Allahabad High Court
Hriday Ram vs Additional District Magistrate Kanoon … on 18 August, 2025
Author: Saurabh Lavania
Bench: Saurabh Lavania
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:48161 Court No. - 11 Case :- CIVIL MISC REVIEW APPLICATION DEFECTIVE No. - 132 of 2025 Applicant :- Hriday Ram Opposite Party :- Additional District Magistrate Kanoon Vyavastha/D.D.C. Faizabad And 3 Others Counsel for Applicant :- Rohit Kumar Sahu,Abhishek Shukla,Prateek Misra Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania,J.
(Order on Civil Misc. Application for Condonation of Delay/I.A. No.1 of 2025)
Finding the grounds/reasons mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay to be sufficient, the application for condonation of delay is allowed.
The delay in filing review application is condoned.
(Order on the Review Application)
1. Heard.
2. Present review application under Chapter V Rule 12 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 has been preferred by the petitioner/applicant in relation to final judgment and order dated 16.05.2025, passed in Writ-B No.972 of 2004 (Hriday Ram Vs. A.D.M. Kanoon Vyavastha/D.D.C., Faizabad and 3 others).
3. By the judgment dated 11.04.2025, under review, the Writ Petition challenging the order dated 03.09.2004 passed in Revision No. 2313/2023 (Sukai Vs. State and others) in exercise of power U/S. 48 Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (in short “Act of 1953”) and the order dated 12.08.2001, passed in Case No.2222 under Section 9 (B) of the C.H. Act 1953 (Hriday Ram Vs. Sukai and others) as also seeking consequential relief, was dismissed.
4. A perusal of the judgment under review indicates that the same was passed after considering the prayer sought, facts pleaded as also the submissions advanced by the counsel for the petitioner/review applicant as also the relevant law related to allotment of Chaks and interference by this court in writ jurisdiction if substantial justice has been done between the parties. The relevant portion of the impugned order dated 16.05.2025, under review, is extracted herein under :-
26. Upon due consideration of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that the allotment of chak(s) to the petitioner is justified and proper. Hence, no interference in the order impugned is required by this Court in exercise of power vested under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. It is for the following fact(s)/reason(s):-
(i) In view of the admitted position that Gata No. 924/0.487 hectare is the original/mool gata of private-respondents namely Sukai and Sukhdeo, which is valuable land being nearer to ‘Kharanja Road’, and the same was provided to them by the DDC vide impugned order dated 03.09.2004 and by this order, chak of 0.099 hectare provided to the petitioner has been interfered.
(ii) No prejudice would be caused, if reserved land has been interfered with by the impugned order dated 03.09.2004 as over the available vacant land, the chak has been provided to the petitioner.
(iii) Thus, substantial justice has been done between the parties and accordingly, this Court is of the firm view that no interference is required by this Court in the impugned order dated 03.09.2004 even on the ground taken by the petitioner, indicated in paragraph No. 3 of this judgement.
(iv) Having observed that substantial justice has been done between the parties, this Court is not interfering in the impugned order in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as interference in the impugned order dated 03.09.2004 would revive illegality related to providing chak(s) over mool Gata i.e. Gata No. 924/0.487 hectare, which is nearer to ‘Kharanj Road’, to recorded tenure holder(s).
(v) On the aforesaid aspect of the case, reference can made to various pronouncements including the following judgment(s).
a) In the case of A.M. Allison Vs. B. L. Sen, AIR 1957 SC 227, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:-
“Proceedings by way of certiorari are “not of course”. (Vide Halsbury’s ‘Laws of England’, Hailsham Edition, Vol 9, paras 1480 and 1481, pp. 877-878). The High Court of Assam had the power to refuse the writs if it was satisfied that there was no failure of justice and in these appeals which are directed against the orders of the High Court in applications under Art. 226, we could refuse to interfere unless we are satisfied that the justice of the case requires to. But we are not so satisfied. We are of opinion that, having regard to the merits which have been concurrently found in favour of the respondents both by the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, and the High Court, we should decline to interfere.”
b) In the case of Grahi Shanker Singh Vs. VIII Addl. District Judge and Others, 1991 RD 10, the Court declined to interfere with the order passed in revision by the District Judge repelling the contention that the revision against the order of the Sub Divisional Officer was not maintainable, on the ground that if substantial justice has been done, the Court under Article 226 is not bound to quash the order passed by any authority relying upon various decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Court.
c) In the case of Bux Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation, U.P., Lucknow and others, AIR 1966 All 156, this Court observed as under:-
“Where orders impugned are equitable and substantial justice seems to have been done to the parties, the High Court would not be inclined to interfere in its writ jurisdiction merely on the ground that such orders are wrong in law.
