SCC 374 (Para 6and 7)
(ii)Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, reported in
(2022) 4 SCC 181 (Para 15 and 16)].
10.12. Making the above submission, learned advocate Mr.
Shah would request this Court to reject the present application.
11. Heard learned advocates appearing for the respective
parties at length. No other and further submissions are made.
12. POINT FOR DETERMINATION
12.1. Whether Appellate Court can disturb and interfere
with a discretionary order passed by the Trial Court, without
holding such order either erroneous, perverse, or contrary to
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the settled legal position of law?
12.2. Whether the Appellate Court can substitute its view by
overturning the view taken by the Trial Court while
adjudicating the injunction order, especially when it exercises
its appellate power under Order 43 Rule 1 of the CPC, when
such view of Trial Court is a plausible view?
12.3. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the order of status-quo granted by Appellate Court requires to
be continued till final adjudication of the suit?
13. ANALYSIS
14. The facts which are observed hereinabove are not in
dispute. It remains undisputed on record that the plaintiffs did
execute a registered PoA on 26.05.2010 in favour of defendant
no. 1. A plain reading of the PoA would authorize defendant
no. 1 to execute sale deeds in relation to the suit property.
The plaintiffs are alleged to have cancelled such PoA vide their
letter dated 09.08.2010, sent by registered post, which is
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alleged to have been received by defendant no. 1 on
12.08.2010. Of course, the defendants including defendant No.1
have not admitted such receipt of the cancellation letter.
15. When any letter is sent by registered post, as per Section
27 of the General Clauses Act, it is presumed to be served
upon the addressee, albeit its rebuttable presumption. So, at
this stage, this Court is required to believe that the aforesaid
cancellation letter was received by defendant no. 1 on
12.08.2010.
16. The sale deed by defendant no. 1 in favour of the
petitioners (the purchasers of the suit land) was executed on
19.10.2010, which is undisputedly after the aforesaid
cancellation letter is presumed to have been received by
defendant no. 1.
17. The question would arise as to whether, in such a set of
factual circumstances, the purchasers can claim that there was
a valid execution of the sale deed by defendant no. 1 in their
favour?.
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18. To better understand the contour of such an issue, it
would be appropriate to refer the few provisions of the
Contract Act which touch upon the revocation/termination of
agency, which are Section 201 read with Sections 207 and
208, which read as under:-
“SECTION 201 OF CONTRACT ACT, 1872
201. Termination of agency.–An agency is terminated by
the principal revoking his authority; or by the agent
renouncing the business of the agency; or by the business
of the agency being completed; or by either the principal or
agent dying or becoming of unsound mind; or by the
principal being adjudicated an insolvent under the provisions
of any Act for the time being in force for the relief of
insolvent debtors.
SECTION 207 OF CONTRACT ACT, 1872
207.Revocation and renunciation may be expressed or
implied.–Revocation and renunciation may be expressed
or may be implied in the conduct of the principal or agent
respectively.
Illustration
A empowers B to let A’s house. Afterwards A lets it himself.
This is an implied revocation of B’s authority.
SECTION 208 OF CONTRACT ACT, 1872
208.When termination of agent’s authority takes effect as
to agent, and as to third persons.– The termination of the
authority of an agent does not, so far as regards the agent, take
effect before it becomes known to him, or, so far as regards
third persons, before it becomes known to them.
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Illustrations
(a) A directs B to sell goods for him, and agrees to give B five
per cent. commission on the price fetched by the goods. A
afterwards, by letter, revoke B’s authority. B, after the letter is
sent, but before he receives it, sells the goods for 100 rupees.
The sale is binding on A, and B is entitled to five rupees as his
commission.
(b) A, at Madras, by letter, directs B to sell for him some
cotton lying in a warehouse in Bombay, and afterwards, by
letter, revokes his authority to sell, and directs B to send
the cotton to Madras. B, after receiving the second letter,
enters into a contract with C, who knows of the first letter,
but not of the second, for the sale to him of the cotton. C
pays B the money, with which B absconds. C’s payment is
good as against A.
(c) A directs B, his agent, to pay certain money to C. A dies,
and D takes out probate to his will. B, after A’s death, but before
hearing of it, pays the money to C. The payment is good as
against D, the executor.”
19. The aforesaid provision would indicate that the
revocation or renunciation of an agency may be expressed or
may be implied in the conduct of the principal or agent,
respectively. At the same time, such termination of the
authority of an agent does not take effect before it becomes
known to the agent or, so far as regards third persons, before
it becomes known to them. So, merely because a cancellation
letter was served upon defendant no. 1 would not ipso facto
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entitled the plaintiffs to claim that the execution of the sale
deed by defendant no. 1 in favour of the petitioners – the
purchasers of the suit land, would be null and void.
20. The PoA was a registered document and, as such, it was
incumbent upon the plaintiffs to intimate its cancellation to the
Sub-Registrar concerned with whom the PoA was registered
and, so also, make known to the public their intention of
cancellation of the PoA by way of a public notice to be
published in newspaper. Nothing of that sort has been done by
the plaintiffs in this regard.
21. According to this Court, when any registered instrument/
document is cancelled by its author, to put notice to a third
party other than its beneficiary/agent, a public notice is
required to be issued, apart from intimating the Sub-Registrar
concerned.
22. At this stage, it would be apt to refer to a decision of
the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Amar Nath
(supra), wherein it has been observed as under:-
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“[52] Since, it is not disputed that the plaintiff did execute
the power of attorney, empowering the second defendant to
sell the property and it is further not in dispute that the
second defendant has executed the sale deed in favour of
the first defendant, the only question which arises is whether
the power of attorney was cancelled before the execution of
the sale deed on 28.04.1987. Undoubtedly, the further
question would be whether the cancellation was effected in
a valid and legal manner and finally, whether it was made
known to not only to the second defendant but also to the
first defendant. Section 201 of the Contract Act, dealing with
termination of agency, declares that an agency can be
terminated by the principal revoking the authority of the
agent. An exception to the power of principal to revoke the
agency is found in Section 202 of the Contract Act, which
provides that where an agent has himself an interest in the
property which forms the subject of the agency, in the
absence of an express contract, the agency cannot be
terminated to the prejudice of the agent’s interest. In such
cases, the agency would be clearly irrevocable. Section 207
of the Contract Act declares that revocation may be express
or may be implied in the conduct of that principal or agent,
respectively. Section 208, which deals with the time when
termination of the agent’s agency takes effect, reads as
follows:
“208. When termination of agent’s authority
takes effect as to agent, and as to third
persons.-The termination of the authority of an
agent does not, so far as regards the agent,
take effect before it becomes known to him, or,
so far as regards third persons, before it
becomes known to them. -The termination of
the authority of an agent does not, so far as
regards the agent, take effect before it becomes
known to him, or, so far as regards third
persons, before it becomes known to them.”
