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In an era where media plays a central role in shaping public discourse, the arrest of Kommineni Srinivasa Rao, a senior journalist and anchor with Sakshi TV, triggered a national debate on the limits of journalistic responsibility and the scope of free speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. The case, which drew immediate attention from legal scholars, journalists, and civil society, presented a rare instance where the Supreme Court of India took suo motu cognizance to address the implications of criminal law being used against a media anchor for statements made by a third party during a live broadcast.
This case serves as a pivotal moment in the Indian jurisprudence concerning freedom of speech, press autonomy, and criminal liability for media professionals. It raises fundamental questions regarding the balance between regulating harmful speech and protecting democratic freedoms, especially in live media settings where spontaneous statements are often beyond the immediate control of the host.
II. Facts of the Case
On June 9, 2025, Kommineni Srinivasa Rao was arrested following a live broadcast on Sakshi TV in which a guest panelist made derogatory remarks against women from Amaravati. Although Rao neither made nor endorsed these comments, the Andhra Pradesh police charged him under Section 109 read with Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), alleging abetment and the promotion of enmity through public communication.
The FIR was widely criticized as an overreach and misuse of the law, particularly in targeting the anchor rather than the speaker. Subsequently, the Supreme Court took suo motu notice of the arrest and granted interim bail to Rao on June 13, 2025, emphasizing the importance of press freedom and judicial restraint in criminalizing speech without proven intent or active participation.
III. Issues Raised
1. Whether a television anchor can be held criminally liable for spontaneous or unscripted remarks made by panelists during a live broadcast.
2. Whether the arrest violated Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of Indi
3. What is the permissible threshold of liability for anchors when moderating public debates?
4. How should courts interpret “abetment” in the context of modern media?
IV. Contentions of the Parties
Petitioner (Kommineni Srinivasa Rao):
Rao maintained that he had no prior knowledge or intention to encourage the objectionable remarks.
He argued that his non-intervention during the live show could not be construed as abetment or implicit agreement.
He invoked Article 19(1)(a), contending that his fundamental right to freedom of speech and journalistic independence was being violated.
Respondent (State of Andhra Pradesh):
The State argued that Rao’s failure to immediately object or interrupt the derogatory statements amounted to tacit approval.
It invoked Sections 109 and 505 IPC, asserting that the anchor’s silence facilitated the dissemination of inflammatory content.
The prosecution emphasized the duty of journalists to regulate hate speech, even in live settings.
V. Judicial Reasoning and Rational
In its interim judgment, the Supreme Court of India underscored the indispensable role of a free press in a democratic society. The Court observed that media anchors must not be burdened with criminal liability for spontaneous remarks unless they are shown to have actively participated or encouraged the act.
Key Observations:
“Mere silence or inaction does not amount to abetment under Section 109 IPC unless accompanied by a conscious decision or intent.”
The Court emphasized that media cannot operate in an atmosphere of fear where criminal laws are selectively invoked to stifle dissent or punish criticism.
Citing the Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the Court reiterated the principle that vague and overbroad interpretations of speech-based offences violate constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression.
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015)
The Court invoked the doctrine of proportionality, stating that criminal sanctions must be used with great caution and only when clearly justified.
VI. Constitutional Framework
The Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). However, Article 19(2) provides for reasonable restrictions, including public order, morality, and defamation. The balance between these clauses has been the subject of substantial jurisprudence.
In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, the Court noted that “freedom of speech and expression lays at the foundation of all democratic organizations.”
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
Similarly, in R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Court recognized the autonomy of the press as being central to democratic governance.
R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632.
Applying these standards, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that journalistic freedom includes not just the right to publish, but also the right to not be punished for third-party statements, unless culpability is established.
VII. Comparative Jurisprudence
Globally, courts have developed doctrines to protect journalists from vicarious liability for guest remarks.
United States:
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court laid down the “actual malice” standard, shielding media from liability unless there is knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR):
In Jersild v. Denmark, the ECHR held that a journalist could not be held liable for racist remarks made by interviewees, as his intent was informative and not propagative.
Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994).
These judgments have shaped international norms, and the Indian judiciary’s position in Sakshi TV case aligns with these democratic values.
VIII. Analysis of Criminal Law and “Abetment”
Under Section 107 IPC, abetment includes instigating, engaging in a conspiracy, or intentionally aiding the commission of an offence. Section 109 IPC penalizes the abettor where no express provision is made.
The Court rightly pointed out that passivity or non-objection during a live telecast does not satisfy the mens rea requirement of these provisions.
Problems in the Current Interpretation:
Lack of statutory clarity on the liability of media anchors.
Ambiguity regarding obligations during live events.
Risk of criminalization of omission, which is generally not penalized in Indian criminal law without a specific duty to act.
The Court, while granting bail, did not foreclose prosecution but emphasized that mere silence does not equal abetment, which is consistent with rulings in:
State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 (requiring specific intent for abetment).
Ramesh v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 668 (upholding editorial discretion in publishing).
IX. Defects in Law and Recommendations
This case exposes key lacunae in the legal framework governing speech, journalism, and criminal responsibility:
1. Overbroad criminal provisions like Section 505 IPC can be misused to target dissen
2. Absence of statutory standards for regulating live broadcast responsibility.
3. No codified guidelines for anchors regarding intervention protocols during offensive speech.
Recommendations:
Enact clear legislative provisions or media guidelines specifying when anchors can be held liable.
Strengthen internal editorial codes of conduct without criminal sanctions.
Establish training programs for media professionals in handling sensitive discussions.
Amend existing laws to differentiate between active propagation and passive facilitation of speech.
X. Broader Implications for Media Freedom
The Sakshi TV case is a landmark moment for Indian media. It reflects the judiciary’s willingness to protect press freedom in an increasingly hostile environment, where political narratives often influence legal actions.
If Rao’s arrest had gone unchallenged, it would have created a dangerous precedent, forcing media anchors to censor debates preemptively, thereby killing spontaneity and democratic deliberation. The Supreme Court’s intervention has restored public trust in judicial impartiality and media independence.
XI. Inference and Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Kommineni Srinivasa Rao case was shaped by a deep concern for constitutional morality, democratic values, and the chilling effect of criminal law on media freedom. The Court recognized that intent is the cornerstone of criminal liability and that without proof of active abetment or complicity, a journalist cannot be penalized for a third-party’s spontaneous speech.
By granting bail and emphasizing due process, the Court upheld the right to dissent, reaffirmed the autonomy of journalistic institutions, and rejected the misuse of law for political vendetta. The judgment draws strength from the fundamental premise that democracy thrives when the press is free, fearless, and not made a scapegoat for others’ words.
In a time when the line between regulation and repression is increasingly blurred, this judgment sends a clear message: Freedom of the press is not a privilege but a right, and criminal law must never be weaponized to suppress it.
Name : Naina Naik
College Name: Jitendra Chauhan College of Law
Notes
1. Article 19(1)(a), Constitution of India – Guarantees freedom of speech and expression to all citizens.
2. Article 19(2), Constitution of India – Allows the State to impose reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech in the interests of public order, morality, etc.
3. Section 107, IPC – Defines abetment as instigating, engaging in conspiracy, or aiding the commission of an offence.
4. Section 109, IPC – Provides punishment for abetment where no express provision is made.
5. Section 505, IPC – Penalizes statements leading to public mischief.
6. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) – Struck down Section 66A of the IT Act for violating freedom of speech.
7. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 – Recognized freedom of speech as the foundation of democracy.
8. R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632 – Affirmed the right to privacy and press freedom.
9. State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 – Held that specific intent is essential for abetment.
10. Ramesh v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 668 – Upheld editorial discretion in publishing content.
11. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) – Introduced the “actual malice” standard in defamation cases.
12. Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994) – Held that journalists cannot be penalized for third-party racist remarks if intent was to inform.
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