d) The aforesaid is based on the judgment passed in the case of Parahu Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1964 AWR 155 and Begum A.H. Khan Vs. The Regional Transport Authority Meerut 1963 ALJ 909.
e) In the case of Om Prakash Vs. U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission, Allenganj, Allahabad and Others, (1990) UP LBEC 983, this Court has observed as under:-
“It is well settled that a decision of an authority, even though without jurisdiction, may not be quashed in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution if by the decision the substantial justice is done between the parties.” (Para 9)
In the instant case, respondent No. 1 having found that though the inspection was alleged to have been done but the inspection memo being not on the record, he rightly directed for inspection again and thereafter to decide the case afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties. I do not find that it is a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”
f) In the case of Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor MANU/PR/0049/1946: AIR 1947 PC 67, the Privy council interpreting Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Privy Council considered the question whether non-compliance of an express provision of law would amount to an irregularity. The Privy Council held that distinction between illegality and irregularity was based on the degree rather than kind, if there was substantial compliance of the procedure prescribed, the defect, if any, would be irregularity but if the noncompliance was of mandatory provision of law, that would result in illegality.
g) In the judgment dated 14.07.2014 passed in Writ- C No. 24211 of 2006 (Ram Nihor Versus Additional Commissioner (Administrative), Vindhyachal Div.) at Allahabad, this Court held that the order of allotment of land, if obtained by fraud or collusion cannot be allowed to stand and the court would not intervene in such matters so as to permit squandering of the property of the state which vests in the Gaon Sabha. Protection of the state property from such fraud by initiation of action for cancellation of allotment/lease would however, be independent of the power of cancellation of such allotment envisaged under section 198(4) of the Act.
h) In the case of Nohar Lal Verma v. District Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., Jagdalpur, 2008 (14) SCC 445, Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in paragraph – 32 as under :
“Now, limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or ap-plication is barred by limitation Court or an adjudicating authority has no jurisdiction, power or author-ity to entertain such a suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits.”
And has further held after referring to Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that a suit or appeal preferred after the prescribed period has to be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or defence has been set up at the threshold, by the Court itself.
i) The Hon’ble Apex Court has also held if by quashing of illegal order another illegality revives, in that eventuality, the Court should not interfere with such order under writ jurisdiction (See: Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1966 SC – 828, Champalal Binani v. CIT, West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 645, Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1999 SC 3609, Malikarjuna Mudhagal Nagappa and others v. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 2000 SC 2976, Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2003 SC 2889, S.D.S. Shipping Pvt. Ltd. v. Jay Container Ser-vices Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others, 2003(4) Supreme 44, State of Uttaranchal and another v. Ajit Singh Bhola and another, (2004) 6 SCC 800 and State of Orissa and another v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 437).
j) In the case of Bharat Singh Versus Additional Commissioner and Others reported in 2017 (5) ADJ 466, this Court observed as under:-
20. This Court is of the considered opinion that as and when it came to the notice of the authority concerned that allotment of land of Gaon Sabha had been made illegally to ineligible person ignoring the rightful claim of several others of the same village who came within the eligibility zone/order of preference given under sub-section (1) of Section 1998 of the Act, the authority concerned was duty bound to set up an inquiry and take action as legally permissible to remedy the wrong. Hence, the allotment order being ex facie illegal, even if the suo motu inquiry was set up by the Revenue Authority and action taken thereafter to correct the wrong could be said to be a bit delayed, this Court would not interfere and set aside such an order as it would revive the illegal allotment made in favour of the petitioner.
21. The allotment of the petitioner was a result of nepotism and corruption amounting to fraud played upon the Statute. Each day passing with ‘the allotment of petitioner over the land in question continuing a fresh cause of action would arise. Being a continuing cause of action of which suo motu cognizance was taken by the Additional District Magistrate, it cannot be said to be an illegal or arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction by the Revenue Authorities. As such, I do not think that there is any good ground on which extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should be exercised by me to quash the order impugned.
k) In Jodhey vs State, reported as AIR 1952 All 788, this Court considered the discretionary and equitable jurisdiction of the High Court and the manner in which the same ought to be exercised. Relevant portion of the same reads:-
“There are no limits, fetters or restrictions placed on this power of superintendence in this Clause and the purpose of this Article seems to be to make the High Court the custodian of all justice within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction and to arm it with a weapon that could be wielded for the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly by the bodies mentioned therein. “(emphasis supplied)
l) In the case of Dukh Haran Verma Vs. State of U.P. (2004) 2 AWC 1147, this Court has observed as under:-
“4. It must be remembered that writ is discretionary remedy vide Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 6 SCC 545: JT (2003) 6 SC 20. In a writ petition the petitioner has not only to show violation of law, he must also show that equity is in his favour. Thus, to obtain a writ the petitioner must satisfy the Court about both law and equity. If the petitioner has only satisfied the Court that the law has been violated but equity is not in his favour the Court shall not issue a writ.