[53] We may notice the following view from Pollock and
Mulla, The Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 14th
Edition:
“Termination not to Affect Third Parties without
NoticeTermination becomes effective only when it
comes to the knowledge of the affected
party. Even if the agent is aware of the
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who in good faith enter into contract with the
agent and in ignorance of the revocation;
they are protected; such provision is in
interest of commerce:9 Where the principal
has terminated the agency, or the agency has
been terminated by happening of events, the
principal continues to be bound by the agent’s
act under the doctrine of apparent authority, until
the third parties have notice of the termination.
Time from which Termination Operates
‘Revocation by the act of the principal takes
effect as to the agent from the time when the
revocation is made known to him; and as to
third persons when it is made known to
them, and not before.'”
[59] While on cancellation, we may notice that the
plaintiff, in his deposition, has stated that he had cancelled
the power of attorney at Mehre and there itself was the Office
of the Sub-Registrar located. He has admitted that he did
not get the power of attorney cancelled at the Sub-
Registrar Office. Even, more importantly, he has admitted
to not having sent any notice of cancellation. The only
evidence consists of a statement of PW1 that the first
defendant was aware of the cancellation and the statement of
PW6, who had said that the first defendant was also there on
02.02.1987, when on two papers a line was drawn to signify
the cancellation. The Trial Court and also the appellate court
have relied upon the DX sent by the plaintiff himself, which
appears to undermine the evidence about the cancellation on
02.02.1987. The High Court should not have, at any rate,
disturbed the said finding in a Second Appeal. In such
circumstances, the conclusion is inevitable that the case of
the plaintiff that power of attorney stood cancelled, in the
manner done on 02.02.1987, cannot be accepted. At any
rate, we find it difficult to accept the case of the plaintiff that
the first defendant, who is the third party, could be attributed
any knowledge of the surrender or the alleged cancellation on
02.02.1987, even assuming for a moment that we could lend
credence to the plaintiff’s version in this regard that the
second defendant surrendered the power of attorney. We
need not pronounce on the question whether the power of
attorney being registered, it could be cancelled only by a
registered power of attorney. This we say as even in the
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absence of a registered cancellation of the power of attorney,
there must be cancellation and it must further be brought to
the notice of the third party at any rate as already noticed.
Such a cancellation is not made out.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. It is also apposite to refer and rely upon a pertinent
observation made by the Honourable Supreme Court in the
case Thankamma George v. Lilly Thomas , reported in (2024) 8
SCC 351, wherein it is held thus:-
“27. In the absence of a particular mode suggested for
revocation of the authority of an agent, the manner adopted
by the principal to revoke the authority of the agent must be
one which clearly and unequivocally communicates to the
parties i.e. to be affected by such revocation, that the
agent’s authority has been withdrawn. In the framework of
Sections 207 and 208 of the Act, the revocation/renunciation
of authority may be made by express words or may be
implied from the words and conduct of the principal viz.
which is inconsistent with the continuance of the agency.
This is one facet of renunciation or revocation of authority of
an agent; the other facet is governed by Section 208 of the
Act. Section 208 provides for the effective time and date of
termination of the agent’s authority and third parties.
28. From a plain reading, Section 208 infers and gives
effect to revocation upon the twin conditions being
satisfied, (i) communication to the agent and (ii)
knowledge to a third party i.e. one who deals with or is
likely to deal with the agent. Then, the revocation of
authority becomes known to the agent and the said third
parties. In other words, an idea in the mind of the principal to
revoke cannot be construed as implied revocation or
renunciation of agency. There ought to be an act or conduct
of the principal which implies that the agency is revoked or
withdrawn. If the revocation is expressed, such as by
publication in newspapers, public notice or
advertisement, communication to the agent, etc. the
parties who deal with the agent have a reasonable
opportunity to know the revocation of agency by the
principal. Two stages of revocation are, firstly, one
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to the third parties. For attracting the consequence of
revocation to either of the situations, the revocation of the
agent’s authority is made by the principal in a manner that
clearly implies that the principal has withdrawn the authority
to act on his or her behalf by the agent. Followed by
knowledge to third parties, let us examine the circumstances
of the case on whether implied revocation coupled with
communication is established.’
(emphasis supplied)
24. Thus, in view of the aforesaid ratio laid down by the
Honourable Court, if having so applied to the facts of the
present case, it can be safely said that plaintiffs have not
followed due procedure while cancelled their PoA. So, it would
not be known to purchasers like the petitioners about such
cancellation by reasonable means.
25. When this Court comes to the conclusion that the PoA
was not validly cancelled as provided under law, the Appellate
Court, by ignoring the aforesaid provision of law and so also
ignoring the settled principle of law laid down by the
Honourable Supreme Court of India, committed a serious error
of law, which resulted in erroneous and perverse findings
being recorded by the Appellate Court.
26. So far as another issue as regards the non-receipt of sale
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consideration by the plaintiffs is concerned, the Trial Court has
discussed the issue in detail and arrived at its own conclusion
that the plaintiffs have received the sale consideration.
Nonetheless, Appellate Court has substituted its own view by
arrived at different conclusion that too without holding the
view of Trial Court bad in law.
27. It is the specific case of the defendants-purchaser that
Rs.15,00,000/- was paid to Mr. Bhandari, who was an ATS
holder, having been executed by the plaintiffs, whereby he was
put in possession of the suit property by the plaintiffs. It is
also the case of the petitioners that Mr. Bhandari has also, in
turn, executed an agreement with the petitioners stating he has
no objection to the sale deed being executed in favour of the
petitioners in relation to suit property. The possession received
in favour of Mr. Bhandari from the obstructor of the suit
property at a given point of time is also on record.
Nonetheless, the pleadings of the petitioners are refuted by the
plaintiffs by filing rejoinder, but no contrary evidence was
produced before the Trial Court in support of such refusal.
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28. Nevertheless, at the time of filing the appeal, the
plaintiffs have produced certain additional evidence to show
that the amount received from Mr. Bhandari was returned back
to him. When this Court put a query to learned advocate Mr.
Viral Shah, appearing for the plaintiffs, as to whether the
procedure followed under Order 41, Rule 27 of the CPC before
producing such additional evidence on the record of the
appeal. Under the instruction of his client, he would replied
that no such procedure was followed but such documents were
submitted along with the appeal.
29. In such a situation, first of all, no fault can be found
with the Trial Court when, in the absence of such
documentary evidence, it refused injunction against the
plaintiffs. Secondly, without following due procedure envisaged
under Order 41, Rule 27 of the CPC, such documents could
not have been taken on record by the Appellate Court;
thereby, on the basis of such documents, it cannot be held
that the plaintiffs have returned the amount to Mr. Bhandari.
As such, before the Trial Court, it was the specific plea of the
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plaintiffs that they had never entered into such an agreement
to sell with Mr. Bhandari.
30. Apart from the aforesaid facts, assuming for the time
being that the plaintiffs have not received the full sale
consideration as alleged, at best, the status of the plaintiffs
would be that of an unpaid seller, and at the end of the trial,
if they successfully prove their claim, the balance sale
consideration, if any, can be granted in their favour. In any
case, there would not be any irreparable loss caused to the
plaintiffs.
31. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Kavina raised certain
fundamental and core issues about the defects that remain in
the suit, which need some deliberation as they go to the root
of the matter and as such also required to be considered by
the Appellate Court when it granted the order of status quo.
32. It is an undisputed fact that there are other co-owners of
the suit land who are not joined in the suit. It seems that the
other co-owners having an actual share in the suit property
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have no objection as regards the execution of the sale deed in
question. To that extent, granting an absolute order of status
quo of title and possession of the entire piece of suit land by
the Appellate Court is nothing but a perverse order passed by
the Appellate Court.
33. Likewise, the plaintiffs have not sought any cancellation
of the sale deed in question, though they sought a declaration
that the sale deed in question may be declared null and void.
The proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963,
would clearly disentitled the plaintiffs from seeking such
declaration when they omitted to seek declaration of
cancellation of the sale deed. To better understand such an
issue, it would be profitable to reproduce Section 34 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963, which reads as under:-
“34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or
right.–
Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as
to any property, may institute a suit against any person
denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or
right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a
declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in
such suit ask for any further relief:
Provided that no court shall make any such declaration
where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a
mere declaration of title, omits to do so.
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Explanation.–A trustee of property is a “person interested to
deny” a title adverse to the title of some one who is not in
existence, and whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee.”
34. The bare reading of the aforesaid provision would clearly
show that when a plaintiffs are able to seek further relief than
a mere declaration of title, and they omitted to do so, the
Court would not make such declaration as prayed for.
35. Learned advocate Mr. Shah, appearing for the original
plaintiffs, was not able to countenance such legal position
pressed into service by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Kavina. In
that view of the matter, when there is an apparent defect
remained in the suit, the plaintiffs cannot be entitled to get an
injunction as prayed for in their injunction application.
36. At last, it would also be required to be observed that
while upsetting and disturbing the discretionary order passed
by the Trial Court, the Appellate Court must have to reach to
the conclusion that such discretionary order passed is
erroneous, perverse, arbitrary, or contrary to the settled legal
position of law, but such observation or finding is not recorded
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by the Appellate Court while passing the impugned order.
Rather it observed that to prove all these discussed issues i.e.
Cancellation of POA & Non-receipt of sale consideration by
plaintiffs, requires to lead evidence to prove such issues.
37. It is now a well-settled legal position of law that in an
appeal from order filed under Order 43, Rule 1 of the CPC
read with Section 104 of the CPC, such appeal would be
considered as having been filed on principle, unlike a regular
first appeal filed under Section 96 read with Order 41, Rule 1
of the CPC, which would be considered on facts as well as on
law.
38. It is also by now well-settled law that the Appellate
Court cannot substitute its own view while exercising its
appellate power under Order 43, Rule 1 of the CPC by
disturbing the view of the Trial Court merely because a second
view is plausible, unless the discretion used by the Trial Court
and its view is so erroneous, perverse, or contrary to the
settled legal position of law.
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39. Such a position of law is no longer remain res integra.
First, I would like to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of (I) Wonder Ltd. And another vs. Antox
India Pvt. Ltd., reported in 1990 Supp1 SCC 727, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in para-9 of the said decision, after considering
the scope of Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code in an appeal
wherein, the discretionary order passed by the learned trial
Court is under challenge, observed as under:-
“9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction
is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by
the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and
uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the
trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well
settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory
remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object
of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated “…is to protect the
plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he
could not adequately be compensated in damages
recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in
his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be
weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to
be protected against injury resulting from his having been
prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he
could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh
one need against another and determine where the “balance
of convenience lies”.
The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status
quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie.
The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising
what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would
like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant
consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence
his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in
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which latter case considerations somewhat different from
those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to
commence his enterprise, are attracted.”
(emphasis supplied)
40. Recently, also in the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi
V/s Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 SCCOnline SC 3538, Hon’ble
Apex Court again reiterated aforesaid principle, albeit with
explaining what amounts to perversity in order having so
observed as under which reads as under :-
“27. The principles of law explained by this Court in Wander’s
(supra) have been reiterated in a number of subsequent
decisions of this Court. However, over a period of time the
test laid down by this Court as regards the scope of
interference has been made more stringent. The emphasis is
now more on perversity rather than a mere error of fact or law
in the order granting injunction pending the final adjudication
of the suit.
28. In Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies
Ltd., 2016 2 SCC 672 this Court held that the Appellate Court
should not flimsily, whimsically or lightly interfere in the
exercise of discretion by a subordinate court unless such
exercise is palpably perverse. Perversity can pertain to the
understanding of law or the appreciation of pleadings or
evidence. In other words, the Court took the view that to
interfere against an order granting or declining to grant a
temporary injunction, perversity has to be demonstrated in the
finding of the trial court.
29. In Mohd. Mehtab Khan v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan,
2013 9 SCC 221 this Court emphasised on the principles laid
down in Wander (supra) and observed that while the view
taken by the appellate court may be an equally possible view,
the mere possibility of taking such a view must not form the
basis for setting aside the decision arrived at by the trial court
in exercise of its discretion under Order 39 of the CPC. ThePage 38 of 61
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basis for substituting the view of the trial court should be
malafides, capriciousness, arbitrariness or perversity in the
order of the trial court. The relevant observations are
extracted below:
“20. In a situation where the learned trial court on a
consideration of the respective cases of the parties
and the documents laid before it was of the view
that the entitlement of the plaintiffs to an order of
interim mandatory injunction was in serious doubt,
the Appellate Court could not have interfered with
the exercise of discretion by the learned Trial Judge
unless such exercise was found to be palpably
incorrect or untenable. The reasons that weighed
with the learned Trial Judge, as already noticed,
according to us, do not indicate that the view taken
is not a possible view. The Appellate Court,
therefore, should not have substituted its views in
the matter merely on the ground that in its opinion
the facts of the case call for a different conclusion.