5. In the present case, admittedly the resolution for no-confidence was passed by 2/3rd of the members of the Board of Directors of the Bank as required by Rule 460. Hence assuming that initiation of the proceedings by means of the notice was bad as the notice was not valid yet the resolution has validly been passed by 2/3rd members of the Board of Directors of the Bank. It must be remembered that if 2/3rd members of the Board are against the petitioner then as provided under the Rules he has to quit his office.
m) In the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences Vs. Bikartan Das 2023 SCC OnLine SC 99, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:-
“52. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be falling in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.”
5. The grounds for seeking review of judgment dated 11.04.2025 taken in the present application, are extracted hereinunder:-
“A. Because during the consolidation proceeding no land was allotted for the purposes of public utility then petitioner made an application under Section 9 (B) (1) of U.P.C.H. Act, 1953 before the consolidation officer, Bikapur and after receiving the report from Assistant consolidation officer, Bikapur and inspecting the records and also after hearing the concerned parties and from the land gata No. 924 area 0.100 acre was allotted for public use which is adjacent to the land gata No. 926 and 927.
B. Because for the village Shihipur, publication was published under Section 20 and seeing the Sahan Land of petitioner ASOC made one LAB Chak having area of 0.099 hecatre from the land gata No. 924.
C. Because opposite party no. 3 has filed objection under Section 20 (3) of UPCH Act which was presented before consolidation officer and after hearing the parties and made spot inspection in the presence of parties rejected the objection of opposite party no. 3 on 12.12.2003.
D. Because Settlement Officer Consolidation has read the revenue records, spot inspection and find out that if the demand of opposite party no. 2 and 3 has been allowed then sahan land of petitioner get affected and if Abadi land was terminated then it became a problem the people of village and as such appeal filed by opposite party no. 2 and 3 has been rejected.
E. Because opposite party no. 1 without considering the statutory provisions of UPCH Act provided under Section 11 (A) passed the order which is against the spirit of law and illegal.
F. Because Lekhpal Consolidation sent a spot inspection report on 30.05.2004 and from which it is crystal clear that the sahan land and house of petitioner are situated over the land gata No. 924, which was allotted for the use of public which was also confirmed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation and as such opposite party no. 1 has no right to cancel the order passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation because it was a Final Order.
G. Because one LAV chak having area of 0.099 was allotted by ACO after seeing the sahan of petitioner which was confirmed by the order dated 12.12.2003 and order dated 27.01.2004 but without considering the factual and legal aspects opposite party no. 1 has cancelled the same due to which petitioner suffered irreparable loss and injury and it was also not considered by the opposite party no. 1 that opposite party no. 2 and 3 was not the resident of village and the land of opposite party no. 2 was present as 937 938 and 939 and opposite party no. 3 has a land gata No. 975 and land given to the petitioner is Udaan Chak but the original gata of petitioner is gata No. 748.
H. Because order passed by opposite party no. 1 is beyond his jurisdiction because the public utility land and reserve land as per the valuation under Section 20 was not fall under his jurisdiction and as per proceeding between parties under Section 9 (B) was became final and if valuation proceeding done under Section 20 of UPCH Act then it was barred by Section 11 (A) as per law laid down in various judgment by this Hon’ble Court itself.
I. Because keeping view at public in large the provision is also made for land reserved for public and as such consolidation officer, Bikapur has allotted land in the gata No. 924 and keeping the view of sahan land of petitioner 0.099 hectare chak was also given to the petitioner and upon which petitioner has made his house over his land but opposite party no. 1 has admitted the revision filed by opposite party no. 2 which is not permissible in the eyes of law.
J. Because land gata No. 924 petitioner house, trees situated which is clearly evident from the spot inspection report but not considering the same by the opposite party no. 1 is not sustainable in the eyes of law and as such petitioner right has been violated provide under UPCH Act is illegal and contrary to law.
K. Because purposes and aim of the Consolidation proceeding that each land holder get benefit of drainage, chak marg and public utility land but as per the order passed by opposite party no. 1 the easement right of petitioner has also been curtail and due to which petitioner access has bene completely blocked which is ignored by the opposite party no. 1 and as such the house made by petitioner’s ancestor was fall under the ambit of order passed by opposite party no. 1.
L. Because in the order dated 16.05.2025 passed by this Hon’ble Court it has been clearly stated that the house of petitioner is situated at southern side of land gata No. 924 and for which objection, appeal and revision has been concluded and in that orders the abadi land was also secure and in such circumstances to cancel the abadi land order is liable to be set aside.