Such an exercise is not the correct parameter for
exercise of jurisdiction while hearing an appeal
against a discretionary order. While we must not be
understood to have said that the Appellate Court was
wrong in its conclusions what is sought to be
emphasized is that as long as the view of the trial court
was a possible view the Appellate Court should not have
interfered with the same following the virtually settled
principles of law in this regard as laid down by this Court
in Wander Ltd. v.Antox India (P) Ltd.”
32. The appellate court in an appeal from an interlocutory
order granting or declining to grant interim injunction is only
required to adjudicate the validity of such order applying the
well settled principles governing the scope of jurisdiction of
appellate court under Order 43 of the CPC which have been
reiterated in various other decisions of this Court. The
appellate court should not assume unlimited jurisdiction and
should guide its powers within the contours laid down in the
Wander (supra) case.
(emphasis supplied)
41. In view of aforesaid, when this Court has found that the
impugned order passed by the Appellate Court is not
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sustainable in law, merely because it remained in operation
between 2017 till date would not be justifiable grounds to get
it continued further till the disposal of the suit.
42. Learned advocate Mr. Shah has heavily relied upon the
decision of Raj Kumar (supra), thereby, emphasised that status-
quo granted by Appellate Court should continue till final
adjudication of suit. As such, in Raj Kumar (supra), no law has
been laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court that if
interim protection granted by this Court has continued for a
long time, such protection should be continued.
42.1. It is a well-settled legal position of law that the ratio
of a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court is binding to
this Court and other courts, i.e. A pronouncement of law
under Article 141 of the Constitution.
42.2. Further, it appears that in the case of Raj Kumar
(supra), it was in relation to a proceeding arising out of a writ
petition which was ordered to be disposed of by the High
Court within a stipulated time, unlike the present case where a
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civil suit is filed wherein complex issues would arise. It is not
unknown that to get the suit adjudicated by the Trial Court,
oral/documentary evidence is required to be led by the parties,
which would undoubtedly consume much more time than
deciding a writ petition wherein there would hardly a scope of
oral evidence to be led by the parties.
42.3. In light of the above, this Court would not accept the
submissions made by learned advocate Mr. Shah that this
Court should not disturb the order of status quo. This Court is
not at all impressed by any of the submissions made by
learned advocate Mr. Shah appearing for the plaintiffs.
43. Thus, in view of the aforesaid position of law, the
Appellate Court could not have disturbed the discretionary
order passed by the Trial Court, having not arrived at a
conclusion that such discretion used by the Trial Court is
either erroneous, perverse, or against such settled principle of
law.
44. When this Court has found that the Appellate Court has
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exceeded its jurisdiction while disturbing the discretionary
order passed by the Trial Court, having substituted its view
over the view of the Trial Court, it is the constitutional duty
of this Court to step in by exercising its supervisory
jurisdiction so vested in it under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. In that case, it is required to interfere
with the impugned order passed by the Appellate Court. The
decisions so relied on by learned advocate Mr. Shah would
also suggest the same.
45. It is also a well-settled legal position of law that to keep
the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority, a
supervisory jurisdiction is required to be exercised by this
Court while exercising its power under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. Nonetheless, this Court would also like
to refer to the pertinent observations of the Constitution Bench
decision of this Court in the case of Waryam Singhvs vs.
Amarnath,, reported in AIR 1954 SC 215, wherein it has been
held thus:-
13. This power of superintendence conferred by Article
227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain AirwaysPage 42 of 61
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Ltd.v. Sukumar Mukherjee[Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd.v.
Sukumar Mukherjee, 1950 SCC OnLine Cal 88 : AIR 1951
Cal 193] , to be exercised most sparingly and only in
appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate
courts within the bounds of their authority and not for
correcting mere errors. As rightly pointed out by the Judicial
Commissioner in the case before us the lower courts in
refusing to make an order for ejectment acted arbitrarily. The
lower courts realised the legal position but in effect declined
to do what was by Section 13(2)(i) incumbent on them to do
and thereby refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by
law. It was, therefore, a case which called for an interference
by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and it acted quite
properly in doing so. In our opinion there is no ground on
which in an appeal by special leave under Article 136 we
should interfere. The appeal, therefore, must stand dismissed
with costs.
(emphasis supplied)
46. It would also be apt to refer and rely upon the recent
decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of
Bhudev Mallick alias Bhudeb Mallick and Another vs. Ghoshal
and Others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 360, wherein in
paras 53 to 58, the Honourable Supreme Court held thus:-
“53. We are a bit disappointed with the manner in which the
High Court dealt with the present litigation, more particularly
while deciding the revision application filed by the appellants
herein against the order passed by the executing court. All
that the High Court has said in one line is that it did not find
any jurisdictional error in the order passed by the executing
court ordering arrest, detention in a civil prison and
attachment of the property of the appellants. We fail to
understand, why the High Court was not able to see the gross
error in the order passed by the executing court, be it called
an error of law or a jurisdictional error. Undoubtedly, the
High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution must ascertain
before interfering with any order passed by a subordinatePage 43 of 61
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court or tribunal whether the same suffers from any
jurisdictional error. At times in litigation like the one on
hand, the court should be guided by its conscience, more
particularly keeping in mind the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case and not strictly go by the term
“jurisdictional error”. It is very easy for the High Court to say
that there is no jurisdictional error and, therefore, no
interference is warranted but before saying so, the High Court
should be mindful of the consequences that would follow like
arrest, detention in civil prison and attachment of property.
54. What is a jurisdictional error has been the subject of a
legion of illuminating judicial decisions. In this case, however,
we need concern ourselves with only one aspect of that
matter and it is enough for us to refer in this connection to the
decision of the Privy Council in the case of Joy Chand Lal
Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury, AIR 1949 PC 239, where Sir
John Beaumont, delivering the judgment of the Board,
observed inter alia as follows:–
“although error in a decision of a Subordinate
Court does not by itself involve that the
subordinate Court has acted illegally or with
material irregularity so as to justify interference in
revision under Subsection (c). nevertheless if the
erroneous decision results in the subordinate
Court exercising a jurisdiction, not vested in it by
law or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested,
a case for revision arises under Sub-section (a)
or Sub-section (b) and Sub section (c) can be
ignored.”
55. If, therefore, an error, be it an error of fact or of law, is
such that the erroneous decision has resulted in the
subordinate Court or tribunal exercising jurisdiction, not
vested in it by law, or in its having failed to exercise
jurisdiction, vested in it by law, that will come within the scope
of Section 115 of the Code or, for the matter of that, of
Article227 of the Constitution, as the case may be. This error
may have resulted from a violation of rules of natural justice,
by taking into consideration matters which are extraneous and
irrelevant, or by substituting judicial consideration by bias,
based on suspicion, arising from those extraneous matters or
from any other cause whatsoever but if it has affected the
assumption or exercise of jurisdiction, as envisaged above, it
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will be a jurisdictional error for purposes of the above Article.
56. There is no exhaustive list of jurisdictional errors, but
case law has identified such an error exists when a
decision-maker has:
• identified a wrong issue;
• asked a wrong question;
• ignored relevant material;
• relied on irrelevant material;
• failed to observe a requirement of procedural
fairness;
• made a decision involving fraud;
• made a decision in bad faith;
• made a decision without evidence;
• applied a policy inflexibly.
57. The concept of jurisdiction has been drastically expanded
after the decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic v. The
Foreign Compensation Commission, [1967] 2 All ER 986.
Now, every error of law is a jurisdictional error. If a decisive
fact is wrongly understood, even then, the decision will be
outside jurisdiction. This concept is best explained by K.S.
Paripoornan, J., in His Lordship’s separate Judgment in
Mafatal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536.
The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:–
“334. Opinions may differ as to when it can be
said that in the “public law” domain, the entire
proceeding before the appropriate authority is
illegal and without jurisdiction or the defect or
infirmity in the order goes to the root of the
matter and makes it in law invalid or void
(referred to in Illuri Subbayya Chetty case
[(1964) 1 SCR 752 : AIR 1964 SC 322 : (1963)
14 STC 680 : (1963) 50 ITR 93] and approved in
Dhulabhai case [(1968) 3 SCR 662 : AIR 1969
SC 78 : (1968) 22 STC 416]). The matter may
have to be considered in the light of the
provisions of the particular statute in question
and the fact-situation obtaining in each case. It
is difficult to visualise all situations hypothetically
and provide an answer. Be that as it may, the
question that frequently arises for consideration,
is, in what situation/cases the non-compliance orPage 45 of 61
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error or mistake, committed by the statutory
authority or tribunal, makes the decision
rendered ultra vires or a nullity or one without
jurisdiction? If the decision is without jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the provisions for obtaining
reliefs contained in the Act and the “ouster
clauses”, the jurisdiction of the ordinary court is
not excluded. So, the matter assumes
significance. Since the landmark decision in
Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation
Commission [[1969] 2 A.C. 147 : [1969] 1 All ER
208 : [1969] 2 WLR 163, HL] the legal world
seems to have accepted that any “jurisdictional
error” as understood in the liberal or modern
approach, laid down therein, makes a decision
ultra vires or a nullity or without jurisdiction and
the “ouster clauses” are construed restrictively,
and such provisions whatever their stringent
language be, have been held, not to prevent
challenge on the ground that the decision is ultra
vires and being a complete nullity, it is not a
decision within the meaning of the Act. The
concept of jurisdiction has acquired “new
dimensions”. The original or pure theory of
jurisdiction means “the authority to decide” and it
is determinable at the commencement and not
at the conclusion of the enquiry. The said
approach has been given a go-by in Anisminic
case [[1969] 2 A.C. 147 : [1969] 1 All ER 208 :
[1969] 2 WLR 163, HL] as we shall see from the
discussion hereinafter [see De Smith, Woolf and
Jowell –Judicial Review of Administrative
Action (1995 Edn.) p. 238; Halsbury’s Laws of
England (4th Edn.) p. 114, para 67, footnote
(9)]. As Sir William Wade observes in his book,
Administrative Law (7th Edn.), 1994, at p. 299:
“The tribunal must not only have jurisdiction at
the outset, but must retain it unimpaired until it
has discharged its task.”
The decision in Anisminic case [(1948-49) 76 IA
244 : AIR 1949 PC 297] [(1948-49) 76 IA 244 :
AIR 1949 PC 297] has been cited with approval
in a number of cases by this Court : citation of a
few such cases — Union of India v. Tarachand
Gupta & Bros. [(1971) 1 SCC 486 : AIR 1971
SC 1558] (AIR at p. 1565), A.R. Antulay v. R.S.Page 46 of 61
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Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372]
(SCC at p. 650), R.B. Shreeram Durga Prasad
and Fatehchand Nursing Das v. Settlement
Commission (IT & WT) [(1989) 1 SCC 628 :
1989 SCC (Tax) 124] (SCC at p. 634), N.
Parthasarathy v. Controller of Capital Issues
[(1991) 3 SCC 153] (SCC at p. 195), Associated
Engineering Co. v. Govt. of A.P. [(1991) 4 SCC
93 : AIR 1992 SC 232], Shiv Kumar Chadha v.
Municipal Corpn. of Delhi [(1993) 3 SCC 161]
(SCC at p. 173). Delivering the judgment of a
two-Member Bench in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur
[(1972) 2 SCC 427 : AIR 1972 SC 2379]
Mathew, J. in paras 10 and 11 of the judgment
explained the legal position after Anisminic case
[(1948-49) 76 IA 244 : AIR 1949 PC 297] [(1948-
49) 76 IA 244 : AIR 1949 PC 297] to the
following effect:
“10. The word ‘jurisdiction’ is a verbal cast of
many colours. Jurisdiction originally seems to
have had the meaning which Lord Baid ascribed
to it in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation
Commission [(1948-49) 76 IA 244 : AIR 1949
PC 297] [(1948-49) 76 IA 244 : AIR 1949 PC
297], namely, the entitlement ‘to enter upon the
enquiry in question’. If there was an entitlement
to enter upon an enquiry into the question, then
any subsequent error could only be regarded as
an error within the jurisdiction. The best known
formulation of this theory is that made by Lord
Dennan in R. v. Bolton [[1841] 1 Q.B. 66 : 10
LJMC 49]. He said that the question of
jurisdiction is determinable at the
commencement, not at the conclusion of the
enquiry. In Anisminic Ltd. [(1948-49) 76 IA 244 :
AIR 1949 PC 297] [(1948-49) 76 IA 244 : AIR
1949 PC 297], Lord Reid said:
‘But there are many cases where, although the
tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry,
it has done or failed to do something in the
course of the enquiry which is of such a nature
that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its
decision in bad faith. It may have made a
decision which it had no power to make. It may
have failed in the course of the enquiry to
comply with the requirements of natural justice.