M. Because in relation of land gata No. 924 the remedy of objection, appeal and revision has been exhausted and as such it has no right also not found to remand the matter or to pass any order and as such the order passed by opposite party no. 1 is became final and liable to be set aside and order passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation and consolidation officer is based in spot inspection and as per revenue records which is liable to be remain / preserve.
N. Because land gata No. 924 house of petitioner, trees more than the age of 50 years or more and as such the land was not separate during the process of consolidation but due to save the land from dispute and to secure the land in which the interest of Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti and Consolidation is secure and as per the valuation report the land allotted to the Sukai and Sukhdeo to their near previous land which is lawful and as per the procedure of the consolidation and interest of all the tenure holders be preserved during the consolidation and as such the order passed by opposite party no. 1 is liable to be set aside, in the interest of justice.
O. Because motive of opposite party no. 2/1 to 3/3 to bulldoze the ancestral home of petitioner.”
6. After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (2013) 8 SCC 320, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below :-
“20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki17, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius18 to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.25,.
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:–
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”
7. In Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs v. Vinod Kumar Rawat reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 896, the Hon’ble Supreme Court citing previous decisions and expounding on the scope and ambit of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1, has observed that Section 114 CPC does not lay any conditions precedent for exercising the power of review; and nor does the Section prohibit the Court from exercising its power to review a decision. However, an order can be reviewed by the Court only on the grounds prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The said power cannot be exercised as an inherent power and nor can appellate power be exercised in the guise of exercising the power of review.
8. Recently the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal vs. State Tax Officer (1) and Another 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1406, observed as under:-
9. In the words of Krishna Iyer J., (as His Lordship then was) “a plea of review, unless the first judicial view is manifestly distorted, is like asking for the Moon. A forensic defeat cannot be avenged by an invitation to have a second look, hopeful of discovery of flaws and reversal of result……… A review in the Counsel’s mentation cannot repair the verdict once given. So, the law laid down must rest in peace.”
10. It is also well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.
11. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, this Court made very pivotal observations:–
“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.”
12. Again, in Shanti Conductors Private Limited v. Assam State Electricity Board, a three Judge Bench of this Court following Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (supra) dismissed the review petitions holding that the scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.
13. Recently, in Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) Through Legal Representatives v. Vinod Kumar Rawat, this Court restated the law with regard to the scope of review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of CPC.
14. In R.P. (C) Nos. 1273-1274 of 2021 in Civil Appeal Nos. 8345-8346 of 2018 (Arun Dev Upadhyaya v. Integrated Sales Service Limited), this Court reiterated the law and held that:–
“15. From the above, it is evident that a power to review cannot be exercised as an appellate power and has to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.”
15. It is very pertinent to note that recently the Constitution Bench in Beghar Foundation v. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired), held that even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of co-ordinate Bench or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.
16. The gist of the afore-stated decisions is that:–
(i) A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
(ii) A judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.
(iii) An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review.
(iv) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected.”
(v) A Review Petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.”
(vi) Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.
(vii) An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.
(viii) Even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a co-ordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.
9. In the case of S.Madhusudhan Reddy Vs. V.Narayana Reddy and Others; reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1034, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under :-
“As can be seen from the above exposition of law, it has been consistently held by this Court in several judicial pronouncements that the Court’s jurisdiction of review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A judgment can be open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising powers of review, the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking two views in a matter. A judgment may also be open to review when any new or important matter of evidence has emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to the condition that such evidence was not within the knowledge of the party seeking review or could not be produced by it when the order was made despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision as against an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneous decision can be corrected by the Superior Court, however an error apparent on the face of the record can only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Yet another circumstance referred to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment has been described as “for any other sufficient reason”. The said phrase has been explained to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule” (Refer : Chajju Ram v. Neki Ram and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius).”
10. Upon due consideration of the grounds taken in the instant review application as also the law related to dealing with the review petition, according to which the review is by no means an appeal in disguise and the scope of review is limited as also the judgment dated 16.05.2025, under review, this Court finds no force in the present review application. For the reasons that while passing the judgment dated 16.05.2025 this Court considered the relevant law on the issue as also the facts of the case pleaded and submissions advanced by the counsel for the petitioner/applicant as also that the present review application has not been filed by the counsel namely Shri Vijay Bahadur Verma, who argued the writ petition (See : Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and another Vs. N. Raju Reddiear and another, (1997) 9 SCC 736 which has relied on M. Poorna Chandran & Another Vs. State of Tamilnadu & Another (1996) 6 SCC 755).
11. Accordingly, the review application is dismissed.
12. No order as to costs.
Order Date :- 18.8.2025
ML/-