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It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued
the provisions giving it power to act so that it
failed to deal with the question remitted to it and
decided some question which was not remitted
to it. It may have refused to take into account
something which it was required to take into
account. Or it may have based its decision on
some matter which, under the provisions setting
it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not
intend this list to be exhaustive.’
In the same case, Lord Pearce said:
‘Lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways.
There may be an absence of those formalities or
things which are conditions precedent to the
tribunal having any jurisdiction to embark on an
enquiry. Or the tribunal may at the end make an
order that it has no jurisdiction to make. Or in
the intervening stage while engaged on a proper
enquiry, the tribunal may depart from the rules
of natural justice; or it may ask itself the wrong
questions; or it may take into account matters
which it was not directed to take into account.
Thereby it would step outside its jurisdiction. It
would turn its enquiry into something not
directed by Parliament and fail to make the
enquiry which Parliament did direct. Any of
these things would cause its purported decision
to be a nullity.’
11. The dicta of the majority of the House of
Lords, in the above case would show the extent
to which ‘lack’ and ‘excess’ of jurisdiction have
been assimilated or, in other words, the extent
to which we have moved away from the
traditional concept of ‘jurisdiction’. The effect of
the dicta in that case is to reduce the difference
between jurisdictional error and error of law
within jurisdiction almost to vanishing point. The
practical effect of the decision is that any error of
law can be reckoned as jurisdictional. This
comes perilously close to saying that there is
jurisdiction if the decision is right in law but none
if it is wrong. Almost any misconstruction of a
statute can be represented as ‘basing their
decision on a matter with which they have no
right to deal’, ‘imposing an unwarranted
condition’ or ‘addressing themselves to a wrongPage 48 of 61
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question’. The majority opinion in the case
leaves a court or tribunal with virtually no margin
of legal error. Whether there is excess of
jurisdiction or merely error within jurisdiction can
be determined only by construing the
empowering statute, which will give little
guidance. It is really a question of how much
latitude the court is prepared to allow….”
In a subsequent Constitution Bench decision,
Hari Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju
[(1974) 3 SCC 415 : AIR 1973 SC 2602]
delivering the judgment of the Bench, Mathew,
J., in para 27 at page 2608 of the judgment,
stated thus : (SCC pp. 423-24, para 28)
“… Though the dividing line between lack of
jurisdiction or power and erroneous exercise of it
has become thin with the decision of the House
of Lords in the Anisminic case [Anisminic Ltd. v.
Foreign Compensation Commission, [1967] 3
WLR 382 : [1967] 2 All ER 986], we do not think
that the distinction between the two has been
completely wiped out. We are aware of the
difficulty in formulating an exhaustive rule to tell
when there is lack of power and when there is
an erroneous exercise of it. The difficulty has
arisen because the word ‘jurisdiction’ is an
expression which is used in a variety of senses
and takes its colour from its context, (see per
Diplock, J. at p. 394 in the Anisminic case
[Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation
Commission, [1967] 3 WLR 382 : [1967] 2 All
ER 986]). Whereas the ‘pure’ theory of
jurisdiction would reduce jurisdictional control to
a vanishing point, the adoption of a narrower
meaning might result in a more useful legal
concept even though the formal structure of law
may lose something of its logical symmetry. ‘At
bottom the problem of defining the concept of
jurisdiction for purpose of judicial review has
been one of public policy rather than one of
logic’. [S.A. Smith, ‘Judicial Review of
Administrative Action, 2nd Edn., p. 98. (1968
Edn.)]”
The observation of the learned author, (S.A. De
Smith) was continued in its 3rd Edn. (1973) at p.
98 and in its 4th Edn. (1980) at p. 112 of the
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book. The observation aforesaid was based on
the then prevailing academic opinion only as is
seen from the footnotes. It should be stated that
the said observation is omitted from the latest
edition of the book De Smith, Woolf and Jowell
— Judicial Review of Administrative Action —
5th Edn. (1995) as is evident from p. 229;
probably due to later developments in the law
and the academic opinion that has emerged due
to the change in the perspective.
335. After 1980, the decision in Anisminic case
[[1969] 2 A.C. 147 : [1969] 1 All ER 208 : [1969]
2 WLR 163, HL] came up for further
consideration before the House of Lords, Privy
Council and other courts. The three leading
decisions of the House of Lords wherein
Anisminic principle was followed and explained,
are the following: Racal Communications Ltd., In
re [[1981] A.C. 374 : [1980] 2 All ER 634 : [1980]
3 WLR 181, HL], O’Reilly v. Mackman [[1983] 2
A.C. 237 : [1982] 3 All ER 1124 : [1982] 3 WLR
1096, HL], Re. v. Hull University Visitor [[1993]
A.C. 682 : [1993] 1 All ER 97 : [1992] 3 WLR
1112, HL]. It should be noted that Racal, In re
case [(1968) 3 SCR 662 : AIR 1969 SC 78 :
(1968) 22 STC 416] [(1964) 6 SCR 261 : AIR
1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 15 STC 450] the
Anisminic principle was held to be inapplicable
in the case of (superior) court where the
decision of the court is made final and
conclusive by the statute. (The superior court
referred to in this decision is the High Court)
[[1981] A.C. 374 (383, 384, 386, 391)]. In the
meanwhile, the House of Lords in Council of
Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil
Service [[1985] A.C. 374 : [1984] 3 All ER 935 :
[1984] 3 WLR 1174, HL] enunciated three broad
grounds for judicial review, as “legality”,
“procedural propriety” and “rationality” and this
decision had its impact on the development of
the law in post-Anisminic period. In the light of
the above four important decisions of the House
of Lords, other decisions of the court of appeal,
Privy Council etc. and the later academic
opinion in the matter the entire case-law on the
subject has been reviewed in leading textbooks.
In the latest edition of De Smith on JudicialPage 50 of 61
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Review of Administrative Action — edited by
Lord Woolf and Jowell, Q.C. [Professor of Public
Law, 5 Edn. — 1995], in Chapter 5, titled as
“Jurisdiction, Vires, Law and Fact” (pp. 223-
294), there is exhaustive analysis about the
concept “Jurisdiction” and its ramifications. The
authors have discussed the pure theory of
jurisdiction, the innovative decision in Anisminic
case [[1969] 2 A.C. 147 : [1969] 1 All ER 208 :
[1969] 2 WLR 163, HL], the development of the
law in the post-Anisminic period, the scope of
the “finality” clauses (exclusion of jurisdiction of
courts) in the statutes, and have laid down a few
propositions at pp. 250-256 which could be
advanced on the subject. The authors have
concluded the discussion thus at p. 256:
“After Anisminic virtually every error of law is a
jurisdictional error, and the only place left for
non-jurisdictional error is where the components
of the decision made by the inferior body
included matters of fact and policy as well as
law, or where the error was evidential
(concerning for example the burden of proof or
admission of evidence). Perhaps the most
precise indication of jurisdictional error is that
advanced by Lord Diplock in Racal
Communications [[1981] A.C. 374 : [1980] 2 All
ER 634 : [1980] 3 WLR 181, HL], when he
suggested that a tribunal is entitled to make an
error when the matter ‘involves, as many do
interrelated questions of law, fact and degree’.
Thus it was for the county court judge in
Pearlman [Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors
of Harrow School, [1979] 1 All ER 365 : [1978] 3
WLR 736] to decide whether the installation of
central heating in a dwelling amounted to a
‘structural alteration, extension or addition’. This
was a ‘typical question of mixed law, fact and
degree which only a scholiast would think it
appropriate to dissect into two separate
questions, one for decision by the superior
court, viz., the meaning of these words, a
question which must entail considerations of
degree, and the other for decision by a county
court, viz., the application of words to the
particular installation, a question which also
entails considerations of degree.
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It is, however, doubtful whether any test of
jurisdictional error will prove satisfactory. The
distinction between jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional error is ultimately based upon
foundations of sand. Much of the superstructure
has already crumbled. What remains is likely
quickly to fall away as the courts rightly insist
that all administrative action should be, simply,
lawful, whether or not jurisdictionally lawful.”
336. The jurisdictional control exercised by
superior courts over subordinate courts,
tribunals or other statutory bodies and the scope
and content of such power has been pithily
stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England — 4th
Edn. (Reissue), 1989 Vol. 1(1), p. 113 to the
following effect:
“The inferior court or tribunal lacks jurisdiction if
it has no power to enter upon an enquiry into a
matter at all; and it exceeds jurisdiction if it
nevertheless enters upon such an enquiry or,
having jurisdiction in the first place, it proceeds
to arrogate an authority withheld from it by
perpetrating a major error of substance, form or
procedure, or by making an order or taking
action outside its limited area of competence.
Not every error committed by an inferior court or
tribunal or other body, however, goes to
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to decide a matter
imports a limited power to decide that matter
incorrectly.
A tribunal lacks jurisdiction if (1) it is improperly
constituted, or (2) the proceedings have been
improperly instituted, or (3) authority to decide
has been delegated to it unlawfully, or (4) it is
without competence to deal with a matter by
reason of the parties, the area in which the issue
arose, the nature of the subject-matter, the
value of that subject-matter, or the non-
existence of any other prerequisite of a valid
adjudication. Excess of jurisdiction is not
materially distinguishable from lack of
jurisdiction and the expressions may be used
interchangeably.
Where the jurisdiction of a tribunal is dependent
on the existence of a particular state of affairs,Page 52 of 61
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that state of affairs may be described as
preliminary to, or collateral to the merits of, the
issue, or as jurisdictional.(p. 114)
There is a presumption in construing statutes
which confer jurisdiction or discretionary powers
on a body, that if that body makes an error of
law while purporting to act within that jurisdiction
or in exercising those powers, its decision or
action will exceed the jurisdiction conferred and
will be quashed. The error must be one on
which the decision or action depends. An error
of law going to jurisdiction may be committed by
a body which fails to follow the proper procedure
required by law, which takes legally irrelevant
considerations into account, or which fails to
take relevant considerations into account, or
which asks itself and answers the wrong
question. (pp. 119-120)
The presumption that error of law goes to
jurisdiction may be rebutted on the construction
of a particular statute, so that the relevant body
will not exceed its jurisdic-tion by going wrong in
law. Previously, the courts were more likely to
find that errors of law were within jurisdiction;
but with the modern approach errors of law will
be held to fall within a body’s jurisdiction only in
exceptional cases. The courts will generally
assume that their expertise in determining the
principles of law applicable in any case has not
been excluded by Parliament.(p. 120)
Errors of law include misinterpretation of a
statute or any other legal document or a rule of
common law; asking oneself and answering the
wrong question, taking irrelevant considerations
into account or failing to take relevant
considerations into account when purporting to
apply the law to the facts; admitting inadmissible
evidence or rejecting admissible and relevant
evidence; exercising a discretion on the basis of
incorrect legal principles; giving reasons which
disclose faulty legal reasoning or which are
inadequate to fulfil an express duty to give
reasons, and misdirecting oneself as to the
burden of proof.” (pp. 121-122)
337. H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth in their
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book –Administrative Law, 7th Edn., (1994) —
discuss the subject regarding the jurisdiction of
superior courts over subordinate courts and
tribunals under the head “Jurisdiction over Fact
and Law” in Chapter 9, pp. 284 to 320. The
decisions before Anisminic and those in the
post-Anisminic period have been discussed in
detail. At pp. 319-320, the authors give the
Summary of Rules thus:
“Jurisdiction over fact and law : Summary
At the end of a chapter which is top-heavy with
obsolescent material it may be useful to
summarise the position as shortly as possible.
The overall picture is of an expanding system
struggling to free itself from the trammels of
classical doctrines laid down in the past. It is not
safe to say that the classical doctrines are
wholly obsolete and that the broad and simple
principles of review, which clearly now
commend themselves to the judiciary, will
entirely supplant them. A summary can
therefore only state the long-established rules
together with the simpler and broader rules
which have now superseded them, much for the
benefit of the law. Together they are as follows:
Errors of factOld rule :
The court would quash only if the erroneous fact
was jurisdictional.
New rule : The court will quash if an erroneous
and decisive fact was —
(a) jurisdictional
(b) found on the basis of no evidence; or
(c) wrong, misunderstood or ignored.
Errors of law
Old rule : The court would quash only if the error
was —
(a) jurisdictional; or
(b) on the face of the record.
New rule : The court will quash for any decisive
error, because all errors of law are now
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jurisdictional.”
58. For the benefit of the High Courts across the country,
we may refer to a very erudite article authored by Krystal
Cunningham-Foran, a legal expert working as a senior
associate in Colin Biggers & Paisley’s Planning
Government Infrastructure & Environment group, on the
topic “Jurisdictional Error”. The learned author has
discussed a judgment rendered by the High Court of Australia
setting out practical guidance for establishing jurisdictional
error in the context of judicial review proceedings in respect of
a decision about the revocation of a decision to cancel a visa.
Article reads thus:–
“The case of LPDT v. Minister for Immigration,
Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural
Affairs, [2024] HCA 12 concerned judicial review
proceedings in the High Court of Australia (High
Court) in which the High Court provided practical
guidance about the threshold of materiality in
the context of jurisdictional error.
The test for establishing jurisdictional error is
two-fold. Firstly, it must be established that an
error occurred and secondly, the error must be
material such that the decision affected by error
could realistically have been different if there
was no error. The practical guidance provided
by the High Court in respect of this test is set out
in this article.
The judicial review proceedings relevantly
concerned an allegation that the decision of the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) in
respect of a decision made under section
501CA(4) of the Migration Act, 1958 (Cth)
(Migration Act) about the revocation of a
decision to cancel the Appellant’s visa
(Cancellation Decision) was affected by
jurisdictional error.
There was no dispute that the Tribunal’s
decision involved an error because the Tribunal
did not comply with a direction of the Minister in
relation to the revocation of a mandatory
cancellation of a visa under section 501CA
(Direction) in breach of section 499(2A) of the
Migration Act.
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In respect of the materiality of the error, the High
Court held that the decision reached by the
Tribunal could have been different if there was
no error and thus the threshold of materiality
was met.
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside
the decision of the Full Court of the Federal
Court of Australia, and ordered the issue of a
writ of certiorari quashing the Tribunal’s decision
and a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to
determine the Appellant’s request for revocation
of the Cancellation Decision according to law.
What is jurisdictional error?
Jurisdictional error arises where a decision-
maker with authority to make a decision under
statute is in breach of an express or implied
condition of the decision-making authority, such
that the decision made lacks legal force and is
“in law…no decision at all”.
The High Court observed that the following
categories of jurisdictional error often arise, but
that the categories are not closed:
• A breach by a third-party of a condition of a
statutory process before a decision is made.
• A breach by a decision-maker given authority
under statute of a condition of making a
decision. Common errors in this context
include : the decision-maker misunderstands the
applicable law, asks the wrong question,
identifies a wrong issue, ignores relevant
material, relies on irrelevant material, exceeds
the bounds of what is reasonable, denies a
requirement of procedural fairness, or makes an
erroneous finding or reaches a mistaken
conclusion.
Two-part test for jurisdictional error
Not every breach of an express or implied
condition of making a decision will render the
decision no decision at all.
The limits imposed by the relevant statute on the
making of a decision must be understood to
determine the following:
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• “…Whether an error has occurred (that is,
whether there has been a breach of an express
or implied condition of the statutory conferral of
decision-making authority)…”
• “…Whether any such error is jurisdictional (that
is, whether the error has resulted in the decision
made lacking legal force).”
Practical guidance for considering jurisdictional
error
The High Court stated the following practical
guidance in respect of the test for jurisdictional
error:
• Both parts of the test start with a consideration
of the statute to understand the nature of the
alleged error in its statutory context.
• Both parts of the test are backward-looking in
that they are answered having regard to the
decision that was made, and if necessary, how
that decision was made.
• Whilst the applicant has the onus of proof on
the balance of probabilities, proving the facts
ought not be difficult or contentious. In some
cases the tendering of the decision-maker’s
reasons is suffi-cient, whereas in others, for
example those involving an allegation of a denial
of procedural fairness, may require evidence of
the content or information required to be
provided to the decision-maker.
• To establish materiality, it is not necessary that
absent the error a different decision “would”
have been made, rather it is whether a different
decision “could realistically” have been made.
The High Court observed that “realistic” is used
to distinguish a possible different outcome from
an outcome that is fanciful or improbable.
• The threshold of materiality is not onerous or
demanding. What must be demonstrated to
meet the threshold depends upon the error. A
Court in determining whether the threshold is
met must not assume the function of the
decision-maker and fall into a merits review of
the decision made.
• Once the applicant establishes an error and
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that there is a realistic possibility of a different
outcome if the error had not been made, the
threshold of materiality is met and relief is
justified subject to any utility and discretion.
The High Court also observed that in some
cases, such as those involving apprehended or
actual bias, the alleged error will be jurisdictional
regardless of any effect on the decision made,
whilst in others, such as those involving
unreasonableness, the potential for the decision
to be effected is inherent in the nature of the
error. In both of these examples, the error
satisfies the requirement of materiality.
The practical guidance from the High Court set
out above overrides any previous guidance of
the Courts.
Jurisdictional error established in this case
The High Court was satisfied that the threshold
of materiality was satisfied in this case because
the Appellant established on the balance of
probabilities that a different decision realistically
could have been made if the Tribunal followed
the process of reasoning required by the
Direction in deciding whether the Cancellation
Decision should be revoked.
Conclusion
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside
the decision of the Full Court of the Federal
Court of Australia, and ordered the issue of a
writ of certiorari quashing the Tribunal’s decision
and a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to
determine the Appellant’s request for revocation
of the Cancellation Decision according to law.”
(emphasis supplied)
47. Thus, the upshot of the aforesaid observations, discussion,
and reasons, the order impugned passed by the Appellate Court
is required to be interfered with by this Court while exercising
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its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India.
48. Nevertheless, it is hereby made clear to all concerned
that the observations made herein above by this Court would
not come in the way of any of the parties to the suit. The
Trial Court is required to decide all legal issues germane in the
suit as per the evidence coming forth on the record of the suit.
It as such requires to decide the lis between the parties in
accordance with the law without being influenced by this order
and or the impugned order passed by Appellate Court or its
own.
49. CONCLUSION
49.1. It is hereby held that the Appellate Court while
exercising its power under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC could not
have disturbed and interfered with a discretionary order passed
by the Trial Court without holding such order either erroneous,
perverse, or contrary to the settled legal position of law.
49.2. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present
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case, the Appellate Court could not have substituted its view
by overturning the view of the Trial Court while passing the
injunction order especially when exercised its appellate
jurisdiction under Order 43, Rule 1 of the CPC.
49.3. In view of the foregoing reasons, the impugned order
dated 25.07.2017 passed by the 5th Additional Senior Civil
Judge, Surat, in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 64 of 2014 is
held to be erroneous, perverse, and contrary to the settled
legal position of law and so also exceeded to its jurisdiction so
vested in it, which requires to be quashed and set aside, and
which is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the
order passed by Trial Court on 30.07.2013 below Ex.5-
Injunction Application filed in the suit is restored back.
49.4. In view of the forgoing conclusion, the present
application requires to be allowed, which is hereby ALLOWED.
Rule is made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J)
MOHD MONIS
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FURTHER ORDER
After pronouncement of judgment, learned advocate
Mr.Viral K. Shah would request this Court for suspension of
the order.
As the suit is instituted in the year, 2011 and during
course of hearing, the request made by plaintiff that suit be
expedited, such request is ill-founded and hence, rejected.
Sd/-
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J)
MOHD MONIS
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